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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
FIRST SITTING 
Monday, 27th April 1987 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Opening of the extraordinary session. 
2. Examination of credentials. 
3. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
4. Adoption of the draft order of business for the extraor-
dinary session (Doe. I 087). 
5. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance - Part I: The 
reactivation of WEU (Presentation of and debate on the 
report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the 
draft recommendation, Doe. 1089 and amendments). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The sitting was opened at 10.40 a. m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Opening of the extraordinary session 
The President declared open the extraordinary 
session of the Assembly in accordance with 
Article Ill (b) of the Charter and Rule 3 of the 
Rules of Procedure. 
2. Attendance register 
The names of the representatives and substi-
tutes who signed the register of attendance are 
given in the appendix. 
3. Tribute 
The President paid tribute to Mr. Berrier who 
had been a member of the Assembly since 1978 
and Chairman of the General Affairs Committee 
since 1986. 
4. Observers 
The President welcomed the observers from 
Denmark, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Spain and 
Turkey. 
5. Examination of credentials 
In accordance with Rule 6 ( 1) of the Rules of 
Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter 
from the President of the Parliamentary 
8 
Assembly of the Council ofEurope informing the 
Assembly that the credentials of the representa-
tives and substitutes for the extraordinary 
session had been ratified by the Assembly with 
the exception of the representatives and substi-
tutes of the Delegation ofthe Federal Republic of 
Germany and Mr. Portillon as a substitute in the 
French Delegation. 
In accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of 
Procedure and subject to subsequent ratification 
by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, the Assembly unanimously ratified the 
credentials of the above. 
6. Address by the President of the Assembly 
The President addressed the Assembly. 
7. Ministerial meeting of the Council 
(Motion for a recommendation with a 
request for urgent procedure, Doe. 1094) 
The President announced that a motion for a 
recommendation on the meeting of the Council 
had been tabled by Mr. Goerens and others with 
a request for urgent procedure in accordance 
with Rule 43 of the Rules of Procedure. 
The Assembly would decide on the request for 
urgent procedure after the vote on the draft rec-
ommendation of the General Affairs Com-
mittee. 
MINUTES 
8. Adoption of the draft order of business 
for the extraordinary session 
(Doe. 1087) 
The draft order of business for the extraor-
dinary session was adopted. 
9. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance 
Part I: The reactivation of WEU 
(Presentation of and tkbate on the report of the 
General Affairs Committee and vote on the 
draft recommendation, Doe. 1089 and amendments) 
The report of the General Affairs Committee 
was presented by Mr. Ahrens, Rapporteur. 
Speakers: Mr. Cuco (Observer from Spain), 
Mr. Inan (Observer from Turkey) and Mr. Budtz 
(Observer from Denmark). 
The debate was opened. 
Speakers: MM. Antoni, Wilkinson, Valleix, 
Klejdzinski, Murphy, Bassinet, Burger, Freeson, 
van der Sanden, Martino, Linster, De Decker, 
Bayiilken (Observer from Turkey) and Katsaros 
(Observer from Greece). 
The debate was closed. 
Mr. Ahrens, Rapporteur, and Mr. Close, 
Acting Chairman of the committee, replied to 
the speakers. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft 
recommendation. 
Amendments (Nos. 2 and 1) were tabled by 
Mr. Bassinet: 
2. In paragraph (i) of the preamble to the 
draft recommendation, leave out .. the proposal 
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made by the Prime Minister of France on 2nd 
December 1986 to draw up a European security 
charter provides " and insert ... the proposals by 
the French Government, and particularly the 
one to draw up a European security charter, 
provide". 
1. At the end of paragraph 2 (f) of the draft 
recommendation proper, add: 
.. ( 1) for this purpose, by instructing the Secre-
tary-General to play aljl active part in 
organising the first course and to promote the 
formation of an association of former partici-
pants of which he would ensure the secretariat; 
(2) by asking the French institute to invite 
Spain and Portugal to send participants to this 
course;" 
Speakers: MM. Bassinet and Ahrens. 
The amendments were agtteed to. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the 
amended draft recommendation. 
The amended draft recommendation was 
agreed to. (This recommendation will be pub-
lished as No. 442) 1• 
10. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The orders of the day for the next sitting were 
agreed to. 
The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 
2.45 p.m. 
The sitting was closed at 1.20 p.m. 
1. See page 11. 
APPENDIX FIRST SITTING 
APPENDIX 
Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance 1: 
MM. De Bondt (Adriaensens) MM. Klejdzinski (Holtz) 
Bogaerts Irmer 
Declercq Kittelmann 
Dejardin Mrs. Blunck (Mrs. Luuk) 
Close (Pecriaux) MM. Lemmrich (Muller) 
Mrs. Staels-Do m pas Niegel 
Mr. Steverlynck Reddemann 
Zywietz (Rumpf) 
Scheer 
France Mrs. Pack (Schmitz) 
MM. von Schmude 
MM. Bassinet Schmidt (Soell) 
de Chambrun Unland 
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Bordu (Gremetz) 
Lacour (Jeambrun) 
Jung Italie 
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Luxembourg 
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The following representatives apologised for their absence: 
France 
MM. Baumel 
Croze 
Galley 
Koehl 
Portier 
Seitlinger 
Federal Republic of Germany 
Mr. Mechtersheimer 
Italy 
MM. Bianco 
Cavaliere 
Ferrari Aggradi 
Fiandrotti 
Frasca 
Gianotti 
Milani 
Pecchioli 
Rauti 
Rubbi 
Sarti 
Netherlands 
MM. van der Sanden (Aarts) 
Worrell (van den Bergh) 
Stoffelen 
de Beer (Mrs. van der 
Werf-Terpstra) 
van Tets (van der Werfl) 
United Kingdom 
Sir Frederic Bennett 
Mr. Brown (Coleman) 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
MM. Garrett 
Murphy (Sir Anthony 
Grant) 
Freeson (Hardy) 
Sir Paul Hawkins 
Mr. Hill 
Lord Hughes 
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Lady Jill Knight 
Dr. Miller 
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MM. Stokes (Sir John Page) 
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Sir Dudley Smith 
Mr. Wilkinson 
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Netherlands 
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Tummers 
I. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets. 
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The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 442 
on the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance -
Part 1: The reactivation of WEU 
FIRST SITTING 
(i) Considering that the proposals by the French Government, and particularly the one to draw up a 
European security charter, provide an opportunity for a fundamental re-examination of the require-
ments of that security; 
(ii) Considering that the policy of deterrence pursued by the Atlantic Alliance rellllains the guarantee 
of that security; 
(iii) Considering that the main threats to international peace now arise in areas not covered by the 
alliance; 
(iv) Considering that European co-operation in armaments matters has become essential for the 
security of Europe; 
(v) Considering that the search for disarmament or the limitation of armaments is essential for the 
maintenance of peace and should continue to be given priority but that this search must not jeopardise 
the security of Europe; 
(vi) Considering that the recent development of chemical weapons constitutes a I!larticularly serious 
threat for all mankind; 
(vii) Welcoming recent measures taken by the Council to increase its activities in order to meet the 
requirements of European security but regretting that information on these activities communicated to 
the public and to the Assembly is still far from adequate; 
(viii) Considering that it is still essential to bring the requirements of European security to the attention 
of the public; 
(ix) Deeply regretting the continuous failure of the Council of Ministers to inform 1 the Assembly in a 
proper way; 
(x) Considering that new governmental activities in WEU must allow the Assembly to exercise to the 
full its responsibilities under Article IX of the treaty; 
(xi) Noting in particular that the replies to Assembly recommendations and written
1 
questions relating 
to the Council's activities, the Standing Armaments Committee and the Independent European Pro-
gramme Group seriously distort the Council's commitments to the Assembly, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Study closely the proposals made by the French Government for drawing up a European security 
charter with a view to: · 
(a) defining Europe's security requirements, acquainting its American allies with them and 
ensuring that current negotiations on the limitation of nuclear and conventional weapons lead 
to substantial reductions without compromising Europe's security based on a policy of deter-
rence; 
(b) reaffirming member countries' continuing concern not to compromise the cohesion of the 
alliance and to include the strengthening ofthe European pillar in the context of the alliance; 
(c) averting a chemical arms race by calling upon the United States and the Soviet Union to seek 
an agreement ensuring the complete elimination of such arms and promoting the extension of 
this agreement to all countries; 
(d) including in the charter a commitment to ensure reciprocal exchanges of information and con-
sultations in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty in regard to any 
threat to international peace; 
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(e) also including an expression of the joint will to remove obstacles still obstructing the devel-
opment of European co-operation in armaments matters; 
2. To this end, direct the measures taken to give new work to WEU so as to ensure that the appli-
cation of the modified Brussels Treaty contributes to the cohesion ofthe Atlantic Alliance and the con-
solidation of peace by: 
(a) keeping the political committee on European security in the framework of WEU; 
(b) considering how the treaty should be applied to ensure that it meets present European security 
requirements and allows WEU to be enlarged to include Western European countries wishing 
and able to take part; 
(c) ensuring that these countries are kept informed of the activities of WEU and allowing the 
countries concerned to take part henceforth in some of these activities, particularly in 
co-operation in armaments matters; 
(d) giving the necessary impetus to European co-operation in armaments matters, inter alia by 
adapting its decision of 7th May 1955 setting up a Standing Armaments Committee to present 
facts of such co-operation; 
(e) acting without delay on its document " WEU and public awareness " so as to inform public 
opinion of all its activities in accordance with the principles set out in the Rome declaration, 
including the issue of communiques at the close of meetings of the political committee on 
European security; 
(f) ensuring co-ordination of member countries' participation in the course to be organised by the 
French lnstitut des hautes etudes de defense nationale in 1988 and ofthe development of sub-
sequent courses so as to promote public awareness of European security requirements in all 
member countries; (1) for this purpose by instructing the Secretary-General to play an active 
part in organising the first course and to promote the formation of an association of former 
participants of which he would ensure the secretariat; (2) by asking the French institute to 
invite Spain and Portugal to send participants to this course; 
(g) developing exchanges of views with the United States authorities so as to enhance the 
cohesion of the alliance; 
(h) applying in full Article IX of the treaty under which it has an obligation to report to the 
Assembly on its activities and on the application ofthe modified Brussels Treaty, even when 
pursued in frameworks other than WEU. 
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SECOND SITfiNG 
Monday, 27th April 1987 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Ministerial meeting of the Council (Motion for a recom-
mendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doe. 1094). 
2. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-first annual report of 
the Council (Presentation of and debate on the report of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doe. 
1090). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The sitting was opened at 2.55 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
I. Attendance register 
The names of the representatives and substi-
tutes who signed the register of attendance are 
given in Appendix I. 
Speaker (points of order): Mr. Hardy. 
The President replied to the points of order. 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The minutes of proceedings of the previous 
sitting were agreed to. 
3. Ministerial meeting of the Council 
(Motion for a recommendation with a request 
for urgent procedure; debate and vote on the 
motion for a recommendation, Doe. 1094) 
In accordance with Rule 43 of the Rules of 
Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to consider 
the request for urgent procedure on the motion 
for a recommendation on the ministerial 
meeting of the Council. 
Speaker (point of order): Mr. Hardy. 
The President replied to the point of order. 
Speakers: MM. Goerens and Hardy. 
The sitting was suspended at 3.20 p.m. and 
resumed at 3.25 p.m. 
In accordance with Rule 43 (6) of the Rules of 
Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to vote by 
roll-call on the request for urgent procedure. 
The request for urgent procedure was agreed to 
unanimously by 52 votes (see Appendix II); 12 
13 
representatives who had signed the register of 
attendance did not take part in the vote. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider the 
motion for a recommendatio~. 
Speaker: Mr. Goerens. 
The Assembly proceeded . to vote on the 
motion for a recommendation. 
The motion for a recommendation was agreed 
to. (This recommendation will be published as 
No. 443) 1• 
Speaker (explanation of vote): Dr. Miller. 
4. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-first 
annual report of the Council 
(Presentation of and debate on the report of the 
Committee on Defence Question$ and Armaments 
and votes on the draft recommendations, 
Doe. 1090 and amendments) 
The report of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. 
Amadei, Rapporteur. 
The debate was opened. 
Speakers: MM. Antoni and Wilkinson. 
Mr. Goerens, Vice-President of the Assembly, 
took the Chair. 
Speakers: MM. Valleix, Bordu, Martino, 
Dr. Miller, MM. Stoffelen and Burger. 
Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed 
the Chair. 
1. See page 19. 
MINUTES 
Speakers: Mr. Fourre, Sir John Osborn, 
MM. Hardy, Close, de Beer, Sir Frederic 
Bennett, MM. Reddemann and Scheer. 
Mr. Goerens, Vice-President of the Assembly, 
took the Chair. 
The debate was closed. 
Mr. Amadei, Rapporteur, and Mr. 
Kittelmann, Chairman of the committee, replied 
to the speakers. 
Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed 
the Chair. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider the first 
draft recommendation. 
An amendment (No. 11) was tabled by Sir 
Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson: 
11. In the preamble to the second revised draft 
recommendation, leave out paragraph (i) and 
insert: 
" (i) Recalling that Europe's security is based 
on the deterrence exercised by all the member 
countries of the Atlantic Alliance thanks to 
their capacity, in spite of Warsaw Pact superi-
ority in many fields, to prevent any potential 
adversary undertaking an aggression in the 
hope that the confrontation will remain at a 
level chosen by him; " 
Speakers: Sir Frederic Bennett (point of order), 
MM. Wilkinson, Amadei and Sir Frederic 
Bennett. 
The amendment was agreed to. 
An amendment (No. 12) was tabled by Sir 
Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson: 
12. In the preamble to the second revised draft 
recommendation, leave out paragraph (iv) and 
insert: 
"(iv) Considering that Western Europe may be 
compelled in the fairly near future to assume 
more responsibility for the requirements of its 
security but that in present circumstances this 
is ensured only thanks to the presence of 
American forces and armaments in Europe; " 
Speakers: MM. Wilkinson, Scheer, Amadei 
and Kittelmann. 
The amendment was agreed to. 
Amendment 12 having been agreed to, 
Amendment 13 fell. 
Speaker (point of order): Mr. Hardy. 
An amendment (No. 16) was tabled by Sir 
Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson: 
16. In paragraph (v), line 3, of the preamble to 
the second revised draft recommendation, leave 
14 
SECOND SITTING 
out " both " and from " deterrence " to end and 
add: 
" whose security should be stabilised by appro-
priate and verifiable disarmament measures 
which are subject to agreement; " 
Speakers: Mr. Wilkinson, Dr. Miller and Mr. 
Amadei. 
The amendment was agreed to. 
An amendment (No. 17) was tabled by Sir 
Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson: 
17. Leave out paragraph (ix) of the preamble 
to the second revised draft recommendation and 
insert: 
" (ix) Recalling in this context that the Soviet 
Union maintains more conventional forces 
than it requires for its defence and that their 
offensive force structures optimised to 
perform aggressive operations must be per-
ceived as a potential threat to the member 
countries by the member nations of WEU; " 
Speakers: MM. Wilkinson, Scheer, Amadei 
and de Beer (point of order). 
The amendment was agreed to. 
Amendment 17 having been agreed to, 
Amendment 1 fell. 
Amendment 2 was not moved. 
An amendment (No. 8) was tabled by MM. 
Scheer and Stoffelen. 
8. In paragraph 1 (a) of the second revised 
draft recommendation proper, leave out from 
" combined with the simultaneous withdrawal of 
shorter-range INF " to the end of the paragraph 
and insert " and combined with the following 
disarmament of all American and Soviet shorter-
range INF in Europe;". 
Speakers: MM. Scheer, Wilkinson and 
Kittelmann. 
The amendment was negatived. 
Speakers (point of order): Sir Geoffrey 
Finsberg, Lord Hughes and Mr. Klejdzinski. 
Amendment 3 was not moved. 
An amendment (No. 18) was tabled by Sir 
Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson: 
18. In paragraph 1 (a), line 5, of the second 
revised draft recommendation proper, leave out 
after" fail" to the end of the paragraph and add: 
" and make effective progress in the negotia-
tions aiming at greater stability and crisis 
control in the conventional field (MBFR) and 
which should take place on the whole of 
Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural 
mountains; " 
MINUTES 
Speakers: MM. Wilkinson, Scheer and 
Amadei. 
The amendment was agreed to. 
Amendment 18 having been agreed to, 
Amendment 4 fell. 
An ~mendment (No. 15) was tabled by Sir 
Fredenc Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson: 
15. In paragraph 1 of the second revised draft 
recommendation proper, leave out sub-
paragraph (c). 
Speakers: Mr. Wilkinson, Dr. Miller and Mr. 
Amadei. 
The amendment was agreed to. 
Speaker (point of order): Mr. Goerens. 
Amendments (Nos. 9 and 10) were tabled by 
Mr. Bassinet and others: 
9. Leave out paragraph 2 of the second 
~evised draft recommendation proper and 
msert: 
"Urge governments participating in the 
informal Vienna consultations to start negotia-
tions as soon as possible in the framework of 
the CSCE on conventional disarmament from 
the Atlantic to the Urals;" 
10. In paragraph 3 of the second revised draft 
recommendation proper, leave out from " to 
accept fully " to the end of the paragraph and 
insert " to accept the French or British chemical 
disarmament proposals tabled at the Geneva dis-
armament conference; " 
Speaker: Mr. Fourre. 
Amendments 9 and 10 were withdrawn. 
An ~mendment (No. 20) was tabled by Sir 
Fredenc Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson: 
20. In paragraph 2, line 3, of the second 
revised draft recommendation proper, leave out 
" reasonable automatic " and insert " regular 
on-site". 
Speaker: Mr. Wilkinson. 
The amendment was agreed to. 
Amendments 5 and 6 were not moved. 
An ~mendment (No. 19) was tabled by Sir 
Fredenc Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson: 
19. In paragraph 3, line 4, of the second 
revised draft recommendation proper, leave out 
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after " inspection " to the end of the para-
graph. 
Speakers: MM. Wilkinson and Scheer. 
The amendment was agreed to. 
Speaker (point of order): Lord Mackie. 
Amendment 7 was not moved. 
An amendment (No. 14) ~as tabled by Sir 
Frederic Bennett and Mr. Willtinson: 
14. In paragraph 4 of the second revised draft 
recommendation proper, leave out sub-
paragraph (b). 
Speakers: MM. Wilkinson a~d Klejdzinski. 
The amendment was agreed to. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the 
amended draft recommendation. 
In accordance with Rule 33 (2) of the Rules of 
Procedure, Mr. Stoffelen asked for a vote by roll-
call. 
More than five representatives having con-
curred, the Assembly proceeded to a vote by roll-
call. 
.The amended draft recommendation was neg-
atived on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix Ill) by 
21 votes to 19 with 14 abstentions; 10 represen-
tatives who had signed the register of attendance 
did not take part in the vote. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
recommendation replying to the thirty-first 
annual report of the Council. 
The draft recommendation was agreed to 
unanimously. (This recommendation will be 
published as No. 444) 1• 
Speakers (explanation of vote): Mr. Irmer, Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg and Dr. Miller. 
5. Date, time and orders. of the day 
of the next sittiilg 
The orders of the day for the next sitting were 
agreed to. 
The next sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 28th 
April, at 10 a. m. 
The sitting was closed at 7.4$ p.rn. 
1. See page 20. 
APPENDIX I SECOND SITTING 
APPENDIX I 
Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance 1: 
MM. De Bondt (Adriaensens) MM. Irmer 
Bogaerts Kittelmann 
Declercq Steiner (Mrs. Luuk) 
duMonceau Lemmrich (Muller) 
(Dejardin) Niegel 
Close (Pecriaux) Reddemann 
Mrs. Staels-Dompas Zywietz (Rumpf) 
Mr. Steverlynck Scheer 
Mrs. Pack (Schmitz) 
MM. von Schmude 
France Schmidt (Soell) 
Unland 
MM. Bassinet 
de Chambrun 
Collette 
Bordu ( Gremetz) ltalie 
Lacour (Jeambrun) 
Amadei Mrs. Lalumiere MM. 
MM. Fourre (Matraja) Antoni 
Prat (Mermaz) Martino (Cifarelli) 
Oehler Giust 
Valleix Mezzapesa 
Federal Republic of Germany 
Luxembourg 
MM. Ahrens 
Bohm MM. Burger 
Buchner Goerens 
Klejdzinski (Holtz) Linster (Hengel) 
The following representatives apologised for their absence: 
France 
MM. Baumel 
Croze 
Galley 
Jung 
Koehl 
Portier 
Seitlinger 
Federal Republic of Germany 
MM. Antretter 
Mechtersheimer 
Italy 
MM. Bianco 
Cavaliere 
Ferrari Aggradi 
Fiandrotti 
Frasca 
Gianotti 
Milani 
Pecchioli 
Rauti 
Rubbi 
Sarti 
Sinesio 
Vecchietti 
Netherlands 
MM. van der Sanden (Aarts) 
Worrell (van den Bergh) 
Stoffelen 
de Beer (Mrs. van der 
Werf-Terpstra) 
van Tets (van der Werft) 
United Kingdom 
Sir Frederic Bennett 
Mr. Coleman 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
MM. Garrett 
Morris (Sir Anthony 
Grant) 
Hardy 
Sir Paul Hawkins 
Mr. Hill 
Lord Hughes 
Mr. Ter/ezki (Jessel) 
Lord Newall (Earl of Kinnoull) 
Lady Jill Knight 
Dr. Miller 
Sir John Osbom 
Mr. Murphy (Sir John Page) 
Lord Mackie (Ross) 
Sir Dudley Smith 
Mr. Wilkinson 
Netherlands 
MM. de Kwaadsteniet 
Tummers 
1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets. 
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APPENDIX II SECOND SITTING 
APPENDIX II 
Vote No. 1 by roll-call on the request for urgent procedure on the motion for a recommendation on 
the ministerial meeting of the Council (Doe. 1094) 1: 
Ayes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 
Noes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 
Abstentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 
MM. van der Sanden (Aarts) 
De Bondt (Adriaensens) 
Amadei 
Antoni 
Bassinet 
Sir Frederic Bennett 
MM. Bogaerts 
Bohm 
Burger 
Martino (Cifarelli) 
Coleman 
Collette 
Declercq 
Sir <Jeoffrey Finsberg 
MM. <Jarrett 
<Jiust 
<Joerens 
Morris (Sir Anthony 
(}rant) 
Ayes: 
MM. Bordu (<Jremetz) 
Hardy 
Sir Paul Hawkins 
MM. Linster (Hengel) 
Hill 
Lord Hughes 
MM. lrmer 
Lacour (Jeambrun) 
Terlezki (Jessel) 
Lord Newall (Earl ofK.innoull) 
Mr. K.ittelmann 
Lady Jill Knight 
Mrs. Lalumiere 
MM. Prat (Mermaz) 
Mezzapesa 
Dr. Miller 
MM. Lemmrich (Muller) 
Niegel 
Sir John Osbom 
MM. Murphy (Sir John Page) 
Close (Pecriaux) 
Reddentann 
Scheer 
Mrs. Pack (Schmitz) 
Mr. von Scb.mude 
Sir Dudley Smith 
Mr. Schmidt (Soell) 
Mrs. Staels-Dompas 
MM. Steverlynck 
Stoffelen 
Unland 
Valleix 
de Beer (Mrs. van der 
Werf-1ferpstra) 
Wilkinson 
I 
l. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets. 
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APPENDIX Ill SECOND SilTING 
APPENDIX Ill 
Vote No. 2 by roll-call on the amended draft recommendation on disarmament (Doe. 1090) 1: 
Ayes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 
Noes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 
Abstentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 
MM. Bohm 
Burger 
Declercq 
duMonceau 
(Dejardin) 
Giust 
Sir Paul Hawkins 
MM. Ahrens 
Amadei 
Worrell (van den Bergh) 
Bogaerts 
Buchner 
Coleman 
Hardy 
Sir Frederic Bennett 
MM. de Chambrun 
Martino (Cifarelli) 
Collette 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
Ayes: 
MM. Hill 
Kittelmann 
Mezzapesa 
Lemmrich (Muller) 
Niegel 
Reddemann 
Sir Dudley Smith 
Noes: 
MM. Linster (Hengel) 
K.lejdzinski 
Lord Hughes 
Mr. Irmer 
Mrs. Lalumiere 
MM. Steiner (Mrs. Luuk) 
Fourre (Matraja) 
Abstentions: 
MM. Goerens 
Morris (Sir Anthony 
Grant) 
Lacour (Jeambrun) 
Terlezki (Jessel) 
Mrs. Staels-Dompas 
MM. Steverlynck 
Buhler (Unland) 
de Beer (Mrs. van der 
Werf-Terpstra) 
van Tets (van der Werfl) 
Wilkinson 
Mr. Prat (Mermaz) 
Dr. Miller 
MM. Oehler 
Close 
Lord Mackie (Ross) 
MM. Scheer 
Stoffelen 
Lord Newall (Earl of Kinnoull) 
Lady Jill Knight 
Sir John Osbom 
MM. Stokes (Sir John Page) 
Valleix 
1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets. 
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TEXTS ADOPTED SECOND SITTING 
RECOMMENDATION 443 
on the ministerial meeting of the Council 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that the diplomatic/press offensive of Mikhail Gorbachev, who iS multiplying pro-
posals for nuclear disarmament, calls for a co-ordinated response from the Atlantic Alliance; 
(ii) Aware that these proposals, which affect first and foremost European security, should lead to 
European interests being defined in WEU, the only European organisation with responsibilities in this 
area; 
(iii) Encouraged by the call to the European members of the Atlantic Alliance by George Shultz, 
United States Secretary of State, following his recent visit to Moscow, requesting their opinion on these 
~~ . 
URGES THE COUNCIL 
1. To make known its collegiate point of view on the Gorbachev proposals through the intermediary 
of its Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Jacques Poos, in his statement to the Assembly on Tuesday, 28th April 
1987; 
2. To instruct its Chairman-in-Office to give the Council's point of view on the Soviet proposals at 
the meetings of the North Atlantic Council to be held on 11th and 12th June 1987. 
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TEXTS ADOPTED SECOND SITTING 
RECOMMENDATION 444 
replying to the thirty-first annual report of the Council 
The Assembly, 
(i) Regretting the serious delay in the communication of the Council's annual report in 1986, the 
omission of information concerning one important meeting, and considering that the absence of 
agreement on certain matters should not prevent the Council from presenting the rest of its report on 
time; 
(ii) Welcoming, however, the communication in October 1986 of the first part of the report for that 
year, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Ensure that in future the whole of the annual report on its activities reaches the Assembly before 
the end ofFebruary ofthe following year and that it contain a complete account of activities arranged by 
the Council; 
2. Take into consideration both the strategic and political aspects when discussing the enlargement 
ofWEU. 
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TIIIRD SilTING 
Tuesday, 28th April 1987 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
Application of Order 65 on the draft budget of the Assembly 
for the financial year 1987 (Presentation of and debate on the 
report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
tration and votes on the draft recommendation and draft 
order, Doe. 1095). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The sitting was opened at 10.10 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Attendance register 
The names of representatives and substitutes 
who signed the register of attendance are given in 
the appendix. 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The minutes of proceedings of the previous 
sitting were agreed to. 
Speaker (point of order): Sir Geoffrey 
Finsberg. 
3. Application of Order 65 on the draft budget 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 
(Presentation of and debate on the report of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
and votes on the draft recommendation and 
draft order, Doe. 1095) 
The report of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration was presented by Sir 
Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur. 
The debate was opened. 
Speakers: Mr. Linster, Sir Paul Hawkins and 
Mr. Garrett. 
Mr. Goerens, Vice-President of the Assembly, 
took the Chair. 
Speakers: Mr. van Tets, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
and Mr. Hill. 
The debate was closed. 
Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur, 
replied to the speakers. 
21 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
recommendation. 
The draft recommendation was agreed to 
unanimously. (This recommendation will be 
published as No. 445) 1• 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
order. 
The draft order was agree~ to unanimously. 
(This order will be published as No. 67) 2• 
4. The need for action by the Assembly 
of Western European Union to press western 
governments for action to channel resources into 
development needs and away from the arms trade 
(Motion for a resolution, Doe. 1096) 
In accordance with Rule 28 of the Rules of 
Procedure, a motion for a resolution was tabled 
by Mr. Freeson. 
The motion for a resolution would be referred 
to the appropriate committee by the Presidential 
Committee. 
5. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The orders of the day for the next sitting were 
agreed to. · 
The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 
5p.m. 
The sitting was closed at 11.25 a.m. 
1. See page 23. 
2. See page 24. 
APPENDIX THIRD SITTING 
APPENDIX 
Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance 1: 
Belgium Federal Republic of Germany 
MM. Bogaerts MM. Ahrens 
Declercq Bohm 
Dejardin Buchner 
Steverlynck Klejdzinski (Holtz) 
Irmer 
Buhler (Muller) 
Niegel 
Reddemann 
Mrs. Pack (Schmitz) 
Mr. Lenzer (Unland) 
France Italy 
MM. de Chambrun MM. Amadei 
Collette Gianotti 
Hunault (Galley) 
Lacour (Jeambrun) Luxembourg Fourre (Matraja) 
Prat (Mermaz) MM. Burger 
Oehler Goerens 
Valleix Linster (Hengel) 
The following representatives apologised for their absence: 
Belgium Mrs. Luuk 
MM. Mechtersheimer 
MM. Adriaensens Rumpf 
Pecriaux Scheer 
Mrs. Staels-Dompas von Schmude 
So ell 
France 
MM. Bassinet Italy 
Baumel 
Croze MM. Antoni 
Gremetz Bianco 
Jung Cavaliere 
Koehl Cifarelli 
Mrs. Lalumiere Ferrari Aggradi 
MM. Portier Fiandrotti 
Seitlinger Frasca 
Giust 
Mezzapesa 
Federal Republic of Germany Milani 
Pecchioli 
MM. Antretter Rauti 
Kittelmann Rubbi 
Netherlands 
MM. Stoffelen 
de Beer (Mrs. van der 
Werf-Terpstra) 
van Tets (van der Werfi) 
United Kingdom 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
Mr. Garrett 
Sir Paul Hawkins 
Mr. Hill 
Lord Newa/1 (Earl ofKinnoull) 
Lady Jill Knight 
Dr. Miller 
Sir Dudley Smith 
Mr. Wilkinson 
MM. Sarti 
Sinesio 
Vecchietti 
Netherlands 
MM. Aarts 
van den Bergh 
de K waadsteniet 
Tummers 
United Kingdom 
Sir Frederic Bennett 
Mr. Coleman 
Sir Anthony Grant 
Mr. Hardy 
Lord Hughes 
Mr. Jessel 
Sir John Osbom 
Sir John Page 
Mr. Ross 
1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets. 
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TEXTS ADOPTED 
The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 445 
on principles applicable in preparing the budgets 
of the WEU ministerial organs and the Assembly 
THIRD SITTING 
Fully endorsing the proposals made by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, for putting an end to WEU's budgetary difficulties, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Implement without delay the three principles defined by the Chairman-in-Office: 
- application to the operating budgets of the ministerial organs and of the Assembly of WEU of 
the growth rate defined in the European Communities; 
- establishment of a separate budget for pensions; 
- recognition ofthe Assembly's freedom to manage its budget within the limits of the appropria-
tions thus calculated. 
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TEXTS ADOPTED 
The Assembly, 
ORDER 67 
on the budget of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 
THIRD SITTING 
1. APPROVES the action taken by the Presidential Committee in application of Order 65 and the terms 
of the memorandum of the President of the Assembly dated 12th March 1987; 
2. INVITES the Presidential Committee and the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
to take the necessary steps to implement, during the present financial year, the provisions decided upon 
for improving the structure of the Office of the Clerk. 
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FOURTH SITIING 
Tuesday, 28th April 1987 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
Address by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxem-
bourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, and debate. 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The sitting was opened at 5.40 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Attendance register 
The names of the representatives and substi-
tutes who signed the register of attendance are 
given in the appendix. 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The minutes of proceedings of the previous 
sitting were agreed to. 
3. The need for action by the Assembly of Western 
European Union to press western governments for 
action to channel resources into development 
needs and away from the arms trade 
(Doe. 1096) 
The President informed the Assembly that 
there was an error in the signatures attached to 
the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr. 
Freeson. 
The name of Mr. Baumel should be deleted 
from the list of signatures and Mr. Bassinet's 
name should be inserted. 
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4. Address by Mr. Poos, Minister 
for Foreign Affairs of Lqxembourg, 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council 
Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-OffU:e ofthe Council, 
addressed the Assembly. 
Mr. Fischbach, Minister of Defence of Luxem-
bourg, addressed the Assembly. 
Mr. Poos answered questions put by MM. 
Wilkinson, V alleix, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. 
Gianotti, Freeson and Brown. 
Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU, and 
Mr. Poos answered a question put by Mr. 
Goerens. 
Mr. Poos answered questi<j>ns put by Mr. 
Terlezki, Sir Frederic Bennett, Sir Dudley Smith 
and Mr. Stoffelen. _ 
5. Close of the extraordi'qary session 
The President declared the extraordinary 
session of the Assembly closedr 
The sitting was closed at 7.05 p.m. 
APPENDIX FOURTH SITTING 
APPENDIX 
Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance 1: 
Belgium MM. Irmer Nether lands 
Kittelmann 
MM. De Bondt (Adriaensens) Lenzer (Muller) MM. Stoffelen 
Bogaerts von Schmude van Tets (van der Werfl) 
Declercq Schmidt (Soell) 
Close (Pecriaux) Zierer (Unland) 
Steverlynck United Kingdom 
Sir Frederic Bennett 
France Mr. Coleman Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
MM. de Chambrun Italy MM. Murphy (Sir Anthony 
Collette Grant) 
Hunault (Galley) MM. Amadei Brown (Hardy) Gianotti Sir Paul Hawkins Lacour (Jeambrun) Giust MM. Hill Koehl 
Mrs. Lalumiere Mezzapesa Woodall (Lord Hughes) 
MM. Prat (Mermaz) Lord Newall (Earl ofKinnoull) Lady Jill Knight Valleix Dr. Miller 
MM. Terlezki (Sir John 
Luxembourg Os born) 
Federal Republic of Germany Ward (Sir John Page) 
MM. Burger Ross 
MM. Ahrens Goerens Sir Dudley Smith 
Klejdzinski (Holtz) Linster (Hengel) Mr. Wilkinson 
The following representatives apologised for their absence: 
Belgium MM. Buchner MM. Rauti 
Mrs. Luuk Rubbi 
Mr. Dejardin MM. Mechtersheimer Sarti 
Mrs. Staels-Dompas Niegel Sinesio 
Reddemann Vecchietti 
Rumpf 
France Scheer 
Schmitz 
MM. Bassinet Netherlands Baumel 
Croze MM. A arts Gremetz 
Jung Italy van den Bergh 
Matraja de K waadsteniet 
Oehler MM. Antoni Tummers 
Portier Bianco Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra 
Seitlinger Cavaliere 
Cifarelli 
Ferrari Aggradi 
Federal Republic of Germany Fiandrotti United Kingdom 
Frasca 
MM. Antretter Milani MM. Garrett 
Bohm Pecchioli Jessel 
1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets. 
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11 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
FIRST SITTING 
Monday, 27th April 1987 
SUMMARY 
1. Opening of the extraordinary session. 
2. Attendance register. 
3. Tribute. 
4. Observers. 
5. Examination of credentials. 
6. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
7. Ministerial meeting of the Council (Motion for a recom-
mendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doe. 
1094). 
8. Adoption of the draft order of business for the extraor-
dinary session (Doe. 1087). 
9. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance- Part 1: The 
reactivation of WEU (Presentation of and debate on the 
report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the 
draft recommendation, Doe. 1089 and amendments). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Ahrens (Rapporteur), 
Mr. Cuco (Observer from Spain), Mr. Inan (Observer 
from Turkey), Mr. Budtz (Observer from Denmark), 
Mr. Antoni, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Valleix, Mr. 
Klejdzinski, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Bassinet, Mr. Burger, Mr. 
Freeson, Mr. van der Sanden, Mr. Martino, Mr. Linster, 
Mr. De Decker, Mr. Bayiilken (Observer from Turkey), 
Mr. Katsaros (Observer from Greece), Mr. Ahrens 
(Rapporteur), Mr. Close (acting Chairman of the com-
mittee), Mr. Bassinet, Mr. Ahrens. 
10. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting. 
The sitting was opened at 10.40 a. m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Opening of the extraordinary session 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- The sitting 
is open. 
In accordance with Article Ill (b) of the 
Charter and Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure, I 
declare open this extraordinary session of the 
Assembly of Western European Union. 
2. Attendance register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The names 
of the substitutes attending this sitting which 
have been notified to the President will be pub-
lished with the list of representatives appended 
to the minutes of proceedings 1• 
3. Tribute 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Minister, 
ladies and gentlemen, since our last sitting, we 
have learned with great sorrow of the death of 
Mr. Berrier, member of the French Senate, and a 
member of our Assembly since 1978 and 
Chairman of the General Affairs Committee 
since 1986. I would like to express the sympathy 
of the Assembly to his family, his wife and the 
French Delegation. I believe I can say, ladies and 
I. See page 10. 
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gentlemen, that the memory of Noel Berrier we 
shall retain will be that of a man devoted to the 
cause of Europe, keenly interested in the work of 
our committee and ready to give of his best to 
heighten the prestige of our Assembly. In his 
memory and in token of our friendship, loyalty 
and respect, let us now observe a few moments 
of silence. 
(The representatives observed one minute's 
silence) 
4. Observers 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - As is the 
custom, I have to inform the Assembly of the 
presence at our proceedings of observers from 
member countries of the Atlantic Alliance. The 
observers are from Denmark, Greece, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain and Turkey. I should particularly 
like, on your behalf ladies and gentlemen, to 
welcome full delegations from Portugal and 
Spain, attending by virtue of the Assembly's 
decision to grant these countries special observer 
status, under which from now on they are 
entitled to attend as a full delegation in 
accordance with Article IX of the Charter of the 
Assembly and to take regular part in the work of 
committees. I extend a most cordial welcome to 
all our Spanish and Portuguese colleagues 
attending the Assembly as a delegation for the 
first time. 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
5. Examination of credentials 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the examination of credentials 
of the new representatives and substitutes 
appointed since the second part of the thirty-
second ordinary session, whose names are pub-
lished in Notice No. 1. 
In accordance with Rule 6(1) of the Rules of 
Procedure, these credentials are attested by the 
statement of the ratification of credentials com-
municated by the President of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, with the 
exception of the representatives and substitutes 
of the Federal Republic of Germany and Mr. 
Pontillon, French substitute, who have been 
nominated since the conclusion of the session of 
the Assembly. 
It is now for the Assembly to ratify these cre-
dentials under Rule 6(2) of the Rules of Pro-
cedure. 
These nominations are in the form prescribed 
by the rules and no objection has been raised. 
If the Assembly is unanimous, we may 
proceed to ratification without prior referral to a 
credentials committee. 
Is there any objection? ... 
The credentials are ratified, subject to subse-
quent ratification by the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
I welcome our new colleagues. 
6. Address by the President of the Assembly 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Ministers, 
your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, as you 
know two reasons led the Assembly, at its session 
in December 1986, to decide to hold an extraor-
dinary session in Luxembourg today and 
tomorrow. 
The first was the importance to be attributed 
to the ministerial meeting of the Council to be 
held tomorrow at which our governments are to 
put the final touches to their agreement on the 
principles to be set out in the European security 
charter proposed by Jacques Chirac, Prime Min-
ister ofFrance, on 2nd December 1986. We felt it 
important for the Assembly to express its 
opinion on the eve of the ministerial meeting. 
This it will be able to do thanks to the report sub-
mitted on behalf of the General Affairs Com-
mittee by our colleague, Mr. Ahrens. 
The same report will also allow us to express 
our views on a number of specific questions 
relating to the reactivation ofWEU for which the 
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ministerial meeting should introduce the final 
stage by taking the necessary 9ecisions for: 
- setting up a European security council the 
principle of which was accepted by the min-
isters last October; 
- restructuring WEU, with a final definition 
of the respective tasks of the Secretariat-
General and the agencies; 
- enlarging WEU to includ~ Spain and Por-
tugal, candidate countries for which the 
Assembly has shown its unreserved support 
by inviting to this session parliamentary 
delegations equivalent to those that they 
would be entitled to have' if they were full 
members of WEU. 
Furthermore - and this matter is by no means 
a secondary one for the Assenibly whose con-
tinued activities are now at stake - the Assembly 
is entitled to expect the Council at last to 
recognise the consequences of the reactivation of 
WEU for the Assembly budget. That is why 
plenty of time has been left f01t consideration of 
budgetary questions in spite of1the adoption of a 
provisional, but wholly inadequate, budget for 
1987. The promises received by the Assembly in 
1986 and in recent months halVe provoked dis-
satisfaction with customary procedure for the 
supplementary budget that lS essential. The 
slowness, ineffectiveness and humiliating nature 
of this procedure for the parli~mentary side has 
made it intolerable. 1 
The Presidential Committee subscribed wholly 
to the three principles defined by Mr. Poos, 
Chairman-in-Office of the Copncil: application 
in WEU of the growth rates · accepted by our 
governments in the European Communities, 
establishment of a separate budget for pensions 
and recognition of the Asse~bly's freedom to 
manage its budget within the liMits of the appro-
priations thus calculated. The Assembly 
therefore now expects the Council to apply, 
without delay, these new principles accepted by 
both sides. It cannot be satisf~d with deferring 
for many months consideratlion of the very 
detailed requests it has been making for a long 
time now for reorganising the Office of the Clerk. 
It cannot continue its normal activities until the 
end of 1987 if this problem, to.which it has con-
stantly drawn the Council's attention, is not 
settled once and for all. Its operating budget is no 
longer enough for normal operations. 
The second reason for convt)ning this extraor-
dinary session was that the Assembly had valid 
grounds for expecting that, at its ministerial 
meeting, the Council would tackle the major 
problems of the day, includina the use of space, 
security in the Mediterranean and above all dis-
armament. While it has been able to give its 
views on the first two problems in recent 
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debates, it has had far greater difficulty with the 
third. 
Here, I must first pay a very special tribute to 
the Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments, and in particular its Chairman, Mr. 
Kittelmann, its Vice-Chairman, Mr. Cifarelli, 
who presided with great authority over the 
decisive meeting, and its Rapporteur, Mr. 
Amadei. They managed in the time available to 
obtain the adoption of the report on disarm-
ament which is on the agenda for this session in 
spite of all the difficulties raised by the divisions 
of European public opinion on this essential 
question. 
Since this report was adopted, two extremely 
important events have occurred which will give 
our debates and, I hope, the work of the Council 
a new dimension. 
First, there was the visit by the Bureau of the 
Assembly to Moscow at the invitation of the 
Supreme Soviet from 6th to 11th April and its 
talks with the most senior Soviet leaders. I have 
had a note circulated so I do not need to dwell 
unduly on this visit and will refer here to only a 
few points. 
First, it is underlined that, five years after the 
China of Deng Hsiao Ping, the Soviet Union of 
Mr. Gorbachev at last decided to establish links 
with an organised Western Europe and chose our 
Assembly as its first institutional European par-
liamentary interlocutor. 
Why did it do so? I think several elements of 
an answer can be given to this question. 
It should first be recalled that even and above 
all during our visit the Soviet press continually 
attacked WEU and its reactivation, accusing it of 
representing a new deployment of forces in 
Europe at a time when the Soviet Union and the 
United States seemed to be drawing close to a 
series of agreements on disarmament. 
We know only too well that there are no 
grounds for such accusations and that neither 
our governments nor the Assembly have con-
templated European deployment distinct from 
NATO. Our comments left no room for ambi-
guity about the vital importance we all attached 
to membership of the Atlantic Alliance, i.e. close 
co-operation with our American allies for every-
thing relating to Europe's defence and security, 
and I have every reason to believe that on this 
point we were heard loud and clear and the 
Soviet side understood us. 
I would emphasise that throughout its stay in 
the Soviet Union our delegation considered 
itself, because of the mandate it was given by the 
Presidential Committee, as representing the 
Assembly as a whole. Over and above the differ-
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ences which animate our debates when we are in 
session, we were able, by speaking to the Soviet 
authorities with a single voice, to make them 
hear the voice of Europe, and there was no mis-
understanding about this. 
The way we were able to present our concern 
about the security of Europe at a time when the 
disarmament negotiations were taking a new 
turn certainly did not remain without response. 
What the Soviet authorities told us and the 
probable significance of their accusations against 
us is that they consider Western Europe to be 
strong enough to oppose, with some effec-
tiveness, a Soviet-American agreement on dis-
armament. 
A forthright explanation of our security 
requirements was certainly worth while, and the 
efforts of several of our governments, and our 
own, were not without avail. Mr. Gorbachev's 
speech in Prague gave the answer to several ques-
tions we had put in Moscow and which the 
persons we met could not yet answer. 
This gives full meaning to the reactivation of 
WEU: insofar as our ministers tomorrow, like us 
today, are capable of expressing the views of 
Europeans on their security in terms that do not 
detract from the will of the United States and the 
Soviet Union to lower considerably the level of 
their nuclear weapons in Europe, we shall be 
heard. We already are heard by all concerned 
because both sides well know that an agreement 
on disarmament in Europe requires the support 
of Europeans. 
It is just as significant to see the United States 
Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz, consult his NATO 
allies on the conclusions on disarmament they 
draw from the recent proposals made by tl}e 
Soviet Union as it is to see the Soviet authorities 
invite the WEU Assembly to discuss these 
matters with it. There is a direct link between 
these two actions, and this link is acknowl-
edgment of the political weight now carried by 
Europe in the international concert. 
Europe is admittedly not yet a great power and 
the negotiations are being held without it. But 
everyone knows that henceforth it will have to be 
counted in if a disarmament agreement is to be 
implemented and, on both sides, efforts are being 
pursued to this end. 
This twofold step places both the Assembly 
and the Council before their respective responsi-
bilities. On the eve of the ministerial meeting, 
the Assembly would be failing in its vocation and 
duties if by a clear vote - however difficult this 
may be - it did not manage to express the view 
of the European public in face of the Soviet pro-
posals. It should do so even more clearly since its 
debates during recent sessions have helped to 
throw light on the positions of all concerned with 
disarmament at the highest level. 
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But no one would understand if tomorrow the 
Council does not express the views of the seven 
governments on a matter so vital for our joint 
security as disarmament. They readily pride 
themselves on being the hard core of Europe, 
and use this as a pretext for skating round the 
candidatures of Portugal and Spain. If they do 
not adopt a clear position, they will fully justify 
the recent remarks by the President of the 
European Commission, who accused WEU of 
concealing behind its claim to defence responsi-
bilities a lack of government will to take deci-
sions when these responsibilities have to be exer-
cised. 
Here we must be clear. The two aspects of this 
extraordinary session give it very specific signifi-
cance. It shows that the Assembly has done 
everything in its power to promote the reacti-
vation of WEU in such a way as at last to give 
Europe the means of expressing itself in security 
matters. 
It is not an exaggeration to say that the whole 
world is awaiting the voice of Europe. After 
China, the Soviet Union is asking to hear it. The 
United States wanted to hear it in connection 
with the strategic defence initiative yesterday 
and, today, it wants to hear it when it is pre-
paring a disarmament agreement. In one way or 
another, four of our European allies have asked 
to take part in the activities of WEU because 
they feel this to be the only way to participate in 
Europe's consideration of its security. 
Tomorrow, it is for the Council to tell us 
whether this hope is to be vain or whether 
Europe is really determined to exist in defence 
questions. The Assembly for its part will have 
said all it could to the Council; it will have done 
everything it could. I personally, during the three 
years in which you have done me the honour of 
having me as President, have done everything I 
thought possible to convince public opinion of 
the need for a European defence policy and I am 
by no means exaggerating if I say that I have 
devoted most of my time and efforts to this end. 
I have also increased contacts with the Council, 
and in particular with those who have been 
chairmen-in-office in the last three years, to 
ensure that the reactivation ofWEU moves from 
kind words to political action. 
In this connection, I wish to convey my very 
special gratitude to the Luxembourg presidency 
and to Mr. Poos, Luxembourg Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, with whom the Assembly has in 
the last ten months had an easy, pleasant rela-
tionship. It is thanks to them that we are meeting 
here today. It is to them, too, that we owe the 
introduction of a parliamentary practice, new in 
WEU, of having a minister always present 
throughout our sessions, empowered to speak in 
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our debates. And here I take the opportunity of 
paying a personal tribute to Mr. Goebbels and 
expressing all my gratitude to him. It is they, too, 
who, thanks to a procedure which is to be inau-
gurated tomorrow, have allowed the Assembly to 
provide the framework for the essential contact 
between the Council and the press at the close of 
the ministerial meeting. 
I am also gratified to have enjoyed the fullest 
support and most loyal co-operation from my 
colleagues of all the political groups without 
exception. If the Assembly has been divided, 
which was natural, on major political matters, it 
has never been divided on the reactivation of 
WEU. 
If tomorrow our hopes are to be dashed, we 
could no longer expect very much of the WEU 
Council. The only way out for the Assembly 
would then be to turn to other !authorities, as Mr. 
Delors recently did, for Europe to exist in an area 
for which we are responsible. In a letter which he 
recently wrote to his Prime Minister, our col-
league, Mr. De Decker, recalled that WEU could 
serve as a framework for ' the meeting of 
European heads of state or ~f government on 
defence questions. The Presidential Committee 
of the Assembly, informed of this approach, 
instructed the General Affairs Committee to 
report on this proposal at the next ordinary 
session and to examine ways and means of pre-
paring a summit meeting on European 
security. 
It is difficult for me to sa)'1 more today. Our 
session, on the one hand, a~d the ministerial 
meeting, on the other, will each. give an answer to 
the question we are all wondt:~ring about, that is 
to say, what part Europe i4tends to play in 
arrangements for its own def~nce. 
The governments are henceforth inevitably 
faced with a pressing need: by assuming joint 
responsibility for defence, tqey must together 
attain the political maturity which is now 
essential for Europe, both for the success of the 
vast internal market in 1992 and for its place in 
international affairs. 
i 
May the voice of Europe noiw be heard by our 
governments, united and ihterdependent in 
WEU. 
I am happy to congratulate you, ladies and 
gentlemen, on having allow~d our Assembly, 
constantly and progressively, to make Europe's 
voice heard in the great East-West debate which 
directly concerns both European defence and dis-
armament directly. 
We have managed to serve the cause of peace 
and security by asserting a European identity at 
world level. 
Thank you, Assembly. Thank you all, my dear 
colleagues; you are all, we are all, Europeans of 
action. 
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7. Ministerial meeting of the Council 
(Motion for a recommendation with a 
request for urgent procedure, Doe. 1094) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I have 
received a motion for a recommendation with a 
request for urgent procedure signed by ten repre-
sentatives concerning the ministerial meeting of 
the Council. The text is now being distributed to 
you. The vote on the adoption of urgent pro-
cedure will be taken when we have finished con-
sidering the report of the General Affairs Com-
mittee. Should the request for urgent procedure 
be approved, the vote by roll-call will be taken at 
the opening of the afternoon sitting. 
8. Adoption of the draft order of business 
for the extraordinary session 
(Doe. 1087) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the adoption of the draft order 
of business for the extraordinary session, Doc-
ument 1087. 
Are there any objections to the draft order of 
business? ... 
The draft order of business is adopted. 
The Presidential Committee has asked the 
political groups for their help in organising our 
work and it has been suggested to them that they 
share out speaking time within total allocations 
proportionate to the numerical size of each 
political group so that we may allow the neces-
sary time for representatives, the rapporteur and 
the chairman of the committee not forgetting, of 
course, that necessary for voting. 
I would like to have proposals from the 
political groups as quickly as possible so that I 
can allocate speaking time. If it could be done 
during Mr. Ahrens's speech on behalf of the 
General Affairs Committee, at least for this 
morning's sitting, I would be grateful. 
9. The European pillar 
of the Atlantic Alliance -
Part I: The reactivation of WEU 
(Presentation of and debate on the report of the 
General Affairs Committee and vote on the 
draft recommendation, Doe. 1089 and amendments) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the presentation of and debate 
on the report of the General Affairs Committee 
on the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance -
Part I: The reactivation of WEU and vote on the 
draft recommendation, Document 1089 and 
amendments. 
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I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Ahrens. 
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - The report I am now presenting 
on behalf of the General Affairs Committee is in 
some respects out of date and in several respects 
imperfect. Out of date, in particular, as regards 
the explanatory memorandum and imperfect pri-
marily because it is a partial report only, since 
the Assembly had not been informed of the 
Council's activities when it was drawn up. This 
information was received only three days ago, on 
24th April. I shall not be able to present the part 
of the report dealing with the Council's commu-
nication until the June part-session at the earliest 
and perhaps not before December. But my report 
is also imperfect because it is confined to aspects 
of the reactivation of WEU, which, ladies and 
gentlemen, appear to be little more than a side 
issue in view of the negotiations now being con-
ducted between the superpowers on European 
security. We must therefore ask ourselves 
whether this report will be helpful in the present 
circumstances, whether it has any point, and 
whether the Assembly should not be considering 
quite different issues, such as a European 
position on the proposals put forward by General 
Secretary Gorbachev, which have paved the way 
for a range of negotiations that none of us had 
dreamt of a year ago. 
So the question we must ask ourselves is this: 
should this parliamentary body, this Assembly, 
not be announcing here and now its opinion of 
the negotiations between the superpowers, in 
which decisions are being taken for us, but not 
with us, on our security, on the future of our 
children and our continent? 
My question does not arise from any distrust 
of our American allies. Western Europe's 
security lies only in the alliance, and only the 
presence of the United States in Western Europe 
and its willingness to defend this part of our con-
tinent, if need be, as if it were its own territory · 
ensures our freedom, even today. Nor do I see 
any reason to doubt our American allies' loyalty 
in the future. But my appeal to Western Europe 
to contribute more than it has done so far to the 
negotiations, which specifically concern the 
future of this part of the world, not only corre-
sponds to Europe's self-image but is also what 
the Americans expect and want. 
We know this from many discussions with our 
American counterparts, and we constantly read 
about it in the American press. For example, 
William Pfaff recently wrote in the International 
Herald Tribune that the West urgently needs 
more than one country which is prepared to lead, 
to think and to defend the values of our civili-
sation and our military security. So the Euro-
peans are still explicitly required to make their 
own contribution to peace, freedom and the 
defence of human rights in the world. 
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Ladies and gentlemen, I would go even 
further. The North Atlantic Alliance will have 
permanent validity only when Europe becomes a 
self-confident and equal partner of the United 
States. We lack neither the opportunities nor the 
potential. Western Europe, with 320 million 
people, is a gigantic market which constantly 
stimulates innovation, and its science and 
research even now largely determine world 
development. In terms of potential, Western 
Europe need not fear comparison either with the 
United States and Japan, or with the Warsaw 
Pact and China. We in Europe do not lack 
opportunities and potential. What we lack is the 
political will to seize these opportunities in the 
interests of Europe and the world. 
But this, ladies and gentlemen, brings us to the 
subject of my report. It concerns no more and no 
less than the improvement of the only 
instrument designed and suitable for the formu-
lation of Europe's position on its defence and 
security. As I have already said, the explanatory 
memorandum in my report has been largely 
overtaken by events. The General Affairs Com-
mittee did not therefore discuss this explanatory 
memorandum further. It could not be up-dated, 
if only for technical and procedural reasons, for 
which I ask your indulgence. 
The General Affairs Committee confined itself 
to discussing the text of the recommendation, 
concentrating on two aspects in particular: first, 
the proposal to establish a European security 
charter, and second, relations between WEU's 
two organs, the Council and the Assembly. The 
proposal to establish a European security charter, 
it seems to me, is the logical extension of French 
policy in recent years. I do not have the feeling 
that it has been agreed in detail with the allied 
governments, although there have been state-
ments by other governments along the same 
lines. 
Common to all these proposals is the demand 
for a stocktaking of Europe's efforts in the area of 
security policy so far, and for a reassessment in 
the light of recent political events in the world 
arena. The goal of these efforts cannot be to 
create a European army, for example, or to 
revive the idea of a European defence com-
munity. What is important is to formulate the 
Europeans' vision of their own security within 
the alliance. We shall be able to agree very 
quickly on the objective, which in my opinion is 
solely to achieve the maximum security with the 
minimum amount of troops and equipment, for 
both parts of Europe - I repeat, both parts. This 
objective must be pursued, the road to its 
achievement will be stony not only for the super-
powers but for us too, and we shall undoubtedly 
have to discuss it in our Assembly as well. 
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The General Affairs Committee has been 
extremely critical of relations between the 
Council and the Assembly. I am surely not 
betraying any secrets when I say that the com-
mittee considerably intensified the draft report 
in this respect. Certainly, it is often not easy for 
the Council to comply with the reporting obliga-
tions imposed on it by the treaty. Its activities 
are long-term, constituting a political process 
which, by its nature, can lead to a final con-
clusion only over long periods of time. The 
Council's reporting obligation is therefore often 
bound to be restricted to reporting on the state of 
deliberations. It is rarely able to report on spe-
cific events. That is in the nature of things, and 
gives rise to no criticism. But what we cannot fail 
to criticise is that, as we see it, the Council very 
often evades or not infrequently delays an 
answer, or refuses to give one, on the grounds 
that the information is classified. 
The Council's attitude often leads to the 
Assembly's fulfilling its own obligations imper-
fectly, or not at all. Hence the recurrent need for 
the Council's attitude to be Jl>ublicly criticised. 
We shall also have to point out to our govern-
ments that they should not be talking about reac-
tivating WEU unless they are prepared to 
develop relations between the Council and the 
Assembly and, in my view, to establish them at 
long last in accordance with the treaty. 
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the 
General Affairs Committee aPIProved the report 
before you with one abstention, and on the com-
mittee's behalf I would ask you to approve it. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. Rapporteur. 
Thirteen representatives have put down their 
names to speak. The distribution amongst the 
political groups seems to me fairly even so we 
shall allow each speaker about seven minutes. 
Before calling the first speaker on the list, I call 
Mr. Cuco from the Spanish Delegation. 
Mr. CUCO (Observer from Spain) (Trans-
lation). - First of all I wish to thank the 
Assembly of Western European Union for 
granting our parliamentary delegation this 
special and privileged opportunity to attend its 
proceedings. The Spanish 'Parliament was 
already represented at the Assembly's thirty-
second ordinary session last December when our 
observers were able to attend a session that was 
offundamental importance to Western European 
Union since it gave fresh impetus, just after the 
Reykjavik summit, to its revitalisation and 
enlargement, a development welcomed by the 
Spanish Government. The European security 
charter then suggested by Mr. Chirac, Prime 
Minister of the French Republic, aroused lively 
interest in all European members of the Atlantic 
Alliance and was, in my opinion, very 
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favourably received. After attending that session 
we are very gratified today at the Assembly's 
decision to increase our delegation to twelve 
members and to extend its powers, thus enabling 
Spain to confirm - both as an ally and as a 
European nation - how interested it is in partici-
pating in such an important forum for European 
security as this Assembly. 
At this extraordinary session, the Assembly is 
looking at the reactivation of WEU with Mr. 
Ahrens's report and its political analysis of what 
the European countries in the Atlantic Alliance 
should be doing. For that reason, the Spanish 
Parliament and consequently the Spanish Gov-
ernment take a very positive view of our 
presence here, given Spain's interest in a 
revitalised WEU. 
There is a small coincidence highlighting 
Spain's interest in WEU and its reactivation. On 
23rd October 1984 Mr. Felipe Gonzales, the 
Spanish Prime Minister, presented a report to 
the Spanish Cortes on a Spanish policy for peace 
and security. Item 6 in that report expressed the 
wish of our country to join Western European 
Union. On 29th October- a few days later - the 
Rome declaration on the reactivation of the 
organisation was signed. Spain is therefore fol-
lowing very closely and with great attention 
developments in the process on which WEU has 
embarked, with the intention of assisting in the 
creation of a real European security forum 
which, as Mr. Caro has very rightly stressed, 
must in no way constitute an alternative to the 
Atlantic Alliance but rather a buttress of the 
European pillar, which will also further the trans-
atlantic dialogue. This " Europeanist " strength-
ening of our security policy has the construction 
of a real Europe as its goal, which explains why 
our interest in a reactivation of WEU is partly 
due to the fact that the way through political 
co-operation, EPC, does not seem possible at 
least at the moment. A more dynamic and 
forward-looking WEU, ready to take up the chal-
lenges to European security, is one in which I 
believe we Spaniards, with our firmly 
Europeanist persuasion, are interested. In that 
light, the Cahen doctrine applies perfectly to my 
country since it is a member of the European 
Communities and the Atlantic Alliance and seri-
ously regards the security dimension as part and 
parcel of European construction. We satisfy all 
the required conditions. 
The Spanish Government is currently 
involved in consultations within the alliance 
which are making good progress, with the object 
of finalising the details of Spain's contribution 
especially at military level, outside the integrated 
military command structure. This latter point 
will be covered more particularly by 
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co-ordination agreements between the Spanish 
high command and the allies and by our partici-
pation in allied planning in the Defence Planning 
Committee, DPC, in a manner similar but not 
identical to that of the integrated countries. 
I would also like to draw attention to our par-
ticipation in the Independent European Pro-
gramme Group, IEPG, of which Spain currently 
holds the chair. Lastly, just as Spain accepts its 
commitments to its allies within the Atlantic 
Alliance I would like you to know that, when the 
time comes, we shall also live up to the future 
obligations of our participation in a redefined 
WEU and those set by Article V of the modified 
Brussels Treaty. 
To conclude, Mr. President, I would like to 
stress that the enlargement of WEU to include 
Spain - although I well understand that this is a 
subject requiring patience and thought - will be 
of value to both sides - to both Spain and the 
present seven members of WEU. In that con-
nection, once again stressing this Assembly's 
interest in Spain, I feel it would be desirable for 
this to be repeated in other WEU bodies as well. 
Ladies and gentlemen, we believe the reacti-
vation of WEU is urgently necessary for the 
political and defence reasons given by Mr. 
Ahrens. We believe in it and hope that it comes 
to pass. We are in favour of this reactivation of 
the organisation and I can assure you that you 
can count on our co-operation in bringing it 
about. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Mr. Cuco. The Assembly very much appreciates 
your remarks. 
I call Mr. Inan. 
Mr. INAN (Observer from Turkey) (Trans-
lation). - Mr. President, I simply wanted to 
inform this great Assembly that the Turkish 
Government has also applied for membership of 
Western European Union as mentioned in Part 
II of Mr. Ahrens's report. Perhaps this could 
have been said in your introduction. You 
referred to four countries showing their interest 
in one way or another: we have done so in the 
plainest fashion Mr. President. I just wanted to 
make that point; ours is a formal application. 
What is more - and what a coincidence this is, 
Mr. President - the European Communities are 
today considering Turkey's application for mem-
bership of the EEC. So this will be a twofold 
commitment to Europe on Turkey's part. What 
is more, our application with regard to defence, 
to join WEU that is, went in twenty-four hours 
before that concerning economic integration, i.e. 
to join the EEC. 
Those of my colleagues present here today are 
well aware of Turkey's contribution to the 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Mr. lnan (continued) 
defence of the western world over the last forty 
years. After the United States, we have the 
second biggest army for the defence of the West 
in the Atlantic Alliance - 800 000 strong - and 
we find it inconceivable for Europe - economic 
Europe or defence Europe - to be constructed 
without Turkey. Our geographic situation itself is 
evidence enough. We share 37% of our frontier 
line with Warsaw Pact countries and we are in a 
region that is vital not just for the West but for 
the world as a whole. 
It was in that context that I wished to put these 
views to the Assembly and I hope that in the 
future we s~all be included among the privileg~d, 
not that I mfer that we should have preferential 
privileges: what we want is not a Europe of the 
privileged but a Europe of Europeans. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Mr. Inan, for your loyal support. 
I call Mr. Budtz, observer from Denmark. 
Mr. BUDTZ (Observer from Denmark). - I am 
very honoured to be given the floor. I would just 
say that we always like to participate as 
observers. We have a special problem in 
Denmark which it might be a good idea to 
present to you - namely that if Denmark should 
one day decide to ask for membership of this dis-
tinguished organisation, we might be forced to 
change our constitution, so if only for that reason 
it is a very difficult problem. There are many 
other problems linked to the possible - or not 
possible - membership of my country, but this is 
not the right time to discuss them of course. We 
are very happy, however, to be able to follow the 
deliberations of this organisation and we thank 
you warmly for your often-repeated invitation 
for us to send observers. Thank you very much 
Mr. President. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you 
Mr. Budtz, and also your colleagues from 
Denmark, for following our debates so assidu-
ously. 
The debate is open. 
I call the first speaker on the list, Mr. 
Antoni. 
Mr. ANTONI (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, ladies and gentlemen, you may 
perhaps allow me a few extra minutes as Mr. 
Gianotti does not appear to be here, which 
means that of two speakers on the list one will 
not be speaking. I shall, however, try to keep 
within the time-limit so that fellow members do 
not complain. 
Saying first that we can give our support, I 
wish to add a few points concerning the recom-
mendation drafted by Mr. Ahrens whom I con-
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gratulate on his work. I can say at once that we 
agree that the report he presepted this morning 
needs to be brought up to date, because of subse-
quent international events of recent date and 
first among these the new stage in the disarm-
ament negotiations. 
It also seems to us however that the overall 
line taken in the report and th~ draft recommen-
dation represents an open position calling in par-
ticular for comment on a number of funda-
mental questions. For exampl~, I should like to 
stress that, independently of the drafting of a 
European security charter, it is no longer possible 
to postpone the need for clos~r co-operation in 
Europe on security and defence, particularly in 
the light of the Reykjavik meeting and the subse-
quent developments in the present negotiations 
between the United States and~the USSR on dis-
armament. 
Europe's security requirements must be 
affirmed and safeguarded within the alliance 
and, at the same time, more active participation 
by the European countries in the negotiations 
must be sought, especially on the zero option; in 
our view this is essential in ortder to promote a 
fresh concept of security in Europe and 
throughout the world. By thlis we mean the 
concept that security involves a combination of 
relationships, guarantees, agreements and con-
trols effective for all parties, replacing the old 
concept of unilateral security guaranteeing 
oneself only and based therefore on weapons and 
their power. Our view is th,at if security is 
reduced, this is the case for everyone; if it is guar-
anteed it can and must be so for everyone. We 
have not found all this in the 
1
draft recommen-
dation but it is true that the reactivation of 
WEU, seen as a problem of the moment, is set in 
the context of international relations leading up 
to substantial reductions in nudlear and conven-
tional weapons. 
Endorsing the need for an agreement between 
the United States and the USSR, the position 
taken on the policy of deterrence is based on the 
ultimate deterrent and this is very close to our 
own view. Again, the need for !Europe to play a 
bigger part in security emerges from paragraph 
1( a) of the draft recommendation proper and is 
correctly linked in paragraph 1(0) to the alliance's 
obligations regarding the European pillar. 
A large part of both the rep<i>rt and the draft 
recommendation is devoted to the reactivation 
ofWEU. Mr. Ahrens has spoken at length on this 
subject this morning. The reactivation of WEU 
is certainly being achieved through our political 
capacity and the capacity of our member coun-
tries, their governments and pa~liaments but the 
role of Western European Union is undoubtedly 
very important and is becoming more so with 
each day that passes. Implementation of the 
decisons taken in Rome in 1984!involves greater 
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co-operation in the joint production of arma-
ments and the enlargement of WEU to include 
member countries of the alliance and Spain and 
Portugal in particular. Paragraph 2(a) of the draft 
recommendation takes this line asking that the 
political committee on European security be kept 
in the framework ofWEU; paragraph 2(b) refers 
to enlargement while the remaining clauses deal 
with important individual points. 
In view also of what Mr. Caro said at the 
beginning of this extraordinary session, we feel 
that the draft recommendation is still topical. 
What still remains to be stressed I take from the 
remarks made by Mr. Ahrens this morning and 
by the President in his speech. Mr. Ahrens said 
that what is lacking is the political will. At the 
end of his speech Mr. Caro said that we must 
together achieve the political maturity that 
Europe needs. This in our opinion is the crux of 
the matter. Europe seems to be too divided, with 
many uncertainties and just as much insecurity. 
It is our hope that through our debate this 
morning on the draft recommendation and on 
Mr. Amadei's recommendation today, common-
sense will prevail and a plan for peace and 
progress will emerge. 
Mr. Ahrens's updated report may therefore 
point the way in that direction for our work in 
this Assembly and that is my hope. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Wilkinson. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom). - Mr. 
President, this debate on the excellent report qf 
Mr. Ahrens is extremely timely and I hope it 
may have historic dimensions. There are just 
four main subjects which I wish to raise: the pos-
sible enlargement ofWEU, the collocation ofthe 
Council, the Assembly and the specialist 
agencies, the work ofWEU in arms collaboration 
and possible co-operation with the IEPG, and, 
last but not least, the potential role of our 
organisation in evolving for Europe a strategy for 
the military application of space technology. 
However, at the outset I think we should 
realise what we are not. We do not represent all 
of Europe, all of free Europe, we do not even 
represent all the members of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation in Europe. There are seven 
others who are very important and some ofthem 
have sent delegates here. We should not allocate 
to ourselves a role in the field of arms control 
and related disarmament questions that are 
properly the function of NATO. But that said, 
there is an urgent need for our enlargement and I 
do most earnestly hope that the Council will now 
give a favourable response to the official requests 
to join from such countries as Spain, Portugal 
and Turkey. It is, I think, vital for the long-term 
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future of our organisation that the response be 
favourable. 
Secondly, on collocation, it is very necessary 
for the best use of our resources that all the 
bodies of WEU be located in the same place. 
Now, some people would wish that place to be 
here and Luxembourg has great merit, not least 
in its facilities and in the hospitality which it has 
accorded to this special Assembly. Others would 
wish the place to be Brussels, but were Brussels 
to be chosen, I am sure that the independence 
and vigour of our organisation would be sub-
sumed by the proximity to NATO and to the 
headquarters of the EEC and I think it would be 
a mistake to be Brussels. No, the place must be 
either Paris or London, and in my judgment it 
must be London, because London has a County 
Hall, the seat of the Greater London Council 
which could in one building house all the bodies 
necessary: the specialist agencies, the Assembly -
in a very excellent hemicycle - and also of course 
the Council, and I feel that the United Kingdom 
which has a maritime dimension could bring to 
the work of WEU the importance of sea power 
and of course an Atlantic dimension also which 
is crucial. 
Then, the IEPG should, I think, on a regular 
basis, report to this Assembly to give this 
Assembly an account of its work. It should not 
be an impossible task. A declassified account 
could be given at each part-session and in that 
way, I think, a constituency for European collab-
oration in the arms field could be built up among 
elected representatives of national parliaments, 
and that would be a very great step forward. 
Finally, Mr. President, in the space field which 
is the field in which my own Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Ques-
tions is particularly active, it is essential for 
Europe to co-ordinate an effective military space 
strategy and for that purpose I would suggest that 
ministers who attend the Council of the 
European Space Agency in Paris should ex 
officio join their defence minister and foreign 
minister colleagues on the Council of WEU 
whenever space matters are to be debated. We 
know that the European Space Agency's charter 
forbids the European Space Agency itself to have 
a function for military space technology, but 
nevertheless it is important, if Europeans' 
resources in the space field are to be effectively 
harnessed for our common security, that those 
ministers who are involved with ESA's work 
should be at hand to advise WEU whenever 
space comes up. 
If those four questions can be addressed, I 
think we shall have made progress as a result of 
this Assembly, but I would urge one final word of 
caution, Mr. President, and that is that if we do 
not enlarge WEU, there is a real risk of creating a 
Europe " a deux vitesses " in the security field. It 
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would be very great shame if WEU as an 
organisation of seven members were to make 
progress but that the cost of that progress were to 
leave further behind the other seven important 
members of NATO who are not at present 
members of our organisation and the way to 
avoid that is to encourage them and welcome 
them within our fold. 
Thank you Mr. President. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Valleix. 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). -
Clearly, after this statement by our colleague and 
friend, Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman of the Com-
mittee on Scientific, Technological and Aero-
space Questions I, as Rapporteur for space, was 
bound to give my full support to the proposals he 
has just made regarding the future course of our 
work and the changes this may require to our 
structure. I would also like to endorse the wish 
expressed by all speakers that WEU should be 
open house to new partners with a natural role to 
play in tackling the security problems of the 
defence of Europe. 
But you will not object, I hope, if I revert to 
the basic problems formulated by Mr. Ahrens 
our Rapporteur and join in your satisfaction 
both at the quality of the report and at the 
general approval already reached in committee -
at which we cannot fail to be pleased - and 
surely also that of this Assembly that I expect 
will be forthcoming this morning. I would like to 
do three things: recall France's attachment to the 
reactivation ofWEU, point out what has already 
been achieved since then and lastly suggest some 
lines of action for the future. 
Firstly, France has long been hoping for this 
revitalisation of WEU. France was a prime 
mover in the reactivation of the organisation 
that was decided in 1984 and had us all solidly 
behind it when we met in Italy. Today we are 
continuing with our efforts to put life into the 
organisation, as demonstrated by the statement 
by Mr. Chirac, the French Prime Minister, in 
Paris last December and the clear commitment 
to WEU that was manifest in his words. I feel too 
that public opinion in each of our countries is 
always very important. There is general approval 
- I think we can say so in France - going beyond 
the traditional political frontiers for the com-
mitment to a more dynamic development of 
WEU and its responsibilities. 
Secondly, reactivation has already made con-
siderable progress. As you recalled a moment 
ago, Mr. President, since October 1984 we have 
been able to push ahead with a number of con-
crete projects: adoption of the Rome declaration 
by the Council of Ministers of the Seven, acti-
37 
FIRST SITTING 
vation of the Council of Ministers, its 
enlargement to include the pefence ministers, 
creation of a real secretariat-general for the 
organisation with the necessary resources and 
improved relations between the Council and the 
Assembly. You have rightly pointed out, Mr. 
Rapporteur, that this is a field in which much 
remains to be done and I hope that we may take 
further steps in that direction at this extraor-
dinary session. There has also been the 
replacement of the Agency fpr the Control of 
Armaments and the Standing 1Armaments Com-
mittee by three new specialised agencies. There 
are still many points to be settled but that will be 
part of our Assembly's new p(>wers to stimulate 
action. 
Lastly there is the attraction that WEU seems 
to have for other countries. This is no doubt a 
positive reaction to the efforts that have been 
made but it is still a pleasure to welcome the 
interest shown by Portugal, iSpain and, more 
recently, Greece and Turkey in our own efforts. 
It is through dialogue, I hope, that we shall 
tighten our links with countries which are inter-
ested observers today and may be fully-fledged 
partners tomorrow. Europe needs them. 
Thirdly, the agreement binding the seven 
member countries of the organisation together 
today should be formalised by an official act as 
the French Prime Minister proposed last 
December. Work is currently proceeding on the 
text as you know and with your permission I will 
remind you of some of the main principles on 
which it could be based. · 
Nuclear deterrence still r~mains the only 
effective means of preventing war in Europe. 
The threat to Western Europe has to be regarded 
in its entirety. For the deterrent to be effective in 
Europe there have to be strategic links between 
the two sides of the Atlantic which means that 
American forces have to be maintained on the 
old continent. European defbce forces, too, 
have to be maintained at a level which matches 
the threat. On this point, the contribution of the 
French and British independenjt nuclear capabil-
ities is essential. The object ofldisarmament has 
to be to strengthen security at lower levels of 
armament by realistic and verifiable agree-
ments. 
Ultimately, our discussions this morning and 
this afternoon are already very closely interre-
lated. 
Mr. President, ladies and gendemen, allow me 
to make it clear at this point that I feel I can 
speak on behalf of the representatives of my 
country on this matter. We cannot be other than 
pleased that this defence effort is apparently 
becoming better organised and that all our coun-
tries' contributions are better co-ordinated and 
consequently more effective. Illl terms of arma-
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ments and the strategic approach, of course, a 
vast amount remains to be done and we shall 
need to show once again, this very day, our unity 
in a world of changing defence problems. This 
should be an opportunity to strengthen the 
alliance between us, not the reverse. This is the 
only responsible way to respond to proposals 
which should represent a chance of peace for the 
world provided the way is through the consoli-
dation of Europe and not its disunion. 
May I conclude, Mr. President, by expressing 
two wishes. On the occasion of this basic report 
on European defence policy my first hope is that 
we shall interest public opinion increasingly in 
the recognition and consequently the 
acceptance of the responsibility that this implies 
- of the fact that democracy and freedom have to 
be defended, if necessary, by force of arms. My 
second hope is that, ultimately, our action may 
be conducted in such a way that Europe will 
become the third world power. That is what it is 
also trying to become on the economic front but 
Europe also needs to do so in terms of 
democracy and freedom, if necessary by 
mobilising its defence capabilities. So you see the 
connection between getting the support of public 
opinion and this climb to the rank of third world 
power, without prejudice of course to the western 
entente. 
Mr. Rapporteur, Mr. President, I think that 
this report adds further strength to the basic prin-
ciples which should enable us to work in that 
direction so that Europe becomes as determined 
in its defence policy as in its will for unity. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Klejdzinski. 
Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, ladies 
and gentlemen, Mr. Ahrens has submitted a very 
balanced and excellent report. Nor need this 
assessment be amended in view of Mr. Ahrens's 
self-critical comments on what his report did not 
or could not achieve. We need a European initi-
ative, and this report is an important contri-
bution, an important step in the right 
direction. 
I agree with Mr. Wilkinson about the impor-
tance of such areas as space technology and space 
research and their possible applications. To bring 
London into play as the seat is undoubtedly not 
a bad move when it comes to possible new loca-
tions for institutions. But I think we should con-
sider this carefully, since I can imagine that there 
are many possible locations in Europe, and it 
might be a good idea to choose somewhere where 
the sun shines more than it does in London. 
Apart from that, we should realise that the 
European nations must continue resolutely down 
38 
FIRST SITTING 
the road of detente, which they first took in the 
1970s, in order to make a major contribution to 
defusing the East-West conflict. 
What we are discussing here today- and we 
should admit this to ourselves and others - is 
our failure to foresee the dramatic nature of 
developments in the Soviet Union under Mr. 
Gorbachev. I believe the present Soviet lead-
ership is so keen to modernise the country 
because it realises that unless it reorganises its 
own system it will not be able to stay the course, 
let alone win the contest between the social 
systems. We must, however, consciously ask our-
selves: is the Soviet Union becoming more 
receptive to co-operation and more predictable 
as a partner? This applies without reservation, 
and must be examined against the background of 
our view that the efforts to achieve disarmament 
and arms control are essential to the mainte-
nance of peace in Europe and the world. What 
should not, of course, be overlooked in these 
efforts is that Europe's security must not be 
jeopardised. But - and let us also remember this 
- nuclear deterrence cannot prevent war for 
ever. 
The proposal from our French colleague for a 
European security charter gives us social demo-
crats the opportunity of considering and defining 
the conditions for European security once again, 
and discussing them with our American friends. 
I do not share the view that the reactivation of 
WEU we are hoping for might jeopardise the 
unity of the Atlantic Alliance. The premise we 
social democrats adopt is that the Federal 
Republic forms an integral part, politically and 
militarily, of the European Community and 
NATO. There is no question about that as far as 
we are concerned. But we take the view that the 
reactivation ofWEU can achieve something that 
means a great deal to us: it can ensure that the 
formulation of objectives in the alliance is more 
closely geared to the efforts of sovereign con-
tracting parties, and that greater account is taken 
of the vital interests of individual members and 
of the security interests of all partners in the alli-
ance's formulation of objectives. 
Reactivation with the object of clearly defining 
European security interests and of allocating to 
the Western Europeans an independent role in 
the alliance so that their interests in the areas of 
defence and detente are recognised is an 
approach that meets with our critical approval. 
Let me conclude by saying that no one under-
estimates the difficulties, no one will underes-
timate the efforts that will have to be made. But 
our goal must not be overlooked in the process: 
it is an established and forward-looking 
co-operation between East and West which - and 
I should like to emphasise this once again -
enables the two systems to compete peacefully, 
without the use of force, so that in both alliances 
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demands for reforms are possible, aimed at 
reaching new agreements on security. We still 
want Western Europe's political role to be 
strengthened; we want to see it asserting itself as 
a political force. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Murphy. 
Mr. MURPHY (United Kingdom). - Mr. 
President, in contributing to this debate on the 
reactivation of Western European Union, I do so 
from the point of view of the need for the 
Council, as the Rapporteur rightly points out, to 
inform public opinion of all its activities in 
accordance with the principles set out in the 
Rome declaration. At the same time, as I have 
emphasised in the British House of Commons, 
there is also a need for publicity to be given to 
the support for this organisation displayed by 
governments as well as to the achievements of 
the Assembly in terms of the benefits to 
European citizens. Throughout the current par-
liament, I have had the privilege of being a 
United Kingdom delegate to Western European 
Union. Since that appointment by the Prime 
Minister, I have gained an insight into its work 
and I hope that I have, at least in some small 
measure, contributed to its progress. 
Mr. President, I made clear in my maiden 
speech to this Assembly and on subsequent occa-
sions my commitment to freedom and 
democracy. Thus, to be a member of the 
Assembly of Western European Union has given 
me an opportunity to broaden that commitment. 
WEU, with its basis in the Brussels Treaty, aims 
to preserve the principles of democracy, personal 
freedom and political liberty and, being con-
cerned with defence and security issues, it has 
provided substantial benefits in helping to 
ensure peace and co-operation. But whatever the 
results of the deliberations of the Assembly of 
Western European Union, however relevant the 
reports may be to the lives of ordinary people, 
whatever the decisions made by the Council of 
Ministers, the fact remains that little in the way 
of reference is made to them and consequently 
little in the way of knowledge is gained by the 
public. During the period of reactivation of 
Western European Union, which, it is intended, 
will ensure that it becomes the European pillar of 
the NATO alliance, the value of the Council ini-
tiating opportunities to draw attention to the 
activities of Western European Union is mani-
festly apparent. However, in parallel, the onus 
must also be upon this Assembly to take similar 
action. 
Mr. President, George Bernard Shaw, who 
lived in mid-Hertfordshire, once declared he 
knows nothing and he thinks he knows every-
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thing. That points clearly to a
1
.political career. As 
Shaw predates my representation of the area that 
cannot be said to have been directed at me unless 
prophecy was intended. However, I now know 
something about Western European Union, 
although I realise that I cannot know quite every-
thing. Perhaps I should leave unspoken what that 
means about a political career. 
I 
Mr. President, so that othetis may know some-
thing about Western European Union too, we 
should support the Rapporteur and the draft 
recommendation and emphasise the importance 
of acting without delay on the document entitled 
WEU and public awareness. 
The PRESIDENT (Translartion). - I call Mr. 
Bassinet. 
Mr. BASSINET (France) (Translation). - We 
have just heard the report so excellently pre-
sented by Mr. Ahrens. He referred to the reacti-
vation of WEU; the term previously used was 
revitalisation but I do not think any semantic 
dispute is involved. The world changes and 
every time some major event takes place, public 
opinion rediscovers the importance of security 
and defence questions. I believe that the revival 
ofWEU that we have been witnessing for several 
years now definitely fits into the framework of 
recent events with their cert~inties and uncer-
tainties which require forum~ for wide-ranging 
discussions. I have already spoken several times 
about the reactivation or revitalisation of WEU, 
saying that, though the intentions were boldly 
announced much less has been achieved by way 
of results. 
After the speech by Mr. Valtix I would never-
theless like to say a word abo t the French pro-
posals. It might be thought, fr m a rapid perusal 
of the report and the draft recommendation, that 
these French proposals and recommendations 
only go back to 1986. Like Mr. Valleix, I wish to 
make it clear that they are in fact part of a con-
tinuous process and that it, was as early as 
December 1981 that Mr. Lemotne, then Secretary 
of State, spoke to this Assembly followed by 
Ministers Hernu and Cheysspn, not forgetting 
Mr. Mauroy the Prime Minister of course, who 
gave a reception for all members ofthe Assembly 
in order to transmit a message very similar to 
what the present Prime Min;· ter had to say in 
December 1986. So they all ake a continuous 
series of initiatives and propo als to which much 
thought was given after the events that had 
occurred, in 1979 in particula~, and I think that, 
as far as our common will to strengthen the 
European dimension of our joint security is con-
cerned, we are all very much agreed. 
There was our Rome declaration ofl984. Here, 
Mr. President, I undertook the useful exercise of 
re-reading it because everybody keeps referring 
to it. There are resounding titles of this kind, 
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ready-made words or phrases that keep coming 
up like the words of a litany. I re-read it to see 
whether the intentions stated by the Council of 
Ministers in 1984 and the objectives of the decla-
ration had any relation to things as they really 
are today. Better use ofWEU, harmonisation of 
views on the specific conditions of security in 
Europe - who could not have agreed? 
In the declaration there was a part devoted to 
reform of the institutions of WEU, a whole 
section concerning the activation of the Council, 
a chapter on relations between the Council and 
the Assembly in which it was said, among other 
things, that the Assembly would have the use of 
contributions from WEU's technical agencies, a 
complete section on the future of the Agency for 
the Control of Armaments and the Standing 
Armaments Committee with, in particular, a 
paragraph which stressed that WEU should be in 
a position to play an active role in providing 
political impetus by supporting all co-operative 
efforts including those of the Independent 
European Programme Group and the Con-
ference of National Armaments Directors and 
lastly a brief but important section dealing with 
contacts with non-member states. So having 
re-read this document, Mr. President, and 
having compared the scale of its ambitions and 
objectives with the real situation today I think 
we have to take stock - as Mr. Ahrens's report so 
excellently invites us to do. 
With regard to the originality and specific 
nature of WEU compared with the other 
European organisations we are all agreed: in 
terms of its organisations, Europe is a many-
sided entity and I do not think it is any good 
imagining that security questions can at present 
be dealt with in depth in the framework of the 
Community. To my mind, therefore, these issues 
will for a very long time remain largely excluded 
from political co-operation among the Twelve -
at least in the framework of the EEC. 
I therefore welcome the presence of the 
observers who are present today in greater 
number than ever before. Whether they come 
from member states of the Community or else-
where their presence is a clear indication of what 
is at stake in the reactivation of WEU, a devel-
opment which I would like to liken to the new 
approach to the Community's institutional 
problems following the European Council's 
meeting in Milan. 
Ultimately, successful reactivation may 
perhaps make WEU superfluous but for the 
moment we are all talking about it; there is not a 
single speech made in this Assembly which does 
not at some stage or other refer to WEU reacti-
vation. The term is now rooted in our minds. We 
are all convinced but it must not, in the reality of 
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things, be reduced to the words of a litany. There 
are positive aspects however: I would not like to 
let it be thought that the Rome declaration has 
been without effect. 
The ministers are now in the habit of meeting 
more regularly and consulting with the represen-
tatives of the Assembly. The new agencies have 
been set up and are beginning, though it has 
taken a very long time, to function. Even though 
there have been no big changes to the Assembly 
because of the diet of budgetary austerity we 
have had to live on, it has experienced a fresh 
surge - more vigorous than in previous years -
of activity and I would even say has gained in 
prestige. But, as Mr. Ahrens points out in his 
report, there have been various difficulties in the 
way of implementing the principles proclaimed 
in Rome and I must say, for the ears of the repre-
sentatives of the ministers and the ministers 
themselves present here today, that the govern-
ments have done everything they could to cover 
up these difficulties. To my mind such con-
cealment is not a positive factor. 
I would also add that, whilst it is clear that an 
effort has been made in certain fields, no particu-
larly convincing results have been achieved in 
any of them. I would like to refer more particu-
larly to the work of the agencies because, though 
something may sometimes happen in them, we 
are the last to be told, if at all, which is rather 
regrettable. 
Nothing has been done either by the Council 
or the renovated SAC to promote co-operation 
on armaments and scientific co-operation. I feel 
this to be disturbing even though we can under-
stand the reasons for the hold-up. I referred a 
moment ago to the problem of the Independent 
European Programme Group because there it has 
to be recognised that the Council today has gone 
backwards from the Rome declaration, a point I 
stress and deplore. 
I will close, Mr. President, because you have 
asked us to be brief. When I last spoke - it was 
on the same subject - I referred to the Council's 
" amiable lethargy ". The phrase was perhaps 
cruel but I have no wish to repeat it exactly. The 
presence of the observers and the applications 
that have been filed to join WEU are incentives 
for the Council of Ministers and all of us to make 
WEU a place that is something more, if I may 
say so, than a mere forum where the European 
countries in the Atlantic Alliance can gather or a 
security appendage of the European Commu-
nities but instead a source of political impetus 
for the defence and security of Europe. It was 
important, to my mind, to recall this point. The 
divide separating the Council of Ministers and 
its activities from our Assembly is still too wide 
but I would say that there has been some 
improvement due largely, without a doubt, to the 
personal efforts of the Chairman-in-Office of the 
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Council of Ministers. Progress has been made in 
this field. I am gratified that this should be so 
and I hope that it will continue in the future. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Burger. 
Mr. BURGER (Luxembourg) (Translation). -
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, may I, as 
leader of our delegation, thank your President, 
Mr. Jean-Marie Caro, whose untiring activity 
and inexhaustible energy have so well defended 
the cause of WEU in its extended phase of reani-
mation - I use the term in its medical sense of 
course. 
I trust that the hopes he has placed in the 
Luxembourg chairmanship will prove warranted. 
Kindly allow me two comments. First, the 
advantage of a very small nation is that it is lis-
tened to without suspicion - or at least with not 
as much suspicion - by its more powerful 
partners who can be in no doubt about the 
European character of our Grand Duchy, whose 
name is so intimately linked with all the 
European institutions. At the last ordinary 
session in Paris last December the Chairman-in-
Office was represented by someone from Luxem-
bourg from beginning to end of the proceedings. 
In turn, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the 
Defence Minister and the Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs all addressed the Assembly and 
replied to representatives' questions. In that way 
the Chairman-in-Office has demonstrated and is 
still demonstrating - even though Mr. Goebbels 
is absent for a few moments - the firm wish of 
the Council to be in direct dialogue with the 
Assembly that has, for many years, been asking 
for closer and more fruitful relations with the 
Council on whose actions the future ofWEU will 
ultimately depend. 
Second, the psychological shock triggered by 
the Soviet Union's hyperactivity seeking to elim-
inate missiles in Europe, seriously complicate 
relations between Europe and America and 
undermine the foundations of the Atlantic 
Alliance, has ultimately played into WEU's 
hands because its political role in the security of 
Western Europe has gained new importance, or 
so I hope, which should bring about the reacti-
vation we want so much. Given the lack of 
progress in the integration of European security 
at Community level - where political and eco-
nomic co-operation has advanced - it is essential 
and logical for WEU to put this vital question on 
its agenda. These two reasons explain why this 
extraordinary session decided upon in Paris is 
being held today in Luxembourg. 
As regards Mr. Ahrens's report, despite the 
remarks he made a few moments ago, his very 
objective study deserves our warmest congratula-
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tions. I shall confine myself to a few problems 
concerned with priorities. 
First the budget. The problem of finance, 
essential for an institution to
1
function properly, 
has long been on the Assem ly's agenda and is 
regularly the occasion of ha h criticism of the 
Council. The rule followed by the Chairman-in-
Office is to apply to the bqdget of the WEU 
Council and Assembly the satne norms as those 
laid down by the budgetary experts of the Twelve 
for " all estimates of the Cpmmunity institu-
tions ". The annual growth rate of expenditure 
would thus be kept within the maximum growth 
in budgetary spending as palculated by the 
Brussels Commission each !Year. In addition, 
under the terms of the agreement negotiated with 
the Council, the Assembly w()uld itself have the 
right to decide financial policy for the coming 
year within that growth rate. I hope that this pro-
cedure put forward by the Chairman-in-Office 
will be applied by the partners. 
With regard to structures, the creation of a 
political committee on European security con-
sisting of the political directors of the foreign 
affairs ministers of the Seven together with 
senior officials from the defen~e ministries is evi-
dence of the will of the Council to promote the 
reactivation of WEU. This political committee, 
which is responsible for evaluating the threat and 
how to respond to it, will m~et periodically bu1 
emergency meetings could also be held as and 
when necessary. This would create links with 
NATO and the Europe of the !Twelve, which has 
no powers with regard to def~tnce. As the Secre-
tary-General of WEU has to attend these 
meetings, the Assembly i~ entitled to be 
informed by the Council about the work done by 
this committee. 
As regards the structures of the agencies and of 
the Independent European Programme Group 
for co-operation in weapon systems and for 
industrial co-operation amon~ Europeans, might 
it not be useful to set up a study and analysis 
centre within WEU in order to improve 
co-operation in technology 1and research? In 
certain cases, our partners in the Atlantic 
Alliance might even be included in sharing the 
work. 
With regard to the European security charter 
proposed by Mr. Chirac, the first problem -
nuclear deterrence - is on O'IJr agenda for this 
afternoon. 
The point about the possib.e participation of 
countries that are members df the Community 
and of NATO but not of WEU in the European 
security charter is, in a way, a first step towards 
the enlargement of WEU. Would not such 
enlargement, by stages, and over a reasonable 
period, act as a kind of supercharger in the reacti-
vation of WEU? 
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Opinions on that problem differ in the 
Assembly and in the Council. Those against 
want the structures and operation of WEU to be 
modified first and those for think the 
organisation would gain in credibility and above 
all be more representative of Europe if it spoke 
for a larger number of countries. 
It must be remembered that the Chairman-in-
Office informs allies outside WEU of the results 
of each ministerial meeting at a briefing in 
Luxembourg and in a report to the NATO 
Council. As members of the General Affairs 
Committee, we have had discussions of value to 
both sides in several countries. Personally, and 
the Chairman-in-Office agrees, I consider that we 
should deal expeditiously with the Portuguese 
and Spanish applications for membership, con-
vinced as we are of the additional strength these 
members of the Community and NATO will 
bring to European security. 
In conclusion, let me say, firstly, that the reac-
tivation of WEU ought not to arouse the ani-
mosity of our transatlantic allies because its 
purpose is to strengthen the European pillar of 
the Atlantic Alliance and, secondly, that the 
security of Europe is guaranteed to the year 2000 
by the Atlantic Alliance and the enlarged WEU. I 
am well aware that a dictatorship which pro-
poses, commands and disposes, is in a position 
of advantage by comparison with a democratic 
institution of seven member countries. I never-
theless put my trust in the wisdom ofthe Council 
and await with some impatience Mr. Poos's 
report tomorrow afternoon. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Freeson. 
Mr. FREESON (United Kingdom). - In my 
remarks I wish to return to the two main points 
that K.arl Ahrens made during the course of his 
introduction of the report. He made the point 
that the two main themes to come out of this 
report were first the question of future rela-
tionships between the Council and this Assembly 
and second, if I understood him correctly, that 
the objective of the charter which this report 
calls upon us to study, and calls upon the 
Council to study, should be - and I quote him -
"maximum security with minimum of wea-
ponry and men". Very important words. In fact 
so important in my opinion that it would be 
useful if somehow in a future text they were to be 
incorporated because they are very relevant to 
the present situation - more so than ever 
before. 
But I want first of all to comment on one parti-
cular aspect of the question of relations between 
the Council and this Assembly which has arisen 
in recent times and which some colleagues will 
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know that I raised this morning. It is an aspect 
which is of direct relevance to the present poli-
tical situation that WEU and others have to 
contend with during the course of the negotia-
tions and the open political discussions taking 
place on the future of arms control and arms 
reduction, in particular nuclear arms reduction. I 
was very concerned - and I make no apologies 
for raising this very important matter- to read 
in a leading newspaper in the United Kingdom, 
on 23rd April, an interview with the Secretary-
General ofWEU, Mr. Alfred Cahen, who will be 
addressing us during our session. I was very 
concerned to read a number of statements which 
very seriously, if correctly reported as I believe 
they have been, pre-empt political discussion 
and decision by this Assembly and indeed by the 
Council of Ministers. I shall quote some of the 
statements, just one or two of them. I should say 
that the report opens as follows - and this is by 
John Lichfield, West Europe editor of The Inde-
pendent, a highly-respected and, I believe, 
genuinely independent newspaper. It opens by 
saying: "Britain and its six partners in the 
Western European Union will attempt next week 
to agree a common strategy for resisting the 
denuclearisation of Europe. " 
I leave aside a lot of the text and we go on to 
see a reference in the report to Mr. Cahen, Secre-
tary-General of WEU who " said yesterday " - it 
does not say to whom he said it, presumably to 
Mr. John Lichfield - " that he believed the Seven 
(Britain, France, West Germany, Italy and the 
Benelux trio) would reaffirm their commitment 
to a nuclear aspect in the defence of Western 
Europe. " He went on to say a number of options 
would be considered this week by this Assembly 
presumably and by the ministers. A number of 
options would be considered including the possi-
bility of keeping a number of short-range mis-
siles on either side ofthe iron curtain. Further on 
he said that all, I quote carefully, "all seven 
members agreed " , not might agree, " agreed that 
nuclear weapons must continue to play a subs-
tantial role in the defence of Western Europe. It 
is accepted that the NATO doctrine of a flexible 
response to a military threat must be preserved," 
and I add that among other things what is 
referred to as flexible response is the possibility 
of first nuclear strike should armed conflict break 
out in Europe. 
I will not quote further and you will notice, 
Mr. President, that I have so far not commented 
on the merits or demerits of the point of view 
being expressed. I may come to that later if time 
permits, but I do want to say this in connection 
with the relations between the Council and this 
Assembly. No civil servant, and certainly not the 
Secretary-General, has the right to go to any 
section of the media, to anyone, and start 
making political statements, major political sta-
tements of that kind before we have debated the 
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issues and before even the ministers have 
debated the issues. 
I put it to you, Mr. President- and I hope that 
all colleagues, whatever point of view they may 
have on these matters, will agree - that you 
make very clear inquiries on our behalf as parlia-
mentarians in this Assembly as to who the Secre-
tary-General was speaking for, on what 
authority, and who arranged that kind ofbriefing 
which I imagine was also given to other senior 
defence and political correspondents in the 
media. If we cannot sort out such things, all our 
talk about constructive relationships being built 
between our parliamentary Assembly and the 
Council of Ministers becomes no more than 
continuing rhetoric. 
Now, ifl have time, I want to deal briefly with 
the other theme which Karl Ahrens rightly 
stressed - the objective of the charter should be 
maximum security for Western Europe with 
minimum of weaponry and men. I turn in that 
connection to only one part of the text. We are 
all, I believe, going to support this report and its 
recommendation, but I want to express one 
reservation or anxiety about the text and then I 
will sit down. Sub-paragraph l(a) says quite pro-
perly that the study of the French Government's 
proposals for a charter should be undertaken 
with a view, and I quote, " to defining Europe's 
security requirements, acquainting its American 
allies with them and ensuring that current nego-
tiations on the limitation of nuclear and conven-
tional weapons lead to substantial reductions 
without compromising Europe's security". 
Absolutely correct and so far as I am concerned 
the full stop could go in on that sentence there. 
But then it concludes with " based on a policy of 
deterrence". At face value one might argue 
about the use of the word deterrence literally, but 
at face value that does not have much political 
significance but we all know that it could 
have. 
Let me put it this way, Mr. President. If that 
reference is coded language for maintaining as a 
long-term strategic objective whatever we may 
reluctantly have to accept in our time now and 
maybe had to accept reluctantly over the last 
forty years, if that is coded language for the inde-
finite continuation of so-called nuclear deter-
rence, then there is one delegate here who does 
not accept that phraseology. And I think there 
are many others who will agree that if it means 
nuclear deterrence we do not accept it. We 
believe our objective must be to move away 
from what we have hoped to be reluctant accep-
tance, whether rightly or wrongly, reluctant 
acceptance of nuclear weapons these last forty 
years, to move away when the opportunity pre-
sents itself, as it appears to be now, to a nego-
tiating position to relieve our continent and 
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hopefully the world of this most serious of 
threats to mankind. On that linderstanding there 
is no objection to the text. B\llt if it does mean a 
continuation of nuclear deterrence, then let there 
be no misunderstanding about it, there will be 
many others who will continue to campaign and 
to challenge that concept. Let not Western 
Europe, or to put it frankly, .let not the British 
and the French Governtrlients become the 
Molotov of the future. Remember the famous 
phrase "Niet, niet, niet ". Not for us. Let there 
be " Yes, yes, yes " to an end to this threat to 
mankind. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
van der Sanden. 
Mr. van der SANDEN (Netherlands) (Trans-
lation). - Mr. President, I wiU begin by congratu-
lating the Rapporteur, Mr. Ahrens, on this first 
part of a report that he has called out of date. I 
think it is a sound, excellent piece of work, but 
that there should indeed be a follow-up which we 
can discuss in greater depth. Mr. President, 
without prejudice to the un~ty within NATO, 
which is after all the cornerstone of peace and 
security in the world and therefore in Europe, 
one of the main issues in Mr. Ahrens's report is 
the proposal from the French Prime Minister, 
Mr. Chirac, that a European security charter 
should be drawn up. On 2nd December 1986 Mr. 
Chirac said in this Assembl)j, and I quote: " ... 
the time has come for us tO! agree to give this 
activity the political inspirat!ion it still lacks. " 
That, Mr. President, was after Reykjavik but 
before the developments of recent months, the 
most important of which was the meeting 
between Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Shultz. 
Obviously, we are now asking, ourselves what the 
Council has done with Mr. Ctiirac's proposal. If a 
security charter had already existed, what signifi-
cance would it have had for the consultations 
that took place in Brussels immediately after the 
discussions in Moscow? 
But perhaps even more pressing is the 
question: what has the Council of Ministers of 
Western European Union been doing since 
Moscow? Or perhaps - I do not know if the Rap-
porteur has the answer to this - the Council's 
meeting here in Luxembourg tomorrow, 28th 
April, will be the first opportunity the ministers 
have had to consider European security since the 
discussions in Moscow. There should surely 
have been consultations i within Western 
European Union, within NATO, before 23rd 
April, the day on which tltle negotiations in 
Geneva were resumed. 
Mr. President, during the developments we 
have witnessed in recent months some very 
important decisions affecting Europe will clearly 
have been taken, and I do not need to remind 
you that considerable emphasis was placed in the 
European capitals on the importance for Western 
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European Union of the progress made in 
Moscow. I recall the statements by Mr. Poos, the 
Luxembourg Foreign Minister and current 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, and by Mr. 
Tindemans. Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British 
Foreign Minister, has also spoken of this. But I 
was thinking very specifically of the Soviet 
Union, where, as you recalled, Mr. President, 
and you were there, a very unexpected interest 
was taken in Western European Union. The visit 
to Moscow by the WEU delegation speaks 
volumes, I feel, at this stage in relations between 
East and West. I should like to make special 
mention of a statement made by one of those I 
have just mentioned, the statement by Mr. Tin-
demans at the conference of the European 
Movement in Paris on 12th or 13th April, I think 
it was. Mr. Tindemans said on that occasion: 
" WEU is the only forum available at present to 
tackle the problems of European defence. Even 
so I would prefer to be able to include the 
defence dimension in the Twelve's work". But 
Mr. Tindemans clearly emphasised that WEU is 
in fact the only instrument we have at the 
moment for European defence. 
Mr. President, the problem of the zero option 
for medium-range weapons should, of course, be 
combined with the problems connected with 
short-range weapons and also, as Mr. Ahrens's 
report points out, with the problems relating to 
chemical weapons. I certainly do not want to go 
into this in depth now, because the main point I 
want to make in this Assembly today is that, as 
stated in Mr. Ahrens's report, disarmament is of 
the utmost importance because Europe's 
security, which has now been guaranteed for 
forty years, must continue to be maintained in 
terms of the greatest possible security with a 
minimum of weapons, as Mr. Freeson has just 
said. 
Then there is a second question, Mr. Pre-
sident: how do we now get the Western European 
Union countries and the other European NATO 
countries to agree? I realise that the Americans 
call the tune in consultations within NATO. I 
also realise that there has to be a consensus there, 
but the heart of the European security philo-
sophy must surely lie where Europe has its own 
structure - a parliamentary structure - and that 
is here in this WEU Assembly. 
Mr. President, I should like to put the fol-
lowing question to the Rapporteur today: does he 
believe that we in Western European Union, and 
by that I mean both the Council of Ministers and 
the Assembly, still have time, following the rapid 
developments of recent months, to study Mr. 
Chirac's proposals at our leisure, with a view to 
drawing up a European security charter? Would 
it not be far better, and perhaps wiser too, to urge 
Western European Union's Council of Ministers 
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to look very closely at Mr. Gorbachev's pro-
posals in the coming weeks, and to call on the 
Council of Ministers itself rather than the Per-
manent Council in London to safeguard 
Europe's very considerable interest in security? 
Do we then, I ask the Rapporteur, need a 
European charter? I do not think Mr. Ahrens and 
I disagree that the delay in the reactivation of 
WEU, the Council's inadequate communication 
with the Assembly, in short the lack of vigour 
and pace for which the Council of Ministers is 
responsible, have had an adverse effect on and 
even restricted major opportunities for Western 
European Union in recent international events. 
Mr. President, my proposition today - and I 
should like to hear whether the Rapporteur 
agrees with me - is that the establishment of a 
European security charter must not be seen as an 
excuse for once again postponing the day when 
Europe speaks with one voice on security 
matters. In international politics too there are 
sometimes very important opportunities that do 
not present themselves every year. When an 
opportunity of this kind arises, it must be seized 
with both hands. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Martino. 
Mr. MARTINO (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, I shall be very brief. Mr. President, 
you like all of us are aware of the vital impor-
tance of the problem of arms limitation and the 
search for disarmament without endangering 
European security. Mr. Gorbachev's vigorous 
and sometimes off-the-cuff policy of making 
offers does not allow time for necessary thought 
on the extent and scope of each response by the 
foreign and defence policies of the WEU coun-
tries, all the European countries and all the coun-
tries united in western defence policy. This 
policy of making offers, Mr. President, is sur-
prising seen against many decades when the 
usual reply was " niet " during a past which we 
all want to forget and have forgotten. In more 
and more cases, the United States is responding 
to this astute policy by equally off-the-cuff 
moves. This modifies the generally-held ideas 
which are put into words by one of our per-
manent committees. This has happened with Mr. 
Ahrens's report which the speaker, with 
becoming modesty, says could be improved, not 
as regards the work which has been put into it 
which is undoubtedly remarkable but because of 
the swiftly-changing circumstances which render 
virtually every assumption out of date overnight. 
The need to prevent a chemical armaments 
race is stressed in the recommendations sub-
mitted to the Council of Ministers in the text 
now before the Assembly. The same text men-
tions the United States proposal to the USSR 
that Soviet experts be present to witness the des-
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truction of chemical weapons held in United 
States arsenals. And we should be seeking now to 
have this invitation extended to our countries 
because such a move would appear to be a direct 
preparatory step on the way to any agreement for 
the elimination of chemical weapons by all civi-
lised nations of the world now that the biotech-
nological developments of our scientific age are 
apparently uncontrollable. 
My request is a matter of urgency, Mr. Pre-
sident, because, while it is understandably dif-
ficult or even impossible for us to be included in 
the negotiations between the two superpowers, it 
is on the contrary quite possible that our nations 
should take part as experts in the application of 
measures which we hope will, in the fairly near 
future, remove from the world this threat to the 
survival of mankind which is second only to the 
nuclear threat. 
Thank you, Mr. President, because I am 
convinced that through your unfailing under-
standing and thoughtful efforts it may or will be 
possible for us to take a direct part in the 
building of peace on the ruins of our very human 
fears. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Linster. 
Mr. LINSTER (Luxembourg) (Translation). -
To my mind, Mr. Ahrens's report, which Mr. 
Wilkinson has described as historic and Mr. 
Valleix as fundamental, is a perfect illustration of 
the old French saying to the effect that without 
the right to criticise there can be no sincere 
praise. Mr. Ahrens is completely even-handed in 
his distribution of bad and good marks to the 
Council. As a Luxembourg representative I 
obviously welcome the latter, particularly those 
addressed to the Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council. 
If, Mr. President, I were to dwell on all the 
good features I find in this very detailed and 
impartial report which combines rare heights of 
political thinking with consistent accuracy in the 
concrete data on which it is built I am very much 
afraid that all my speaking time would go in 
congratulations. Let me just say that both in 
form and substance, Mr. Ahrens's indictment of 
the Council is an ideal example of what the 
role, position and importance of the Assembly 
should be. 
It is certainly not without good reason that the 
General Affairs Committee criticises - with the 
qualifications that Mr. Ahrens has added in his 
address - the way the Council clings to its tradi-
tional questioning of the Assembly's exercise of 
the powers it is given by Article IX of the treaty 
and refuses to apply in our regard all the prin-
ciples or all the hopes contained in the Rome 
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declaration. Parliamentary participation in the 
political reactivation of WEU is undermined by 
the Council's attitude towards the Assembly that 
is doubly restrictive, firstly lin its information 
policy and secondly, as President Caro has just 
pointed out, in its budgetary policy. 
All of which hardly enables us to play the part 
of a second political power, which since 1954 is 
what the amended Brussels Treaty intended this 
Assembly to be and that is greatly to be 
regretted. 
I said, Mr. President, that Mr. Ahrens was 
even-handed in his award of bad and good 
marks. So you will find it natural for a Luxem-
bourg socialist deputy to note with pleasure 
certain points made in favour of the Council by 
the Rapporteur and other speakers, particularly 
as regards the efforts of the Chairman-in-Office 
and the Luxembourg Milltister for Foreign 
Affairs, to whose great understanding of the work 
and importance of our Ass~mbly tribute has 
already been paid by President Caro and other 
speakers. In this connection I :appreciate in parti-
cular the remarks made by Mr. Valleix and Mr. 
Bassinet. 
With regard to the resources that the Assembly 
should be given, this is something we shall be 
returning to tomorrow in the debate on the 
budget but today, in the political context of the 
problem, I feel it is important to stress straight 
away, as President Caro did this morning, that 
the Chairman-in-Office of the Council and the 
President ofthe Assembly and the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration are in 
complete agreement on this matter - as 
expressed, incidentally, in a draft resolution 
approved by that committee this morning. Here 
I would express the wish, in the most formal 
terms and with the utmost vigour, that the 
ministers will hear our mess~ge and accordingly 
agree, tomorrow, to follow Mr. Poos along the 
road he proposes towards a workable solution for 
the Assembly's long-standing ~udgetary troubles; 
a permanent solution here w~uld be a vital step 
towards parliamentary politiccal participation in 
the reactivation of WEU. 
Mr. Ahrens is also perfectly right to my mind 
to welcome, among other things, the Council 
decision at its Luxembourg meeting in 
November 1986 that the meeting of political 
directors of foreign ministries assisted by senior 
officials from defence ministries should be of an 
official, binding and regular nature. This seems 
to me a tool of the most vital importance parti-
cularly since, as the Council's reply to Recom-
mendation 438 and an earlier verbal statement 
by Mr. Poos make abundantly clear, " the 
Assembly is to be informed of the results of the 
meetings". 
I would also like to endorse the Rapporteur's 
oral presentation though I would add that, in my 
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opinion, Mr. Ahrens's report is not, in substance, 
invalidated by the two series of proposals Mr. 
Gorbachev has made regarding what the media 
call the zero and super zero options. I would just 
like to add this: in my opinion, certain European 
governments should bear in mind that, in this 
connection, insisting on something better could 
definitely leave us worse off, which is why I am 
very pleased to hear that an amendment has 
been tabled to paragraph 2( c) of the recommen-
dation to the effect that disarmament should be 
added to the subjects of co-operation. This stems 
logically from paragraph (v) of the preamble to 
the recommendation we are now considering. I 
would like to round offwhat I have just said on a 
personal note by adding that, being myself 
unconvinced of the usefulness or even logic of 
nuclear deterrence, I hope that the whole of the 
draft recommendation will be revised on the 
basis of conventional defence rather than deter-
rence. 
To conclude I would like to voice one further 
concern. With the formation of an unavowed, 
secret even, but nevertheless real security policy 
axis linking Paris, Bonn and London, are we 
small countries not right to nurse the same fear 
in WEU as WEU itself has with regard to the 
United States, namely that of being left out of 
account and not even consulted in any reaso-
nable way in the decisions of the bigger coun-
tries? It is in that context, and for that reason 
among others that I plead very strongly - and I 
do so as Mr. Bassinet has just done on behalf of 
the Socialist Group - for the effective and speedy 
application of paragraph 2(b) of the recommen-
dation, in other words the enlargement of WEU 
to the countries which have a right to take a full 
part in our work, which want to do so, and which 
can produce the necessary democratic guarantees 
to join our ranks. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
De Decker. 
Mr. DE DECKER (Belgium) (Translation). -
You will not be surprised, ladies and gentlemen 
if, on behalf of the Liberal Group, I join in the 
congratulations offered to Mr. Ahrens for his 
excellent report and to the whole General Affairs 
Committee for its work under the chairmanship 
of Mr. Close. I really feel, Mr. Ahrens, that your 
report strikes exactly the right note at the point 
we have reached today in the history of WEU's 
development and in the implementation of the 
concept of the defence of Europe by Europeans 
themselves. I think you are right to insist on two 
essential points. In the preamble I would single 
out paragraph (v) which considers that the search 
for disarmament or the limitation of armaments 
is essential for the maintenance of peace and 
should continue to be given priority; but you 
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add, and I feel this to be vital, that this search 
must not jeopardise the security of Europe. 
I think that here we are at the heart of the 
problem. Europe today has its back to the wall 
under the bombardment of denuclearisation and 
disarmament proposals from the East after so 
many years and decades of refusing to talk whilst 
constantly increasing its military capability. I 
really believe we cannot accept much longer that 
meetings attended solely by the United States 
and the Soviet Union should discuss the security 
of our continent. The United States and the 
Soviet Union discuss our security without our 
being present. Admittedly we are consulted before 
hand but there ought to be a far deeper invol-
vement on our part. After all, while it is natural 
for the discussion to be between the Russians 
and the Americans because it is their arms they 
are talking about, the question we have to answer 
is why the weapons that ensure our security are 
almost exclusively American; fortunately France 
and the United Kingdom have their own. 
So I think, Mr. Ahrens that, in this context, 
you are right in your criticism of the Council of 
Ministers. I feel that WEU has greatly changed in 
three years and that we are ready and waiting to 
perform a far more important role, thanks in par-
ticular to our President, Mr. Caro, and to the 
untiring efforts, since the revitalisation of WEU, 
of Mr. Cahen, the Secretary-General, whose 
dynamic activity deserves mention and whose 
stands on behalf of the organisation, though also 
in defence of the governments of our countries, 
must cause us great satisfaction. 
But whilst we are ready and waiting, I feel we 
need - in order to go ahead at this point - to 
discuss things at a European summit which is 
why I would like to return to the proposal I made 
following those of Mr. Delors and which you 
were kind enough to mention, Mr. President, in 
your address. I know that my proposal could not 
be dealt with in this report because it came too 
late to be included in the work of your com-
mittee but I really think that, for a European 
summit on the concept of security to stand a 
chance and for the debate, decision-making and 
creation of awareness at such a summit to be suc-
cessful, the summit must be attended by the 
heads of state and government of the seven 
member countries of WEU, possibly enlarged to 
include countries that have applied to join 
WEU. 
The truth is that if we were to confine the 
summit to the framework of the European Eco-
nomic Community we would be taking an his-
toric risk and making a complete mistake. It 
would obviously be impossible to arrive at a 
result or a concrete decision in the presence of 
our Irish friends who are neutral, Denmark that 
is not prepared for any discussion of nuclear pro-
blems and the Greeks, who, for the moment, 
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have a foreign policy which leaves a big question 
mark about whether they are closer to the 
Warsaw Pact or to the Atlantic Alliance. Frankly, 
since they insist on dissociating themselves from 
the positions of the Atlantic Alliance it would be 
difficult to arrive at a decision on defence policy 
in the Twelve, in an organisation which requires 
unanimous agreement on every issue. 
That is why I am glad that, on the suggestion 
of the President, the General Affairs Committee 
has agreed to study my proposal and I hope, for 
the sake of peace, that this proposal I put forward 
in all modesty on behalf of the Liberal Group 
will one day materialise and that we shall have 
some serious thinking about disarmament, 
though without prejudice to the security of our 
continent. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
last speaker, Mr. Bayulken, observer from 
Turkey. 
Mr. BAYULKEN (Observer from Turkey). -
Mr. President, as I take the floor for the first time 
in this important body, allow me to say how 
happy and gratified I am to be in the midst of 
this important Assembly. My association with 
the work of Western European Union goes to the 
days of the 1960s when I had the honour to 
represent my country as Ambassador to the 
Court of St. James. Later on, in assuming other 
responsibilities, I had the honour to expound the 
use of important words: the role of Europe in the 
defence of the free world. So, Mr. President, it is 
with special feeling and happiness that I 
represent the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
in the Assembly of Western European Union 
today. 
I would like to endorse what my colleague, Mr. 
Inan, said when he spoke this morning, that the 
Grand National Assembly and, in fact, all the 
Turkish political parties as well as Turkish public 
opinion attach a great importance to the work 
and the role ofWestern European Union. In fact, 
Turkish public opinion appreciates what WEU is 
doing and feels that its role should be empha-
sised and increased and, as you know, Sir, just a 
few days ago the Turkish Government made an 
official request to become a full member of 
Western European Union. I feel that through the 
work of this Assembly and through the addition 
of new members, including my country, Turkey, 
the role of this body in defining and emphasising 
the defence of Western Europe will be much 
better illustrated. 
With these words, Mr. President, I would like 
to conclude my remarks by saying that I com-
pliment Mr. Ahrens on his excellent report and I 
shall subscribe to the views that he expressed in 
it. Thank you very much. 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you 
Mr. Bayulken. Let me say, on behalf of the 
Assembly, how much I appreciate the partici-
pation of observers in our discussions. I am 
therefore pleased to call Mr. Katsaros once again, 
our colleague from Greece. ! 
Mr. K.ATSAROS (Observer from Greece).- In 
connection with Mr. Ahrens's 1excellent report, I 
should point out that the need to bring fresh 
vigour to Western European Union and expand 
its role is uncontested. In the light of this consi-
deration Greece has formally expressed its 
interest in being a member of Western European 
Union. Greece is a member ofNATO.Its armed 
forces are assigned to the allliance integrated 
command. Its defence expenditure, higher than 
all of the other allies, represents 7% of the coun-
try's gross national product. Most important is 
that it is a member of the Eutropean Economic 
Community and European political co-operation 
in which the political and ecqnomic aspects of 
security are being discussed. I hope and trust that 
the Seven will keep this in mind in considering 
how legitimate and reasonable is the interest of 
certain countries in acceding to Western 
European Union. May I add that a renewed 
Western Europe could and should play a decisive 
role in reviving the talks of arms control and 
disarmament. Thank you. 
The PRESIDENT (Translatipn). - The debate 
is closed. 
I call the Rapporteur. 
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Ladies and gentlemen, let me 
begin by thanking you for your ,kind words about 
the report I have submitted. I should like to pass 
on much of this appreciation to the secretariat 
and also express my gratitude for the close co-
operation in committee. Youl will understand, 
Mr. President, that I cannot take up everything 
that every speaker has said. I will just comment 
on a few remarks. 
Mr. Antoni suggested that the vote should be 
deferred and the report revised once again. I do 
not think we should do this. What the actual ope-
rational part of the report says is still topical and 
should, in my opinion, be voted on by the 
Assembly today. 
The subject of enlargement was generally dis-
cussed, and all the speakers who referred to it 
were in favour. It is surely no .surprise that this 
was also essentially true of the observers, whom I 
should also like to thank very sincerely for their 
interest. Their participation in1 our proceedings, 
ladies and gentlemen, in fact shows that our 
organisation's standing in th! outside world 
cannot be so bad. Sometimes !we who work in 
this organisation may suffer more from this than 
is realised outside. It has been said that this 
Assembly, this organisation must be an open 
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house, open to other partners, and I share this 
view and feel that it is high time that a decision 
was taken in particular on the request Portugal 
made to join years ago. I see from the report of 
the Council of Ministers, however, that no more 
can be said about enlargement today than was 
said in the last report and the one before that. 
Several representatives have referred to the 
need for the public to be better informed about 
our work. I would go even further and say that 
the public should be better informed about 
Europe's defence and security. It is the way of the 
world that many of our fellow citizens in Europe 
have never personally, thank God, had to expe-
rience a time when freedom was threatened. But 
I believe it is all the more important to point out 
again and again that peace cannot be taken for 
granted and that it will not be possible to take 
freedom for granted either. 
I also feel we must talk more about the efforts 
we are making to preserve peace and freedom. 
We should not be content to say that Europe has 
been successfully kept free from conflict and the 
freedom of at least one half of our continent has 
been ensured: we must provide more infor-
mation on our contribution in this respect. 
Reference was made to the co-operation 
between the Council and the Assembly, and I am 
genuinely concerned - viewing the situation 
from the Assembly's point of view - that, if we 
continue to be inadequately informed, the 
Assembly will be unable to do what it is there 
for, according to the treaty. We are supposed to 
be a second organ of this organisation, and I feel 
we should be put in a position to act as such. 
One quite frequent question is whether the 
Communities would not be the place to discuss 
security policy. There are undoubtedly many 
connections, and a clear dividing line certainly 
cannot be drawn. But I believe it is more appro-
priate for security policy questions to be dis-
cussed in WEU, enlarged, if you like, to include 
the countries which meet the requirements for 
accession and have applied to join, than in the 
European Community. For one thing, the Com-
munity already has enough problems to solve, 
and I do not have the impression that it is being -
particularly successful or making particularly 
rapid progress in solving these problems. For 
another, I feel that the tasks of this organisation 
are such that its existence would be threatened or 
questioned if co-operation in the area of security 
policy were also to be handed over to the Com-
munity. It has in any case already been said that 
Ireland, as a neutral country, naturally adopts a 
different position. 
I completely agree with what Mr. Burger and 
Mr. Linster said about co-operation between the 
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smaller and the larger member states. I would 
say the same about the Council of Europe. I am 
very glad that we have in Europe countries that 
carry different weight and can represent different 
positions and that the smaller countries can 
sometimes afford to reflect on certain things 
more than the larger countries, where the politi-
cians are called upon to take action straight 
away. I must stress that at the last part-session in 
Paris I also welcomed the fact that your minister 
took part in the whole debate on these issues. 
Mr. Freeson referred to the Secretary-Gene-
ral's statement to the press. I cannot say anything 
about this. The Secretary-General will be here 
tomorrow afternoon. I would just like to recall 
one thing in this context. For years this 
Assembly has been calling for a political Secretary-
General, and I feel that if that is what we want, 
we should not take it amiss if he continues 
to be a politician. I am not familiar with the 
interview. We should ask him about it 
tomorrow. I will do no more than recall the 
demand the Assembly went on making for 
years. 
The question is, after all, and I will conclude 
with this, Mr. President, the question is, do we 
have enough time left? I very often doubt 
whether we really have any time left to ensure 
that Europe's voice is heard, and I do not think 
that the aim at the moment should be to issue 
statements and declarations which are polished 
and balanced and thought out down to the last 
detail. A German politician in the last century 
once said that the art of politics - I am quoting 
him rather freely - is not to draw up major pro-
grammes and always to have well-founded plans. 
The art of politics is to know when the cloak of 
history is swirling through the room and to grasp 
a corner of it. Mr. President, the cloak ofhistory 
may also be passing through this chamber. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
acting Chairman of the committee. 
Mr. CLOSE (Belgium) (Translation). - Mr. 
President it would be ungracious of me to add 
anything to what has been said apart from 
joining the unanimous chorus of praise for Mr. 
Ahrens's excellent report and I would like to 
congratulate him personally and on behalf of the 
committee. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you 
Mr. Chairman. I think your remarks express the 
feeling that is very widely shared by this 
Assembly. 
Two amendments have been tabled by Mr. 
Bassinet. We shall consider first Amendment 2 
and then Amendment 1. They read as follows: 
2. In paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft 
recommendation, leave out " the proposal made 
by the Prime Minister of France on 2nd 
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December 1986 to draw up a European security 
charter provides " and insert " the proposals by 
the French Government, and particularly the 
one to draw up a European security charter, 
provide". 
1. At the end of paragraph 2 {f) of the draft 
recommendation proper, add: 
" ( 1) for this purpose, by instructing the 
Secretary-General to play an active part in 
organising the first course and to promote the 
formation of an association of former partici-
pants of which he would ensure the secretariat; 
(2) by asking the French institute to invite 
Spain and Portugal to send participants to this 
course;" 
To save time, Mr. Bassinet, could you speak to 
your two amendments at the same time? 
Mr. BASSINET (France) (Translation). - With 
pleasure, Mr. President. Briefly, on Amendment 
2, I recalled a moment ago during my address 
that there had been several French initiatives. 
There is no need to single out one more than any 
other and since, moreover, it would be unreaso-
nable to list them all in the recommendation, I 
propose this wording which ought, it seems to 
me, to satisfy everyone. 
The second amendment is simply an attempt 
to refine one of the proposals in the recommen-
dation by stressing the importance that an asso-
ciation of ex-students would have since the 
courses are organised by the Institut des hautes 
etudes de defense nationale as part of the process 
of co-operation - which we advocate and which, 
for my part, I had previously recommended 
several times in this Assembly - between the 
various institutions of Western European Union. 
Incidentally, I think it is also important that we 
should invite Spain and Portugal to send stu-
dents. To my mind that would be fully in line 
with their applications to join WEU. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - What is the 
committee's opinion? 
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - The committee has not, of 
course, had an opportunity to consider these 
amendments. I think I can say, with the Chair-
man's agreement, that the amendments comply 
with the general tenor of the report and 
recommend that they be adopted. 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Mr. Ahrens. We shall now vote on Amendment 
2 tabled by Mr. Bassinet, on which the com-
mittee has expressed a favourable opinion. 
(A vote was then taken by show of hands) 
Amendment 2 is agreed to. 
I now put Amendment 1 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by show of hands) 
Amendment 1 is agreed to. 
We shall now vote on the amended draft 
recommendation. 
Does anyone request a vote by roll-call? ... 
No. We shall therefore vote by sitting and 
standing. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The amended draft recommendation is agreed 
to 1• 
10. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I propose 
that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this 
afternoon at 2.45 p.m. with the following orders 
of the day: 
1. Ministerial meeting of the Council (Motion 
for a recommendation with a request for 
urgent procedure, Document 1094). 
2. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-first 
annual report of the Council (Presentation 
of and debate on the report of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments and votes on the draft recommenda-
tions, Document 1090 and amendments). 
Are there any objections? ... 
The orders of the day of the next sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak? ... 
The sitting is closed. 
(The sitting was closed at 1.20 p.m.) 
I. See page 11. 
SECOND SITTING 
Monday, 27th April 1987 
SUMMARY 
1. Attendance register. 
Speaker (points of order): Mr. Hardy, the President. 
2. Adoption of the minutes. 
3. Ministerial meeting of the Council (Motion for a recom-
mendation with a request for urgent procedure; debate and 
vote on the motion for a recommendation, Doe. 1094). 
Speakers: Mr. Hardy (point of order), the President, Mr. 
Goerens, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Goerens, Dr. Miller (expla-
nation of vote). 
4. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-first annual report of 
the Council (Presentation of and debate on the report of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and 
votes on the draft recommendations, Doe. 1090 and 
amendments). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Amadei (Rapporteur), 
Mr. Antoni, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Bordu, Mr. 
Martino, Dr. Miller, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Burger, Mr. 
Fourre, Sir John Osbom, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Close, Mr. De 
Beer, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Scheer, 
Mr. Amadei (Rapporteur) Mr. Kittelmann (Chairman of 
the committee), Sir Frederic Bennett (point of order), Mr. 
Wilkinson, Mr. Amadei, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. 
Wilkinson, Mr. Scheer, Mr. Amadei, Mr. Kittelmann, Mr. 
Hardy (point of order), Mr. Wilkinson, Dr. Miller, Mr. 
Amadei, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Scheer, Mr. Amadei, Mr. de 
Beer (point of order), Mr. Scheer, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. 
Kittelmann; (point of order): Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Lord 
Hughes, Mr. K.lejdzinski; Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Scheer, Mr. 
Amadei, Mr. Wilkinson, Dr. Miller, Mr. Amadei, Mr. 
Goerens (point of order), Mr. Fourre, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. 
Scheer, Lord Mackie (point of order), Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. 
Klejdzinski; (explanation of vote): Mr. Irmer, Sir Geoffrey 
Finsberg, Dr. Miller. 
5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting. 
The sitting was opened at 2.55 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sitting 
is open. 
1. Attendance register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The names 
of the substitutes attending this sitting which 
have been notified to the President will be pub-
lished with the list of representatives appended 
to the minutes of proceedings1• 
I call Mr. Hardy on a point of order. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). - You will 
recall the last Assembly and that a motion to 
refer Mr. Amadei's report back to committee was 
carried. It was then established that that motion 
should not have been accepted because it was in 
breach of the rules of the Assembly. The rules 
make it absolutely clear that reference back can 
be moved only after the rapporteur has presented 
the report and the debate has commenced. On 
that occasion, Mr. Amadei had not even begun 
to present his report. 
Now that was made clear. A number of my 
colleagues saw you, Mr. President, and that was 
clearly established as a breach of rule. I was 
therefore astonished to learn that despite the 
breach of rule the report was still referred back to 
the committee. I am not a member of that corn-
l. See page 16. 
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mittee, otherwise I would have had a fair 
amount to say about it, because I do think it was 
a slack interpretation of rules which does not do 
the Assembly good service because I believe the 
rules of the Assembly have to be observed. Once 
the rule had been established and made clear, 
then it should have been observed in full. I 
would like your observations on that. 
My second point touches upon the reporting of 
the deliberations of the Assembly. I have spoken 
to you and to Mr. Moulias about this; I did so 
with yourself once in Strasbourg and with Mr. 
Moulias twice in Strasbourg. I listened to the 
Prime Minister, Mr. Chirac, address the 
Assembly and I was listening to the English inter-
pretation and I and other people heard Mr. 
Chirac - according to the interpretation -
announce that France would increase defence 
expenditure by 20%. I heard it beyond all doubt 
and I quoted that remark in a speech I made the 
following week. Other people may have heard it 
in other languages; I heard it very clearly in 
English and I want to say, Mr. President, that I 
am deeply annoyed and deeply concerned when 
people tell me that I did not hear what I know I 
heard and what I know I quoted. There can be no 
doubt that that figure was used in English. 
Now, I would have been happier if people had 
said the figure had been wrongly interpreted, but 
I did not know it had been wrongly interpreted. I 
am prepared to accept that it may have been. 
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However, I spoke to Mr. Moulias in Strasbourg 
and, as he will recall, in our first conversation 
Mr. Moulias said that people are entitled to 
change their speeches. I then saw you, Mr. Pre-
sident, and Mr. Moulias and said that I was 
deeply concerned because - whether there was a 
mistranslation or not - we do need to have rules 
in this Assembly which ensure that speeches are 
an accurate report of what is said. There needs to 
be a system by which this can be checked and it 
is quite obvious that there is not a system which 
allows a proper check to be made. 
Now, I do not want to be accused of disrupting 
the Assembly, but I must tell you, Mr. President, 
bearing in mind the failure to accept that the 
movement of the reference back was out of order 
and is contrary to the rules, and bearing in mind 
that it is impossible to establish what was 
actually said and what was not said by the 
speaker, then there do seem to me to be grounds 
for serious concern about the effectiveness of the 
operation of this Assembly. 
Now those two points of order, Mr. President, 
are very serious matters. I hope they are going to 
receive very serious consideration because it is 
not enough for people to tell me that things I 
heard were not said. I know that they were said; I 
am not prepared to accept that they were not and 
I hope that we can establish the facts of this 
matter. But more important, I hope we can see 
that the rules are so established that this sort of 
absurd situation can never be repeated. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I note your 
two points of order, Mr. Hardy. On the first, I 
believe there was no opposition on the part of 
the Assembly, even if, as you say, the Rapporteur 
had not yet spoken. I can assure you I shall check 
carefully what happened. I in no way question 
what you say, and if the Rules ofProcedure have 
been misapplied I shall make an official 
statement to that effect. In any event your 
remarks will be noted to ensure that such a 
mistake cannot happen again. I can only repeat 
to you and the Assembly that, casting my mind 
back to the time in question, the Assembly did 
not query the propriety of voting on this motion 
for referral, and the matter seemed to have been 
dispatched without any procedural problem. 
That does not mean that the Rules of Procedure 
can be circumvented, and I promise you a con-
clusive and public answer on this question. 
With regard to the Prime Minister's state-
ments which prompted your request for explana-
tions, the Presidential Committee having taken 
due note of your letter which was circulated to all 
members of the Presidential Committee and the 
relevant information having been obtained by 
the administration from the Prime Minister's 
office, you will be aware that the reply confirmed 
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the figures inserted by the Prtime Minister into 
the text he had circulated to Alssembly members. 
The only way to avoid queries of this kind would 
be to tape all addresses so that we could, 
whenever necessary, check points like the one 
you raised. I shall ask the administration 
whether the financial resources available to the 
Assembly would extend to ac9uiring such means 
of verification, but, once agatn, the matter has 
been dealt with by the means we have to hand. 
We have no other facilities for conducting the 
full enquiry you have asked for. 
In the light of these replies and the effort I 
undertake to make to provide Mr. Hardy with as 
much information as possibl~, I consider that 
these two points are for the time being closed. 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). In 
accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Pro-
cedure, the minutes of proceedings of the pre-
vious sitting have been distributed. 
Are there any comments? ... 
The minutes are agreed to. 
3. Ministerial meeting of the Council 
(Motion for a recommendation with a request 
for urgent procedure; debate a11d vote on the 
motion for a recommendation, Doe. 1094) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - As I 
informed you, the orders of the day call for 
examination of the request for urgent procedure 
on the motion for a recommendation concerning 
the ministerial meeting of the Council, Doc-
ument 1094. In accordance with Rule 43 of the 
Rules of Procedure this request has been tabled 
by the requisite minimum nunb.ber of ten repre-
sentatives or substitutes and the document was 
distributed at this morning's sitting. 
As required by the Rules of Procedure, I shall 
now ask the Assembly to consider the request for 
urgent procedure. I shall call one speaker, Mr. 
Goerens, to support the motiop. and another, if 
available, to oppose it. 
I call Mr. Hardy on a point of order. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). - There is 
some merit in the motion, but we have certain 
views about amendments which we regard as 
necessary. Could you advise us what the pro-
cedure is in regard to the possibility of amending 
that particular document? 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - With 
regard to the amendment procedure, I refer to 
Rule 29(2) of the Rules of Procedure: 
"Amendments tabled in writing and signed by 
their author shall be distributed without delay. 
No amendment shall be proposed and put to 
the vote in the Assembly if it has not been 
tabled at the latest before the end of the sitting 
preceding that at which it is considered. In the 
case of the first sitting, this time-limit shall end 
with the opening of the sitting. " 
I am very sorry, Mr. Hardy, but this article pre-
vents my accepting your amendment as the text 
of the motion was distributed this morning 
whereas your amendment should properly have 
been tabled before the start of this sitting. What 
you could do, and this is only a suggestion, is to 
make a statement which will appear in the 
official report. 
I call Mr. Goerens. 
Mr. GOERENS (Luxembourg) (Translation). 
- Thank you, Mr. President, for allowing me a 
few moments. The authors of the motion for a 
recommendation which you have before you 
urge the Council to make known its collegiate 
point of view on Mr. Gorbachev's proposals 
through the intermediary of its Chairman-in-
Office, Mr. Jacques Poos, in his statement to the 
Assembly on Tuesday, 28th April 1987. The 
recommendation further urges the Council to 
instruct its Chairman-in-Office to give the Coun-
cil's point of view on the Soviet proposals at the 
meetings of the North Atlantic Council to be 
held on 11th and 12th June 1987. 
My purpose in speaking is not to go into the 
substance of the questions posed by the recom-
mendation before you but to prove its urgent 
nature, so that it can be included in the orders of 
the day for this session. Consideration of the 
contents of this text leaves no doubt as to its 
urgency. The Council's Chairman-in-Office is 
requested to make known to the Assembly 
tomorrow at the conclusion of the ministerial 
meeting the views of our governments on Mr. 
Gorbachev's disarmament proposals and then to 
communicate these views to the North Atlantic 
Council. 
Clearly this recommendation would be 
pointless if not adopted today, as it calls for 
action which must be taken tomorrow and will 
even be initiated this evening at the meeting of 
the defence ministers. 
I must also emphasise that this recommen-
dation in no way affects or prejudices the vote to 
be taken this afternoon on Mr. Amadei's report 
on disarmament. The Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments has prepared a report 
which examines the issues in depth and con-
siders the various aspects of disarmament as the 
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situation now stands. On the other hand, the 
motion for a recommendation which I am pro-
posing is concerned not with disarmament itself 
but solely with the orders of the day for tomor-
row's ministerial meeting. 
In its report the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments naturally makes no ref-
erence to the ministerial meeting, at least in this 
connection, as the event which gave rise to the 
motion for a recommendation submitted to you 
by the members of the Presidential Committee is 
basically the approach made to America's NATO 
partners by the United States Secretary of State, 
Mr. Shultz, on his return from Moscow. 
We are aware that in NATO the services con-
cerned are currently studying the contents of the 
Soviet proposals passed on to them by Mr. 
Shultz. The present question is whether or not 
the ministers of defence and foreign affairs 
should meet in WEU to consider issues which 
are simultaneously being examined by NATO. 
This question was raised yesterday by the 
Assembly's Presidential Committee, and two 
objections were raised to urgent procedure for 
this motion for a recommendation. 
The first objection was on the point of whether 
or not consultation within WEU should precede 
the necessary co-ordination within NATO. It 
seems to me that the doctrine which our 
Assembly has defended throughout its existence 
and which the Council expressed in the Rome 
declaration bears precisely on this point. If we 
wish the voice of Europe to be heard and heeded 
in the political arena, this must occur before 
NATO's positions are finalised. It is because 
NATO's ministerial meeting is to take place in 
June and because NATO is already studying Mr. 
Gorbachev's proposals that the WEU Council 
should address itself to the matter this 
evening. 
The second objection arose from the fact that 
it is Mr. Gorbachev himself who has confronted 
the West with a kind of ultimatum by 
demanding that it should reply very quickly to 
his disarmament proposals. 
The truth is that these proposals are naturally 
going to give rise to long negotiations and do not 
of themselves demand such a speedy response. 
There is therefore no reason why the West 
should comply with Mr. Gorbachev's demands 
on the subject. Clearly, these proposals demand 
prolonged thought and in-depth study before a 
reply is given. It was certainly not the intention 
of the authors of this motion for a recommen-
dation to ask governments to take immediate 
and inadequately considered action to satisfy the 
wishes of Mr. Gorbachev. What is urgent is not 
the reply but that our seven governments should 
bend their efforts to working out a European 
attitude to Mr. Gorbachev's disarmament pro-
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posals. It is not so much disarmament as 
Europe's involvement which is at issue here. If 
you vote for urgent procedure we will shortly be 
able to discuss the contents of the motion for a 
recommendation, and, if you so wish, its terms 
may be amended. Anyway, this particular 
objection is no longer valid in view of the inter-
pretation of the Rules of Procedure just given by 
the President. 
What I now ask is that you vote in favour of 
urgent procedure, because it is vital if our 
Assembly is to exert influence on the Council 
meeting starting this evening. By doing this, you 
will give proper weight to the Assembly's role 
and justify holding this extraordinary session to 
coincide with the meeting of the Council of Min-
isters so as to facilitate an immediate exchange of 
views between the Council and the Assembly. If 
you fail to vote for urgent procedure, you nullify 
the central reason for holding this extraordinary 
session. 
Finally I must point out that, with a single 
exception, the reservations expressed at the 
meeting of the Presidential Committee yesterday 
evening did not imply their authors' refusal to 
support the request for urgent procedure, and I 
therefore have great confidence in appealing to 
you to vote in favour. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Hardy to speak against the request for urgent 
procedure. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). - I am 
speaking against, Mr. President, as a response to 
your ruling of a few moments ago, since we really 
did not have time actually to present manuscript 
amendments and, indeed, I think we can almost 
say that we have seen a commendable devel-
opment: the rules of the Assembly being intro-
duced and applied with a speed which has never 
before been experienced. It is an unparalleled 
example of progress, so I suppose we should be 
grateful. 
The reason for my seeking to move amend-
ments to this, Mr. President, is simply because 
the motion as it stands seems to be rather ungra-
cious and somewhat grudging. I do not believe 
that Europe should be ungracious and grudging 
in response to the proposals from the United 
States and the Soviet Union. I believe that 
Western Europe would be regarded as both 
hypocritic and irresponsible if it did not welcome 
that reduction of tension, that possibility of 
removal of nuclear weapons, that prospect of the 
disappearance of some categories of nuclear 
weapons within a short time. I believe that we 
would be regarded as hypocritic if we were to 
take that view, not least because reference has 
already been made in debates today to the report 
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in one new but important British newspaper, 
The Independent, when the Secretary-General 
refers to the fact - in fact us<es the words: " This 
is our own zero-zero proposal of six years ago. 
Why should we change our minds today?" N~w, 
if we find an international agreement wh1ch 
appears to be embodying that which this 
Assembly called for six years ago, we would and 
do look rather foolish if we cannot even offer it a 
welcome. 
I think at the same time we are entitled to say 
that the Americans should understand that 
Western Europe has its own security needs and 
for that reason I do not depart from the view that 
Western Europe must exercise its own inde-
pendent judgment. But in the exercise of that 
independent judgment I think it would be 
remarkably foolish and, as I said, hypocritic if we 
could not recognise the need to offer a welcome 
for that which we appear to have been calling for 
ourselves over a long period. And because there 
is no reference to a welcome, because Europe 
appears to be almost frightened of the develop-
ments rather than seeking to take such wise 
political initiatives as will build upon the 
prospect of peace which these proposals can 
provide, we wish to make amendments. 
The amendments themselyes would not have 
been absolutely dramatic. For example, the 
revised text would read: " Welcoming proposals 
by the United States and the Soviet Union for 
nuclear disarmament, calls for co-ordinated 
action by the Atlantic Alliance". And in the 
fourth paragraph, in the first of the two para-
graphs in which we urge the Council to take 
action, we would merely have inserted three 
words to the first of those tw<J> paragraphs so that 
it would read: "To ma~e known to this 
Assembly ". Because, unfortunately, over the 
recent years this Assembly is not always made 
fully aware of the views and decisions of the 
Council of Ministers and on a matter of this kind 
this Assembly ought to have the information 
which is, of course, of such enormous impor-
tance to the security and to political life in all our 
member states, and indeed 
1 
in the rest of the 
western alliance. 
So it is rather unfortunate that this breach of 
rules, or this failure to observe a rule which we 
had not previously known about, should have 
prevented the Assembly from considering words 
which I believe would have improved and 
enhanced, strengthened and made more sensible 
the motion which has been tabled in good faith, 
but which could have been ttather better than it 
will now appear. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The 
Assembly has listened carefu~ly to your remarks, 
but under the Rules of Procedure I can now only 
put to the Assembly the request for urgent pro-
cedure on which we shall vote by roll-call. 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
The President (continued) 
Has everybody signed the attendance reg-
ister? ... 
The sitting is adjourned for five minutes. 
(The sitting was suspended at 3.20 p.m. and 
resumed at 3.25 p.m.) 
In accordance with Rule 43(6) of the Rules of 
Procedure, we shall now vote by roll-call on the 
request for urgent procedure. 
The voting is open. 
(A vote by roll-call was then taken) 
Does any other representative wish to 
vote? ... 
The voting is closed. 
The result of the vote is as follows: 
Number of votes cast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 
Ayes................................. 52 
Noes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 
Abstentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 
The request for urgent procedure is agreed to 
unanimously. 
Ladies and gentlemen, the orders of the day, as 
amended, now call for a debate on the motion 
for a recommendation on the ministerial 
meeting of the Council for which urgent pro-
cedure has been adopted. We have heard the 
speakers. Do they wish to speak again? ... 
I call Mr. Goerens. 
Mr. GOERENS (Luxembourg) (Translation). 
- Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, you have 
just voted for urgent procedure to debate the 
motion for a recommendation which I now 
propose. However, I wish to say a few words 
about the contents of the recommendation on 
which you will shortly be voting. 
I must stress first of all that it is addressed 
directly to the Council as a constituted body. Its 
purpose is to make clear the specific role of the 
WEU Council, which differs, at least in terms of 
powers, from that of the ministerial institutions 
of the Twelve and from that of NATO by virtue 
of its specifically European character. By its 
Rome declaration the Council gave notice that it 
was the forum where Europeans discussed 
among themselves questions affecting their 
security. Who would deny that Mr. Gorbachev's 
proposals fall within the Council's terms of ref-
erence? Like it or not, these proposals are now 
central to the problems of European security, 
and the responses to them in coming months will 
decide how European security is assured over the 
next few decades. The part to be played by 
1. See page 17. 
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nuclear weapons in the system ensuring our 
security is now at issue. As a result, the extent of 
the effort we should make to establish a relative 
balance in the conventional sphere is a problem 
still far from solution. 
The motion for a recommendation is straight-
forward, and the first paragraph of the preamble 
clearly assigns to the Atlantic Alliance the 
responsibility of replying to Mr. Gorbachev's 
multiple disarmament proposals. There is not 
the least intention of substituting WEU for 
NATO in this or any other field. The purpose is 
to define what the position of Western European 
Union can and should be. 
Members of the Council and government offi-
cials often criticise the Assembly for urging the 
Council to do more than it can and to take deci-
sions beyond its competence. However, this 
motion for a recommendation is well inside the 
limits. What it asks of the Council is that it 
should not stand aside but should exercise its 
rights and exchange government views on ques-
tions as crucial to European security as those 
constantly posed by Mr. Gorbachev over the last 
fifteen months and those the Soviet authorities 
invited our Presidential Committee to go to 
discuss in Moscow or those raised twice recently 
in Mr. Gorbachev's speeches in Prague on 9th 
April last and in the discussions he had with Mr. 
Shultz the following week. 
I need hardly say that the presence of our dele-
gation in Moscow as these new proposals were 
made public inevitably fired our interest in these 
problems. 
The third paragraph of the preamble makes 
clear the not unimportant point that exami-
nation of disarmament problems by the Euro-
peans does not call in question our relations with 
the United States. We all recall how in February 
1985 the American Government let our own gov-
ernments know it did not wish the WEU Council 
to concern itself with disarmament, which the 
United States Government proposed to treat, if 
not entirely exclusively, at least as an area 
reserved to itself for the duration of the Geneva 
negotiations. 
Now, on the contrary, we have the Secretary of 
State, Mr. Shultz, briefing NATO on Mr. 
Gorbachev's proposals and asking the European 
allies for their views. This must remove any 
concern that we might cause serious displeasure 
to our American allies. It was indeed they who 
informed the European members of the alliance 
of the state of their negotiations with the USSR 
and made it known that they would not pursue 
these negotiations if their allies did not wish 
them to do so, at least as far as Euromissiles were 
concerned. 
It is with due regard for these three factors that 
our motion for a recommendation urges the 
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Council to take two actions which appear 
obvious if an initial, unstated premise is 
assumed: the first essential is, of course, that the 
Council address itself effectively to the disarm-
ament problem before decisions are taken in 
NATO, and, ifwe accept that Western European 
Union is properly concerned, however limited its 
competence in the matter, with defence issues, it 
follows that the Council should direct its 
attention to the disarmament question before 
NATO takes any decision. 
The meeting of ministers taking place this 
evening provides both the means and the obli-
gation to do this. This is the basis of the two par-
agraphs of the recommendation: if the Council 
addresses itself effectively to the disarmament 
question, will it brief the Assembly on the 
outcome of its exchanges of view? Article IX 
imposes this obligation, and it is moreover dif-
ficult to see what the Council's Chairman-in-
Office, Mr. Poos, could talk about tomorrow 
afternoon if not these exchanges of view. 
If we want the press representatives to come to 
our Tuesday sitting and to continue attaching 
importance to what we do, it is vital that the 
Council's Chairman-in-Office give the Assembly 
an account of this aspect of the Council's work. 
Similarly, as our American allies properly saw fit 
to consult us in NATO, it is a matter of ele-
mentary logic that the Council's Chairman-in-
Office should explain to our NATO allies the 
point of view of the members of Western 
European Union. 
So, there is nothing revolutionary about the 
motion for a recommendation I am proposing. It 
is in line with the other reports we have 
approved or will approve during this session. It 
is a continuance of what the Assembly has 
always asked of the Council, but here it is crucial 
as it associates closely the work of the Assembly 
with that of the Council on an immediate and 
most burning issue. I therefore ask you to vote in 
favour of the recommendation so that it can be 
transmitted to the Council this evening. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Mr. Goerens. 
Are there any other speakers? ... 
There are none. 
The Assembly now has to vote on the motion 
for a recommendation contained in Document 
1094. 
In accordance with Rule 33, the Assembly 
votes by sitting and standing unless five repre-
sentatives or substitutes present in the chamber 
request a vote by roll-call. 
Do five members request a vote by roll-
call? ... 
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No. We shall therefore take the vote by sitting 
and standing. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The motion for a recommendation is 
adopted1• 
I call Dr. Miller to explain his vote. 
Dr. MILLER (United Kingdom). - May I 
speak on behalf of my colleagues who abstained 
and say immediately that we have nothing 
against the intention of the motion for a recom-
mendation, we think it is a very good idea. But 
in view of the fact that the possibility of an 
improving amendment was not permitted by you 
- and I can understand the reason why it was 
not, but unfortunately, the text was only pro-
duced to us this morning. We did not have very 
much time to table an amendment - an 
amendment which, as I indicated, I think from 
the point of view of the English would have 
improved it. We did not want to block the 
motion itself, but we wanted to draw attention to 
the fact that there are areas in it of which we did 
not approve. For example, in the English trans-
lation, to put " diplomatic/press offensive " I 
find to be a gratuitous offence, whoever it is to, 
and this time it is to Mr. Gorbachev, and I do 
not think it is necessary to be gratuitously 
offensive and insulting to the proposals which he 
is making. 
Secondly, it is also rather niggardly to criticise 
the proposals by saying that he is multiplying the 
proposals. I will agree that a number of proposals 
have been made and it has been indicated in 
some newspapers in Britain certainly that there 
have been a bewildering series of proposals. But 
it depends upon who is being bewildered by it 
and in any case it is rather insulting to call it 
multiplying proposals rather than say a series of 
proposals which we take seriously. 
It is only because of that and because, Mr. 
President, we have to await also the outcome of 
the deliberations, the actual recommendations 
which will take place, that we felt that we could 
not support the initiative, but, at the same time, 
not wishing to defeat it we abstained in the vote. 
4. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-first 
annual report of the Council 
(Presentation of and debate on the report of the 
Committee on Defence Questons and Armaments 
and votes on the draft recommendations, 
Doe. 1090 and amendments) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the presentation of and debate 
on the report of the Committee on Defence 
I. See page 19. 
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Questions and Armaments on disarmament -
reply to the thirty-first annual report of the 
Council and votes on the draft recommenda-
tions, Document 1090 and amendments. 
I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Amadei. 
Mr. AMADEI (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, ladies and gentlemen, the draft I am 
presenting today is, as you know, the second 
revision of a report already adopted three times 
by the committee and twice referred back by the 
Assembly, latterly last December when the 
Rapporteur was not even able to present his text 
to the Assembly, as Mr. Hardy has reminded us. 
Paragraph 1.1 and the following paragraphs of the 
explanatory memorandum outline the history of 
the text. This time the report has been adopted 
by the committee in a spirit of compromise by 
nine votes to none with eight abstentions. 
Two elements in the political situation have 
changed since the report was referred back to 
committee for the second time. In the first place, 
the initial intense debate between European 
countries and between them and their American 
ally on the acceptability of certain audacious -
and some might say too bold - proposals put 
forward at the Reykjavik summit has been con-
cluded by the agreement between the sixteen 
NATO countries establishing an order of priority 
in the application of the Reykjavik concepts. 
This agreement between the allies is embodied in 
the North Atlantic Council communique of 12th 
December 1986, reproduced as Appendix IV to 
the report, and has since been confirmed in a 
number of government statements. 
In the second place, the Soviet Union has 
added further appreciable concessions to those 
implicit in its position at Reykjavik and is con-
tinuing to make new proposals. I refer here to 
General Secretary Gorbachev's speech in 
Moscow on 28th February, of which the report 
takes account. However, even after the report 
was adopted by the committee on 31st March, 
Mr. Gorbachev made a second important speech 
in Prague on lOth April, and Mr. Shultz visited 
Moscow from 13th to 16th April. A second debate 
among allies is now going on in this city where 
the WEU Council is meeting, as well as in the 
various divisons of NATO. With these changes 
of position the conclusion of an agreement on 
intermediate missiles in the coming months is 
now at least a possibility. 
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, in antici-
pation of the important debate ahead of us - the 
Assembly's first debate on disarmament in a year 
- I shall concentrate my presentation of the com-
mittee's report on the key subject of disarm-
ament, and in particular the question of interme-
diate missiles but with due reference to 
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conventional forces also. Any agreement on 
intermediate missiles must concentrate attention 
on conventional forces, in which the Soviets 
have a great superiority in the central region, and 
it is this fact which led the committee to Vienna 
to hear the representatives of various countries 
at the three conferences currently being held in 
that city. 
As the reply to the Council's thirty-first annual 
report has been largely overtaken by events - we 
have this morning received the thirty-second 
report - and has lost some of its relevance, the 
committee has divided the recommendation into 
two. The reply to the Council is dealt with in a 
separate recommendation, and Chapters 11 to IV 
of the explanatory memorandum have been 
updated. 
I now turn to the question of long-range INF 
missiles or LRINFs. Paragraph l(a) of the draft 
recommendation proper refers on the one hand 
to NA TO's collective position and on the other 
recommends that the Council " support the 
United States" in negotiating an agreement 
under the conditions defined in paragraph l(a). I 
wish now to consider the desiderata stated here, 
together with the questions raised within the 
alliance and the position adopted by the Soviet 
Union with regard to each. 
As regards verification it is clear that an 
agreement must be " properly verifiable " as the 
committee states in the text. On this point I note 
that Mr. V orontsov, the chief Soviet negotiator, 
took the offensive by stating on 6th March in 
Paris that the Soviet Union would demand in 
situ inspections even within United States pro-
duction plants and was ready to grant the same 
facilities on a reciprocal basis. 
Elimination means the destruction of INF 
missiles, not just placing them in storage from 
which they could be redeployed, perhaps 
unknown to an adversary. 
With regard to the elimination of missiles 
within range of Europe, it is not sufficient to 
eliminate the SS-20s - and the few remaining 
SS-4s - deployed in Europe. Elimination must 
cover the European zone, which necessarily 
includes SS-20s stationed beyond the Urals 
which are still capable of reaching Western 
European targets. On several occasions the 
Soviet Union has accepted that the European 
zone extends to longitude 80° east, which means 
eliminating all missiles up to a distance of 
1 300 km east of the Urals. 
We come now to shorter-range INF missiles or 
SRINF. Since the deployment of cruise missiles 
by the NATO countries from 1983 onwards, the 
Soviet Union has deployed in Czechoslovakia 
and the German Democratic Republic short-
range INF missiles, including versions with 
ranges of 500 to 1 000 km, which are capable of 
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reaching the capitals of West ern European coun-
tries. The constraints to be imposed on such mis-
siles in the INF negotiations will be important. 
Until 28th February the Soviet Union accepted 
the withdrawal of SRINF missiles deployed in 
Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic 
Republic as soon as an intermediate missile 
agreement was signed, followed by the imme-
diate opening of negotiations on the reduction 
and possible elimination of such missiles. The 
recourse for the NATO countries if such negotia-
tions failed would have been, as the committee 
states in the draft recommendation, " the right 
for NATO to match Warsaw Pact numbers in 
such missiles". But on lOth April in Prague Mr. 
Gorbachev suggested immediate negotiations on 
the elimination of SRINF without linking the 
question to that ofLRINF missiles. Then, during 
Mr. Shultz's visit to Moscow the USSR proposed 
that the commitment to eliminate all SRINF in 
Europe by a fixed date should be incorporated in 
an agreement on long-range missiles and that 
SRINF negotiations should be initiated else-
where. With regard to SRINF missiles, I would 
point out that NATO possesses only seventy-two 
German Pershing lA missiles with a range of 
700 km compared with 370 equivalent Soviet 
missiles, including perhaps 130 in Europe. 
Mr. Gorbachev confirmed in Reykjavik that 
the strictly European British and French nuclear 
forces would not be affected in any way by an 
intermediate missile agreement. 
With regard to the balance following an inter-
mediate missile agreement, the zero-zero option 
for intermediate missiles associated with the 1979 
decision was proposed by NATO as early as 1981. 
Only now has it been accepted by the Soviet 
Union without fresh contrived obstacles. Such 
an agreement implemented in several sta~es, 
each verifiable, will be of great psychological 
importance, but it must be seen in the context of 
the current general levels of nuclear weapons. If 
an agreement of this kind is applied, it will - as 
stated in paragraph 5.23 ofthe explanatory mem-
orandum - mean eliminating 316 nuclear war-
heads on the NATO side against 1 224 warheads 
on the Soviet side - an excellent deal for NATO. 
However, this reduction is minimal in relation to 
the total of some 18 000 nuclear warheads of the 
American strategic and tactical forces which 
could be used against the Warsaw Pact. Consid-
ering only the American nuclear weapons 
capable of reaching Soviet territory from Europe 
or European waters, 1 300 warheads, or more 
than four times the number of LRINF to be 
eliminated by NATO, will remain in service after 
elimination of LRINF without counting the 
4 000 warheads of the American tactical air force 
and the shorter-range delivery systems which 
will remain in Europe. The agreement will 
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involve neither decoupling the American stra-
tegic deterrent forces nor the denuclearisation of 
Europe. 
The situation with regard ~o the negotiations 
on conventional forces is described in paragraph 
5.53 and the following paragraphs of the explan-
atory memorandum, and I draw your attenti<?n 
to section V(c)(iv) concerning the new talks m 
Vienna on a mandate for negotiations on the 
zone from the Atlantic to the Urals. The meeting 
the committee had in Vienna produced infor-
mation which confirms, without change, the con-
clusions of the draft report. In his Prague speech, 
Mr. Gorbachev suggested that battlefield nuclear 
missiles - with a range under 500 km - should 
be examined in the framework of the new negoti-
ations, and this matches NATO's position that 
nuclear weapons cannot be eliminated as long as 
the Warsaw Pact has a massive superiority in 
conventional forces. 
As far as the other aspects of disarmament are 
concerned, the explanatory memorandum of the 
committee's report examines in detail the work 
in progress in all the bodies both bilateral and 
multilateral - and I have co1.1nted nine - cur-
rently engaged in negotiating on the many issues 
involved. I shall refer briefly, Mr. President, to 
those mentioned in the other paragraphs of the 
draft recommendation proper. 
Paragraph 1(c) stresses the importance of 
respecting existing treaties. This phrase refers 
particularly to the ABM treaty1which is currently 
operative and ratified by both parties. It also 
relates to the SALT 11 agreement, which both 
parties had observed until the end of last year, 
though the United States have never ratified it. 
The governments of our member countries have 
. made quite clear the importance they attach to 
honouring existing treaties, as is confirmed by 
the quotations in the explanatory memorandum 
from paragraph 5.30 onwards. 
In paragraph 2 of the recommendation proper 
the committee stresses the importance of 
pressing in the MBFR negotiations for an early 
agreement along the lines at p11esent proposed by 
NATO. If the Soviet Union iSiSincere in its new 
proposals for widening negoti~tions on conven-
tional forces from the Atlantic to the Urals, the 
best way of proving it would be the speedy con-
clusion of the very limited agreement currently 
proposed in the MBFR framework and described 
in paragraph 5.53 and subsequent paragraphs of 
the explanatory memorandum. 
With regard to the chemical1 weapons referred 
to in paragraph 3, the explanatory memorandum 
gives an account of the substantia~ progress ma~e 
in drafting the treaty of the multilateral negotia-
tions in Geneva. A broad consensus already 
exists on the aspects of verification which 
concern the declaration of stocks and their 
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destruction, as well as the associated routine 
inspections. The key issue of additional 
inspection after prior notification still awaits 
solution. I draw your attention here to Mr. 
Gorbachev's declaration in his Prague speech of 
lOth April according to which the Soviet Union 
has stopped producing chemical weapons and is 
constructing the facilities necessary for their 
destruction - facilities the United States 
acquired several years ago. Mr. Gorbachev 
added that there are no Soviet chemical weapons 
outside the frontiers of the Soviet Union and 
that the other Warsaw Pact countries had never 
possessed any. Of course, this has still to be ver-
ified, but previously the Soviet Union has never 
made any statements ofthis kind and it would be 
extraordinary if the USSR were to make untrue 
statements at a time when it is preparing to open 
its frontiers to inspection and has indeed already 
opened them in line with the confidence-building 
measures approved by the Stockholm con-
ference. 
In conclusion, I turn to the question of nuclear 
tests. With regard to paragraph 4(a) of the draft 
recommendation concerning the United States 
proposals for calibrating the yield of nuclear 
tests, we can take satisfaction from press reports 
that the two superpowers have agreed to 
undertake a nuclear test for calibration purposes 
in each other's test area. Lastly, paragraph 4(b) 
calls for the opening of negotiations on a com-
prehensive test ban, such negotiations having 
been halted at the Geneva disarmament con-
ference since the suspension in 1980 of the tri-
lateral negotiations between the United States, 
the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. 
(The speaker continued in Italian) 
Mr. President, after the effort I have made to 
speak French, may I be allowed a few concluding 
remarks in Italian to say that the situation is so 
complex and so difficult and is changing so 
rapidly that every attempt to deal with the 
problem of disarmament is liable to be overtaken 
by events. Time after time we find ourselves 
with documents which have to be updated 
because the situation and the proposals have 
moved forward. I think therefore that, regardless 
of differing political views and attitudes in this 
Assembly for which I have the fullest respect, it 
has to be admitted that the Rapporteur's 
patience is very often severely tried. I hope I 
have found a compromise which will be 
acceptable to everyone. If anyone thinks that I 
have not done well may I remind the Assembly 
that even doing something badly involves hard 
work. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Mr. Amadei. On behalf of the Assembly, I thank 
you for your untiring efforts and good will as 
Rapporteur. You have set an example to many 
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of us. I hope your work will enable the Assembly 
to advance in its deliberations and in deter-
mining its political positions. 
The debate is open. 
I call Mr. Antoni. 
Mr. ANTONI (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, ladies and gentlemen, we agree with 
the statement that disarmament is an issue on 
which everyone must adopt a clear position and 
accept definite responsibilities. To this end, we 
wish to repeat briefly and with fresh emphasis a 
number of essential points in the line we take. 
First of all, we believe that one basic objective 
which must be maintained is a halt to the arms 
race and the reduction of armaments. Conse-
quently, we believe that any attempt to achieve 
military superiority by anyone must be rejected. 
Disarmament must guarantee the elimination of 
nuclear weapons and the agreed reduction of 
conventional weapons to the lowest possible 
levels. The security of Europe and of the indi-
vidual European countries cannot be achieved 
unilaterally. The way is through negotiation. 
Together with disarmament, the main 
instrument is arms control and while the way to 
total nuclear disarmament is certainly full of 
complexities, substantial nuclear disarmament in 
Europe is now a short-term possibility. This calls 
for a new concept of military strategy and in par-
ticular for rejection of the idea that nuclear 
weapons can be used effectively in war or as 
instruments of political intimidation. Mr. 
Klejdzinski said this effectively this morning in 
the words " military deterrence cannot prevent 
war". Admittedly nuclear disarmament 
increases the importance of the role of conven-
tional weapons for which a balance at the lowest 
possible level must be guaranteed. As Mr. 
Ahrens said this morning, the two sides of 
Europe must ensure their security with a 
minimum of equipment and armed forces. 
All the negotiations are now open and have 
most recently been extended to the question of 
shorter-range missiles and their destruction, for 
which, as our President, Mr. Caro, quite cor-
rectly said this morning, our delegation argued 
and was given a good hearing at the talks in 
Moscow. This was confirmed in the remarks 
made by Mr. Gorbachev in Prague and at the 
meetings in Moscow with Secretary of State 
Shultz. According to official reports, the Soviet 
Union has today tabled in Geneva its proposal 
for the destruction of the medium-range, 
so-called Euromissiles. This represents an 
extension of the zero option to the shorter-range 
missiles deployed in Czechoslovakia and the 
German Democratic Republic. 
The opportunities are great therefore. Some 
people think that this represents a modification 
of the present balances and imbalances while 
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others have doubts concerning the United States 
and believe that it takes insufficient account of 
Europe's needs. Anyone like myself who went 
with the delegation to Moscow will, I think, cer-
tainly have recognised that the new attitude and 
the change from the past is very real in that 
country. We believe therefore that the worst 
mistake that could be made in Europe would be 
to put the brake on this drive towards disarma-
ment. It would be illogical and could only have 
the worst consequences. 
The view can realistically be taken that fol-
lowing the recent positive response from the 
Soviet Union regarding shorter-range missiles it 
has now become possible and practicable to con-
clude an agreement on bases which will con-
tribute to greater security in Europe and provide 
the impetus for further negotiations and agree-
ments on disarmament, a balance of conven-
tional forces and the destruction of chemical 
weapons. Europe must not hold back; on the 
contrary, it must not miss the opportunity of 
advancing its own interests and must seek to 
ensure its own security, to influence the negotia-
tions and to safeguard itself. In our view, 
however, Europe has the vital responsibility of 
paving the way for this great leap forward in 
international relations now that the biggest ally, 
the United States, has declared its willingness to 
go ahead. Just think, ladies and gentlemen, of the 
damage which would be caused to East-West 
relations, world security and European security 
and sovereignty if Europe itself were to spoil the 
great and extraordinary opportunity now before 
us, which, let us not forget, offers us for the first 
time the possibility of destroying the huge stocks 
of nuclear weapons and of moving towards real 
disarmament. 
These, ladies and gentlemen, are our firmly 
held views. They have been developed over the 
years and have been argued on many occasions 
in this Assembly where we have always shown 
understanding for the views of other political 
parties similar to our own from whom we could 
learn something in this Assembly and in our own 
country. And it is on these beliefs that we have 
based our action during these latest develop-
ments in international relations and in Western 
European Union. 
With this approach, we can also appreciate the 
effort made by our Rapporteur to provide the 
Assembly with a vast quantity of facts and infor-
mation on the attitudes and options ofboth East 
and West, while at the same time giving due rec-
ognition to recent statements from both sides 
indicating first the intention and then the real 
possibility of action to bring about disarm-
ament. 
The draft recommendation with all its known 
changes is less positive. The Rapporteur con-
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eluded by asking us to be patient and saying that 
even his own patience had b~en severely tried. 
Yet by going back to this the Rapporteur was 
referring basically to the ups and downs of the 
draft recommendation. The truth is that atti-
tudes which have so far proved irreconcilable 
have run up against each other. We believe that 
the conditions laid down by s()lme members and 
in particular the British conseJ!Vatives have been 
a serious difficulty. Furthermore, as the 
Rapporteur himself recognised, the most 
important political section of the text - the 
question of nuclear disarmament in Europe -
has been overtaken by the new corrections - you 
will remember the expression Mr. President -
which the Russians have m~de to their pro-
posals, in which WEU can clailm to have partici-
pated in the talks I mentioned earlier. 
To conclude, Mr. President, we have tabled a 
number of amendments which bring the draft 
recommendation up to date and correct posi-
tions which in our view do not respond to the 
most general requirement, briefly argued here, 
that nuclear disarmament mus[ be furthered, but 
that European security must not be threatened 
but rather strengthened as a result. It seems to us 
that these amendments are particularly necessary 
in paragraph l(a) referring to the disputed 
question of whether a commitment to the imme-
diate withdrawal and destruction of shorter-
range missiles should be exclu4ed from the nego-
tiations or should be entered into. This is the 
purpose of Amendment 3 signed by Mr. Rubbi, 
Mr. Antoni and others, but I can say at once that 
we are quite prepared to withdraw it and to 
support Amendment 8 tabled by Mr. Scheer and 
Mr. Stoffelen which deals with the same question 
and in our view offers at least as good, and pos-
sibly a better, solution. 
My final word, Mr. President, ladies and 
gentlemen, is to express the eamest hope that our 
Assembly can genuinely express the people's 
wish for disarmament and co-operation between 
nations as a guarantee for security, democracy 
and progress in Europe. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Wilkinson. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom). - I 
think our alliance has forgotten the origins of the 
zero-zero option. If we remember, it was Helmut 
Schmidt, back I think in 1977, who urged the 
deployment of medium-rangtt theatre nuclear 
weapons by NATO because! he feared that 
without the presence of such United States 
weapons on West European soil, West Europe 
could become decoupled from the United States. 
His fear was very similar to that of President de 
Gaulle who thought that the United States 
nuclear guarantee was never fully credible 
because in the ultimate analysis, in the event of 
all-out Soviet aggression against Western 
Europe, the United States would never actually 
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be prepared to invoke its strategic nuclear 
deterrent on our behalf. Hence the need for the 
force de frappe on the one hand and, on the 
other, the need advocated by Helmut Schmidt 
for modernised intermediate-range nuclear 
forces. Politically, of course, his call was very dif-
ficult to implement and in 1979 we went for the 
twin-track decision. We sought to buy off neu-
tralist and critical socialist and labour opinion 
within Western Europe with the assurance that 
the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear 
forces - modem intermediate-range nuclear 
forces - by NATO would be accompanied by 
measures of arms control. And in 1981, two 
years later, we went for the full zero-zero option 
hoping, then, that the Soviets would be prepared 
to dismantle their SS-20s which had been 
growing in number ever since the end of 1977. If 
they would do so, we would then be exonerated 
from the need to modernise our own medium-
range nuclear forces. 
Of course, in 1983 we had to deploy and that 
process of deployment has been going on since 
then, but it is not yet complete. It is not true to 
say that the Soviets are merely taking up our own 
NATO zero-zero option, because the situation 
has greatly changed since 1981. It has changed by 
the very fact that we have had to deploy and, 
more significantly, by the deployment on the 
part of the Soviets themselves of short-range, 
shorter-range, intermediate-range systems, 
namely, the SS-22s and SS-23s in Czechoslo-
vakia and the German Democratic Republic. 
The Soviets are very, very effectively cashing in 
on the disunity within our alliance. They are 
seeking to promote disunity not only between 
Europeans but between the Europeans and the 
Americans, cashing in on the fact that the Pres-
ident is coming to the end of his term in Wash-
ington with very few significant foreign policy 
achievements, eager to achieve an arms control 
agreement almost at any price. We see the dis-
array among the West Europeans too: within our 
own ranks in this Assembly, we see it in the 
ranks of the coalition government in the Federal 
Republic - between divergent statements on the 
part of the Foreign Minister, Mr. Genscher, and 
the Defence Minister, Mr. Warner, and we see 
nuances and differences between governments of 
West European nations within the alliance: the 
French and the British extremely cautious and 
sceptical, and others saying we must take the 
Soviet offer - or offers as they now are - at their 
face value. 
I would say to this Assembly, Mr. President, 
that, even if the zero-zero option for long-range 
INF goes ahead, the strategic threat to Europe 
from the Soviet Union will remain and if there 
were an attack upon W estem Europe we would 
not so readily, I think, be assured of a strategic 
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response by the United States, since its own INF 
on the continent of Europe would no longer be in 
existence. Of course there would be submarine-
launched systems, but that is not the same as 
having nuclear forces in place. 
As for the conventional balance, that is very 
much in the Soviets' favour still. If we were 
seeking genuine measures to enhance our 
security, we would surely have begun the other 
way round - we would have begun by measures 
to reduce on a mutual basis, on a verifiable basis, 
our conventional forces and we would have 
sought to achieve parity in the balance of con-
ventional forces in Europe. Instead, that has not 
been possible since the Soviets have been stalling 
at the MBFR talks in Vienna since 1973. 
All this, of course, makes even more important 
the French and British strategic nuclear deter-
rents, but even they are not the same - they are 
not equivalent - to INF deployed on the alli-
ance's behalf by the Americans in Western 
Europe. I am pleased that Mr. Chirac and our 
own prime minister have met and that Franco-
British military co-operation is improving and I 
note that the French and British prime ministers 
have begged the Americans to keep their conven-
tional commitment to Europe at the same level. 
But we are very much wanting it both ways. First 
we wanted an effective nuclear deterrent 
deployed in Europe for NATO because we were 
unwilling to make the financial sacrifices for an 
effective conventional defence and, now that 
those nuclear forces are to be reduced, if not 
eliminated altogether at intermediate level, now 
we say: Please, Americans, we know that you are 
impoverished, that you have a dollar crisis and 
commitments all around the world, and great 
difficulties in meeting those commitments, yet 
we want you to stay at your present level. Instead 
we should be saying: We will make positive 
improvements in our own conventional defence. 
And that I think is urgently necessary as is, of 
course, a great improvement in the capability of 
our alliance for chemical defence since the pre-
ponderance of the Soviets in chemical warfare is 
as yet untouched. 
To conclude, Mr. President, I think that 
NATO strategy recalls that of the Grand Old 
Duke of York who led his troops to the top ofthe 
hill and then led them down again. It was very 
difficult to achieve the modernisation of our INF 
forces. If we eliminate INF systems - both long-
range and short-range - that will pose political 
problems for the Germans in particular, who of 
course could see their country turned into a 
nuclear battlefield if deterrence were ever to 
break down. Also, I think, we must acknowledge 
the fact that without reductions in conventional 
forces and without reductions in chemical forces 
on the part of the Soviets, we will actually be 
making ourselves more vulnerable in Western 
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Europe, rather than less, and diminishing the 
effectiveness of the United States nuclear guar-
antee. That said, Mr. President, I welcome the 
fact that we have this debate - it is very timely -
but I subscribe very much to the words of 
warning of President Nixon, Mr. Kissinger, 
Manfred W 6rner and others who know the 
nuclear strategy business and understand it, and 
who are not guided in their political thinking 
largely by wishful thinking. 
(Mr. Goerens, Vice-President of the Assembly, 
took the Chair) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Valleix. 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). - With 
a lengthy debate in prospect, I would like to look 
at a number of essential points and to congrat-
ulate our Rapporteur who, after many ups-and-
downs, is today presenting the conclusions 
arrived at by the committee under admittedly 
difficult conditions. The subject is indeed a dif-
ficult one, and I remind you that the committee 
voted 9 to 0, but with 8 abstentions ifl have read 
the document correctly. 
This report is attended by new and one might 
say exceptional circumstances. I refer here to Mr. 
Gorbachev's proposals on arms limitations: the 
zero option suggested in February for medium-
range missiles, Euromissiles, followed by the 
extension of the negotiations to short-range mis-
siles, chemical weapons and conventional forces 
in Europe proposed more recently by the Soviet 
leader. The present situation is also exceptional 
in that the Europeans are considering more seri-
ously than in the past the establishment of a spe-
cifically European defence system. This was I 
think effectively and very opportunely demon-
strated by our debate this morning, supported by 
a virtually unanimous vote. 
With reference to the present negotiations on 
disarmament and the limitation of arms in 
Europe, I wish to remind you firstly of France's 
steadfast position and to make some comments 
on Mr. Amadei's report. 
I can summarise France's position by making 
three specific points. Firstly, France is deeply 
concerned for peace, for itself and for the world. 
Disarmament is a most desirable objective, and 
France has taken many initiatives in that 
direction. I would remind you that in 1978 the 
then President of the Republic, Mr. Giscard 
d'Estaing, expressed to the United Nations his 
deep commitment and ambitious ideas, with rec-
ognition of the need to maintain regional bal-
ances. France's position, which has since been 
restated, is equally categorical in its determi-
nation to maintain its own deterrent and its hope 
for the initiation of disarmament procedures 
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which are balanced and subject to verification 
and inspection. 
The second point has greater current rele-
vance. The present discussions involve only the 
Russians and the Americans, and could in no cir-
cumstances include either French or British 
nuclear weapons. I am personally pleased to note 
the unqualified identity of view on this point 
between the President of the Republic and the 
French Government. It is a fact that the French 
nuclear force differs from intermediate weapons 
in both character and purpose. It is a central 
system designed to protect our vital interests and 
must consequently be excluded from any negoti-
ations between the two superpowers. 
On a question where I believe the French 
position does not differ greatly from that of the 
British Government - and Mr. Wilkinson has 
referred to the recent contact~ between our two 
prime ministers - I would remind you that the 
present debates cannot and do not relate to our 
arsenals. This is a point which has not been men-
tioned, but it is one which I· think needs to be 
stated. 
My third point is that it is nuclear deterrence 
alone which guarantees European security. It is 
impossible to regard the denuclearisation of this 
part of the world as being without danger. It 
would have the effect of rendering a future con-
ventional war not only possible but inevitable 
given the known imbalance between East and 
West of three to one, perhaps much more, in 
conventional forces and our geographical cir-
cumstances. 
I have three main remarks to make on Mr. 
Amadei's report. In the first place, it is true that 
we French are opposed to a ban on nuclear tests 
in Europe. As I have just said, the nuclear 
deterrent is for us our only effective means of 
preventing a European war. Maintenance by the 
Europeans of their nuclear qefence efforts at a 
level compatible with the threats we face is 
therefore vital, and that is the reason for my 
willing acceptance of Amendment 14. 
My second point, which is addressed particu-
larly to the Rapporteur, is that we must not con-
template the withdrawal of American forces 
from the European theatre. You, as advocates of 
a European security charter, know full well that 
this linkage is of paramount concern. For us all, 
European deterrence requires the strategic 
coupling of the two sides ofthe Atlantic, and this 
demands the presence in our continent of con-
ventional and nuclear American forces, as the 
previous speaker said. 
My third point is of capital importance. 
Working together with the Council, we must con-
sider the establishment of a genuine European 
defence system, and in this, as we said this 
morning, WEU has a leading role to play. Our 
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debate is therefore concerned both with the con-
stant principles at issue, which we wish to see 
strengthened, and with a highly dynamic and 
mobile current situation largely due, it must be 
admitted, to the initiative of the Soviet General 
Secretary. 
As far as the principles are concerned, it is 
obvious that the democracies are in a weak 
position compared with any totalitarian system, 
and in the cat and mouse game Mr. Gorbachev is 
currently pursuing - and I do not mean here to 
contradict the introductory remarks by our 
Chairman as presenter and author ofthe motion 
for urgent procedure - the democracies are in a 
weak position against the capacity of a totali-
tarian system to manoeuvre. We must remember 
this, and our readiness for possible discussions 
must be matched by our caution in conducting 
them. 
While noting the words just added by our 
Rapporteur, I must express my regret that the 
concept of verification mentioned in the report 
and, more particularly in the recommendation, 
makes inadequate reference to the need for 
inspection as an element of verification. Once 
again, it is obviously only the genuineness of the 
checks which gives any substance to possible dis-
armament. Without it we drift into complete 
unreality. Ladies and gentlemen, I will conclude 
by saying that I can on no account vote in favour 
of the recommendation as it stands at present. 
Everything therefore depends on the later course 
of the discussion. 
Let us not forget that Europe has been living in 
peace since 1945. It is an unfortunate fact that 
this historical truth rests on a balance of forces 
largely based on deterrence. If history now offers 
us a chance of peace with fewer weapons and 
with our means of defence and deterrence 
rebalanced at a lower level, well and good. But 
let us not be led by our ambitions or our hopes of 
peace without weapons to compromise the his-
torical good fortune of the peace in Europe which 
has lasted forty-two years. This is a responsibility 
we must shoulder, and it will be interesting to 
note tomorrow's developments at the ministerial 
meeting of the Council. We must clearly gear our 
enthusiasm and flexibility to our historic respon-
sibilities. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Bordu. 
Mr. BORDU (France) (Translation). - I wish 
first of all to thank Mr. Amadei, the Rapporteur 
of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments for his patience in producing a 
report which is a most useful source of infor-
mation for the Assembly. On the other hand, I 
regret the succession of changes which the com-
mittee has made to the concluding draft recom-
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mendation. These changes reflect the unwill-
ingness of some to see Europe committed to a 
disarmament process from the Atlantic to the 
U rals. By talking of disaster, they are seeking to 
impede the disarmament process. To speak of 
peace in terms of disaster must surely be the 
limit. 
But notwithstanding the efforts of the 
Rapporteur and the committee, the fact is that 
events are moving much faster than the parlia-
mentary process, so that many of our assess-
ments and recommendations are overtaken - a 
point which the Rapporteur fully appreciated 
when he undertook the impossible task of trying 
to bring the report up to the minute. It is impos-
sible to disregard the explanations furnished by 
Mr. Gorbachev in the Prague speech and in his 
conversations with Mr. Shultz in Moscow. In 
other words, we must not close our minds and 
fall in with the majority view of this Assembly 
based on the hypothesis of possible Soviet 
aggression. 
The explanations I refer to answer the worries 
expressed in the West about Euromissiles -
weapons designed to respond to the deployment 
of American medium-range missiles and short-
and long-range tactical weapons. What is now 
being suggested is the zero option for all nuclear 
weapons stationed in Europe, and we may 
suppose that, had the Americans been prepared 
to forgo the militarisation of space, this could 
have been followed by strategic nuclear 
weapons. 
While the question of verification, so often 
raised by us as a major obstacle to disarmament 
agreements, may admittedly involve very dif-
ficult negotiations, it no longer constitutes a sub-
stantial problem. All that is now required is the 
will to discuss the matter. 
It is similarly obvious that conventional 
weapons must also be reduced in a balanced 
manner. Once more, the Soviet proposals are 
clear. The arguments based on disparities in con-
ventional and chemical weapons also cease to 
apply. The document adopted by the Warsaw 
Pact contains serious proposals for serious nego-
tiations, and it is to be hoped that the thirty-five 
CSCE countries negotiating in Vienna will adopt 
France's proposal opposed to inter-pact negotia-
tions, so that the CDE can meet again in 
Stockholm, this time to conduct concrete negoti-
ations on reducing conventional armed forces in 
Europe. 
The question of the alleged Soviet superiority 
in chemical weapons has been raised in recent 
months. Here, too, the proposal is perfectly clear. 
The Soviet Union has decided to stop pro-
duction of these weapons and is fully prepared to 
conclude an agreement on their reduction and 
the destruction of existing stocks. Again, the 
most rigorous verification is envisaged. 
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The question for us is not therefore to look for 
new pretexts for avoiding negotiations while pur-
suing plans for reinforcing military resources in 
Western Europe, including the militarisation of 
space either by supporting SDI or developing a 
European version. Our Assembly must have a 
will for disarmament in the same way as it is 
desired by public opinion. Casting doubts on Mr. 
Gorbachev's good faith is perhaps no more than 
a gambit designed to mislead public opinion. 
With the time ripe for dialogue, it is irresponsible 
to use arguments of this kind. It is after all the 
survival or extinction of mankind which is at 
stake. 
And that really is the issue. The accumulation 
of nuclear weapons is reaching a level which 
threatens continued human existence on earth. 
That is the verdict of experts throughout the 
world, and our common sense tells us it is so. 
With our present means of destruction there 
would be neither conquerors nor vanquished in 
any military confrontation. Nothing would 
survive! To overarm is to challenge human exis-
tence. 
The time has come to reconsider seriously the 
way we view the security of our countries and of 
Europe as a whole. The choice is simple: either 
we continue to accumulate sophisticated 
weapons, nuclear, conventional or whatever, and 
engineer the means of conducting war in space, 
so increasing the destabilisation of the continent 
and further imperilling the security of its inhabi-
tants, or we seek political means of bringing 
about disarmament and opening the way to 
effective detente in Europe leading to enduring 
peace and peaceful co-operation in every area, 
including space, in the interests of genuine 
security and the welfare of all. This is the chal-
lenge mankind has to face. 
We, like others, have made our choice. We 
want peace, disarmament, and the survival and 
well-being of the peoples of our planet. Not a 
Soviet or an American peace, but peace unqual-
ified. We believe that the real security of the 
European peoples and of Europe as a whole 
depends on progressive, balanced and verified 
disarmament, accompanied at every stage by 
agreements underpinning collective security and 
the security of each in relation to others. 
I therefore suggest that, having regard to the 
current situation and the events which have 
occurred since the final formulation of the report 
and the draft recommendation, our Assembly 
should submit to the Council relatively short 
texts: 
"The Assembly, 
Considering that in a nuclear world the use of 
arms would lead to the destruction of 
mankind; 
63 
SECOND SITTING 
Considering the need for progressive, balanced 
and verified disarmament to the lowest pos-
sible level; ' 
Considering the Soviet positions on nuclear, 
conventional and chemical qisarmament; 
Considering the proposals made by the 
Warsaw Pact countries on the reduction of 
conventional armaments in Europe, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL urge member 
governments: 
To adopt forthwith a position favourable to 
the offers of negotiation on medium- and 
short-range nuclear weapollls, conventional 
forces and armaments and chemical weapons 
existing or deployed in Europe; 
To encourage their American ally to contribute 
effectively to the conclusion of an agreement 
with the Soviet Union covering the withdrawal 
of all long-range nuclear missiles stationed in 
Europe; 
To act in all negotiations in which they are 
concerned to bring about the denuclearisation 
of the European continent, the progressive, 
balanced and verified reduction of conven-
tional forces and armaments, the banning of 
chemical weapons and the destruction of all 
existing stocks under rigorous inspection; 
To demand that negotiations be opened on the 
total banning of nuclear tests for military pur-
poses within the framework of the Geneva dis-
armament conference. " 
This obviously means that, while I can support 
Mr. Amadei's first and second lfeports, I cannot 
support the third. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Martino. 
Mr. MARTINO (Italy) (Translation).- Thank 
you, Mr. President. It is wholly understandable 
that there are many different national and 
alliance interests and that on certain questions, 
which may include security issues, direct rela-
tions with Moscow can and should be envisaged. 
But what should be clear to everyone is that 
there must be firm and formal wlitical solidarity 
between the European countries and with the 
United States. This means that whenever the 
interests of any party involve the security 
interests of the allies, any country which has 
bilateral contacts with the Soviet Union should 
inform its allies of the nature and progress of 
those contacts. 
Yes, Mr. President, as I did this morning I am 
referring to information concerning direct con-
tacts between the United States of America and 
the Soviet Union relating to the destruction of 
chemical weapons on United States territory in 
the presence of Soviet experts. 1This is a sign of 
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great willingness on one side and is one possible 
way of forcing the other to destroy its own stocks 
and so arrive at a total ban on chemical weapons. 
It is now clear to everyone, at least from the ter-
rible knowledge we have of non-accidental eco-
logical disasters with chemicals as at Seveso, on 
the Rhine, the pollution from Trazzine and 
Molinate and the tragedy of Bhopal how terrible 
chemical deterrents would be, just as there are 
signs of duly cautious bilateral progress towards 
reducing first the quantity and then the quality of 
the nuclear deterrent. 
Mr. President, peace built on and supported by 
deterrence is a sad peace which conceals our peo-
ple's anxieties and fears through ignorance only. 
The newspaper article I quoted is perhaps merely 
a sign of reason. 
It is in this belief that I call on the presidency, 
in approving as we shall today the excellent 
report drafted by Mr. Amadei and in submitting 
its recommendation to the Council of Ministers, 
to stress the subject of chemical weapons and to 
draw ministers' attention to the United States 
initiative, urging them to widen its scope and 
content through a simultaneous reduction of the 
two forms of deterrence. 
Mr. President, I should have finished but I still 
have the dissatisfaction of having to discuss 
security problems solely from the standpoint of 
armed defence. In the past, here in the WEU 
Assembly, I have raised with Mr. Genscher, Mr. 
Andreotti and Mr. Spadolini the problem of con-
structing, forming and perhaps transforming an 
international security agency for protection 
against the ecological disasters with which 
mankind is now threatened by technological 
progress. I would ask you, Mr. President, to keep 
this point in mind also in approving this 
report. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Dr. 
Miller. 
Dr. MILLER (United Kingdom). - Mr. Pres-
ident, despite the length and complexity of this 
report, it is about a subject which is encom-
passed in only one word and that is " disarm-
ament". It may not be obvious to people who 
listen to some of this debate that that was the 
subject under discussion, the subject to which 
the Rapporteur directed his attention. 
A few weeks ago I might have been satisfied -
almost completely satisfied at any rate - with the 
recommendations of the report. The report itself 
is a very comprehensive one, full of all kinds of 
information, important information, but I do 
believe, Mr. President, that the events of the last 
few weeks have altered the situation and I am, of 
course, referring to proposals made by Mr. 
Gorbachev. In my opinion it opens a completely 
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new field and, as our American allies would say, 
it has begun an entirely new ball game. It seems 
to me that it presents an opportunity of putting 
to the test the views of some of us - I am talking 
about those on the western side, among the 
allies, some of the allies, who say that they are in 
favour of multilateral but not unilateral disarm-
ament. 
Surely Mr. Gorbachev's proposals give an 
opportunity - an opportunity which should not 
be missed - of putting the desire for multilateral 
nuclear disarmament - or reductions to begin 
with - to the test. I know that there are people 
who say: That is all very well but we do not trust 
the Soviet Union. That is the whole problem, the 
lack of trust. There is a mutual lack of trust - I 
will accept that - but I think it is exaggerated on 
both sides and there has to be some kind of per-
ception of what the risks are and how each side 
sees the situation from its point of view and try 
to see it from someone else's point of view too. 
One of the other arguments is not only from 
the point of view oftrusting ofthe Soviet Union 
to keep its word in one respect, but also to keep 
its word when it comes to the reduction of 
weapons because some people say this cannot be 
verified. Verification enters into the argument 
and I do not disagree with that, I think it has to 
be verified. But we are in a situation now, tech-
nologically, of being able to verify even relatively 
small nuclear experimentations and explosions 
and the Soviets - the Russians - have offered to 
the West the facilities to bring instruments for 
verification to Soviet soil if they are allowed to 
do the same thing on the soil of the allies, and I 
certainly do not see anything wrong in that kind 
of tit for tat. I do not think that the expressions 
of worry coming from two Johnny-come-latelies 
like ex-President Nixon and globe-trotting 
Kissinger should be allowed to influence how 
people who want peace, who want disarmament, 
approach this tremendous problem. 
Mr. Wilkinson - for whom I have a very high 
regard, certainly from the point of view of his 
knowledge of this subject ofweapons, destructive 
power - mentioned that perhaps we should not 
be taking the Soviet offers at their face value. 
Well, I do not think anyone should take any offer 
at face value; I would accept that kind of admon-
ition, that kind of fear. But we certainly should 
take them seriously and we should consider them 
as moves towards multilateral nuclear disarm-
ament. That is of course what most of us think 
we should be aiming for. I am afraid, Mr. Pres-
ident, that in this very dangerous game, in which 
it would appear that both sides want the other 
side to take all the risks, that as far as the West is 
concerned there are people, unfortunately - I 
hope there are not many - who have a greater 
fear of a Soviet Union which uses its enormous 
natural resources for the economic development 
of its country than they have of a Soviet Union 
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which builds up more and more nuclear weapons 
and spends money on its defence. I am just 
afraid that there are people on our side who are 
willing to take the awful risk of a nuclear holo-
caust, believing that there is a deterrence 
involved in it, rather than take the risk of seeing 
a Soviet Union using these natural resources 
which it no doubt has in order to become an eco-
nomic competitor with the United States, with 
Germany, with Japan, with Britain, with Italy, 
with all the developed nations. 
I am not a pacifist, Mr. President. I believe 
that if there is a risk of our being attacked we 
should have the means with which to defend 
ourselves. First, I do not think that we can 
defend ourselves with nuclear weapons, but, 
second, the risks should be assessed and we 
should not see the certitude of attack where that 
certitude does not exist. It is my opinion that we 
should be looking for reasons to go ahead with 
moves towards disarmament and peace and not 
looking for reasons - although they are there and 
can be found too easily - for postponing this and 
continuing with the build-up of nuclear weapons 
which in themselves constitute an enormous 
danger not only to the countries of Western 
Europe but to the whole world. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Stoffelen. 
Mr. STOFFELEN (Netherlands). - In this 
debate, Mr. President, I do not speak as 
Chairman of the Socialist Group but primarily as 
a Dutch representative and for that reason I go 
on in my own language. 
(The speaker continued in Dutch) 
(Translation). Mr. President, before 
involving myself in the will-you, won't-you argu-
ments that have broken out in Europe since Mr. 
Gorbachev put forward his latest proposal, I 
should like very briefly to refer to some of the 
premises contained in the report of the com-
mission chaired by Olof Palme, the Independent 
Commission on Disarmament and Security 
Issues. Olof Palme made it clear that technology 
has changed the world. National frontiers are no 
longer defensible national shields. There is no 
effective defence against missiles with nuclear 
warheads. Not now and not in the future. A 
second problem, according to the Palme com-
mission, is that the more one spends on main-
taining a modern war machine to provide 
security against an external threat, the fewer the 
resources for solving social problems. Excessive 
concentration on external security thus threatens 
internal security, all of which means that there 
must be major changes in the way in which coun-
tries address problems relating to armaments 
and security. Above all, countries must realise 
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that in the nuclear age none of them can achieve 
security at the expense of .the others. Every 
country, Mr. Palme's report 'goes on, would be 
involved in the destruction if a nuclear war 
broke out. Recognition of mutual dependence 
means that countries must co-operate in formu-
lating and pursuing their security policies. 
Mr. President, what does aU this add up to? To 
four, one might say, principles for action: first, 
there must be a policy of shared security, and 
international peace must be. based on a com-
mitment to joint survival, not on the threat of 
mutual destruction. Second, complete and total 
disarmament must be the ultimate objective and 
remain the yardstick for disalrmament talks, as 
Maurice Miller has just stressed. Third, the eco-
nomic and social costs of the. arms race are the 
most important arguments for disarmament. 
And fourth, it is true that to a certain extent arms 
control and disarmament are connected with the 
general political climate, although these political 
links must be avoided as far as possible. 
Why, Mr. President, have I reiterated these 
principles? Principally because there is every 
reason to feel concern about the reactions from 
Western Europe to Mr. Gorbachev's various dis-
armament proposals. I foun<ll it really embar-
rassing to see the consternation and confusion in 
some countries when an agreement was almost 
reached in Reykjavik by MrJ Reagan and Mr. 
Gorbachev on medium-range missiles. Imagine, 
we saw some heads of government thinking, an 
important step was almosl taken towards 
stopping the insane arms race without asking our 
opinion! The same people are often surprised 
that in an increasing number cpf European coun-
tries a majority of the population have more 
faith in Mr. Gorbachev's disarmament proposals 
than in the proposals from the President of the 
United States. I too find this public reaction very 
worrying, but I do understand it. 
The zero option, as Lord Carrington has said, 
was from the outset the basic premise ofNATO's 
well-known twofold decision in 1979. The 
deployment of new medium-qmge missiles was 
intended as a political means of exerting pressure 
on the Soviet Union to counteract the 
deployment of SS-20s. So, according to Lord 
Carrington, there is absolutely no reason for 
panic or anger if it should suddenly prove pos-
sible to put this zero-zero optiop into effect now. 
Nonetheless, the course of events has been 
remarkable. In Reykjavik an agreement on 
medium-range missiles was v.[ithin reach. This 
agreement came to nothirlg because Mr. 
Gorbachev forged a link between a ban on INF 
missiles and the SDI project. After Reykjavik the 
Soviet Union was suddenly prepared to drop this 
link with SDI and to conclude an agreement on 
INF missiles without involving other weapons 
systems. Some Western European countries were 
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then, all at once, extremely worried about 
superior numbers, not of SS-20s but of nuclear 
weapons with a range of less than l 000 km. The 
Soviet Union reacted by making quite a generous 
offer concerning weapons with a range between 
500 and l 000 km, of which the Warsaw Pact has 
far more than NATO, and some Western 
European countries then, all at once, began to 
worry about the Warsaw Pact's remaining super-
iority, not in SS-20s, not in short-range missiles, 
but in the rest of the nuclear weaponry and con-
ventional military potential. 
Mr. President, as my speaking time is limited, 
I shall now confine myself to a few conclusions: 
as I said, the Reykjavik meeting almost produced 
an agreement, which would have resulted in a 
drastic reduction of strategic systems and the 
removal of the United States' and the Soviet 
Union's medium-range missiles from Europe. 
This agreement on medium-range missiles in 
Europe based on the zero option is now possible. 
We really must make an urgent appeal to the 
United States and the Soviet Union to conclude 
this agreement now. I am firmly convinced that 
we should reject all the new conditions which 
some European countries are now, all at once, 
trying to impose on any such agreement. The 
removal of these missiles must certainly not 
provide an excuse for the deployment of new 
types of short-range missiles, and as soon as the 
INF agreement is concluded, the negotiations on 
short-range missiles, battlefield nuclear weapons 
and conventional armaments must be resumed. 
An agreement on these weapons is just as nec-
essary. But this agreement should be based on a 
realistic assessment of military capability on 
both sides and not just on the familiar game of 
comparing mere numbers of people and 
weapons. 
Mr. President, let us not prevaricate: if there 
was ever a time for real progress in the areas of 
arms control and disarmament, that time is now. 
So let us seize this opportunity of taking a bold 
step towards a world freed from the scourge of 
violence and war. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Burger. 
Mr. BURGER (Luxembourg) (Translation). -
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, a world 
without weapons is an illusion. After escalation, 
we are now experiencing a drive for disarm-
ament aimed at a consensus on a simultaneous 
and verified balance of arms between East and 
West at the lowest possible level. For the time 
being, Mr. Gorbachev has the initiative against a 
weakened America and a Europe which takes its 
cue from its transatlantic partner. Relations 
between the Europeans and the Americans are 
not set fair at the moment, and the Soviet leader 
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is seeking to profit by this in long-term negotia-
tions, although fortunately for us no com-
mitment has yet been made. 
What is the role of nuclear deterrence? What is 
the role of conventional deterrence? A majority 
will say that Europe's forty years of peace are 
based on the nuclear deterrent, while the two 
superpowers are engaged in conflict in other 
parts of the world without the use of nuclear 
weapons. The destructive force of nuclear arms 
is such that their use is inconceivable and the 
price unacceptable. 
So, the security of the West is founded less on 
defence than on the fact that there will be no 
attack from the East. If the nuclear deterrent 
ceased to exist tomorrow, East-West tensions 
would probably increase, and an armed conflict 
would be possible at any time. The complete 
elimination of nuclear weapons would perhaps 
be possible with two adversaries which were 
pluralist democracies, but the closed system of 
the East cannot be so described, as the Berlin 
wall bears witness. 
The same is true of bilateral verification, 
which is certain to prolong all disarmament 
negotiations. Mr. Gorbachev has much to say on 
the matter, but in the Vienna negotiations on 
troop numbers the Soviet delegation rejects all 
proposals and has not given an inch. 
As for the negotiations on chemical weapons, 
the eastern bloc delegation has at most agreed to 
inspection and the destruction of existing stocks, 
but this is not enough if there is a genuine wish 
for effective agreements. 
Apart from the problem of verification, the 
elimination of nuclear weapons raises other 
problems. For example, it affects the East-West 
balance in varying degree, and it is unlikely that 
France and the United Kingdom will give up 
their European nuclear arsenals. As regards the 
problem of a partial reduction of nuclear 
weapons, and the zero option for intermediate 
nuclear forces is an example of this, it is vital 
that simultaneous agreements be reached on 
short-range intermediate forces, chemical 
weapons and conventional forces, as in these 
three areas the Warsaw Pact is reported to have a 
worrying superiority over Western Europe. 
According to a reliable source, a compromise 
has been reached in the Atlantic Alliance to 
retain in Europe a number oflong-range interme-
diate nuclear weapons, although nothing official 
has been said. Long-range intermediate missiles 
threaten the USSR with attack in the event of 
conflict with the West, so that the zero option 
would primarily benefit the East. The Warsaw 
Pact's advantage of I 400 against 170 short-range 
intermediate nuclear missiles, some of which are 
located in the German Democratic Republic and 
Czechoslovakia, plus the eastern bloc's 
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advantage in conventional forces would 
therefore be unacceptable to Western Europe. 
Instead of inviting the West to establish 
equality - creating problems in public opinion 
and defence budgets - the East could demon-
strate its desire for peace by destroying its 
surplus stocks and thereby restoring the balance. 
While it is possible to reduce nuclear deterrents 
it is vital that the United States consult thei; 
European allies befor~ summit negotiations, as 
the aim of the USSR 1s to uncouple the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
The problem of bilateral verification in the 
event of an agreement will certainly take time, 
because the requirements of the Atlantic Alliance 
are exacting and involve the permanent presence 
of a hundred inspectors to monitor production 
storage and missile assembly units. This is why 
~ravda stresses that there are still many obstacles 
m the way of an agreement with the United 
States, our ally in the Atlantic Alliance whose 
European pillar should be strengthened by WEU 
without delay. 
With regard to the role of conventional deter-
rence, I repeat that the Warsaw Pact has a con-
siderable superiority in conventional forces. Any 
request for additional funds for defence budgets 
would present serious difficulties for the political 
leaders of the Atlantic Alliance. It is also true 
that most public opinion is pacifically inclined 
and wants disarmament. If nuclear weapons 
were eliminated, conventional deterrents would 
certainly increase the probability of armed con-
flict, initially in West Berlin. The best way to 
prove its desire for peace would be for the 
eastern bloc to start by accepting a reduction in 
conventional weapons, where it has a consi-
derable advantage. 
.However, over thirteen years ofMBFR negoti-
atiOns t~e West. h3:s n~t succeeded in reducing 
th~ ~oviet s~penonty m conventional weapons. 
Fallmg a radical and unlikely change on the part 
of the USSR, conventional deterrence is like 
partial nuclear deterrence in that it is certain to 
create more problems instead of providing 
answers for ensuring the maintenance of peace. 
I will conclude by saying that a reduction of 
nuclear deterrence to a minimum level is fea-
sible. Conventional deterrence alone is ineffi-
cient. In the medium term it will increase in 
importance as nuclear deterrence diminishes. 
Western European Union, as the European pillar 
of the Atlantic Alliance, must make efforts to 
play a greater part in its defence. 
Europe must no longer be absent when 
summit decisions are taken affecting its security. 
Allies must be consulted in advance, not after the 
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event, if the European pillar of the Atlantic 
Alliance is not to be eroded. 
(Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed 
the Chair) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Fourre. 
Mr. FOURRE (France) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Amadei's 
report coincides with a situation which is 
perhaps unprecedented sin<;e the end of the 
sec<;u~d world war. F~llowing' President Reagan's 
deciSIOn on SDI, which evoked varying reactions 
both on the technological implications of 
Europe's proper role in this important American 
initiative and on the strategic significance the 
initiative might have for Europe, we have now 
heard a series of proposals qy Mr. Gorbachev. 
The prospect of the elimination and reduction 
of American and Soviet intermediate nuclear 
forces in Europe was already envisaged by 
NATO in 1979, 1981 and 1986. On 4th March last, 
the President of the French Republic said this 
served the interests of Franc~ and of peace. But 
we must be clear - the President said that any 
reduction should be balanced, simultaneous and 
verified, and it is unquestionably about the last 
aspect that doubts are still felt. It is true, as Mr. 
Valleix reminded us just now, that in 1978 
France itself suggested the creation of an interna-
tional monitoring satellite agency capable of ver-
ifying directly actual disar:J1lament, crises and 
outbreaks of tension throughout the world. Mr. 
President, I have myself several times taken up 
this initiative in this Assembly and have even 
proposed instead a European monitoring satellite 
agency in face of the refusal by the two super-
powers to accept a system which seemed to us 
entirely feasible. 
One of the measures proposed by Mr. 
Gorbachev - calling for an agreement on the 
short-range SS-20, SS-21, SS-22 and SS-23 mis-
siles after or at the same time as a treaty on the 
SS-20, Pershing 11 and cruise missiles - would 
set us a completely different problem. This does 
not mean we should not all welcome any disarm-
ament. Disarmament is not only our wish but 
continues to be our basic objective. 
But, quite simply, beyond such agreement 
other problems have to be resolved and these 
centre on a question which must be the principal 
concern of our Assembly - what would then 
become of European security~ Again, there is the 
problem of decoupling, which arose in con-
nection with the SDI decision and is now 
besetting us again; a decision which awakens us 
to many rumours, circulating even in the United 
States, which are occasionally put into concrete 
terms by some members of the American Con-
gress. 
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Some think the denuclearisation of Europe is 
the right solution, but, in my opinion the idea 
that the two superpowers should embark on this 
path without allowing us Europeans any possi-
bility of asserting our individuality, in 
accordance with the world status we are seeking 
to establish, is not a satisfactory solution. It 
would also mean by-passing the issue of conven-
tional forces and disregarding Soviet strength in 
this area, as has been stated several times. More 
especially it would hinder progress towards a 
European defence system, if only because the 
United Kingdom, and more particularly France, 
would then be under pressure from other 
European countries to consider changing their 
defence doctrine. It seems to me that any such 
change would at present be unthinkable, so great 
is our conviction in France ofthe rightness ofthe 
principle of independence, entrenched in public 
opinion, an independence based on nuclear 
deterrence which ensures our security and allows 
us to play our part in confronting world 
problems. It acts as a central system, and pro-
vides a pointer to a possible solution for other 
European countries. 
In this area and perhaps beyond, our European 
countries must consult each other, must refuse to 
submit to a timetable imposed from outside and 
must jointly define a range of policies - as we 
have been trying to do over several years - cov-
ering for example armaments, research, devel-
opment and, of course, the underlying principles 
of European defence. 
But in speaking of disarmament we must also 
recall the principles and terms of the Helsinki 
final act and the measures approved when the 
thirty-five signatory states met in Madrid. To 
promote the cause of disarmament is to 
encourage and develop all kinds of relationships 
between the member countries of the Warsaw 
Pact and the countries of the West and, in 
general, to condemn any actions which can lead 
to confrontation between the blocs and per-
petuate tensions between the countries of 
Europe. In practical terms, it means demanding 
that the member states of the Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe should fully 
implement the provisions of the Helsinki final 
act and the final document produced in Madrid, 
and also that they should at once open negotia-
tions on conventional disarmament, without 
which any debate and any agreement is bound to 
produce substantial divisions in a Europe which 
is still in search of itself and which has no need 
of obstacles in its quest for a European defence 
system. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
John Osborn. 
Sir John OSBORN (United Kingdom). -Mr. 
President, I welcome this debate because disarm-
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ament is an important subject today and 
involves the peoples of Europe deeply and, 
depending on which part of Europe those people 
live in, in different ways. This report has, 
however, been superseded by events. After all, it 
was a report about the annual report of the 
Council for 1985, which was delayed, and com-
ments on the delay of the 1986 report, but its 
major theme has been disarmament. There are a 
number of amendments which we have to con-
sider, some of which I will readily support, 
others which I will find difficult to support. But 
at the end of the day my inclination is not to 
support the report outright, because it has been 
superseded by events. However, it has given rise 
to a very topical and valuable debate. These 
events include not only the Reykjavik con-
ference, the acceptance by Mikhail Gorbachev of 
the original1981 NATO proposals supported by 
President Reagan- Mr. Valleix and others spoke 
about his initiative; I think those supporting 
NATO feel the initiative came from them and 
welcome his support. Now this has been fol-
lowed up by George Shultz and presents a chal-
lenge to Western European governments and its 
institutions. 
Mr. Goerens put forward a useful motion for a 
recommendation relevant to the short timescale 
and I had no hesitation in supporting it. Mr. 
President, the week the British Prime Minister, 
Mrs. Thatcher, went to Moscow I summarised 
my views in a leader in the local paper but they 
were from the scientific and technological angle 
and with in mind the challenge the likelihood of 
disarmament will present to European institu-
tions, whether the European Economic Com-
munity, the Council of Europe, but, above all, 
Western European Union. And this, I think, our 
ministers must address themselves to 
tomorrow. 
I have said this before, but for some 
twenty-five years I have been secretary, vice-
chairman and, for most of that time, chairman of 
the British-Soviet parliamentary group. Some 
five years ago I led a delegation, just after the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; it was an all-
party British Delegation and protested at the 
superiority in Soviet conventional and Soviet 
nuclear arms. That week was a very difficult one, 
but my bargaining position was undermined by 
the fact that the leader ofthe opposition, Michael 
Foot, and the then shadow foreign secretary, 
Denis Healey, had given a promise for the next 
general election, which was to be in 1983, that 
the socialists would support independent nuclear 
disarmament - unilateral nuclear disarmament. 
This is, Mr. President, Neil Kinnock's policy for 
the British Labour Party today and it has been 
commented on in the United States of America. 
I think some of the differences in this Assembly 
reflect those differences of approach and they 
were emphasised by John Wilkinson. But in my 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Sir John Osborn (continued) 
view the strong line of the prime minister and 
European leaders to support President Reagan 
and place cruise and Pershing missiles to combat 
the SS-20 now makes realistic disarmament talks 
possible in the European theatre and peace 
through strength has justified itself. 
I happened to meet Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev 
when he came to London in December 1985. So 
when he became General Secretary I wrote to 
him and my opposite-number in the British-
Soviet group urging recognition of the need to 
open up a dialogue on economic and industrial 
matters as well as science and technology with 
the main European institutions, but especially 
the Council of Europe, although I was not 
adverse to the European Parliament. In practice, 
the Soviet Union had concentrated on bilateral 
talks with each individual European country. 
The fact that we can talk together is very 
important. 
Mr. President, now that disarmament is a real 
issue, I was not surprised to learn of the invi-
tation to the Presidential Committee to visit 
Moscow. Your report has made interesting 
reading, particularly the Soviet respect for the 
European personality. 
I would like to end on three points. In the 
middle of February, the parliamentary and scien-
tific committee of my country visited NATO and 
SHAPE. This arose because British scientists 
were conscious that 50% of the research and 
development budget in Britain was going on 
defence and also Lord Carrington had, at the 
December session of the Assembly, suggested 
co-operation in research and development on 
defence. Discussions covered defence research 
and development and the work of the IEPG. 
This committee met General Rogers but the dis-
cussion was more about the technology of verifi-
cation and disarmament than procurement 
because it was only a few days after Gorbachev's 
speech. 
The second point: as a member of the British 
Parliament I have approached ministers and 
some of their negotiators about the complexity of 
the very talks that have taken place in Vienna, 
Geneva and Stockholm. In fact our Secretary-
General was at one of those private meetings not 
so long ago. At one of these meetings I thought 
the role of our defence commanders was surely 
solely defence and not counting forces of verifi-
cation. But it was put to me by these profes-
sionals that this was not the case. Therefore the 
Council of Western European Union has to 
decide the extent to which it will now share with 
NATO not only defence but the whole question 
of forces' assessment and verification. 
When I was in the Soviet Union I stressed the 
superiority of all Soviet forces. I got a very 
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impressive document propounding to me pre-
cisely the opposite. But asses$ment involves high 
technology as well as political will - I think the 
will is a function of this Assembly. But in 
response to John Wilkinson as Chairman of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions, there are scientific and 
technological aspects to arms surveillance and 
arms verification; this involves seismology and 
satellites and Mr. Fourre has covered this. 
But there is a third aspect. The United States 
has a high level of public expenditure on its own 
defence and European defence and also an isola-
tionist streak. It wants Western Europe to take a 
bigger share of its own defencte and we in Europe 
should not forget this. On ~he other hand, the 
Soviet economy is virtually in a mess - partly 
because of its own Marxist economic policies, 
which I believe Mikhail Gorbachev wishes to 
change, but mainly because the level of defence 
expenditure is about double that, in per capita 
terms, of western countries. I have raised this in 
IPU debates but I genuinely believe Mikhail 
Gorbachev wants to meet t}le apprehensions of 
Western Europe and therefore we should meet 
him half way. Therefore arms reductions on a 
mutual and balanced basis, with adequate verifi-
cation, are a possibility. What the Western 
European role is has to be determined, but I 
await the considered response of ministers. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Hardy. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). - Mr. Fourre 
a moment or two ago reminded the Assembly 
that we are in an almost unprecedented position 
and that, internationally, developments have 
been rapid. They certainly have been rapid since 
the Amadei report surfaced:. At that point, it 
seemed to me that the report was viewed in some 
circles with animosity, or at least suspicion, 
though I think to some extent the animosity has 
to be muted, although the suspicion may still 
exist in the same quarters. But a few months ago 
it was possible to argue that. we were asking for 
too much, that the world was not ready for the 
sort of calls which the report was offering. The 
report then, as now, presenttd us with a timely 
opportunity. Timely, since it provides the chance 
for members of the Assembly to comment upon 
the international scene. It is also timely for us to 
remind Western European countries that they 
have time and time again vdted for multilateral 
disarmament, multilateral nuclear disarmament 
and it would be therefore absurdly, perhaps even 
obscenely, inconsistent if our governments were 
to appear to be taking a position which was dif-
ferent and in contrast with the international 
posture which they have adopted for a decade or 
more. 
I had not intended to say very much more 
than that, in fact, except to point out that the 
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report also touches upon the need for reduction 
in conventional weaponry and it certainly makes 
a very necessary and relevant reference to the 
question of chemical warfare and chemical 
weapon capacity, to which many members have 
referred and, I think, referred with justification. 
Those things require very considerable attention. 
But I want very briefly to reply to Sir John 
Osborn, because I think in his valedictory 
utterance his reference to my own party and its 
policies does require at least a brief response. I 
have never been a member of the campaign for 
nuclear disarmament and Sir John Osborn as a 
fellow Yorkshire member of parliament will be 
aware of my position. It is a position shared by 
many who are prepared to support the Labour 
Party's policy. It is a policy I support for this 
reason - a reason that perhaps the Assembly 
might like to recognise: if we do not have an ade-
quate conventional capacity, then nuclear war is 
more likely than otherwise. We have taken the 
view that the British Government, and perhaps 
other Western European governments, has 
placed far too high a priority on the nuclear 
capacity and has neglected the conventional 
potential. Since my party takes the view that it 
must at all costs, in order to ensure the survival 
of humanity, prevent a nuclear war taking place, 
it has taken the view that a priority should be 
given to the conventional. 
Now the reason for that is very simple. Sir 
John may rejoice in a decision taken a few days 
ago in South Yorkshire that a company is going 
to provide a very large sum of money for a 
private educational venture. The money is 
actually coming from a company which purveys 
the products of Japan and a number of other Far 
Eastern countries. Those countries have been 
able to enter our market and make enormous 
profits and enormous sales in the markets of 
Western Europe because they have not been 
investing anything like the same share of their 
gross national product in and for military pur-
poses. There are lessons to be learned in America 
and Western Europe about the growth in the 
economies of countries which do not devote such 
high priorities to military purposes and it may be 
that Mr. Gorbachev's initiative is in response to 
that economic reality. It is an economic reality 
·which should dominate our consideration at the 
present time and I make no apology for the pol-
icies of my party which have been made to 
appear far more respectable in the last few 
months than the conservative members of our 
parliament and our community might like. 
But it is not because of party positions, Mr. 
President, that I make those remarks. It is 
because I believe that we have, as a result of a 
Russian initiative, an opportunity to reduce 
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tension, reduce expenditure and enhance the 
security of mankind. I am a realist. It will take a 
lot of time, it will take detailed negotiations, it 
will take an awful lot of verification and the 
terms of reference have to be widened. But for us 
to appear niggardly, for us to appear querulous, 
for us to appear suspicious and demonstrate that 
suspicion or seek to put hurdles in front of 
potential advance will be an act which a future 
generation, if it has the opportunity, will regard 
as criminal and irresponsible in the extreme. 
I congratulate Mr. Amadei on the opportunity 
to make those remarks. I believe his report is 
timely, I certainly hope that it is overwhelmingly 
endorsed. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Close. 
Mr. CLOSE (Belgium) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, ladies and gentlemen, I must admit to 
qualified feelings with regard to Mr. Amadei's 
report. I salute his sustained and worthy efforts 
in producing for us a remarkable account of all 
the various moves including especially the 
strenuous attempt made on the Soviet side to ini-
tiate negotiations. All the same, the prolonged 
and, we might say, almost professional argu-
ments which have dominated the discussion of 
this report suggest to me that something in the 
report is not quite right. To me it somehow calls 
to mind the Echternach procession with its two 
paces back for every three paces forward - after 
all we are in Luxembourg!- or a knitting pattern 
prescribing a series of alternating stitches. 
I turn now to some particular points to explain 
where I depart from the Rapporteur's line of 
thought. I am very afraid the report is danger-
ously selective in the quotations made in the 
draft recommendation. While it reproduces 
certain phrases used in the North Atlantic 
Council communique of 12th December 1986 -
" Ministers welcome the progress at Reykjavik 
towards agreement on 50% reductions ... and pay 
tribute to the efforts made, etc.", there is no 
mention of an essential paragraph which follows 
this paean of praise by the ministers of the 
Atlantic Alliance and which reads as follows:" ... 
particularly since reductions in nuclear weapons 
will increase the importance of removing con-
ventional disparities and eliminating chemical 
weapons. ... an essential requirement " and I 
would personally underline those last words, " ... 
for real and enduring stability and security in 
Europe". I believe that it is a truly essential 
requirement. 
Let us sum up the situation. In the first place it 
is a fact that the credibility of nuclear deterrence 
is wearing thin, whatever the speed of the 
process. I remind you that the intermediate 
weapons are American, and if the Americans are 
determined to reach agreement with the Soviet 
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Union on their elimination they will go ahead 
despite our protests and our eloquence. 
But what does European public opinion expect 
of us at this crucial session? It expects us to 
decide our position, and if, as has been fore-
seeable for some time, the importance of nuclear 
deterrence is diminishing, public opinion expects 
us to take measures to co-ordinate our actions, 
strengthen our conventional forces, possibly 
conduct discussions about balanced reductions 
on both sides, but in any case it expects us to 
guarantee our security. I am afraid we have so far 
failed to reach a common position, but 
tomorrow afternoon we shall perhaps have the 
reply of the Council of Ministers. 
Listening - just this once! - to my very 
right-wing neighbour a moment ago I seemed to 
be hearing the notes of Munich with Muscovite 
overtones, and I was reminded of what I lived 
through at the end of the 1930s when persistent 
lethargy and laxity led us to Munich, the Sude-
tenland, Czechoslovakia, Danzig and the second 
world war. It is important to remind ourselves of 
the lessons of history. 
My conclusion is brief. I cannot subscribe to 
the recommendations of a report which, despite 
the praiseworthy efforts of its author, in my 
opinion fails entirely to meet the demands of 
European security and serves even less the search 
for a European identity. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
de Beer. 
Mr. de BEER (Netherlands) (Translation). -
Mr. Amadei's report has had a hard time, for 
understandable reasons. Firstly, Mr. Amadei had 
the unfortunate experience of seeing current 
events constantly overtake the latest version of 
his report, and secondly, and I say this in the 
friendliest possible way, we find the report paints 
a somewhat one-sided picture here and there. 
The recommendation in its original form would 
not in fact have been acceptable to many of the 
members of the Liberal Group. But in the 
meantime it has undergone two thorough revi-
sions in this Assembly's Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments and I am one of those 
who are able to endorse the tenor of the recom-
mendation now that these changes have been 
made, though some minor improvements are 
still possible here and there. 
What the new version of the recommendation 
must undoubtedly reveal is that we in Western 
Europe will become more vulnerable if the 
partial denuclearisation of our part of the world 
is actually carried out. We shall be more vul-
nerable militarily, and we shall therefore be more 
vulnerable politically as well. This will most cer-
tainly be true if short-range missiles and/or 
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chemical weapons are not covered by the nego-
tiations, but even if they are, we shall be far more 
vulnerable. After all, the Warsaw Pact will still 
be vastly superior in conventional forces, which, 
unlike NA TO's forces, are offensive. In short, it 
is we Western Europeans who will be running the 
risks if this procedure is adopted, not the Rus-
sians or the United States. 
On the other hand, we must also realise that 
this is a unique opportunity for doing something 
about the arms race. Withil(l a broader historical 
context we must do everything humanly possible 
to ensure that this opportunity is not wasted. We 
must therefore be willing to take something of a 
risk in the short-term, but not with blind faith in 
the good intentions of the Russians and their 
allies. Their country, a dictatorship which 
exposes its own people to t111e terror of the KGB, 
treats dissidents as psychi*ric patients, regards 
anyone wanting to leave the country as a traitor 
and commits the most dreadful crimes in a 
country like Afghanistan, certainly cannot be 
trusted. It can be trusted only when the Berlin 
wall disappears, when believers are allowed to 
hold prayer meetings witho'-lt being arrested and 
when Afghan children can pick up toys without 
being crippled for life. A country should be 
trusted only when it has a free press and when its 
judiciary is genuinely independent. So there 
must be no blind faith on our part, but we should 
risk a first step, while watching carefully to see 
how the Warsaw Pact countries react in the areas 
of political detente and human rights. 
To come back to Mr. A:tnadei's report, if the 
recommendation is adopted in its amended 
form, there will be talk of a discrepancy between 
the report and the recommendation - the tone of 
the report will be different from the tone of the 
recommendation. But we are not voting on the 
report in this Assembly, we are voting on the 
recommendation in its final form. We think it 
necessary, Mr. President, to point this out and to 
say that how we vote on the recommendation 
must certainly not be construed as a complete 
endorsement of everything in the report. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
Frederic Bennett. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom). -
Mr. President, I would endorse the last speaker's 
words when he talked about trust and mentioned 
the Soviet Union that invades places like 
Afghanistan. I think perhaps it is a little hum-
bling for all of us, or ought to be, that while we 
are talking in this way aboljlt ensuring peace and 
security for ourselves, there is a country that 
invades countries like Afghanistan. They are, at 
this very minute while we are sitting here, 
bombing and killing the population of a non-
aligned country in Asia. It is not just a matter of 
people who behave like this, they are behaving 
like this at the present time, and I make no 
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apology in asking all colleagues please to 
remember that we are talking about a country 
which is conducting at this very moment an 
aggressive war of a particularly brutal sort 
against a small non-aligned country. 
Secondly, in regard to his final remark about 
the way we are voting, of course, particularly if 
the amendments are carried, it will be a very dif-
ferent consequence of the explanatory memo-
randum. In the past it has always been difficult 
because, although technically we are voting for 
the recommendation, we have to bear in mind 
the material as a whole, all the thinking in it, not 
just the points that have been gained by com-
mittee discussion, but the thinking behind the 
whole report. And that certainly causes a number 
of my colleagues and myself considerable 
anxiety. 
The Rapporteur began today by saying, quite 
truthfully, that he had been very patient and had 
had a difficult time. He and I have done our best, 
I think, to collaborate and I thank him for what 
he did. He was good enough also to express grat-
itude to myself and those who think like I do. 
But I think we must put it on the record that in 
this kind of Assembly, where there are no 
absolute majorities and no whips, if rapporteurs 
are to get reports through easily they have to get 
a consensus that is acceptable to a substantial 
majority. Otherwise, if they do not, they are 
going to have to go through the experience that 
Mr. Amadei has had to go through and this is the 
: background to it. There is always the danger that 
the longer a contested report takes for discussion, 
the more often it is referred back to committee. 
Of course, it is more likely - as has happened 
today - to become increasingly overtaken by 
events, irrespective of what the original moti-
vation was. There is no politics in that because 
obviously the longer a discussion goes on the 
more situations can develop which make the 
situation different and that has happened today. 
I say quite quickly that I now think that this doc-
ument, without political considerations from 
either side, is very largely irrelevant in the 
context of the situation as we see it today, 
whether on the left, the right or the centre. 
Europe, disarmament, the relationship with 
the United States, with the Soviet Union is not 
what it was when Mr. Amadei first planned his 
report and he knows that, and I know that; we 
are living in a very different atmosphere to when 
he first took on this task. 
The main theme of what I want to say refers 
back to my colleague, Mr. Hardy. I think I quote 
him rightly - I must be very careful on this - I 
think he said we pay too much attention at the 
moment to nuclear defence and too little to con-
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ventional. This I think is symptomatic, if I may 
say so, of the confusion in ministers' and others' 
minds throughout Europe, America for all I 
know, and the Soviet Union too. There is no 
indication in history that merely getting a bigger 
and bigger defence capacity comparable with that 
of your potential enemies produces peace. I have 
done a little research before I came here. We had 
the war in 1914, not when there was an 
enormous majority in favour of the central 
powers of Germany, Austria and Hungary. In 
fact, France, Britain and Russia fighting at that 
time had more conventional forces than our 
opponents at that time, and we still had a war. In 
1939, if we actually look at the armaments that 
we all possessed at that time, Nazi Germany -
greater Germany - had at that time rather fewer 
forces than the allies that went against it: Britain 
and France. Yet, we had a war. So trying to 
match up conventional weapons and say that 
this will bring peace - and this is what distresses 
me so much about actually saying that what we 
have to do in Europe is to spend a lot more 
money and build up our conventional forces 
until we get nearer to the level of the Russian 
forces - may do all sorts of things, but it has not 
brought peace in the past, when we did have 
parity. So why we have got bemused into 
thinking that, because we undertake this action, 
we make war unlikely is quite beyond my per-
ception. 
Mr. President, there is only one consideration 
that we should be thinking of and that is deter-
rence, not defence. Deterrence is the name of the 
game and ought to be. We ought not to be 
thinking in terms of whether we could fight a 
successful defence war - if one takes place - we 
all ought to be thinking of how we should 
prevent that war ever taking place and the only 
lesson we have is deterrence, and the example we 
have is poison gas in the last war. When there 
was an element of deterrence, poison gas was not 
used. It was not a matter of some people had a 
little more poison gas or a little less poison gas, it 
was an element of deterrence. That is what is 
guiding people like myself into thinking that we 
do not want to denuclearise Europe if it simply 
means another conventional arms race to try to 
get to a situation which failed dismally to 
prevent war in 1939 and, unless we are careful, 
will prove dismally useless in the future. 
Under these circumstances, since this debate is 
taking place about a paper which, with all 
courtesy to the Rapporteur, is outdated, I want 
to listen to the further amendments that are 
going to be moved today from both sides and 
then come, with my colleagues, to a decision. But 
I say now, irrespective of the outcome of these 
amendments, I myself shall find it very hard to 
give my support to a document which I regard -
with the best wishes of all to the Rapporteur and 
thanks for what he has been trying to do - as 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Sir Frederic Bennett (continued) 
being irrelevant and outdated in the context of 
today. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Reddemann. 
Mr. REDDEMANN (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). -Mr. President, we are 
today debating the report which is intended as 
the Assembly's reply to the Council's thirty-first 
annual report. It rather sounds as if on this fine 
sunny day we are discussing the New Year's Day 
weather report and trying to draw conclusions 
from it. This problem has been created not by 
our excellent Rapporteur but by our working 
methods, and we should perhaps take this oppor-
tunity to consider how we can adapt our working 
methods more quickly to the practical situa-
tion. 
We have, ladies and gentlemen, witnessed an 
interesting development in recent weeks. After 
decades of seeing the Soviet Union not only 
holding back but usually opposing any disar-
mament proposal, the news we are now receiving 
from the Soviet Union is favourable, and I feel 
that the first thing we should do is to welcome 
this. For us in this Assembly it is all-important to 
remember that before the West's arms build-up 
there was considerable controversy as to whether 
any disarmament negotiations at all with the 
Soviet Union would be possible after this 
build-up, or whether it would in fact result in the 
Soviet Union's moving back to the negotiating 
table of its own accord. 
In my opinion, the fact that the Soviet Gov-
ernment and the Soviet party leaders have been 
making very positive signals in favour of disarm-
ament in recent weeks and months has shown 
how important it was for the democratic coun-
tries of Europe and our allies across the Atlantic 
to carry on jointly with the arms build-up, 
because all of us must now be certain that 
without it the Soviet Union would have con-
tinued to arm, without offering to negotiate. The 
joint approach adopted by the democratic coun-
tries in the arms race should lead on to a joint 
approach in the talks with the Soviet Union. In 
other words, we should continue in future negoti-
ations what we have begun together, so proving 
Henry Kissinger wrong in his recent comment on 
disarmament that the democrats run the risk of 
falling victim to blackmail they have talked 
themselves into. 
Ladies and gentlemen, we all want disar-
mament. But we know equally well that weapons 
alone are neither the crucial nor the dangerous 
factor; the question is one of intent: whether 
weapons are kept for purposes of defence or 
attack. So what is crucial in the first instance is a 
basically peaceful outlook, and no country can 
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prove it has peace in mind, ladies and gent-
lemen, unless it not only puts forward proposals 
on disarmament but also and above all backs 
them up by approving the verification of disar-
mament. And on this, to be quite frank, I com-
pletely disagree with some rerresentatives, par-
ticularly members of the Brit:tish Labour Party, 
who felt we should not be so sceptical. I believe 
scepticism has its place at thll: beginning of the 
deliberations, and thereafter, 1 not simply when 
some control station or other has been set up but 
when it is actually possible to ,check up on one's 
suspicions on the spot - only then can we accept 
the existence of the peaceful attitude that is 
undoubtedly necessary if we want to make any 
progress, not only towards disarmament in the 
technical sense but also in the disarmament of 
the various concepts of society. 
Ladies and gentlemen, though I say this with 
conscious scepticism after seventy years of 
Soviet imperialism, I am pleased that for the first 
time the Soviet Government has talked about 
the zero option for long-range intermediate mis-
siles. But here again we must realise that it has 
not yet been possible to scrutinise the offers 
made so far, because the Sovi€t Government has 
not yet given all the necessary details. 
I must say that, for examp[e, Dr. Jorg Kastl, 
German Ambassador to Mosaow for many years 
and an expert on the Soviet Union, told us once 
again only last weekend, and I quote: " So far, 
Gorbachev's declarations of intent are more dra-
matic than the reality. " I feel we must bear this 
in mind when we discuss the overall situation. 
Nevertheless, I hope we will very soon have a 
solution, particularly in the case of long-range 
intermediate missiles, because this was, of 
course, a problem where the arms race was con-
cerned, and it would be a good thing if we had 
the opportunity of actually bringing peace a little 
bit closer with fewer weapons. 
But, ladies and gentlemen, we also know that 
there is a twofold problem, in that the Soviet 
armies with their conventional weapons are far 
stronger than the NATO countries, the countries 
of WEU. And to behave as if we could dispense 
with the nuclear shield without a single doubt, at 
the same time ignoring the Soviet Union's con-
ventional weapons, would, I :believe, be exces-
sively naive, so if we are to <iliscuss joint disar-
mament, we must also discuss conventional 
disarmament, which is just a$ crucial. 
Ladies and gentlemen, as a child I experienced 
the horrors of conventional war. I saw the incen-
diary bombs raining down on us, and yet I know 
that by comparison that represented, I will not 
say child's play, but a great deal less in fire power 
and destructive power than conventional 
weapons produce today. Hence my urgent appeal 
that nothing should be overlooked in the disar-
mament talks we want to hold - that these 
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powerful, these lethal, these murderous weapons 
should be included in the negotiations. 
Mr. President, I should like to introduce a 
final item into the debate. Such wide-ranging 
negotiations on disarmament as have now been 
announced can only be conducted with a gov-
ernment which we know to be secure in office 
and capable of sustaining proposals which 
represent a complete departure from statements 
and practices stretching back over many years. 
And here again I should like to quote Ambas-
sador Kastl. He writes: " However much of a 
dove Mikhail Gorbachev may seem to us, his 
closest advisers are very hawk-like in their defi-
nition of the general line to be taken vis-a-vis the 
international class enemy. " I am not saying that 
this statement should be accepted by everyone, 
but I do think we should regard it as the 
statement of an expert, an admittedly sceptical 
expert, and take it into account in our delibera-
tions. 
It would be nice if Mikhail Gorbachev and the 
present majority of the Politburo of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union were to take a step towards giving 
communism a more human face. But I feel we 
should not just take such statements, however 
striking, at face value. We should, if you will 
allow me such a comment, amend the old 
proverb " One swallow does not make a 
summer " and say that while we rejoice in oppor-
tunities for disarmament," One Gorbachev does 
not make peace. " 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Scheer. 
Mr. SCHEER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. 
Amadei's report is in fact being used for a 
political controversy under which it has, I am 
sorry to say, so far suffe~ed badly. I will therefore 
consider the controversy, not the fact that much 
of the report is out of date, for which, as the pre-
vious speaker said, the Rapporteur is in no way 
to blame. The more serious problem is that a 
report is now in dispute although it goes no 
further than past reports adopted by the 
Assembly. This dispute is, in my opinion, partly 
due to the fact that there are now greater oppor-
tunities for disarmament than ever before. Never 
since 1917 has there been a Soviet leadership so 
willing to disarm and now that we suddenly have 
these practical opportunities, we in the West 
must also stand by our own former initiatives. 
But some people no longer want this, because 
they did not mean their earlier proposals seri-
ously. In other words, we are slowly approaching 
the moment of truth, when we must show just 
how serious we are about disarmament. 
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That is the issue here. The West - as I will 
show with a few examples - has constantly 
imposed a number of preconditions. In 1981 it 
imposed the condition of the zero-zero option. 
The NATO twofold decision had a far more 
restricted condition attached. It says that the 
West might refrain from an arms build-up if the 
Soviet Union kept the number ofSS-20s down to 
the 1979 level. Then came the zero-zero option, 
which, strictly speaking, goes beyond the NATO 
twofold decision. Then, all of a sudden, triggered 
off by a fundamental change of course, the Soviet 
Union accepted the zero-zero option. Then came 
the West's next reservation: short-range missiles. 
Now the Soviet Union is willing to dismantle the 
short-range missiles, this having been previously 
agreed by Mr. Shultz and the Soviet Foreign 
Minister in Moscow in recent weeks. And sud-
denly the word goes round that Europe would be 
denuclearised, deprived of its protective nuclear 
shield. 
The American Foreign Secretary himself has 
denied this. There would still be over 4 000 
nuclear weapons left in Western Europe if both 
medium- and short-range missiles were with-
drawn. There would still be aircraft carrying 
nuclear weapons, and there would still be the 
Poseidon launchers. There would still be tactical 
nuclear weapons. There would still be the British 
and French systems, which will have a larger 
number of missiles by the end of the decade than 
the present number of Soviet SS-20s - and those 
are modern weapons. All that would still be 
there. Then there was the point that, if Europe 
were to be denuclearised, it would face the Soviet 
Union's allegedly enormous conventional supe-
riority. Quite apart from the fact that conven-
tional disarmament takes much longer because it 
is far more complicated, if everything were to be 
postponed until a conventional treaty was 
signed, what, I ask myself, would the next reser-
vation be, when it came to finding practical solu-
tions? 
I am not now referring to everyone who may 
have been sceptical, but the nucleus of resistance 
is clearly discernible and far more obviously 
evinced here. And then there are the political 
arguments: for instance General Close's refe-
rence to a new Munich. When is an agreement 
with the Soviet Union likely to be concluded, if 
not under this changed leadership? Will it only · 
be possible when the Soviet system has been 
abandoned? That seems to be the only logical 
conclusion. That means disarmament is abso-
lutely impossible until something has changed. 
If the present proposals were implemented, the 
Soviet Union would be giving up more missiles 
than the West, because it has more medium-
and short-range missiles. If it gives up more than 
the West, how can the West be weakened? I find 
this argument completely incomprehensible. 
How can the West be more vulnerable? That is 
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impossible. On the contrary, the British and 
French systems, which the British and French 
Governments also declared, after the last but one 
world summit in Williamsburg, to be part of the 
western deterrence, would actually be the only 
long-range systems left in Europe. The West 
would become stronger. In other words, it is 
quite conceivable that, where nuclear missiles 
alone are concerned, the Soviet Union would be 
taking a greater risk than the West. 
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has 
dropped one precondition after another. To 
make it easier for us in Western Europe to 
include the British and French systems in some 
form, it has dropped the SDI package. We really 
will make no progress if one side imposes more 
and more conditions after the previous condi-
tions have been met, until the other side feels 
that nothing will come of its efforts, no matter 
what it may offer. The essential problem cannot 
be solved, Mr. Reddemann, by saying that we all 
want disarmament. The essential problem lies 
elsewhere. 
In my opinion, Sir Frederic Bennett high-
lighted the focal point far more clearly and, I 
would say, more honestly. The essence of the 
problem is this: are we or are we not intent on 
retaining every form of nuclear deterrence? I do 
not believe that Sir Frederic Bennett is on the 
whole questioning the willingness of the Soviet 
leadership. He is afraid that too much nuclear 
deterrence would be lost. That is the main 
problem, and the NATO twofold decision was 
indeed a cover for two different positions. One 
was the arms control position, as officially pre-
sented, the other the gap in deterrence that was 
to have been filled with medium-range missiles. 
In the latter case it is absolutely immaterial 
whether there are Soviet medium-range missiles 
or not. 
The proponents of the deterrence gap theory 
hid behind those who wanted arms control, 
hoping that their demands could never be met by 
the Soviet Union. They could not imagine the 
Soviet Union dismantling all its SS-20 missiles, 
the latest and most modern missiles it has at 
present. Now, all at once, the idea is becoming 
feasible, and the real background to the oppo-
sition in the West is coming to light. They cling 
to the logic of deterrence, which has increasingly 
resulted in the West taking an irrational view, 
but justifying it with mathematical logic. And 
somehow or other the fragile structure of deter-
rence must match up theoretically, with so many 
short-range and medium-range missiles, even 
long-range missiles, whatever the cost, not least 
in money terms, or in terms of missed opportun-
ities for disarmament. 
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I am firmly convinced that those who are now 
opposed to the zero-zero option for short-range 
missiles were in fact opposed to a reduction in 
medium-range missiles, bu~ were unable to 
prevent it because the West had been demanding 
it for too long. They were against it because they 
stood by the deterrence gap theory. Now that 
they are no longer able to p~vent this, they are 
absolutely determined to solVIe the same problem 
with short-range missiles, even if it means 
increasing the number of these missiles. This 
school of thought, which is also represented here, 
prefers an increase in westetn short-range mis-
siles, even if this means eastern short-range mis-
siles remaining in place, to the reduction of 
short-range missiles to zero in both East and 
West. Anything else bypas~es the problem to 
some extent, insofar as other suggestions have 
been made here. And some people here, thank 
God, have been honest enough to say so. 
So the "right to matdh" Warsaw Pact 
numbers of short-range missi!les, called for in the 
recommendation, which was the committee's 
compromise formula, is in the final analysis the 
opposite of the zero-zero option, judging at least 
by what has emerged in the last two weeks. The 
situation here has therefore changed very consid-
erably, because all those who are opposed to the 
zero-zero option for short-range missiles and 
quote the " right to match " really mean an 
increase in the number of short-range missiles. 
Secretary of State George Shultz has put this in 
so many words. He advocates, rightly, in my 
opinion - it is in our own interests too - the 
zero-zero option for short-range missiles as well, 
warning the European governments who may 
not want to join in that if they do not agree to the 
zero-zero option for short-range missiles as well, 
they must now agree to an artns build-up. That is 
the dilemma. I believe it is in our own interests 
to support the zero-zero option for medium-
range and short-range missil~s, because these are 
weapons that could destroy 1 the European con-
tinent, and we must do the same for zero-zero 
options relating to other weapons where this 
arises. At the moment, these are the two things 
we are concerned with, and that is the dilemma I 
wanted to underline. 
Sir Frederic, there is one point I think you 
should consider. How long do we intend to sub-
scribe to a theory of deterrence that is our eco-
nomic ruination, because · the weapons are 
becoming increasingly complex and increasingly 
expensive? How much longer? Might the fact 
that we have had peace in Europe for so long be 
due not only to nuclear weapons but also to the 
existence of two blocs of roughly equal strength, 
which no longer pose the serious problem of 
balance in Europe, as was the case in the last 
century, when four or five European super-
powers faced each other, umable to agree? The 
existence of these two blocs has a more 
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stabilising effect than individual weapons 
systems. 
(Mr. Goerens, Vice-President of the Assembly, 
took the Chair) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is closed. 
Does the Rapporteur wish to speak? ... 
Mr. AMADEI (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, ladies and gentlemen, I will be very 
brief, as I do not wish to try your patience. I 
simply wish to thank everyone who has taken 
part in the debate whether they have spoken in 
favour or have accepted the report less enthusias-
tically. As I said at the outset, this has been a 
very troublesome report and has had to be 
looked at every day because of the events which 
have followed in such quick succession that the 
Rapporteur could not even follow them. As I 
said to begin with, even the present text can be 
regarded as partly out of date because of what 
has happened. I think that we must accept this 
however. I am neither a sceptic nor an optimist; I 
wish to be pragmatic and realistic. I am not 
greatly interested in what is being said by those 
who believe everything that Mr. Gorbachev says 
is true or by others who doubt his every word. 
What is important is to make progress. 
This report is not accepted with enthusiasm by 
anybody but on average is acceptable and satis-
factory to almost everybody and this is the 
purpose of the report. As I said several times in 
committee, I preferred the first report which was 
more my personal report and I stated formally in 
committee that I was not the Rapporteur for a 
group but for the whole committee and as such 
had to resign myself to the amendments in order 
to reach a compromise acceptable to the very 
great majority of the committee and therefore of 
the Assembly. I hope, therefore, that I succeeded 
in doing this. I think that the present text could 
be further improved later but that we should now 
put a full stop to it. 
I wish to thank the Christian Democrat 
Group, because early this morning they asked 
me to wait again before approving the report 
because, as was argued with good reason, it could 
be overtaken by events. I wish to thank the 
christian democrat members for not persisting in 
this attitude because in my view it would have 
been scandalous to refer it back again after a 
first, second and third time. This was a bit like 
making fun of the Rapporteur. I think, therefore, 
that the first task can now be regarded as com-
pleted, with the approval of the very great 
majority; this will not be the last task and we 
shall see another report in another year. I wish 
the next rapporteur more luck than I have had. 
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I am at the disposal of all members who have 
tabled amendments. I shall reply to them in turn 
and I do not wish to waste any more of the 
Assembly's time except to thank all members for 
their support and interest and for what they have 
done to help in having my report approved. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I thank the 
Rapporteur. Does the Chairman of the com-
mittee wish to speak on Mr. Amadei's report? 
Mr. KITTELMANN (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - The reason why this 
report has been discussed at such length and 
given rise to so many misunderstandings and so 
much rejection is probably that while it was 
being drawn up a series of political changes was 
taking place, due to the Soviet Union's con-
stantly renewed efforts either to cause uncer-
tainty in the West by being more precise about 
past proposals or putting forward new ones, or to 
introduce new ideas, possibly based on better 
knowledge. The fact that the Rapporteur has suf-
fered as a result of these developments should be 
a lesson to us all, because it shows how some 
uncertainty - as the last few speeches have 
revealed - has been introduced into the whole of 
the western camp by proposals from the Soviet 
Union. 
We of WEU's parliamentary Assembly must 
be more critical of both sides, both of the Soviet 
Union and in relation to the Council, which 
awaits our proposals, our recommendations and 
our advice. And if, as Mr. Scheer says, this 
debate represents the moment of truth, he has 
himself contributed something to that moment 
of truth by saying, as regards certain compro-
mises that have been reached, how he would like 
to see the resulting consensus interpreted and 
understood. 
In other words, the point at issue is mutual 
distrust, the exacerbation of the conflicts within 
the western camp following Mr. Gorbachev's 
proposals, which we do not expect to be put 
forward and discussed in depth until the Geneva 
negotiations. So far the Soviet Union has been 
highly successful in testing the western camp by 
making these proposals, and we are discussing 
them among ourselves, emotionally may be, but 
always sustained by the common will to do the 
best we can for our security. 
Consequently, the amendments before us are 
probably controversial in themselves, but this 
too we must deal with among ourselves. On the 
committee's behalf I should like to thank the 
Rapporteur for his efforts. The committee has 
endeavoured - as the debate has shown - to do 
justice to its theme. The absence of agreement in 
the committee on every issue is simply due to the 
fact that the two political camps represented here 
in Western European Union showed their 
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colours most clearly during this contribution to 
the disarmament debate. 
(Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed 
the Chair) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Mr. Chairman. We shall now take the vote on 
the draft recommendation on disarmament, 
Document 1090. Twenty amendments have been 
tabled to this text and they will be considered in 
the following order: Amendments 11, 12, 13, 16 
and 17 by Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. 
Wilkinson, 1 by Mr. Antoni, 2 by Mr. Gianotti, 8 
by Mr. Scheer, 3 by Mr. Rubbi, 18 by Sir 
Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson, 4 by Mr. 
Rubbi, 15 by Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. 
Wilkinson, 9 by Mr. Bassinet, 20 by Sir Frederic 
Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson, 5 by Mr. Antoni, 6 
by Mr. Gianotti, 10 by Mr. Bassinet, 19 by Sir 
Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson, 7 by Mr. 
Antoni and 14 by Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. 
Wilkinson. 
At the same time, I ask you to take note of the 
following information on procedure: if 
Amendment 12 is agreed to, Amendment 13 
falls; if Amendment 17 is agreed to, Amendment 
1 falls; if Amendment 8 is agreed to, Amend-
ments 3, 18 and 4 fall; if Amendment 9 is agreed 
to, Amendments 20 and 5 fall; if Amendment 6 
is agreed to, Amendments 10 and 19 fall; if 
Amendment 10 is agreed to, Amendment 19 
falls. 
We shall start with Amendment 11 tabled by 
Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson which 
reads: 
11. In the preamble to the second revised draft 
recommendation, leave out paragraph (i) and 
insert: 
"(i) Recalling that Europe's security is based 
on the deterrence exercised by all the member 
countries of the Atlantic Alliance thanks to 
their capacity, in spite of Warsaw Pact superi-
ority in many fields, to prevent any potential 
adversary undertaking an aggression in the 
hope that the confrontation will remain at a 
level chosen by him;". 
I call Sir Frederic Bennett. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom). -
On a point of order. All these amendments under 
my name are, of course, not just a personal pro-
duction, they represent joint efforts to get a con-
sensus within the Federated Group and this 
morning we decided within the group that Mr. 
Wilkinson should be entrusted with the task of 
moving all the amendments, I having done it the 
other day in committee. He is now entrusted on 
behalf of the Federated Group as a whole to 
move the amendments that would otherwise be 
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in my name, so perhaps in future you would call 
Mr. Wilkinson rather than myself and I now ask 
you to call him for this amendment. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Wilkinson to move Amendment 11. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom). - Mr. 
President, Amendment 11 tabled by Sir Frederic 
Bennett and others is perfectly straightforward. It 
would, in the preamble to the draft recommen-
dation, leave out paragraph (i) and insert the 
words on the order paper which members have. 
Exactly the same amendment \vas tabled at the 
Defence Committee meeting and unfortunately 
was not carried because the vote was tied. I feel 
that the wording of the existing paragraph (i) is 
exceptionally weak and inadequate to begin a 
report of this importance. The amendment out-
lines the fact that the Atlantic Alliance's 
deterrent is a spectrum of capabilities and that 
our deterrence is based on the principle of 
flexible, graduated response. And those simple, 
clear, strategic facts need to be enunciated in an 
unambiguous way and in a more adequate 
fashion than in the existing wording. For those 
reasons, Mr. President, I would put this 
amendment to the Assembly for its approval. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
anyone wish to speak against the 
amendment? ... 
What is the committee's opinion? ... 
Mr. AMADEI (Italy) (Translation). - I would 
like to point out, Mr. President, that the opinions 
I will be giving on these amendments will be 
solely my own because the committee has not 
had a chance to discuss them. I thought it was 
right and proper to say that and to leave the 
Assembly free to decide. However, paragraph (i) 
in the preamble to the draft recommendation, as 
it happens, reflects the wording proposed by Sir 
Frederic Bennett for the first part and approved 
by the committee. As to the second part, I asked 
Sir Frederic to withdraw it and he agreed. I make 
the same request today and ask the Assembly to 
keep the first text as it was approved and Sir 
Frederic and Mr. Wilkinson to withdraw their 
amendment as they did in committee. Thank 
you. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
Frederic Bennett. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom). - I 
made it quite clear to the Rapporteur at the 
meeting that I would not withdraw and we all 
abstained in the vote at the end. I was asked by 
Mr. Amadei whether I would withdraw and I say 
the answer is no, because we all said that what 
we did in committee would have no effect at all 
on how we would act in the plenary Assembly. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - It was my 
impression that Sir Frederic wished to speak to 
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withdraw his amendment, as he did use the word 
"withdraw". In those circumstances I was 
entitled to call him, but the result is not what I 
anticipated. I maintain that in good faith I was 
right in my interpretation of the Rules of Pro-
cedure, but so that the debates on the amend-
ments may be conducted properly, I repeat that I 
shall now call only the speaker supporting the 
amendment, the speaker against and the com-
mittee Chairman or Rapporteur. If, after hearing 
the committee's opinion, the author wishes to 
withdraw his amendment, he is to raise his hand 
and say "I withdraw". 
I shall now put Amendment 11 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 11 is agreed to. 
Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson have 
tabled Amendment 12 which reads: 
12. In the preamble to the second revised draft 
recommendation, leave out paragraph (iv) and 
insert: 
"(iv) Considering that Western Europe may be 
compelled in the fairly near future to assume 
more responsibility for the requirements of its 
security but that in present circumstances this 
is ensured only thanks to the presence of 
American forces and armaments in 
Europe;". 
I call Mr. Wilkinson. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom). - Mr. 
President, I speak to Amendment 12, which is 
another amendment which was put to the com-
mittee and, most unfortunately, was not carried 
because the vote was tied. 
I regard this amendment as particularly 
important. It raises the fact that Western Europe 
may be compelled in the fairly near future to 
assume more responsibility for the requirements 
of its security. I believe that factor is funda-
mental to our deliberations; we would not be 
having this special Assembly were that fact not 
to be true. And also it draws attention to the 
necessity of maintaining American forces and 
armaments in Europe. In view of the problems 
which our American friends have - financial, 
political and otherwise - I think this is especially 
important as well. It is, of course, or was, the 
subject of the talks between Prime Minister 
Thatcher and Prime Minister Chirac in London. 
So I think this particular amendment which 
would leave out paragraph (iv) of the preamble 
and insert a new wording is timely, apposite and 
fully deserves the support of the Assembly. I beg 
to move. 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Scheer to speak against the amendment. 
Mr. SCHEER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - The paragraph (iv) we are con-
cerned with here is intended to reflect a common 
position and responsibility as regards disarm-
ament policy. Although the text that is now to be 
replaced is well worth reading, the crucial point 
is what is to be omitted, namely joint responsi-
bility for disarmament policy. This amendment 
therefore represents an attempt to turn a recom-
mendation on disarmament into a recommen-
dation on deterrence, with as little reference to 
disarmament policy as possible. It must 
therefore be opposed. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - What is the 
committee's opinion? ... 
Mr. AMADEI (Italy) (Translation). - This 
wording, to my mind, is in open contradiction 
with the recommendation and for that reason I 
am against. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman of the committee. 
Mr. KITTELMANN (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - As there was a more 
or less tied vote in the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments and we cannot now 
discuss the various amendments in committee, I 
can only give my personal opinion. I do not per-
sonally agree with Mr. Scheer's dramatic view 
and would consider this amendment to be a clar-
ification. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Mr. Chairman. 
I now put the amendment to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by show of hands) 
Amendment 12 is agreed to. 
Amendment 12 having been agreed to, 
Amendment 13 falls. 
I call Mr. Hardy on a point of order. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). - How many 
votes were actually cast in each case? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - As you 
know, Mr. Hardy, I am always prepared to do 
what is asked of me, but you are a dedicated 
defender of the Rules of Procedure, and it is my 
belief that, unless expressly decided otherwise, 
the numbers of votes on amendments taken by 
show of hands are not communicated. However, 
as it is your wish, I shall do so next time. 
Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson have 
tabled Amendment 16 which reads: 
16. In paragraph (v), line 3, of the preamble to 
the second revised draft recommendation, leave 
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out " both " and from " deterrence " to end and 
add: 
" whose security should be stabilised by appro-
priate and verifiable disarmament measures 
which are subject to agreement; ". 
I call Mr. Wilkinson. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom). -
Amendment 16, Mr. President, is a relatively 
straightforward one and I hope that the 
Assembly will not regard it as controversial. In 
paragraph (v), line 3, of the preamble, leave out 
the word "both" after "reiterates " in the 
English text and then after " deterrence " , line 3, 
leave out from " based " to the end of the para-
graph, and add the words on the order paper. 
The existing words in the final three lines of 
paragraph (v) I think are convoluted, long-
winded and unnecessarily complicated. I find the 
wording that we propose more succinct, the 
meaning and objects are the same and I would 
hope that for general reasons of convenience and 
good drafting the Assembly will accept this 
amendment. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Dr. 
Miller to speak against the amendment. 
Dr. MILLER (United Kingdom). - Mr. Pres-
ident, I am against this amendment. I do not 
think the text is convoluted. I think that the 
wording 'Of the paragraph itself includes aspects 
of the problem which it is quite right that we 
should emphasise. It adds to the attempts at 
solution which we are making and in addition to 
that I think that the amendment itself uses a 
concept which I think is at least doubtful, 
because I do not think you can stabilise security 
by appropriate and verified disarmament mea-
sures which are subject to agreement. I think that 
the paragraph itself adequately emphasises, ade-
quately portrays and conveys what it is that the 
Rapporteur is trying to do. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - What is the 
committee's opinion? ... 
Mr. AMADEI (Italy) (Translation). - I find 
that the present text, that in the recommen-
dation, is the same as the wording in the NATO 
communique. I copied that communique word 
for word and I would therefore ask the members 
to accept the t((xt as it is. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I shall now 
put Amendment 16 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by show of hands) 
Amendment 16 is agreed to by 30 votes to 21. 
Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson have 
tabled Amendment 17 which reads: 
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17. Leave out paragraph (ix) of the preamble to 
the second revised draft recommendation and 
insert: 
" (ix) Recalling in this conte!Xt that the Soviet 
Union maintains more conventional forces 
than it requires for its defence and that their 
offensive force structure~ optimised to 
perform aggressive operatidns must be per-
ceived as a potential threat to the member 
countries by the member n~tions of WEU; ". 
I call Mr. Wilkinson. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom). - I 
think the important factor, Mr. President, in 
moving this amendment, wh~ch would replace 
existing paragraph (ix) in the preamble with new 
(ix) whose words are on the order paper, is to 
bring home to the Assembly the fact that the 
Soviet Union maintains far more conventional 
forces than it requires for its defence and that 
their exercise manoeuvres, their planning and 
their strategy are geared specifically to aggressive 
operations that could be a potential threat to the 
member countries of this organisation. We 
could, Mr. President, become so preoccupied 
with our understandable desire to achieve a 
measure of mutual balanced nuclear disarm-
ament that we forget this overriding fact that 
there is a massive conventional threat that will 
still have to be counted. So great is that threat 
and so dominant should it be in our thinking 
that it is our belief that the wording on the order 
paper in this amendment desetves to be accepted 
by the Assembly. Thank you, Sir. 
The PRESIDENT (Tran~lation). - Does 
anyone wish to speak against the 
amendment? ... 
I call Mr. Scheer. 
Mr. SCHEER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - The main point is always to 
check what is to be omitted in favour of the pro-
posed new text, and this proposal suggests in 
practice that the statement on a ban on all 
chemical weapons should be replaced. What I 
said just now about another amendment applies 
equally to this one. I am opposed to it. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - What is the 
committee's opinion? ... 
Mr. AMADEI (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, this paragraph (ix) in the preamble, 
which is in the text, is word for word the 
amendment tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett in 
committee where I accepted it. Now I am asked 
to change what was done in committee and my 
answer is no. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
de Beer on a point of order. 
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Mr. President, I am not entirely sure that this is a 
point of order. The vote poses a problem as the 
text of the amendment relates to a subject dif-
ferent from that of the text which it replaces, that 
is to say the two are not incompatible. I wish to 
propose that a vote be taken on the amendment 
and that it then be decided whether it replaces 
the existing text. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - As you 
know, we cannot consider verbal amendments to 
amendments. They have to be tabled. We are 
obliged to follow the Rules of Procedure, and I 
think that the only solution for those like 
yourself who have some difficulty is to choose 
one of the three voting alternatives. This is one 
of the questions which should be considered by 
the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privi-
leges to give added flexibility to debates. I per-
sonally would be in favour. 
I shall now put Amendment 17 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by show of hands) 
Amendment 17 is agreed to by 31 votes to 23. 
Amendment 17 having been agreed to, 
Amendment 1 falls. 
Mr. Gianotti and others have tabled 
Amendment 2 which reads: 
2. In paragraph 1, lines 2 and 3, of the second 
revised draft recommendation proper, leave out 
"to support the United States" and insert "to 
support active participation by European coun-
tries". 
Is there no one to move Mr. Gianotti's 
amendment? ... 
The amendment is not moved. 
Mr. Scheer and Mr. Stoffelen have tabled 
Amendment 8 which reads: 
8. In paragraph 1 (a) of the second revised draft 
recommendation proper, leave out from " com-
bined with the simultaneous withdrawal of 
shorter-range INF " to the end of the paragraph 
and insert " and combined with the following 
disarmament of all American and Soviet shorter-
range INF in Europe;". 
I call Mr. Scheer. 
Mr. SCHEER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - The purpose of this amendment 
is to refer to the political debate within NATO 
and between East and West since the meeting of 
the Soviet Foreign Minister and the American 
Secretary of State in Moscow and the prelim-
inary agreements on the possibility of disman-
tling short-range as well as other missiles. We 
propose that the passage which refers to a " right 
to match" in the case of short-range missiles 
should be replaced by a clear statement 
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endorsing a follow-on agreement on the 
zero-zero option for short-range missiles with a 
range of over 500 km as well as for other mis-
siles. 
I would add to what I said just now in my con-
tribution to the debate: this amendment reflects 
the avowed position not only of the Soviet 
Union but above all of the American Secretary of 
State. It is also the avowed position of the 
Federal German Government from today. It was 
in any case the avowed position of the Federal 
German Foreign Minister and of my party in the 
Federal Republic of Germany, to name but a few 
in this context. I name them because the debate 
stems from the only country in which short-
range missiles are deployed and would be dis-
mantled. I would point out that anyone who 
opposes this amendment will almost certainly 
also be opposing the government in this 
Assembly. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
anyone wish to speak against the 
amendment? ... 
I call Mr. Wilkinson. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom). - I wish 
as strongly as I am able to urge the Assembly to 
reject this amendment which I believe to be fun-
damentally extremely dangerous. The wording in 
the existing text "the right for NATO to match 
Warsaw Pact numbers in such missiles if those 
negotiations fail; " are in fact the words of my 
own prime minister, the British Prime Minister, 
Mrs. Thatcher. If we were to see these negotia-
tions end up with a disparity, perpetuated, with 
us unable to match a preponderance on the other 
side, we would be more vulnerable, less secure, 
weaker, and our peoples would be more at risk at 
the end of this process than at the beginning. 
For these reasons, I think it would be 
extremely dangerous to accept Mr. Scheer's 
amendment and I am sure the Assembly will 
note that there is a much more responsible 
amendment, No. 18, which I think is com-
mendable if, as we all hope, No. 8 is defeated. I 
urge that this amendment be rejected. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - What is the 
committee's opinion? ... 
Mr. KITTELMANN (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - This amendment, Mr. 
President, is undoubtedly a central element of 
the question of faith that finds expression here. I 
personally recommend that this amendment be 
rejected. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I shall now 
put Amendment 8 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by show of hands) 
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Amendment 8 is negatived by 33 votes to 15 
with 5 abstentions. 
I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg. 
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
It should be made clear that the President does 
not have to give the number of votes. You gave 
in to Mr. Hardy; there are other members in the 
Assembly and I do suggest that we now ask you 
to go back to the normal procedure of 
announcing the result and not giving the 
figures. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - In these cir-
cumstances the final decision rests with the 
Assembly, as it is the good intentions of the chair 
which have been democratically challenged. I 
therefore ask the Assembly whether or not I 
should announce the numbers of votes by show 
of hands on the amendments. 
(The President continued in English) 
I know I can give a ruling myself without 
having a vote by the Assembly on this point, but 
apparently it is a question on political grounds 
and I want to have clearly the view of the 
Assembly. It is my duty as President. 
I call Lord Hughes. 
Lord HUGHES (United Kingdom). - When 
you replied to Mr. Hardy's request, you said the 
rules did not require the numbers to be given 
unless a request was made. A request was made 
and you followed that. It does not say that it has 
to be a request from the Assembly as a whole. It 
is as you put it. It was a request from a member. 
Now, if in fact it is not a request from a member 
but has to be followed up by a vote, then of 
course the point made by Sir Geoffrey is valid. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I under-
stand Mr. Hardy's motion to refer to the 
amendment on which he intervened, and I am 
similarly prepared to accede to Sir Geoffrey's 
request to stop giving the numbers unless 
someone else asks for them. 
I call Mr. Klejdzinski. 
Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). -In view of the impor-
tance of these amendments, I believe the results 
of the voting should continue to be 
announced. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Opinions 
are divided. You do no more than acknowledge a 
fact of which all, including your President, are 
well aware. In the circumstances I maintain my 
position. 
Mr. Rubbi and others have tabled 
Amendment 3 which reads: 
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3. In paragraph l(a) of the second revised draft 
recommendation proper, le~ve out " combined 
with the simultaneous withdrawal of shorter-
range INF from Czechoslovakia and East 
Germany; the right for NATO to match Warsaw 
Pact numbers in such missiles if those negotia-
tions fail " and insert " in the context of an 
undertaking to withdraw , immediately the 
shorter-range INF missiles stationed in Czecho-
slovakia and East Germany ". 
Is there no one to move the amendment? ... 
The amendment is not moved. 
Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson have 
tabled Amendment 18 which reads: 
18. In paragraph l(a), line 5, of the second 
revised draft recommendation proper, leave out 
after " fail " to the end of the 1paragraph and add: 
" and make effective progress in the negotia-
tions aiming at greater 1stability and crisis 
control in the conventional field (MBFR) and 
which should take place on the whole of 
Europe from the Atlantic! Ocean to the Ural 
mountains;". 
I call Mr. Wilkinson. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom). - The 
Assembly having rejected the Scheer-Stoffelen 
amendment, I think it is important that it now 
pass Amendment 18, leaving out after " fail " , 
that is, the concluding phrase of sub-paragraph 
(a) to paragraph 1 in the draft recommendation 
proper, because the important thing is to achieve 
stability and crisis control in the conventional 
field so that the negotiations at a nuclear level do 
not precipitate any instability or tendence for 
outbreaks of conflict in our continent. I think 
this amendment would enhance the sub-
paragraph and should be adopted by the 
Assembly. I beg to move. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
anyone wish to speak against the 
amendment? ... 
I call Mr. Scheer. 
Mr. SCHEER (Federal R~public of Germany) 
(Translation). - As the amendments that have 
been adopted have now completely distorted the 
report on disarmament, tlrere is absolutely no 
point in making any further attempt to improve 
it in some way. The destruction of the report has 
already been achieved. I am, therefore opposed to 
this and the other amendments tabled by Sir 
Frederic Bennett. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - What is the 
committee's opinion? ... 
Mr. AMADEI (Italy) (Translation). - NATO 
is not asking for links with conventional negotia-
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tions and therefore there is no point in putting 
them in here. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I now put 
Amendment 18 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by show of hands) 
Amendment 18 is agreed to. 
Amendment 18 having been agreed to, 
Amendment 4 falls. 
Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson have 
tabled Amendment 15 which reads: 
15. In paragraph 1 of the second revised draft 
recommendation proper, leave out sub-
paragraph (c). 
I call Mr. Wilkinson. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom). - I seek 
to move Amendment 15 in the name of Sir 
Frederic Bennett and myself to leave out sub-
paragraph (c) to paragraph 1 in the draft recom-
mendation proper. This is, I think, an extremely 
important one. I do not believe that wording as 
sloppy as this should be contained in a recom-
mendation to a Council as important as this one 
is: " existing treaties " - well, which " existing 
treaties " ? It is totally open-ended and of course 
it is the parties to those treaties, the signatories to 
them, who must decide what their future is. I do 
not think we as an Assembly can urge our gov-
ernments themselves to urge the United States to 
take a particular line of action with regard to par-
ticular treaties. Do they mean the unratified 
SALT II treaty, do they mean the ABM treaty on 
which there are different interpretations? Inter-
pretations with differentiation can only lead to 
confusion and uncertainty within our own 
alliance. So, for all these reasons, I think it would 
be much wiser if we simply deleted this little sub-
paragraph which otherwise could cause us unnec-
essary trouble. I beg to move. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
anyone wish to speak against the amendment? ... 
I call Dr. Miller. 
Dr. MILLER (United Kingdom). - I think we 
ought to hear the view of the Rapporteur on this, 
because he has a reason for including it. As far as 
I am concerned, I think Mr. Wilkinson is quib-
bling a little here. The object surely that we are 
trying to attain is contained in the words 
" respecting treaties which can be modified only 
by agreement between the parties to them". 
Surely that is something that we ought to be 
striving for and the fact that it encompasses or 
does not mention treaties that Mr. Wilkinson 
perhaps would like it to mention does not make 
it a paragraph which has no value. The para-
graph does have value because, in my opinion, 
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that is what negotiations try to achieve. In other 
words, if agreement has been made, if a treaty is 
made, it should not be possible for it to be abro-
gated by one side. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - What is the 
committee's opinion? ... 
Mr. AMADEI (Italy) (Translation). - The 
position in sub-paragraph (c) is that of all WEU 
governments and includes the stance taken by 
Mrs. Thatcher. May I refer you, ladies and 
gentlemen to paragraph 5.46 which gives what 
Mrs. Thatcher said word for word: " the anti-
ballistic missile treaty... required negotiation 
before testing and deployment in accordance 
with the terms of the treaty". 
I have nothing further to add. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I now put 
Amendment 15 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by show of hands) 
Amendment 15 is agreed to. 
I call Mr. Goerens. 
Mr. GOERENS (Luxembourg) (Translation). 
- I wish to know the voting figures. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Ayes 30, 
noes 21, abstentions 1. 
I call Mr. Fourre. 
Mr. FOURRE (France) (Translation). - It was 
our belief in considering this report that, in view 
of the difficulties encountered, the different 
views expressed and the necessary approaches 
which suggested that we might reach a measure 
of consensus in this Assembly, some amend-
ments to this text might be tabled. That was the 
purpose of Amendments 9 and 10 tabled and 
signed by a number of my French colleagues. 
Considering the amendments which have been 
approved, we feel that our Rapporteur's text has 
been turned upside down. A short time ago he 
himself expressed his opposition to all the 
amendments, and yet, by a large majority, this 
Assembly is altering the text without regard for 
the work of the committee. 
We now have a text which seems to us both 
ridiculous and biased, and I apologise for these 
terms. So, on behalf of my colleagues, I wish to 
announce that we withdraw Amendments 9 
and 10. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Mr. Fourre. I take due note of the withdrawal of 
Amendments 9 and 10. 
Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson have 
tabled Amendment 20 which reads: 
20. In paragraph 2, line 3, of the second revised 
draft recommendation proper, leave out " rea-
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sonable automatic " and insert 
on-site". 
I call Mr. Wilkinson. 
"regular 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom). - I 
a~ee t~at those am~ndments were not appro-
pnate m present circumstances, but also I 
express appreciation of the stand he and his 
French colleagues have taken on a number of 
nuclear matters, not least certain aspects of this 
report. I hope we :Will now be able to accept 
Amendment 20 which, of course insists on an 
important right: in paragraph 2, li~e 3, leave out 
" reasonable automatic " and insist upon 
" regular on-site" inspections. This is crucial if 
we are to make quite certain that the provisions 
of any arms control agreement are actually kept 
and it is for that reason that those two words 
must be removed and regular on-site inspections 
insisted upon. For those reasons I hope that 
Amendment 20 will be carried. Thank you, Sir, I 
beg to move. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
anyone wish to speak against the amendment? ... 
What is the committee's opinion? ... 
I now put Amendment 20 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by show of hands) 
Amendment 20 is agreed to. 
Mr. Antoni and others have tabled 
Amendment 5 which reads: 
5. At the end of paragraph 2 of the second 
revised draft recommendation proper add " thus 
promoting a new concept of balanced and ver-
ified European security linked to the noblest 
values of a policy of peace and co-operation in 
the world". 
Is there no one to move this amendment? ... 
The amendment is not moved. 
Mr. Gianotti and others have tabled 
Amendment 6 which reads: 
6. In paragraph 3 of the second revised draft rec-
ommendation proper, leave out " to press the 
Soviet Union to accept fully the United 
Kingdom compromise proposal " and insert " to 
combine their efforts to seek an agreement 
acceptable to all the parties ". 
Is there no one to move this amendment? ... 
The amendment is not moved. 
Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson have 
tabled Amendment 19 which reads: 
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19. In paragraph 3, line 4, of the second revised 
draft recommendation proper, leave out after 
" inspection " to the end of the paragraph. 
I call Mr. Wilkinson. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom). - In 
paragraph 3, line 4, of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out after " insp~ction " to the end 
of the paragraph. That is, l think, important 
because what is necessary now is for NATO to be 
able to take whatever appropriate measures are 
necessary and putting stipulations of the kind 
that are in the existing wordling I do not think 
would give us the flexibility we could ultimately 
need. The important thing is for the British Gov-
ernment's compromise proposals on those 
aspects to be accepted, and 'Ye should press the 
Soviet Union to do so. In the interests of speed, I 
hope the amendment will quickly be carried. 
Thank you, Sir. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
anyone wish to speak against the amendment? ... 
I call Mr. Scheer. 
Mr. SCHEER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - As the am~ndment seeks the 
deletion of the reference to 1987 as the time-limit 
for a ban on chemical weapons, it is obvious that 
what is wanted is not the destruction of chemical 
~eap<;ms but, _on the c~mtra~, the earliest pos-
sible mcrease m stockpiles of chemical weapons. 
That is the only conclusion to be drawn from this 
amendment, otherwise it would not have been 
tabled. Those who keep voting for these amend-
ments should now know which way the wind is 
blowing. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - What is the 
committee's opinion? ... 
I shall now put Amendment 19 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by show of hands) 
Amendment 19 is agreed to. 
I call Lord Mackie. 
Lord MACKIE (United Kingdom). - May we 
have the figures, please? 
The PR~SIDENT (Translation). - Certainly, 
Lord Mackie: ayes 30, noes 21, abstentions 0. 
Mr. Antoni and others have tabled 
Amendment 7 which reads: 
7. In paragraph 4( a) of the second revised draft 
reco_mmen~ation proper, leave out "Urge the 
Soviet Umon to accept the United States' pro-
posal " and insert " Promote the conclusion of an 
agreement acceptable to both the United States 
and the Soviet Union". 
Is there no one to move this amendment? ... 
The amendment is not moved. 
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Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson have 
tabled Amendment 14 which reads: 
14. In paragraph 4 of the second revised draft 
recommendation proper, leave out sub-
paragraph (b). 
I call Mr. Wilkinson. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom). -
Amendment 14 is one of the more important 
ones. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommen-
dation proper, leave out sub-paragraph (b). The 
important thing is that the NATO alliance 
should be able to know that its weapons -
nuclear weapons - will operate effectively, that 
they are secure, and if there is a need for their 
modernisation - and this is very likely with the 
advent of a British Trident D-5 system shortly to 
come into service and with the French 
modernisation plans that are envisaged - it is 
important that our nuclear forces be secure and 
work, and can be seen to have effective warheads 
that can be guaranteed to operate entirely as pre-
dicted. For these very sound and sensible 
reasons, I do not think it would be wise to do any 
other than to accept this amendment to delete 
sub-paragraph (b) to paragraph 4. I beg to 
move. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
anyone wish to speak against the amendment? ... 
I call Mr. Klejdzinski. 
Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - All I want to say 
about this amendment is that it represents a 
complete departure from all the WEU recom-
mendations we have adopted on this subject in 
the past, and I would also say, Mr. Wilkinson, 
that those who seek to justify this amendment 
with an argument of this kind do not in fact want 
nuclear weapons removed from Europe. They 
continue to favour a sharp rise in nuclear stock-
piles, which means the presence oflarge numbers 
of nuclear weapons in Europe. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - What is the 
committee's opinion? ... 
I now put Amendment 14 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by show of hands) 
Amendment 14 is agreed to. 
The figures are ayes 28, noes 22, abstentions 0. 
We shall now vote on the amended draft rec-
ommendation. 
In accordance with Rule 33(2), the Assembly 
votes by sitting and standing unless five repre-
sentatives or substitutes present in the chamber 
request a vote by roll-call. 
I call Mr. Stoffelen. 
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Mr. STOFFELEN (Netherlands). - Mr. Pres-
ident, I have been a member of this Assembly for 
about twelve years. I have never seen such a 
complete change in a report and recommen-
dation. The recommendation on disarmament 
has become a plea for further armament, for an 
increase in armaments, for the production of 
chemical weapons. It is, at the same time, an 
attack on the position of, for instance, the Chan-
cellor of the Federal Republic of Germany; it is 
an attack on the President of the United States. I 
want to see who wants to be responsible for 
accepting such a scandalous document. For that 
reason we ask for a vote by roll-call. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Are there 
five members who request a vote by roll-
call? ... 
There are. 
We shall therefore vote by roll-call. 
The voting is open. 
(A vote by roll-call was then taken) 
Does any other representative wish to 
vote? ... 
The voting is closed. 
The result of the vote is as follows 1: 
Number of votes cast .................. 54 
Ayes .................................. 19 
Noes ................................. 21 
Abstentions ........................... 14 
The amended draft recommendation is nega-
tived. 
The Assembly now has to vote on the draft 
recommendation replying to the thirty-first 
annual report of the Council. 
In accordance with Rule 33(2), the Assembly 
votes by sitting and standing unless five repre-
sentatives or substitutes present in the chamber 
request a vote by roll-call. 
Are there five members who request a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
There are not. 
We shall therefore take the vote by sitting and 
standing. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The draft recommendation is agreed to unani-
mously. 
I call Mr. Irmer for an explanation of vote. 
Mr. IRMER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, ladies and 
1. See page 18. 
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gentlemen, this is the first time I have attended a 
sitting ofthis august Assembly, and it is no doubt 
due to my lack of experience that I do not now 
know whether I have spent the last two hours 
witnessing a tragedy or a farce. I have certainly 
seen how a report that was no longer completely 
up-to-date because time has passed, has not been 
up-dated here to make good the time-lapse, but 
has in fact been turned into precisely the 
opposite of its original intention. Far from 
bringing it up-to-date, I would say this has 
actually catapulted it back several years into the 
past. My impression - and this is why I voted 
against the recommendation - is quite simply 
that this Assembly has this afternoon withdrawn 
from the current debate in Europe and the world. 
In the light of this, I wonder if I was wise to vote 
this morning for the report seeking to extend this 
Assembly's rights. I did so with great conviction. 
I hope that what happened today was an 
exception, that in future this Assembly too will 
take up the subjects and proposals that are being 
discussed by the public and by governments, the 
forward-looking topics, and that we shall stop 
living in the past. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg for an explanation of vote. 
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
That was an example of how you lose with no 
good grace. Can I say, Mr. President, that basi-
cally I abstained for the very simple reason that I 
am not prepared to be party to a farce, which was 
to go along with a series of recommendations 
prefaced by a most biased and outdated preface. 
That is the point. Had it been possible to remove 
all the introductory remarks, then I would have 
happily voted for the recommendations. But you 
know, and I know, that people will read the 
explanatory report and say to themselves: Ah! 
That is really what was meant; the recommenda-
tions do not actually count. That is the problem 
and it may well be that one of the things the 
Committee on Rules of Procedure should do is 
to see whether an opportunity should be given 
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for people to vote against the explanatory memo-
randum as well as the recommendations. That is 
why I abstained and in my view we have been 
participating in a system showing that the left 
wing do not like any disarmament proposals and 
they showed it in their way. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Dr. 
Miller. 
Dr. MILLER (United Kingdom). - I voted 
against the report and I have been asked to 
express the views of some of my colleagues who 
also voted against it because the amendments 
which were passed indicate to us quite clearly 
that there are people in this Assembly who do 
not want disarmament. There .are people who are 
interested only in continuing a situation which is 
dangerous, as I said in my speech, not only for 
the people of Europe but for the people of the 
world. And I would say that in this Assembly 
there are members of parliament who are 
attached to the continuation of an almost warlike 
situation. 
5. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I propose 
that the Assembly hold its next public sitting 
tomorrow morning, Tuesday1 28th April, at 10 
a.m. with the following orders of the day: 
Application of Order 65 on the draft budget of 
the Assembly for the financial year 1987 (Pre-
sentation of and debate on the report of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Admin-
istration and votes on the draft recommen-
dation and draft order, Document 1095). 
Are there any objections? ... 
The orders of the day of the next sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak? ... 
The sitting is closed. 
(The sitting was closed at 7.45 p.m.) 
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3. Application of Order 65 on the draft budget of the 
Assembly for the financial year 1987 (Presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration and votes on the draft recommen-
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4. The need for action by the Assembly of Western European 
Union to press western governments for action to channel 
resources into development needs and away from the 
arms trade (Motion for a resolution, Doe. 1096). 
5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next siting. 
The sitting was opened at 10.10 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sitting 
is open. 
1. Attendance register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The names 
of the substitutes attending this sitting which 
have been notified to the President will be pub-
lished with the list of representatives appended 
to the minutes of proceedings 1• 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). In 
accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Pro-
cedure, the minutes of proceedings of the pre-
vious sitting have been distributed. 
Are there any comments? ... 
The minutes are agreed to. 
Before taking the first item, I would remind 
you that the sitting this afternoon will start at 
about 5 p.m. This will be a very special sitting 
since, with the Council as a whole, Mr. Poos, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg and 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, will report to 
the Assembly. The press will be here; there will 
not be a press conference at the close of the 
Council meeting. 
I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg. 
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
Am I right in assuming that on this occasion 
there will be no requirement to put questions in 
writing beforehand? 
l. See page 22. 
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The PRESIDENT. - You are quite correct. 
There is no requirement to put questions 
beforehand. 
Questions may be put freely. 
3. Application of Order 65 on the draft budget 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 
(Presentation of and debate on the report 
of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration and votes on the draft recommendation 
and draft order, Doe. 1095) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the presentation of and debate 
on the report of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration on the application of 
Order 65 on the draft budget ofthe Assembly for 
the financial year 1987 and votes on the draft 
recommendation and draft order, Document 
1095. 
I call Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and 
Rapporteur of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration. 
Sir Dudley SMITH (United Kingdom). - Mr. 
President, this is the last time I shall be 
addressing the Assembly as Chairman of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
tration because I have now done, surprisingly I 
find, four years - three is the normal, four by the 
grant of the committee - and therefore under the 
rules I shall have to make way for somebody else 
at the next meeting of the committee. 
Be that as it may, I would like today, before 
presenting the motions that I intend to propose 
to say that in the time I have been Chairman I 
have enjoyed very much the co-operation of the 
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staff and of you, Sir, and indeed of members of 
all political parties. We have, I think, been 
united in our feeling of unjustness that we have 
always been dogged by lack of money in our task 
in trying to reactivate our side of Western 
European Union, namely the Assembly. Indeed, 
the position is somewhat farcical inasmuch as we 
have been charged to reinvigorate our activities 
and to play a responsible role along with the 
other arms of WEU in reactivation and yet we 
have been starved of funds. There are many 
activities, there is much administration which 
could be more efficient, more relevant and more 
positive with a little extra funding which in 
global terms, in state terms, is minuscule com-
pared with the budgets of so many other 
organisations and so many other activities of 
government. Matters are now rapidly reaching a 
crisis point in my view and while, in some ways 
thankfully, I shall no longer have the responsi-
bility as Chairman of the committee, Mr. Pres-
ident, I shall of course as a member of the 
Assembly, if I am fortunate enough to be re-
elected as a member of my national parliament 
in the not too distant future, and indeed for-
tunate enough to be reappointed as a member of 
the British Delegation - all ofthese hurdles have 
to be taken in their course - I shall of course con-
tinue to do what I can to support the very real 
case that the Western European Union Assembly 
has and I am sure that in that view I am strongly 
supported by many other members who hope 
and believe that perhaps they will be able to con-
tinue here to try and obtain justice for the 
Assembly. 
I wish, Sir, to move the two motions which I 
think have been circulated and which arise from 
the meetings of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs a week ago and yesterday. They are 
printed on the order paper and therefore I do not 
propose to read them out. The first one recom-
mends to the Council three very salient points 
that need to be taken into consideration by the 
Council if they are to assist us. In the second one, 
the Assembly invites the Presidential Committee 
and the Committee on Budgetary Affairs to take 
the necessary steps to implement the reorganisation 
and improvement of the structure of the Office 
of the Clerk. There is an explanatory memo-
randum at the end of this particular document 
and I shall be only too pleased to amplify any 
points in the discussion which takes place later 
on. 
Can I therefore, in formally moving those par-
ticular motions, Mr. President, just give a little 
background detail to members about the situ-
ation we are now in. 
As the Assembly knows, the draft budget of the 
Assembly which was submitted to the Council 
showed an overall growth rate, including pen-
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sions, of 6.85% over the previous budget. The 
growth rate of the operatingi budget if you take 
away the pensions element alone was 4.9%. We 
made, I thought, an excellent case from the Presi-
dential Committee downwards for that par-
ticular budget, but in fact the Council turned 
down all the proposals regarding the operating 
budget. The total net operadng budget from the 
Council's point of view was to be 0.49% and the 
total net budget overall including pensions 
2. 79%. And therefore we biave to note as an 
Assembly that our operating budget, and I mean 
the operating budget leaving aside pensions, to 
which we are totally committed and have no 
option one way or the other, was thus reduced in 
real terms to the foreseeable inflation rate for 
France which I understand is 2 % and I think that 
is optimistic. I would imagiae that the inflation 
rate in France might well be, at the end of the 
day, higher than 2%. But we did not just get a 
zero growth rate, Mr. President, we had a cut. 
We were told" you will have less money in effect 
if you take away the particular pensions 
issue ". 
As the Assembly knows, this has not gone 
down at all well with members in all quarters of 
the Assembly and it has, I think, been a bone of 
contention in the discussions in the Presidential 
Committee, in the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and indeed in political groups of the 
Assembly, again questioning, reiterating the 
thought, are we really a relevant organisation, 
should we be in existence, do our national gov-
ernments want to cut us down and cut us off or 
do they really support us, but are going through 
difficult financial times and perhaps have not 
explained themselves as properly and as help-
fully as they should have done. But we suggested 
that one ofthe best ways of meeting the situation 
would be to examine the whole of the 
organisation of WEU with reformations, with 
changes, with the right kind of assistance so that 
we could all share perhaps in the restructuring 
and the reorganisation of the various arms of the 
union. But the Council again deferred any 
decision in effect on this particular point until 
the end of the year. 
There is a promise that there will be this 
reorganisation. Indeed alreaCily some of the arms 
of the union seem to have benefited. We have 
not. And any benefit that is going to come 
to us will not come until the end of the year. In 
those circumstances therefore it is pointless for 
us to introduce a supplemen~ary budget for 1987 
in accordance with the A$sembly's Order 65 
because it would be meaningless. It would be 
rejected immediately and there is no possibility 
whatever of the right kind of consideration for 
that until the reorganisation has properly taken 
place. Knowing how these things go, I would 
think that it would be later rather than sooner, 
even though at the most optimistic it would not 
be until the end of the year. 
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Now I come to the second point. The first 
point in the motion which has been put is the 
~uggestion, which I think is a very sound one and 
mdeed many others would feel accordingly that 
we should organise ourselves along the lin'es of 
the EEC: application to the operating budgets of 
the ministerial organs and of the Assembly of 
WEU of the growth rate defined in the European 
Communities. This is the idea of Mr. Poos who 
has been an exceptionally helpful Chairman of 
the Council of Ministers - he is the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, our hosts for this 
particular session. This was very much his idea 
and we have incorporated this although I must 
say, Mr. President, I cannot imagine the govern-
ments responding favourably to it, but that 
should not stop us putting forward something 
which we think is right and useful. 
We come on to the question of pensions, 
which I shall deal with in a moment, but the next 
thing is the question of the restructuring of the 
Office of the Clerk. Now, you Sir, and indeed the 
Presidential Committee and every other member 
that I have talked to on this subject, irrespective 
of his political background, believes that this 
should be an internal matter for the Clerk as our 
chief executive, for the President of the 
Assembly, whoever he is, and indeed for the 
official side of our Assembly, that the restruc-
turing should be an internal matter. 
But what do we have today? We have to 
submit our budgets. They go in, we get our global 
amounts, but then they are gone through, as I 
always understand it, by the officials on behalf of 
the Council and there is a kind of approval or 
rejection like the smallest little business where 
every particular item is scrutinised and there is 
the attitude of you may have this but you may 
not have that. Now, in an organisation with 
highly-paid officials, with government money 
backing this, with democratically-elected mem-
bers of parliament who in fact help to run the 
organisation on a democratic basis, surely in this 
age an Assembly could be trusted, given a total 
amount of money to spend in what it considers 
to be the wisest possible way. Surely, it should 
not be treated like small children being governed 
and supervised at every turn. There are checks 
and balances in the situation and in the absurd 
and totally unlikely event of some madness 
developing and someone being profligate with 
~he funds, it could be stopped very quickly 
mdeed, but we all know that it would be done 
sensibly and responsibly by both the officials and 
by the politicians. 
~ think it is ve:Y ~egrading and demeaning that 
this Assembly with Its budget should not have its 
ow~ intef?al autonomy and it is something I 
beheve this Assembly is beginning to press very 
strongly now and should go on pressing until it 
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actually achieves success because, unless it does, 
I see a very poor future indeed for the 
Assembly. 
"X o.u, Mr. President, explained the Assembly's 
positiOn to Mr. Poos at the meeting you had in 
Luxembourg last March and your views and his, 
as I understand them, fully converged. He was 
very appreciative and understanding of our situ-
ation and you emphasised to him the need to 
find a solution without further delay and you 
were very strongly of the opinion that this 
internal reorganisation should be allowed to 
proceed as an internal matter. But the Council wh~n it fi~ally met, and despite the advocacy of 
their Chmrman, merely took note of this. No 
decision has yet been communicated to this 
Assembly. I am sorry to tell you, Mr. President 
ladies and gentlemen, that as far as I know cer~ 
tainly up until the beginning of this Asse~bly 
this morning, no communication has come from 
the Council on this particular issue. 
Then we come to the very vexed question of 
pensions which we have debated before. No 
person, no fair person, would believe other than 
that it is unfair for any assembly, any 
organisation to be burdened with a pensions 
commitment which will grow and which will 
continue to grow and which has to be paid for 
out of the global funds handed over each year -
particularly in a zero growth situation. We are 
committed to former members of the staff, 
whose numbers will be added to substantially at 
the end of this year and in years to come, because 
they have served the Assembly well and deserve 
their pensions. We all hope that they will live to 
a ripe old age, but the longer they live, and the 
greater their number, the actual burden grows. 
As I explained to one of the foreign ministers 
in my own parliament just recently, the day will 
come - we shall all probably be gone and no 
longer associat~d with WEU - but the day will 
actually come, If zero growth rates persist when 
this Assembly will do nothing else but pay the 
pensions of former employees of the Assembly. 
The whole of the budget will be devoted to the 
payment of pensions which of course is a ludi-
crous situation and one which ought not really to 
be tolerated. We have been into this many times. 
We have sought the various ways in which we 
could get the agreement of the Council to extract 
pensions from this situation. 
Mr. ~inster, who I see here this morning, did 
an .admirab~e report on this . not so long ago in 
which he said that the Council appeared to begin 
to understand the problems of the pensions and 
that they shared some of our anxiety although of 
course they were not prepared to act. He came up 
with three possible solutions and I shall just read 
th~m out briefly. He said that the governments 
mi~t assume. full responsibility for financing 
penswns outside the operating budget or an 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Sir Dudley Smith (continued) 
independently-managed pension fund might be 
set up in WEU into which the contributions of 
staff and the organisation would be paid, or the 
management of the fund might be handed over 
to a private insurance company. All excellent 
suggestions, all relevant, all of which deserve the 
fullest and most detailed consideration by 
experts, and I emphasise this, by experts, and I 
am sure we could get that expert advice which 
would tell us. But no, my latest information, and 
indeed talking to my own government and else-
where, leads me to believe that the Council of 
Ministers remains stony-faced even though 
under the surface sympathetic about the pen-
sions issue. At the moment, as far as I know, 
there is no proposition whatever to do anything 
about the pensions except to leave them where 
they are as a constant drain on the budget of the 
Assembly. 
I would say, Mr. Chairman, in moving this 
today, and I have been gloomy deliberately 
because I think these points need to be under-
lined, we need straight speaking, we need frank 
speaking, the time has gone for the niceties of 
these exchanges. We now must very rapidly ask 
the Council of Ministers exactly where we are 
going to stand on the premise that if a job is 
worth doing, it is worth doing well. And I think 
we ought to say, Sir, to the Council of Ministers 
and our own relevant governments, and some of 
us have already said it, if you do not want us, be 
frank enough to say so. Do not go on paying lip 
service to us about how you believe in the 
Assembly and, oh yes, we do support you, ifyou 
do not want us, be frank about it. We would 
appreciate this so much more. But if you feel that 
we do have a place, that we do have a relevance 
in WEU, then pay us properly and treat us 
properly. I beg to move. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I thank 
both Sir Dudley as Rapporteur and, through 
him, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration for the report and for their 
excellent work. This report is indeed vital not 
only for the Assembly but also for WEU as a 
whole. I hope that all those who believe in WEU 
realise that our political debates would serve no 
purpose if the budget issue were not dealt with at 
the very highest level and our means of existence 
thus secured. 
On behalf of all the members of the Assembly, 
thank you Sir Dudley for your efforts which may 
attract less notice than the great political debates 
but whose importance, I am sure, is obvious to 
everyone. 
The debate is open. 
I call Mr. Linster. 
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Mr. LINSTER (Luxembourg) (Translation). -
Mr. President, budgets and figures are of course a 
boring subject in what is essentially a political 
assembly. As a Luxembourge11, I should perhaps 
be pleased that the chamber is almost empty 
today because the coach tour of our capital 
would seem to be competing successfully with 
this morning's order of business. However that 
may be, I am not going to repeat the figures and 
arguments that Sir Dudley has just given you 
with the skill and eloquence we know to be his. 
Actually Mr. President, as Sir Dudley Smith 
has so forcefully argued and proved, the issue of 
the budget - imposed on our Assembly by the 
Council organs - is really political and the 
debate upon it in this chamber is a political 
debate. 
I would like to take this opportunity, Mr. Pres-
ident, ladies and gentlemen, to congratulate Sir 
Dudley Smith on his clear-sighted and deter-
mined leadership of our Committee on Budg-
etary Affairs and Administration over which he 
has presided with skill and fuirness and on his 
political impartiality on which all members of 
the committee, regardless of their political divi-
sions, are agreed. 
Yesterday, in his report on the reactivation of 
WEU, our colleague Mr. Ahrens cogently argued 
that to withhold basic finan<rial resources is to 
refuse the Assembly the tools of its political trade 
because the very exercise of its political responsi-
bilities under Article IX of the treaty is seriously 
imperilled. If anyone had the deliberate 
intention of emasculating this Assembly politi-
cally there would be no better way than to con-
tinue to deny the Assembly the budgetary 
resources it needs for the effective performance 
of the political role that the treaty explicitly 
confers upon it. That is exact'y what the Council 
has so far done. 
Up to now the Council has rejected every pro-
posal we have made for an improvement in our 
operating budget. The result is a reduction in real 
terms in the Assembly's resources as compared 
with possible expenditure for the preceding 
year. 
Let me explain. Following the Council 
decision the Assembly's budget, pensions 
included, is to be increased by only 2. 79% but 
when we look at the operating budget on its own, 
which is all we have for o~r work, the unfor-
tunate fact is that net growth there is only 0.49% 
as Sir Dudley has just told us. 
The Assembly's purchases of goods and ser-
vices are made in France where - according to 
what has been called a very optimistic estimate -
the rate of inflation will be at least 2%. Sir 
Dudley has just said that there is every reason to 
be more than sceptical about this figure. So there 
is no need to be a mathemat~cian to see that the 
Assembly's purchasing power is in fact being 
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reduced by an amount equivalent to the French 
rate of inflation. The economic reasons that 
were, a few years ago, still lending a semblance of 
plausibility to the retention of a zero growth rate 
- really a euphemism for negative growth - no 
longer apply in most of our countries: there is no 
longer any serious economic crisis nor galloping 
inflation and the fact is that the governments in 
most of our countries have, for some years now, 
dropped zero growth as a national objctive. So 
why maintain it for the WEU parliamentary 
Assembly when the zero growth rate is in 
practice no longer maintained for the ministerial 
organs? 
I do not propose to give so categoric an answer 
to this question this morning as the Rapporteur 
for the General Affairs Committee did yesterday 
mainly because of the number of statements that 
the Chairman-in-Office of the Council has made 
at various times in support of the Assembly and 
its real needs. I shall just note the facts while 
asking myself a number of questions. 
Is it the deliberate decision of the ministers to 
deny in this underhand way, the rights that are 
ours under the Brussels Treaty and the Rome 
declaration? Or is it not simply a mistake on the 
part of the experts who sometimes seem to me to 
discuss the internal affairs of our Assembly as 
capably as a blind man could discuss colour? Or 
is it both at once? It is true that the sorry spec-
tacle we gave of ourselves yesterday afternoon is 
not calculated to refute the criticisms that can be 
levelled at the Assembly. However, I would like 
to point out here that, in my view and in that of 
many of the representatives on this bench, the 
farce - to give it the name used yesterday 
evening by a German colleague - was not the 
result of a badly working Assembly but of the 
failure and extreme conservatism of the majority 
in this Assembly which only parliamentary 
courtesy prevents me from qualifying, always 
supposing that a term including the notion of 
quality can rightly be used in their regard. 
However this may be, the facts are clear. For 
one thing, the Council has up to now been 
steadily reducing the Assembly's purchasing 
power and therefore the extent and impact of its 
activities. For another, the Council has so far 
avoided taking any decision about restructuring 
the Office of the Clerk. What is more, by refusing 
to take a decision on the position of pensions in 
the WEU budget the Council is making it impos-
sible to present a supplementary budget for 1987 
whereas Order 65 of the Assembly formally 
called for such a budget. 
This being so I feel it is natural for our 
Assembly to register, in the plainest and most 
formal terms, its full endorsement of the two 
documents put before us by the Committee on 
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Budgetary Affairs and Administration and more 
particularly the recommendation to the Council. 
Sir Dudley has explained them and since the 
texts were distributed yesterday there is no point 
in going over them in detail. 
Suffice it to add this. Yesterday I expressed 
formally and vigorously the hope that the 
Council would support the Chairman-in-Office 
in his proposals regarding the Assembly's budget. 
In that connection, I would remind you of the 
memorandum he wrote on the subject as early as 
12th March 1987, fully endorsing the views of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
tration, namely: a growth rate in step with that 
worked out each year for the organs of the 
European Communities, a budget divided into 
categories in which expenditure on pensions 
would be separate and not covered by the growth 
rate - and I do not propose to go over the 
various ways in which pension costs could be 
met since Sir Dudley has just done so - and 
lastly the budgetary independence of the 
Assembly once the total budget figure is decided, 
on the model of the gentlemen's agreement gov-
erning relations between the Council of the 
European Community and the European Par-
liament in this field. Within the scope of this 
independence I would definitely include our 
right to deal with restructuring the Office of the 
Clerk ourselves. 
Those, Mr. President, are the three decisions 
that we elected parliamentarians are hoping for 
from the WEU Council. It is in the light of how 
positively and promptly the Council responds on 
these three points that we shall judge the role 
that the Council intends to assign to our 
Assembly in the future. It is in this way that we 
will know whether the Council really intends to 
reduce us to the role of an echo chamber or 
whether it is prepared to restore to us elected rep-
resentatives our full political role under the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty. Yesterday, Mr. President, 
at the dinner given by the Luxembourg author-
ities, you said you hoped that the speech that the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs was to give this 
afternoon would, provided the results of this 
morning's Council meeting so allow, be a Lux-
embourg declaration of equivalent importance to 
the Rome declaration and open a fresh and 
decisive chapter in the reactivation of WEU. 
May I express the hope that, after due consider-
ation, Mr. Poos will receive a mandate from his 
colleagues this morning in terms enabling his 
speech, as far as the budget is concerned, to 
become also a Luxembourg declaration on the 
future operation of the Assembly and to rep-
resent for us, a clearcut and favourable decision 
on the political role of our parliamentary 
Assembly? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
Paul Hawkins. 
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Sir Paul HA WKINS (United Kingdom). - Mr. 
President, after listening to Sir Dudley Smith, I 
wondered whether it was worth while getting up 
and saying anything at all because we all believe 
and have been fighting for these principles which 
he has set out today for so long and they are so 
clear to us and must be so clear to the Council of 
Ministers that it hardly seems worth while reite-
rating. Yet I believe that we have all got a job to 
do to put over to the Council of Ministers, not 
only here but also in our own countries, as we 
have tried to do, the stupidity of keeping in being 
the Assembly ofWestern European Union if they 
do not intend it to work. 
I would like here, if I might, just to say to Mr. 
Linster how wonderful it has been to be in his 
country and to receive the hospitality that we 
have received. I am sure it was not the hospi-
tality we received last night which has emptied 
this chamber but, as he said, the beautiful 
weather outside which Luxembourg has given us 
and also the entertainments put on for people 
today. But even if we are small in numbers we 
are in fact representing the whole of the 
Assembly in what they feel very strongly about. 
We do not want to do a job which is not wanted 
to be done. We want to know that we are wanted 
and I hope that the Council of Ministers will 
begin to wake up to the fact that it is no use 
keeping us in being if they are going to cut every-
thing that we want to do or they want us to do or 
should want us to do. 
I would like to congratulate our Chairman on 
the tremendous hard work, not just on his report 
today, but on the tremendous hard work which 
he has put in over many years. I think I was on 
the Budgetary Affairs Committee before that and 
he was too before he became Chairman. I would 
also like to congratulate our President on the way 
in which he has put this forward time and time 
again to the Council of Ministers. I believe that 
we have got to go on in the way of dripping water 
on a stone until we wear through to the heart of 
the Council of Ministers and make them wake 
up to the fact that they are really cutting their 
own throats if they allow us to continue in this 
way. 
I think I must mention the three points that 
are really the key points; they have been and will 
be extremely well put by everybody else far 
better than I. It does seem to be extraordinary 
that the EEC, which is a very rich organisation, is 
allowed a growth rate and we who are a poor 
organisation are not allowed any at all or in fact 
we are cut back on our expenditure altogether. It 
looks like one law for the rich and one for the 
poor. Over the question of pensions it really is 
absolute nonsense, and we must go on saying this 
time and time again, to have pensions, which are 
growing yearly, included in our total budget for 
which we are given zero growth. Secondly, this 
pension matter really does make the work of the 
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Assembly almost impossible to carry on because 
we want to see fair pensions for those people who 
have served us, but when we employ fresh 
people, if we are being cut back somehow or 
another, the pensions will have to be cut back as 
well and that is something no one would wish to 
do. Finally, I must support! Sir Dudley Smith 
when he says that to treat thel organisation as if it 
is a child and cannot manage its own affairs, that 
you cannot go out and buy a typewriter when 
one is wanted without referring back to London 
or to the Council of Ministers, does seem abso-
lutely ridiculous. 
If I am lucky and we do not have an election 
called before the time we should meet in Paris, I 
may meet my friends here again and I do not 
mean just my friends on the political side, but 
many friends which I have made over the years 
and across the boundaries of party. This will be 
my last year with Western European Union and 
the Council of Europe because I am retiring at 
this parliament. And so, I would like to say what 
tremendous interest this Assembly has given to 
me. I want to see this Assembly worthwhile. I 
want to see it grow in influence and, strangely 
enough, I was told by the leader of the delegation 
who went to America how much emphasis they 
are putting on our importance. So I wish you, 
Mr. Caro, and whoever su~eeds you, and the 
whole of the Assembly my tery best wishes for 
the future and for the futuite of this Assembly 
which I believe is going to plFtY a very important 
part in the world in the future and the sooner we 
make the Council of Ministers realise this the 
better for the whole, I believe, of Western 
Europe. Thank you Mr. President. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Sir Paul. You have told us of a coming event that 
we shall all keenly regret but I hope that today's 
will not be your last speech and that we can still 
look forward to having you with us. Please let me 
say how much the Assembly has appreciated 
your faithful attendance at its meetings and in 
particular the pains you have always taken to 
defend the interests of our organisation. Please 
accept my grateful thanks, Sir Paul. 
I call Mr. Garrett. 
Mr. GARRETT (United Kingdom ). - Mr. 
President, I have been on the delegation to 
Western European Union rtow for seven years 
and budgetary problems ¥:ve been recurring 
with monotonous regularity and each budgetary 
problem emphasises the inherent dangers of this 
organisation going bankrupt. The point is that 
we could go into overdraft if we had any fixed 
assets, but we do not even have a building. All 
we have is human resources and the human 
resources we have are of good quality. We pay 
good salaries, we expect good reports and good 
service and we get it. And it seems a shame to me 
that the quality of the reports that are issued and 
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debated here from time to time should be pos-
sibly placed in jeopardy, for other people to read, 
placed in jeopardy by the fact that the staff may 
have to be reduced; staff would have to be reallo-
cated and the whole anxiety of organisation in 
the long run must affect the quality, morale and 
general well-being of all associated with this 
important institution. 
I am a committed believer in Western 
European Union and anybody of my generation 
who has been in the armed forces and seen the 
horrors of conflict will realise that when you are 
talking about the defence of Europe, you are 
talking about not merely the political defence of 
Europe, but the defence of all the citizens in 
Europe and, regrettably, the seven nations which 
form this organisation shoulder the burdens for 
other nations which are in Europe and the other 
nations which are in Europe should be making 
their contribution to Western European Union. 
They are actually living on the backs of the 
nations that form Western European Union and 
regard it as part of the defence equipment. 
Now budgetary matters seem to have been 
with me all my life and I know how difficult it is, 
and we all do because we are all politicians in our 
own different countries, we all know how dif-
ficult it is to move finance ministers into reallo-
cation of the resources available. But I take up 
the point made by Sir Paul Hawkins, my col-
league in the United Kingdom Parliament. He is 
absolutely right. The EEC, the European Eco-
nomic Community, is awash with money and 
one of the reasons why they can get funds so 
easily, not so easily now as it used to be, but still 
they can get their budgets made and adjusted to 
increases, percentage increases per annum, the 
reason they get it is quite simple. A powerful 
civil service lobby operates in Brussels and 
because it is powerful it is self-protecting. If there 
are any civil servants in here this morning, I 
hope that they will not think that I am getting at 
them personally, I am getting at the system. It is 
so easy that when they are in power they will 
protect their own interests and unfortunately 
there are politicians here in this Assembly this 
morning who are so besotted with the principles 
of the European Economic Community that they 
lack the guts and the resolution to say enough is 
enough to their national parliaments. They will 
still not face up to the fact that they are handing 
money over to the European Economic Com-
munity and, if some of that money was not 
handed over to the European Economic Com-
munity by our national parliaments, that money 
could be reallocated to an important organisation 
like this. That is where the problem has to be 
tackled from the start, within our national parlia-
ments. 
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Mr. President, a new generation of politicians 
will come up within our national assemblies and 
they will not be as kind and generous to the EEC 
as our generation has been. They will be looking 
at the EEC much more critically than we have 
done hitherto and when they have done that they 
will come to the conclusion that money raised by 
taxes within our national parliaments should be 
reallocated and it is possible that they will look 
with favour upon Western European Union. 
They will look with favour, upon Western 
European Union because, as I said earlier, we are 
an organisation built up to defend democracy in 
Europe, to keep peace through strength and if we 
keep peace through strength then we can get good 
allies within the parliaments of Europe. 
Now, on pensions, I think that whether we are 
here as parliamentarians or ministers on the 
Council, we have a moral responsibility to pay 
pensions. In my lifetime, masses of people in our 
own countries never received pensions. Two-
thirds of the people working in the United 
Kingdom did not have a pension. Some would 
say that the pensions they have now are not ade-
quate. But then we are moving forward and the 
public servants - that is what our staff are - are 
expected, and we expect them, to set an example 
in responsibility and the level of reward should 
be pensions which are paid so that people in the 
retiring years of their life should be free from 
financial anxiety. That is what it is about. It is 
not getting money so that you can pass it on to 
relatives, it is getting money so that you enjoy a 
reasonable standard of living in your retirement 
and that is what we are seeking to achieve 
through a sensible policy on pensions. 
I conclude by saying that when we met in 
Rome we decided we would reactivate Western 
European Union. There are cynics who say the 
word reactivate does not mean too much, but 
those of us who were here yesterday afternoon 
saw a good animated debate with a lot of cross 
political banter, but the point was that the 
Assembly here yesterday afternoon looked alive. 
It looked as if it was doing its job. And my con-
clusion was, it was doing its job. So therefore, 
given the opportunity, given the finances, given 
the resources that we need, I see no reason why 
WEU should not go from strength to strength 
and I hope that when the ministers read my 
speech - I hope one or two of them read it 
anyhow, I doubt if they will all read it - I hope 
they will realise that there are people in this 
Assembly like myselfwho have great belief in its 
future. 
(Mr. Goerens, Vice-President of the Assembly, 
took the Chair) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
van Tets. 
Mr. van TETS (Netherlands).- Mr. President, 
my remarks will be addressed solely to the 
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matter of pensions which is a subject I happen to 
know something about. On the matter of pen-
sions, a choice has been made for this 
organisation, a choice which faces all gov-
ernment institutions in the matter of pensions, 
and that is whether to equalise the cost over the 
years or to take the costs as they arise. Now for 
governmental organisations, both systems have 
their merits. But once a choice has been made its 
consequences should be accepted. If the choice 
had been to pay annual premiums to build up a 
capital from which pensions can be paid, these 
costs would be part and parcel of our normal 
operating budget. There would have been no 
special problem in extending to them all the rules 
of the game pertaining to the budget including 
the zero growth concept if that was in force. 
However, now that the choice has been the 
other way we are in an entirely different ball 
game. A small organisation such as ours could 
face disruption of its work by the retirement or 
death of just a few members of its staff, especially 
at a time when a zero real growth policy is being 
pursued. This is not the case where some govern-
ments are faced with a similar choice and have 
made a similar choice, where hundreds of thou-
sands or even millions of civil servants are incor-
porated in such a system. It would not even be 
much of a problem if we were dealing with ten 
thousand employees. A difference in system 
would, in that case, be ironed out by the large 
numbers involved, whereas that is not the case in 
a small organisation such as we have. I know 
that what I have described does happen in 
national administrations but I have the 
impression that those who advise the Council in 
this matter overlook the fact that the conse-
quences of this choice in a small organisation are 
so different. In fact, those who wish to maintain 
the zero real growth doctrine should be the last to 
want to apply it in such a way that it becomes 
nonsense. Pensions are a preferential obligation. 
To have such an obligation weigh on our oper-
ating budget means gradually but increasingly 
curtailing the activities of WEU at a time when 
we have just discussed the desire to reactivate it, 
a desire which has recently developed into a 
necessity. 
Mr. President, I have been involved in 
pension management for nearly thirty years. I 
have seen systems ranging from very good to 
very poor, but I have never before seen a system 
being applied in such a way that it is inconsistent 
with and frustrating to the stated aims of the 
organisation that has set it up. And that is what 
we are now doing in WEU, and that is what we 
should put a stop to. Thank you Mr. Pres-
ident. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg. 
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Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
We just heard a very valuable1 intervention from 
Mr. van Tets and if I may go, back to what Mr. 
Garrett said, no the ministers will not read all the 
speeches, let us be very clear about that. They 
will be given a very small selection that their offi-
cials think they ought to see. Now that is under-
standable, I am not being critical of their civil 
servants, but ministers have a vast number of 
documents to read, so unless they are very lucky 
they will not read Mr. Garrett's excellent speech 
and I know he will forgive me if I say my worry 
is they are even less likely to read Mr. van Tets's 
speech because he actually hits at the system and 
it is those who control the s~stem that decide 
what the ministers are going to read. 
So let us just reflect upon tihat for a moment 
and I am not, I make the point again, I am not 
being critical, I am merely being factual. Having 
been a minister, I know exactly how it works and 
unless you say you are going to read everything, 
and Sir Dudley knows this as well, you get only a 
selection and if you say you are going to read 
everything, my God, you will get everything and 
you will work twenty-four hours a day just 
reading. So the system has to be looked at in that 
way. But I think we need to take what Mr. van 
Tets has said and between us just bring this 
home in our own countries. 
There are four or five points I would like to 
make, Mr. President. The first is that I had a 
couple of years on the Budget Committee under 
Sir Dudley and at one stage I was hoping to per-
suade the Budget Committee to say very simply 
that if the means were not willed then the 
Assembly should suspend itself and that would 
be an interesting point because under the treaty 
there has to be an Assembly and it would be 
interesting to know how the legal advisers to the 
governments would have dealt with a suspended 
Assembly. But we did not go that far because 
there were signs and pointers and one kept on 
hoping. I think that what Sir Dudley has said 
today was interesting because we seem to have 
the commitment of the Chairman-in-Office of 
the Council of Ministers antl we may know 
today, when we question him, whether he has 
been able to deliver what he feels and what he 
understands. 
Sir Dudley made a comment that he and I may 
not be here but as the years go Cl>n more and more 
of our staff will quite rightly' be drawing pen-
sions. I just ask that you reflect for a moment 
that if all our staff were wom~n they would be 
getting their pensions for even longer because 
women live that much longer and so perhaps we 
ought to be thankful that, at present anyhow, 
most of our staff drawing pensions and who will 
be drawing pensions are male. That is not in any 
way sex discrimination, it is merely being factual 
again. 
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Can I say that what does concern me is the 
unwillingness of those who have any responsi-
bility for our pension system to take advice. I 
am, amongst other things, one of the trustees of 
the pension fund of the House of Commons and 
we have a very substantial sum of money to 
invest. We do not believe that we know the best 
way of doing it. We certainly do not believe civil 
servants know the best way and we have given it 
to an outside organisation, expert in pensions. 
This makes an enormous difference to the proper 
management of a pension fund and I hope that 
perhaps more and more pressure will be put 
upon those responsible to get the right to have 
proper outside actuarial advice from sources 
other than treasuries or civil service. 
Mr. Linster made the point - which I thought 
was a very important point - that perhaps min-
isters do not actually consider some of these 
points, that again the slowness in response comes 
in fact from the ambassadors and the officials 
who are too over-awed by the fact that much of 
their future depends upon the attitude of the civil 
servants in their home treasuries. They do not 
want to upset those treasury officials too much. 
Again one has to accept that that is not being 
critical, it is a fact of life - if you want, for your 
own department, an increase in your budget pro-
vision, it does not always help you to go around 
attacking the treasury and therefore you might 
decide that you will be fairly quiet and not push 
the matter too far. It comes back, I think, to the 
need to influence the ministers, not their dep-
uties. That is what I think we have to do. 
Might I just give a brief quotation, Mr. Pres-
ident, from the excellent information report that 
we had last November from Mrs. Hennicot-
Schoepges and on page 35 there is a quotation 
from the late and great Mr. Spaak who said this: 
"We (the Council of WEU) have been deter-
mined to leave you the greatest possible 
freedom " (that is the Assembly), "relying upon 
your experience and your wisdom ... We consider 
that the organisation and working methods of 
the Assembly... are matters for its own 
decision ... ". Why do we not ask the Council of 
Ministers why they have reneged upon what Mr. 
Spaak said. Why do we have to get their per-
mission to make internal changes in our staff 
organisation? Why is our experience and 
wisdom, as Mr. van Tets has proved on pen-
sions, not looked at properly? Why is it that I 
have to go to the expense of flying over to Paris 
to discuss proposed changes in rules because 
there is no such thing available to Mr. Moulias as 
a telex? That is the situation and I say bluntly to 
every ambassador who should be here and who 
is not, probably at the Council of Ministers, to 
every representative of the Seven who are here 
and to every minister, would they or would their 
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civil servants at that level exist without a telex 
machine? The answer is no. So why should we? 
That, I think, is the point we need to make very 
strongly indeed. 
The last thing that I want to say is quite simply 
this. I yield to nobody, and I hope my friends on 
the left will not be too offended, I yield to 
nobody in my very strong belief in a tough mon-
etary policy, but if governments who follow 
monetary policies- and in the United Kingdom 
both the last labour government and the conser-
vative government followed monetary policies, 
the first because of the IMF, the second by choice 
- but where this is followed if you decide that 
there is an organisation or policy you are going to 
support, you do not slowly starve it of funds. 
You either wipe it out or you fund it to do the 
job you want. And so I am not being in any way 
wet in my application of monetarism, but I am 
saying if the governments believe they want the 
Brussels Treaty and the Assembly to do its work 
then they should fund it to a sensible amount 
and I believe that the proposals Sir Dudley has 
put to us fit that bill adequately. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Hill. 
Mr. HILL (United Kingdom). - It is a great 
pleasure this morning to be able to congratulate 
my colleague and friend, Sir Dudley Smith, on 
that excellent address he gave at the beginning of 
the budget debate. He has laboured long and 
probably if he was a farmer he would have 
starved to death by now because of course the 
people who can give us the rewards so that we 
can continue to work a very efficient, but never-
theless a reactivated institution, have not seen it 
quite the same as we here this morning. 
In fact, there is a question being answered. I 
received it on 15th April, a reply from the 
Council which I think answers all the naive ques-
tions that have been put by some of my col-
leagues this morning. The reactivation ofWEU-
and this is Recommendation 438 for those who 
love figures - also involves the strengthening of 
its structures, the improvement of its working 
methods and the Permanent Council will con-
tinue to co-ordinate all the organisation's activ-
ities. It goes on to a lot more waflle from the 
Council because there are going to be additional 
meetings of political directors, the Council of 
Ministers are beefing up the number of times 
they are going to meet, they now think that, in 
their work programme, the maximum they can 
do is two meetings a year, but nevertheless that 
was an improvement on one meeting a year. 
When we talk of these ministers and how the 
secretariats put before them a briefing of 
meetings, has anyone not suggested this 
morning, these are the same people all the time, 
the same ministers, ministers of the Council of 
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Ministers, are exactly the same people as would 
meet on EEC problems, on Council of Europe 
problems, on WEU problems. Of course the 
whole emphasis I get is that there is not at the 
moment a real purpose in the Council of Min-
isters declaring that there will be a fundamental 
reactivation of WEU. 
I think the circumstances over the last few 
months, and certainly the Gorbachev public rela-
tions campaign which has proved very suc-
cessful, have meant that the Western European 
countries are beginning to worry about conven-
tional warfare. They are being very worried 
about no nuclear umbrella of any kind and WEU 
is obviously the forum in which conventional 
warfare and procurement could be discussed. 
Until the Council of Ministers really make up 
their minds that WEU has a real purpose, we are 
in this Catch 22 situation. There will be little or 
no money available. They do not want this insti-
tution to die off so they send them the odd can-
ister of oxygen to breathe some sort of new life, 
in most cases it is not oxygen it is hot air because 
the odd minister will make a reactivation speech 
once again. 
We were all enthused in Rome some consid-
erable time ago when the German Foreign Min-
ister made a very forthright speech on reacti-
vation and since then we have had numerous 
speeches from the copycat ministers who make 
exactly the same speech but at the end of the day 
those self-same ministers, when they meet in 
another room on their own, cannot seem to bring 
themselves to the position of spending a little 
more on an institution that they and the press 
have called moribund and which is now in need 
of reactivation. 
I certainly think there is a good case here for 
following up some of the points that Mr. Linster 
made and certainly the privatisation, if that is 
not a dirty word, of the pension fund would be a 
very good way to start. Get some people from the 
outside to put forward a formula to present to 
the Council of Ministers to see whether the 
pension burden could not be lifted from the 
institution itself without the fear that many of 
our old employees - we are all grateful to say 
most of us are living longer and indeed have 
greater expectations healthwise than, say thirty 
or forty years ago - for our old employees to be 
well and truly covered during the lifetime oftheir 
retirement. Is there not another way that we can 
point out to the Council of Ministers the 
problem of its 2% inflation growth in France? 
The franc is a weak currency. I say that with all 
humility at the moment. Perhaps one of the basic 
means of securing stability would be to link it 
with a strong currency. The pension fund in par-
ticular should be linked to a strong currency such 
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as the German mark or the Swiss franc. These 
are points that only a detail ~ommittee could 
work out and if they are taking no notice of our 
Budget Committee then it has to be a working 
party set up by the Council of Ministers and I 
hope they will think carefully and long on that. 
The difficulty of talking about budgets is that 
invariably you are either for. spending more 
money or you are for spending. less money. We 
have heard how the EEC budget is inflated. But 
of course they have a great burden, a far greater 
burden than any pension fund. They have their 
common agricultural policy and that is the real 
fulcrum of the expenditure of the EEC. The 
Council of Ministers would defend their budget 
to the EEC on the fact that cireumstances have 
got really out of control and they would of course 
not think twice about making an advantageous 
budget linked to the national VATs of every par-
ticipating country and be fully justified inasmuch 
as they cannot evade what are treaty obliga-
tions. 
Now, from my point of view, are there any 
treaty obligations to Western European Union? 
Are we going to survive? Are we going to be able 
to continue to be the second layer to NATO? Are 
we going to be almost the emergency defensive 
system that is protecting the conventional forces 
and indeed the short-range nuclear umbrella in 
Europe? Or are we just going to meet here once 
in a while getting written questions from the 
Council of Ministers which disprove that they 
are thinking along the same lines as ourselves? In 
the end, will Sir Dudley Smith have felt that his 
four years' labour have been lost? The tragedy of 
a politician's life is that you work long and hard, 
you are actually vital in your <1>wn sphere, but 
your words fall on deaf ears ot are put before 
blind eyes. 
I think, Mr. Chairman, this is the great 
problem. Is the Council of Ministers alert enough 
to be able to see that this institution is in a des-
perate situation? If they were a room of bank 
managers they would be able to see it, but they 
are a room of politicians aided •and advised by 
their secretariat. We are in desperate straits. For 
goodness' sake, Council of Ministers, open up 
your eyes, listen with your ears and see that one 
of the most worthwhile institutions of Europe is 
beginning to flag and die for lack of finance. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is closed. 
Does Sir Dudley, in his twofold capacity of 
Rapporteur and Chairman of the committee, 
wish to speak? 
Sir Dudley SMITH (United Kingdom). - At 
the conclusion of this debate, Clnd listening to 
Mr. Hill and his rather cynical vi~w about reacti-
vation, which I must say is s.hared by many 
people, I realise just how wide and how deep the 
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feelings of members go. We have had a good 
cross-section of members speaking this morning 
and I think it is a great pity that the ambassadors 
and a number of the officials are not here. There 
may be good and adequate reasons why not, but 
I do hope that in fact the ministers, particularly 
for this debate, will look at it, that the ambas-
sadors and the ministers will read the report of 
this comparatively short debate because there are 
many many views which have been put across 
which need to be noted and even acted upon and 
which again show an extraordinary unanimity. 
Very rarely in any political assembly is there 
such unanimity and this shows that this 
Assembly has a really excellent case. 
I am grateful for the kind remarks of many of 
the members who have spoken and one or two 
points need to be emphasised. Mr. Linster said 
that it is right to stress that in Europe we are no 
longer in the state of economic crisis that pre-
vailed four or five years ago. As he said, zero 
growth does not operate in other areas of gov-
ernment. Why specifically should it be so where 
Western European Union is concerned? As Sir 
Paul Hawkins, who is an old friend and an 
effective advocate of sensible reform over the 
years, said, it is no use keeping this organisation 
in being if our funds are to be cut and he is abso-
lutely right. That is a view that I think is shared 
by many others including Mr. Garrett who says 
that we have a right to say where our resources 
should be used and we have no assets of our own 
but we have human resources and these are of 
high quality if given the opportunity to function 
well. 
Then there was, I thought, a devastating 
comment from Mr. van Tets. We all know that 
he was a very high expert in his own country, the 
Netherlands, where pensions were concerned, 
during his professional life and he made a very 
serious condemnation of the position, one which 
I think the Council of Ministers ought seriously 
to take on board. It was something which was 
reiterated by my colleague, Sir Geoffrey 
Finsberg, and he said that we need expertise in 
this sphere. I can tell my colleague that the 
present pension system is very convenient for 
governments but it is falling down. It needs 
expertise and they are letting down the demo-
cratic countries they represent if they do not 
obtain the best possible deal. Sir Geoffrey 
brought back a theme that he did raise. He 
reminded us in the committee some time ago 
that there was always this option of suspending 
the activities of the Assembly if we did not 
obtain the assistance that we deserve. I think it 
certainly remains an option. At the time I did 
not advocate it because it was fairly drastic but I 
think it appealed to quite a lot of members and it 
was something that was held in abeyance. I really 
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think, Mr. President, that if we do not obtain 
assistance fairly quickly it is an option that we 
should re-examine very seriously. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Mr. Rapporteur. The Assembly now has to vote 
on the draft recommendation contained in Doc-
ument 1095. 
In accordance with Rule 33(2), the Assembly 
votes by sitting and standing unless five repre-
sentatives or substitutes present in the chamber 
request a vote by roll-call. 
Are there five members who request a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
There are not. 
We shall therefore vote by sitting and 
standing. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The draft recommendation is adopted 
unanimously 1• 
The Assembly now has to vote on the draft 
order contained in Document 1095. 
In accordance with Rule 33(2}, the Assembly 
votes by sitting and standing unless five repre-
sentatives or substitutes present in the chamber 
request a vote by roll-call. 
Are there five members who request a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
There are not. 
We shall therefore vote by sitting 
standing. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting 
standing) 
The draft order is adopted unanimously 2• 
4. The need for action by the Assembly 
of Western European Union 
to press western governments 
for action to channel resources 
into development needs and away 
from the arms trade 
(Motion for a resolution, 
Doe. 1096) 
and 
and 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- Under Rule 
28 of the Rules of Procedure, I have received 
from Mr. Freeson a motion for a resolution on 
the need for action by the Assembly of Western 
European Union to press western governments 
for action to channel resources into development 
needs and away from the arms trade. 
I. See page 23. 
2. See page 24. 
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It will be referred to the appropriate com-
mittee by the Presidential Committee. 
5. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I propose 
that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this 
afternoon at 5 p.m. with the following orders of 
the day: 
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Address by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of 
the Council, and debate. 
Are there any objections? ... 
The orders of the day of the next sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak? ... 
The sitting is closed. 
(The sitting was closed at 11.25 a.m.) 
FOURTH SITTING 
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SUMMARY 
1. Attendance register. 
2. Adoption of the minutes. 
3. The need for action by the Assembly of Western European 
Union to press western governments for action to channel 
resources into development needs and away from the 
arms trade (Doe. 1096). 
4. Address by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Lux-
embourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Poos, Mr. Fischbach (Min-
ister of Defence of Luxembourg), Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. 
Valleix, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Gianotti, Mr. Freeson, 
Mr. Brown, Mr. Goerens, Mr. Cahen (Secretary-General of 
WEU), Mr. Terlezki, Sir Frederic Bennett, Sir Dudley 
Smith, Mr. Stoffelen. 
5. Close of the extraordinary session. 
The sitting was opened at 5.40 p.m., with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sitting 
is open. 
1. Attendance register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The names 
of the substitutes attending this sitting which 
have been notified to the President will be pub-
lished with the list of representatives appended 
to the minutes of proceedings 1• 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). In 
accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Pro-
cedure, the minutes of proceedings of the pre-
vious sitting have been distributed. 
Are there any comments? ... 
The minutes are agreed to. 
3. The need for action by the Assembly 
of Western European Union 
to press western governments 
for action to channel resources 
into development needs 
and away from the arms trade 
(Doe. 1096) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I have been 
told there is an error in the signatories of Doc-
ument 1096 containing Mr. Freeson's motion for 
a resolution. 
I. See page 26. 
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The name of Mr. Bassinet should be inserted 
instead of Mr. Baumel. 
4. Address by Mr. Poos, Minister 
for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the address by Mr. Poos, Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg and 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
Mr. Chairman, Ministers, Your Excellencies, 
in welcoming you here on behalfofthe Assembly 
I take this opportunity of expressing once more 
the Assembly's gratitude to the Luxembourg 
chairmanship and repeating what I said yes-
terday evening to the Chairman of the Council, 
to Mr. Fischbach and to all your government col-
leagues. Our gratitude also goes to the Chamber 
of Deputies, its President, Colonel Hengel, Vice-
President, and to the Lady Burgomaster of Lux-
embourg, who have provided the Assembly with 
the facilities for this extraordinary session. 
The Assembly is particularly aware of the sig-
nificance of simultaneous sessions ofthe Council 
and the Assembly at such an important time for 
European construction and for Europe's status in 
international affairs, including the great 
East-West debate. The Council's advice is nec-
essary to us, and the Assembly would welcome 
the political guidance the WEU Council of Min-
isters is required to provide on such important 
subjects as security and disarmament and at least 
on alignments between member states so that the 
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance to which 
we are all deeply committed can be built. 
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Mr. Chairman, we await your address with 
great interest, and we are aware that, with the 
agreement of your ministerial colleagues on the 
Council, you have allowed us something com-
pletely new. This is the first time that, after a 
meeting of the Council of Ministers, the 
Chairman of the Council accompanied by repre-
sentatives of the other member states is to 
address the Assembly in person to give details of 
the communique and to bring to the attention of 
the press not only your statements but also your 
contact with the parliamentary organ instituted 
by the modified Brussels Treaty. 
Mr. Chairman, after your address I hope you 
will be kind enough to reply to the questions 
some delegates will no doubt want to ask. 
I thank you and now ask you to take the floor. 
Mr. POOS (Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, ladies and gentle-
men, ministers and colleagues, allow me first to 
say how happy I am that this extraordinary 
session of your Assembly coincides with the 
ordinary meeting of our Council of Ministers, 
the second to be held during the present Luxem-
bourg presidency. 
This coincidence allows me to inform you all 
together of the results of the ministerial discus-
sions immediately after they have been con-
cluded. I am happy about this because I attach 
vital interest to the continuous development of 
the meaningful dialogue that must exist between 
the representatives of the executives and those of 
the legislative bodies of our member states. Only 
through this democratic, and hence public, 
debate will public opinion become aware ofwhat 
the security of our Europe means in both the 
European and Atlantic context. 
Even more significant is the fact that your 
extraordinary session and the ordinary meeting 
of the Council of Ministers are both being held at 
a time which is of particular importance for 
Europe and our organisation. 
For several months, East-West and transat-
lantic relations have been evolving at a steadily-
accelerating rate. Today, we can discern the pos-
sibility of major changes whose foreseeable 
impact is likely to change considerably the stra-
tegic environment of our continent. The delicate 
balances on which peace has depended for more 
than forty years are to be considered in this new 
light. 
In such circumstances, the need for our states 
to reflect together and to concert their approach 
to their security problems in the framework of 
active Atlantic solidarity, without which there 
can be no credible defence of the West and hence 
of Western Europe, is for ever essential. 
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Under the chairmanship of Mr. Fischbach and 
myself, our foreign affairs and defence colleagues 
have just been devoting their efforts to this 
process of reflection and consultation. We did 
this at two levels, which are in fact inseparable: 
the assessment of the situation facing us today 
and the progressive definition of our essential 
security interests, i.e. the criteria on which our 
joint consideration of the situation can be 
based. 
I am happy to say that this twofold exercise 
was conducted in the Council in the most open, 
detailed and constructive manner. It allowed us 
to identify significant convergences, the broad 
lines of which I shall communicate to you. 
In regard to the present situation, we were 
unanimous in noting with satisfaction the 
improvement in East-West relations and the pos-
itive consequences for arms control and disarm-
ament. 
It was in this context that we discussed the 
talks held by the Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz, 
in Moscow from 13th to 15th April with the 
General Secretary of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union and the Soviet Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Shevardnadze. Following 
talks with the same authorities by the Prime 
Minister of the United Kingdom and Sir 
Geoffrey Howe, and preceding those I myself 
have just had, they take their place in a 
movement of dialogue to which all our govern-
ments are highly favourable. 
The cohesion of the alliance and the coherence 
of the positions of certain members probably 
encouraged this positive trend. We all wish this 
cohesion and coherence to be maintained or 
even strengthened and in this connection we 
welcome the determination of the United States 
to pursue its in-depth consultations with its allies 
with a view to defining joint positions taking real 
account of joint interests. 
Our member states have always expressed the 
wish for intermediate nuclear forces to be with-
drawn from the European theatre. They therefore 
approved the zero-zero option when it was 
tabled by their American ally at the Geneva 
negotiations in 1981. It is therefore with positive 
interest and satisfaction that they now note the 
possibility of reaching agreement to this end. As 
is normal, they wish such progress to be a factor 
to strengthen their security, and not the 
reverse. 
The ministers recalled their serious concern at 
the existing Soviet superiority in shorter-range 
intermediate nuclear missiles and the requirement 
not to neglect this in any intermediate nuclear 
force agreement. In this context, they noted that 
the Soviet Union had, in response to earlier pro-
posals tabled by the United States, recently made 
statements on these missiles, the content of 
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which should be carefully studied as soon as they 
are clarified in writing. They welcomed the con-
sultations now being held in the alliance. 
Earlier, I referred to the delicate balance which 
has ensured the peace that we have enjoyed for 
forty years. So far, this balance has been based on 
nuclear and conventional elements which 
together ensure the credibility of the strategy of 
flexible response. We remain faithful to this 
strategy and we intend its credibility to be main-
tained in the future and hence the two compo-
nents, nuclear and conventional, to be retained. 
For each element of our defence potential, this 
requires a real East-West balance of forces at a 
level that we obviously wish to be as low as pos-
sible. Inter alia, this is particularly true for 
chemical weapons and conventional capabil-
ities. 
These proposals may be considered to be those 
of all the WEU member states. Moreover, they 
correspond to a series of guidelines that are 
essential for Europe's security. 
What are these guidelines? We think the first 
aim of European security policy is to prevent, by 
means of adequate deterrence and defence, any 
form or threat of military conflict. Now and in 
the foreseeable future, Western Europe's security 
cannot be ensured without a defence structure 
including both conventional and nuclear means 
which visibly and indivisibly combine to 
exercise credible deterrence. In this connection, a 
strong conventional component is the primordial 
condition for Western Europe's forward defence 
strategy. 
Furthermore, we consider that there can be no 
concept of Western European security outside 
the Atlantic Alliance: the maintenance of the 
necessary American forces in Europe, guaran-
teeing the coupling between European and 
American security, is essential. 
The French and United Kingdom nuclear 
forces make a major contribution to European 
security. They are not concerned by the current 
negotiations between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. 
It goes without saying that each European state 
must enjoy equal security. In return, each 
European state must make a contribution to the 
joint defence commensurate with its own capa-
bility. In this context, greater effectiveness in the 
European countries' defence efforts depends on 
improving co-operation in arms procurement. 
The security of Europe cannot be considered 
separately from that of the rest of the world. 
Thus, in assessing risks, European states must 
take into account tension and conflicts outside 
Europe insofar as such developments affect their 
security. 
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Our security depends as much on the dialogue 
and reduction of tension as it does on our 
defence effort. These are not two conflicting 
factors; on the contrary, they are wholly comple-
mentary and were linked in the famous Harmel 
report. 
The WEU Council of Ministers therefore 
agreed to play an energetic part in a policy of 
co-operation and dialogue based on a credible 
defence capability. The will to promote the 
control of armaments and disarmament to 
ensure a stable balance of forces at a lower level 
is an essential aspect of such a security policy. 
Agreements on these matters must increase our 
security and strengthen stability while being veri-
fiable. 
In any event, the ministers expressed their 
wish to see Western Europe, at the present inter-
national juncture, play a part in the development 
of any dialogue in full exercise of its responsibil-
ities. Inter alia, they examined how to avoid any 
risk of Europe being side-lined in the present 
strategic debate. 
It was in accordance with the guidelines that I 
have just described that the Council of Ministers 
took note of a report on European security 
interests in the present strategic context. This 
report was prepared in accordance with the 
mandate set out at the informal ministerial 
meeting of the WEU Council on 13th and 14th 
November 1986. On the instructions of the 
Council, this document will be studied further 
and extended by the relevant bodies of the 
organisation. 
From what I have just told you, I think it is 
clear that the reactivation of WEU is now well 
under way: it may be considered to have reached 
cruising speed. The ministers therefore decided 
to consider at the present Council meeting the 
role, tasks and final structures of the 
organisation. The close association of ministers 
for foreign affairs and defence with all the 
organisation's work is now an accomplished fact. 
The political directors of the ministries for 
foreign affairs of our seven states and their coun-
terparts in the ministries of defence now meet 
regularly. In the first four months of 1987, they 
have already met twice. Senior officials -
assistant political directors or politico-military 
directors from the ministries for foreign affairs 
and their counterparts from the ministries of 
defence - do likewise in the framework of a 
special working group, but even more frequently, 
i.e. once a month, which is even more often than 
meetings in the framework of European political 
co-operation. These two bodies are responsible 
for examining any matter relating to European 
security that may arise in the context of Atlantic 
solidarity. 
Finally, experts from the capitals meet in the 
same dual context to examine matters entrusted 
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to them such as problems raised by the evolution 
of the strategic defence initiative or Western 
Europe's security interests. The frequency of 
their meetings depends on the requirements of 
their work. New structures have therefore 
emerged alongside those which already existed 
such as the Council of Ministers and the Per-
manent Council, which co-ordinates all the 
organisation's activities. They make it possible 
to pursue reflection and consultation on the 
security matters that reactivated WEU was man-
dated to handle by the Rome declaration and 
provide it with the means of becoming what it 
was intended to be: political co-operation on 
security matters. 
The ministerial organs, the Secretariat-General 
and the agencies for security questions are at the 
service of these old and new structures to which I 
have just referred. The Secretariat-General 
assists them with their everyday work, particu-
larly through its political division. The agencies, 
in close contact with the secretariat, are to con-
stitute a medium- and long-term study centre 
whose effectiveness will be enhanced by being 
under the authority of a single director and 
organised and composed in such a way as to offer 
the intergovernmental structures the best oftheir 
expert knowledge. The Permanent Council has 
been instructed by the ministers to implement in 
a detailed manner the guidelines adopted by the 
ministers. 
The Council of Ministers gave preliminary 
consideration to an outline study of security 
interests in the Mediterranean, prepared jointly 
by Italy and France. They instructed the appro-
priate bodies of the organisation to go further 
into the matter. The Council also took note of a 
report on the SDI prepared by the experts in 
which the politico-strategic implications of the 
current research programmes on strategic 
defensive systems are analysed. The ministers 
wished the experts to continue to examine these 
implications at regular intervals in the context of 
the necessary reflection on all matters affecting 
Western European security interests. 
My foreign affairs and defence colleagues also 
examined the problem of the enlargement of 
WEU. Interest in our organisation is growing. 
After Portugal and Spain, Greece and Turkey are 
now showing, by their respective approaches, the 
importance they attach to WEU. We all obvi-
ously consider these demonstrations of interest 
in what our organisation is in the process of 
becoming to be a positive factor. 
However, it would be premature for the WEU 
Council of Ministers to take a decision at this 
stage. The ministers tackled the problem on an 
informal basis only, waiting for matters to 
become clearer both for WEU member states 
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and for states interested in becoming members. 
On the one hand, final decisions still have to be 
taken on the role, tasks and structures of WEU 
before 31st December of this year, and on the 
other hand the joint definition of the funda-
mental guidelines of European security on which 
a consensus can be found is being pursued. 
This, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, is 
what was done at the meeting of the Council of 
Ministers. It is not without some satisfaction that 
I review this work since, as I am sure you will 
agree, it was far from negligible. 
You will probably appreciate that what we 
were mainly concerned with in our ministerial 
discussions tallies exactly with your own con-
cerns, as testified by the talks between your Pres-
ident and several of his colleagues from the Pres-
idential Committee in Moscow, on the one hand, 
and the debates at the extraordinary session you 
have just held, on the other;, as shown in par-
ticular in Recommendation 443. As you can see 
from what I have just told • you, the ministers 
took and will continue to take the utmost 
account of all this in the future. 
A European security policy and its underlying 
defence effort require as wide a consensus as pos-
sible of the European nations in regard to the 
essential aims of that policy. Such a consensus 
necessarily implies a dialogue between us. 
The ministers were aware of this reality when 
they discussed the problem of the Assembly's 
budget. I know how concerned you are about this 
question and we have discussed it at length and 
in depth, particularly during the talks that I have 
had with your President and Presidential Com-
mittee. This important matter is still on the 
agenda of the Council of Ministers. 
However, the latter has jus~ agreed to improve 
the situation by accepting a separate budget from 
the ordinary budget to ~eet the growing 
financial implications of p~sions. It has also 
agreed to meet your wishes in regard to inde-
pendent budgetary management, within the 
limits of agreed appropriations. In regard to an 
increase in the ordinary budget, it wishes to have 
more time to consider this matter on the basis of 
specific data. As you can see, two of your three 
wishes have now been given a constructive 
answer and I personally am happy to be able to 
announce this. 
Furthermore, the ministers agree with the 
Assembly on intensifying the dialogue to allow 
better political means to be found for increased 
co-operation between the legislative and exec-
utive bodies of our organisation. They therefore 
held an exchange of views on relations with the 
Assembly. In accordance with a suggestion by 
the latter, they instructed the Secretary-General 
to make proposals at the next ministerial 
meeting. 
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With all my colleagues, m1msters from the 
seven member states, I welcome the results thus 
obtained and trust that it will thus be possible for 
our meetings to be held in such good conditions 
as today. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Mr. Chairman. I have listened closely to your 
most important statement and may I say that in 
my view it contains political guidance meriting 
close consideration by the committees of the 
Assembly. 
I am not of course in a position here to make 
any value judgment, but perhaps I may be 
allowed to say that your words and the political 
and administrative ideas you have outlined seem 
to prove that you and the Minister of Defence 
have been most effective chairmen. I am glad of 
this on your behalf as you have spared no effort 
in responding unfailingly to the views of the 
Assembly and in the patience you have shown to 
it and, more particularly, its President, who has 
invariably been demanding towards the Council 
and especially its Chairman. Thank you, Min-
ister. 
I call Mr. Fischbach. 
Mr. FISCHBACH (Minister of Defence of Lux-
embourg) (Translation). - Ladies and gentlemen, 
I have asked for the floor to say once more that 
the joint council structure is a sound 
arrangement which works well. This was shown 
again yesterday evening by the informal 
exchange of views held by the ministers of 
defence. This exchange was arranged in the spirit 
of co-operation which guides WEU defence min-
isters, and yesterday's discussion was basically 
concerned with the problem just mentioned by 
the Chairman of the Council, the INF disarm-
ament proposals. I can tell you that the talk was 
frank and of real substance and that those 
responsible for defence made clear their expecta-
tions as well as their concerns and personal areas 
of responsibility. 
The ministers again stressed that INF did not 
constitute the sole nuclear threat to Western 
Europe. The total elimination of intermediate-
range systems would not fundamentally reduce 
the threat to Europe in absolute quantitative 
terms. Europe must retain a balancing deterrent 
force. We need a weapons system which can 
threaten the potential aggressor without men-
acing our own countries or peoples. We therefore 
need deterrent weapons of sufficient range. Fur-
thermore, INF disarmament measures must not 
be separated from parallel efforts for disarm-
ament in strategic and conventional weapons, 
and such measures must not upset existing bal-
ances. The imbalance in conventional forces was 
the main concern of the defence ministers, who 
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insisted on the need to restore the balance. 
Everything must be done to safeguard the 
flexible response, and this requires a deterrent 
capacity at every level. 
Some ministers wondered about the chances 
and timeliness of a zero-zero option, involving 
the total elimination of intermediate nuclear 
systems and not just in Europe. In this con-
nection, mention was made of the need to 
maintain fundamental European solidarity. 
The means of verification which will have to 
accompany any agreement on the reduction of 
nuclear weapons were considered to be essential 
but also extremely difficult, or even impossible 
in certain respects. 
As far as the general approach to the INF nego-
tiations is concerned, it is important that these 
should not be conducted under pressure. Not 
only do we Europeans have a unique chance of 
influencing the American negotiating position, 
but it is the Americans themselves who have pro-
vided us with this opportunity. 
The ministers of defence are fully conscious of 
their responsibilities here and are quite prepared 
to shoulder them. The discussion yesterday 
evening again showed that the problems raised 
by the proposals for nuclear disarmament in 
Europe are complex, and it is a fact that the 
current debate touches the very core of European 
security. The discussion also showed just how 
useful a forum like WEU is for co-ordinating and 
harmonising views on political and strategic 
problems of crucial importance to Europe. The 
present debate on nuclear disarmament in 
Europe carries some risks for the Europeans, but 
it also gives them an opportunity to define in 
clearer terms their essential security concerns in 
both the short and the long term. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Minister. I am very glad you were also able to 
address our Assembly. The brevity and con-
ciseness of your remarks bear no relation to the 
effort involved, as I can personally attest. I 
welcome your efforts to strengthen the contacts 
between the defence ministers of our member 
countries and to associate them as closely as pos-
sible with the work of the ministers for foreign 
affairs. By your actions you have fulfilled one of 
the most urgent wishes of our Assembly, which, 
even before reactivation, considered that the 
WEU Council of Ministers was of necessity the 
appropriate forum for the competent gov-
ernment representatives in these two important 
areas. Thank you again, Minister, for all your 
work. 
I call Mr. Wilkinson to put the first 
question. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom). - Mr. 
President, may I first express my appreciation to 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Mr. Wilkinson (continued) 
Foreign Minister Poos and Defence Minister 
Fischbach for their candour and the openness 
with which they have addressed this Assembly 
and shared with us some of their reflections on 
European security policy. We greatly appreciate 
that and we appreciate the generosity of spirit 
and practical generosity too of the Luxembourg 
Government throughout the period of the Lux-
embourg presidency, which has been I think a 
positive period in our Assembly's devel-
opment. 
Can I ask the ministers why they did not say 
more, or were not able to agree more in the 
course of their discussions on European military 
space policy, on collocation of the various insti-
tutions and organs of WEU - namely the 
Council, agencies and Assembly? Whether they 
are hopeful to be able to do more in the longer 
term for the budgetary needs of our Assembly? 
We greatly welcome the fact that the pensions are 
to be taken out of the main working budget and 
treated separately. This is a thoroughly positive 
development. But could I remind the ministers 
that we are a very cost-effective organisation. We 
are not a sort of travelling circus like the 
European Parliament. We have a staff of 
twenty-six instead of 2 600 and we produce really 
very good reports and excellent value for money 
and we deserve, we believe, to be supported 
financially so we can continue to do worthwhile 
work. 
In that regard, can I say that we still hope that 
it will ultimately be possible for the fourteen 
European members of our NATO alliance all 
ultimately to be members ofWEU. Then, surely, 
would there not be the appropriate institutional 
framework to make Eurogroup fully represent-
ative and have all the agencies and support ser-
vices necessary to concert a more effective 
European security policy? 
In short, Sirs, can I ask you to tell us what 
needs to be done immediately to make WEU, in 
your judgment, from the time you have been 
working on the Council, in the presidency, a 
more effective organisation than it is today, 
because in that we share a common purpose? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. POOS (Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council) 
(Translation). - Thank you, Mr. Wilkinson, for 
your very kind appraisal of the Luxembourg 
chairmanship. The results we have achieved over 
the last ten or eleven months were made possible 
by the small back-up team of our two ministers 
and by the willing collaboration of the WEU sec-
retariat. When the chair is held by a small 
country the work invariably has to be done by 
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the secretariat, and its contribution has been 
greatly appreciated. 
Why did I not say more about SDI? Because I 
think you will be receiving the interim report 
prepared by our experts on the subject, and that 
you will have the opportunity to address this 
subject later. I can however reveal to you some 
of the general ideas embodi~d in this report. It 
makes the first point that research into space 
defence is not confined to the United States but 
is also conducted by the Soviet Union. Secondly, 
it considers that the deployment of SDI will take 
a very long time and that the system will not be 
effectively in place before the end of this 
millenium or only after the year 2000. 
The report draws the third conclusion that, 
while it is still too early to make final judgments, 
it is highly likely that the deployment of SDI will 
restart a race in both defensive and offensive 
armaments with each side tzying to increase its 
offensive weapons to penetrate the shield erected 
by its adversary. That is a first important con-
clusion of the report. But I stress that it is an 
interim report, and we have instructed our 
experts to continue their analysis in the context 
of world strategic developments. 
The relocation of WEU organs was the subject 
of an in-depth exchange of views between min-
isters in very restricted session, and we found 
that opinions on this were divided. You all know 
that our organs are at present located in the two 
cities of London and Paris, and that moving else-
where would cause additional expenditure. We 
are continuing to think about the issue, but it 
seems that the Council of Ministers does not 
ascribe high priority to the question. We are also 
continuing to consider th<t agencies but are 
already agreed that these should be combined 
under a single directorate. This action will result 
in rationalisation and budgetary savings. 
To conclude on the questlion of the budget, I 
am sure that this is a matter of prime importance 
to you, and I have been insistent with my col-
leagues that the problem must be finally solved. 
You are aware that the chair suggested a method, 
but it seems there are some reservations. Never-
theless, I gained the impression that the various 
attitudes expressed were moving towards a better 
understanding of your concern. The ministers 
are agreed that means should be sought of 
allowing WEU generally and hence the Assembly 
a budget growth rate compatible with our 
political decisions on the reactivation ofWEU. I 
stressed that the figures in q11estion were derisory 
when compared with the funlds made available to 
other international organisations. I hope that 
deliberations will continue in national cabinets, 
and that the Council will be able to address this 
problem again at its next m~eting under Nether-
lands chairmanship. 
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The decision taken to separate the pensions 
budget from the operating budget is a step 
forward which will enable WEU to honour its 
commitments to former employees whether of 
the secretariat or of the Office of the Clerk of the 
Assembly. 
The last question asks: what is your opinion of 
the reactivation ofWEU? I think I replied to this 
when I spoke on behalf of the Council. My col-
leagues consider that the reactivation of WEU is 
an accomplished fact and that it will now be suf-
ficient to finalise the relevant document pre-
pared under the Luxembourg chairmanship. The 
WEU organs and the substance of the debates 
conducted at various levels from ministerial 
councils to the groups of experts prove that the 
Rome decision has been translated into fact. 
I am therefore highly satisfied with what has 
been accomplished, and I leave it to my suc-
cessor, Mr. van den Broek, Chairman for next 
year - to whom I express my regards here today 
- to put the final touch to the reactivation and to 
meet the target date of 31st December 1987 set by 
the ministers in Rome. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Valleix. 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). - I shall 
not add to the compliments already paid to the 
Chairman-in-Office. All of us appreciate the 
value of what he had to say. Mr. Chairman, you 
have reminded us of many points relating to 
what was said in this Assembly last December 
about the idea of a European security charter, 
launched at that time by the French Prime Min-
ister, Mr. Jacques Chirac. Do you think that 
action could be taken to interest the public in 
this idea and to focus attention on the major 
security principles involved? I think this would 
be a useful tool for our Assembly and Council, 
and would at the same time provide a means of 
increasing public awareness and a proper under-
standing in our countries. I think that could give 
important support to our work. 
My second question concerns the relations 
between the Assembly and the Council. You 
have referred to the task entrusted to the 
Secretary-General, and, without wishing to 
presume on a mission which will be wholly his 
responsibility, I consider that this evening's 
arrangements are both exceptional and note-
worthy. May we look forward to repetitions? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. POOS (Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council) 
(Translation). - I was expecting an intervention 
on this subject, as the charter or joint principles 
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of European security were separate items on the 
agenda of the ministerial session, and I am 
pleased to tell you that progress has been made. 
We have instructed the Permanent Council to 
prepare a report and to define on that basis a 
common platform identifying European security 
interests for examination and adoption at the 
next ministerial meeting, which will be in The 
Hague. 
It has therefore been accepted that the prin-
ciples should be defined, though we have not yet 
decided on the title to be used. This will be done 
when we have defined the security issues on 
which we can all agree. We have already 
instructed the Permanent Council to examine in 
what form these principles should be put for pre-
sentation to European and world public 
opinion. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg. 
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
I thank the Minister for what he said and could I 
ask him three simple direct questions? 
First of all, as there has been this advance on 
the matter of pensions, will he allow the 
Assembly to look into the way the pension fund 
money is invested and see if they are in a 
position to do better than governments and gov-
ernment officials, which is the experience we 
have certainly had in the United Kingdom? 
Secondly, could I ask whether the separate 
budget means that the normal increases in pen-
sions will be added to that budget without 
reflecting upon any other increases that may be 
required for growth? 
Thirdly, on the question of collocation, may I 
ask the Minister whether he realises that it may 
be that the cost of putting organisations from two 
cities into one may cost more the first year - I 
know of few examples in commerce where it 
does not then save a lot of money - and does he 
appreciate that too much thought on a subject 
paralyses action? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. POOS (Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council) 
(Translation). - I am not aware of present WEU 
practice, and I do not know whether the money 
allocated to future disbursements is banked to 
earn interest or whether the pensions are paid 
from each year's operating budget. I think it is 
the Secretary-General who should answer this 
technical question, but at any rate the decision 
taken today is that the rate of increase of pension 
payments will be determined by actual needs. 
The ministers are agreed that the rate of increase 
for this item should be different from that 
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applied to the rest of the budget. I can say 
nothing more regarding the relocation of WEU 
organs, as the Council has not yet reached 
agreement on this matter. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Gianotti. 
Mr. GIANOTTI (Italy) (Translation). - Min-
ister, for many years Europe has been witnessing 
a faster and more intense arms race and both 
governments and peoples in Western Europe 
have come to look upon both the race and the 
fears which it has brought as being inevitable. 
Now we have the near prospect of agreement 
between the United States and the Soviet Union 
on a reduction of nuclear armaments, which 
affects Europe. 
My question to you is: as you said in your 
speech today the governments are concerned 
about security; there are no proposals from them 
but only understandable concern. Do you not 
think that this attitude involves a double risk, 
firstly, of obstructing an agreement on disarm-
ament and secondly of confirming the impotence 
of the European governments? Thank you for 
your reply. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. POOS (Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council) 
(Translation). - I must tell the speaker that I see 
no contradiction in the position of the WEU 
Council. I have just made it clear that the WEU 
doctrine continues to be that set out in the 
Harmel report: concern for defence combined 
with readiness to discuss and conclude con-
trolled and verifiable disarmament agreements. I 
think it is wrong to say that Europe or the West 
in general does no more than react to Soviet pro-
posals, as exactly the contrary has been the case 
in recent years. It was the alliance which in 1981 
made a major proposal on the zero option in 
Europe, and it is the Soviet Union which took 
five years to accept. It is therefore totally 
incorrect to regard the Soviet proposals now on 
the table as genuinely original initiatives to 
which Europe is merely reacting without having 
its own ideas on disarmament. 
Again, it was Europe which demanded that 
shorter-range missile systems be included in the 
framework of an agreement on long-range mis-
siles, and we are still waiting for a reply from the 
Warsaw Pact countries to the Brussels appeal for 
conventional disarmament. I also remind you 
that MBFR negotiations have been in progress in 
Vienna for the last fourteen years without the 
other side accepting any of the western proposals 
on disarmament in conventional weapons where, 
as you know, there are large imbalances. I 
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therefore believe that public opinion should be 
given a more positive image of the western 
position on disarmament, and we have tried to 
do this in the Council communique, which will, I 
think, be distributed to you this evening. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Freeson. 
Mr. FREESON (United Kirlgdom). - Still on 
the same theme, Mr. Chairman, Mr. President, 
in the opening part of the Minister's address to 
us he expressed satisfaction ,on behalf of the 
Council of Ministers at the progress - limited as 
it may be so far - that is being made with regard 
to nuclear disarmament at intermediate-range 
level. He went on, if I heard him correctly, to 
state that the ministers took seriously the state-
ments that the Soviet Union has been making 
more recently covering a variety of other levels 
of disarmament - medium-range, short-range 
and, indeed, conventional weaponry and per-
sonnel. All these have been statements and he 
said that what the Council of Ministers wanted 
was to consider these matters seriously when 
they had been put in writing and had been 
tabled. I think I quote the Minister correctly. 
He then went on to state, as I understood him, 
and this is where my question arises, what the 
Council of Ministers' positio:n was on security 
matters, what the policy was: that Europe had to 
maintain a nuclear deterrent. Now if I have got 
that wrong I shall be interested to hear the 
answer. If I got it right, I would like to know how 
one can make compatible a I statement which 
expresses serious interest in di$cussing and nego-
tiating the statements that are being made by the 
Soviet Union once they are put into writing, 
which cover all levels of nuclear arms, and at the 
same time declare a positioh where Western 
Europe is going to maintain the nuclear 
deterrent. 
I finish with this, if I may,
1 
in the form of a 
question. Until recently nuclear weapons were 
officially a regrettable necessity. That was our 
position. Something we only did because the 
East had them as well. When they got rid of 
theirs we would too, with relief. That was our 
position. Now that it seems Moscow is moving 
in our direction, are we to believe that Western 
Europe still has to have nuclear weapons, even if 
the Russians do not have them~ Is denuclearising 
Europe something to hope and work for or to 
fear and obstruct? Does the Minister appreciate 
that, if this is the line, we will be - some of us, 
some of our countries - in abrogation of the non-
proliferation treaty? What does he think will be 
the effect of that on existing non-nuclear powers 
who have the capacity to become nuclear 
powers? 
The PRESIDENT (Transla~ion). - I call the 
Minister. 
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Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, I think I replied 
to the first part of the question a moment ago by 
saying that the members of our union will be 
ready to discuss the Soviet proposals on SRINF 
when they are put in writing. The only text on 
the Soviet proposal is General Secretary 
Gorbachev's Prague speech. In our view this is 
not a sufficiently detailed proposal to enable us 
to react at the moment by suggesting, say, a limit 
to which we would be prepared to dismantle 
short-range systems. We have not given any 
definitive response but have said we will 
examine the proposals in detail when they 
become known. 
As far as alliance strategy is concerned, I repeat 
that the flexible response is the only strategy we 
advocate. It is a strategy which comprises both a 
conventional and a nuclear element. I have been 
very clear on this point in the draft statement 
which has been formulated and which will, I 
hope, be adopted at our next ministerial Council. 
In present circumstances the nuclear component 
of European security is clearly included, and I do 
not need to remind you that the reason for this is 
the conventional superiority of the other side. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Brown. 
Mr. BROWN (United Kingdom). - Thank 
you, Mr. President. Mr. Chairman, in your most 
interesting speech you referred quite specifically 
to the continued defence of Europe by both con-
ventional and nuclear weapons. Could I ask you: 
how does this square with the publicly-stated 
intention ofthe President of the United States to 
achieve the removal of all nuclear weapons - I 
repeat, all nuclear weapons - from Europe? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. POOS (Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council) 
(Translation). - I have no knowledge of any such 
statement by the United States President. I know 
that when he first presented his strategic defence 
initiative he did say that, by deploying the anti-
missile ballistic defence system in space, the 
United States could acquire a facility which 
would render atomic weapons obsolete. Such a 
statement does indeed exist, but I have yet to see 
any statement by the United States President 
announcing his intention of eliminating all 
nuclear weapons in Europe. I do not know of any 
such statement, but I am aware of many in the 
opposite sense, including especially those of the 
American Secretary of State. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Goerens. 
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Mr. GOERENS (Luxembourg) (Translation). 
- Mr. Chairman, you will be aware that a very 
large majority of our Assembly yesterday voted 
in favour of a motion for a recommendation 
with a request for urgent procedure which urged 
the Council " to make known its collegiate point 
of view on the Gorbachev proposals through the 
intermediary of its Chairman-in-Office, Mr. 
Jacques Poos, in his statement to the Assembly 
on Tuesday, 28th Aprill987 " and that in para-
graph 2 of the recommendation proper the 
Assembly urged the Council " to instruct its 
Chairman-in-Office to give the Council's point 
of view on the Soviet proposals at the meetings 
of the North Atlantic Council to be held on 11th 
and 12th June 1987 ". 
My first question after this brief introduction 
is whether this recommendation caused any 
change to be made to the Council's agenda and 
what action, if any, was taken in response to the 
Assembly's recommendation adopted under 
urgent procedure. 
I would then like to ask whether the Council 
Chairman can tell me when we shall have the 
report on SDI. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Secretary-General. 
Mr. CAHEN (Secretary-General of WEU) 
(Translation). - Thank you, Mr. President. The 
SDI report referred to by the Minister is still 
under study and will be examined by the Per-
manent Council before being finalised as quickly 
as possible for transmission to the Assembly. 
The report is, of course, part of an on-going 
study, as the SDI is still evolving, and we shall 
also have to mould our ideas to various 
hypotheses relating especially to the strategic 
impact of SDI. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. POOS (Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-office of the Council) 
(Translation). - In answer to the first part of Mr. 
Goerens's question, I can inform the Assembly 
that its recommendation under urgent procedure 
was passed to Council members in writing. It 
was not added to the agenda but was, I believe, 
taken into account in drafting the final 
communique, which refers to Mr. Gorbachev's 
proposals on short-range missiles, details of 
which we are still awaiting. 
We were informed during the meeting that the 
Soviet Union has today tabled a draft INF 
agreement in Geneva, but that no reference is 
made to SRINF in any section of the text. In 
these circumstances the Council was not in a 
position today to respond to the proposals made 
by the General Secretary of the Soviet Com-
munist Party. I am not being evasive. The 
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Mr. Poos (continued) 
Council is at all times alert to the news from 
Geneva and is ready for consultation to decide a 
common position as soon as the proposals are 
known. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Terlezki. 
Mr. TERLEZKI (United Kingdom). - Thank 
you, Mr. President. I too wish to congratulate the 
Minister for an excellent speech about the 
defence of Europe, about disarmament -
nuclear, conventional and, indeed, chemical 
weapons. 
What I would like to ask the Minister is: Is 
there room for discussion and debate - irre-
spective of what platform, WEU, Council of 
Europe, at the defence level, NATO level - about 
human rights, about the Helsinki agreement, 
about the European people who are suffering 
under the tyranny in the Soviet Union, in the 
satellite states? Should we not sometimes include 
also the debate about the millions of people who 
are not so fortunate as us; where we enjoy 
freedom and democracy and they, for about 
seventy years, have suffered under tyranny and 
oppression? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. POOS (Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council) 
(Translation). - The Council of Ministers has 
rightly underlined the global nature of detente. 
Detente is not limited to disarmament agree-
ments, however important they may be. Detente 
must also extend to human rights and to 
reducing tension points throughout the world, 
where the true behaviour of the Soviet Union 
will be tested by its actions. 
We were agreed in stressing this point, which I 
think responds to the concern which has been 
expressed. Every western minister who has had 
an opportunity of meeting his Soviet counterpart 
has emphasised western insistence that greater 
efforts should be made in the Soviet Union. 
Although there have been some releases of 
refuseniks and dissidents, hundreds of people are 
still confined in internment camps and prisons, 
and when I was in Moscow I personally insisted 
that additional efforts should be made in this 
area. 
We must never lose sight of the fact that the 
military arsenal which we are endeavouring to 
control and restrain is the product of distrust, 
and the Soviet Union must understand that 
certain causes of this distrust must be removed if 
the chances of a general disarmament agreement 
are to improve. 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
Frederic Bennett. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom). -
Thank you, Mr. President. I was particularly 
delighted to hear the Minister's last remarks in 
which he said what I think is in the hearts of 
many of us, that any assessment of the threat 
with which we are possibly having to cope 
cannot be judged just on weaponry alone but in a 
wider context of observance of the CSCE, which 
some of us feel very strongly when we are seeking 
to assess just what threat it is that we are trying 
to face. 
The Minister in his opening remarks, again 
entirely comprehensibly, mentioned the fact that 
it was very difficult for ministers today to give a 
joint collective response, or indeed any response, 
to what were merely declarations but were not in 
fact written proposals on which we could 
comment. I thought that was the only possible 
answer he could have given. 
Could he say - because at least he has sources 
of information and we parliamentarians merely 
have to rely only on the media - whether some 
of these declarations, which may or may not 
come in the form of proposals, does he know of 
any that are in the pipeline, which would 
indicate that a precondition of any settlement 
would be the abandonment by France and/or 
Britain of their own sovereign nuclear deter-
rents? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. POOS (Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council) 
(Translation). - At this stage it is impossible to 
play the prophet and predict what Mr. 
Gorbachev may still have in his pipeline, which 
seems to me to be quite long and amply filled. 
However, the Soviet Union has not in the 
current negotiations so far insisted that the 
French and British nuclear forces be dismantled. 
On the contrary, a Soviet demand to this effect, 
which had been maintained since 1981, was lifted 
at Reykjavik, and since then the existence of 
these forces, which are not integrated in NATO, 
has ceased to be a subject for pressure in the 
Soviet-American negotiations. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
Dudley Smith. 
Sir Dudley SMITH (United Kingdom). - Mr. 
President, could I, as Chairman of the 
Assembly's Committee on Budgetary Affairs, 
thank the Chairman for his thoroughly 
enlightened and helpful approach during the 
time he has held office in our very intense and 
difficult deliberations about the budget and its 
future. Perhaps I could go as far as saying that I 
do not believe we would have achieved what we 
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Sir Dudley Smith (continued) 
have so far without his advocacy and his deter-
mination to back up our very legitimate claims 
and I am sure all of us, irrespective of our 
parties, would thank him for his efforts on our 
behalf. 
Can I just ask, Sir, whether you could say 
when the pensions element is likely to be severed 
from the main operating budget? Will it be in the 
current financial year? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. POOS (Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council) 
(Translation). -The reply is" Yes". We will try 
to do this as quickly as possible. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Stoffelen. 
Mr. STOFFELEN (Netherlands). - Mr. Pres-
ident, I too want to thank the Minister for his 
rather clear and encouraging statements. Never-
theless, I was a bit puzzled by a more or less 
cryptic statement on the relationship between an 
agreement on INF and the short-range missiles. 
If I try to understand the statements, at least I 
heard something like: in an essential agreement 
on INF, the problem of short-range missiles 
should not be neglected. If I heard that correctly. 
Does that mean that, in a separate agreement on 
INF missiles, a passage should be included some-
thing like: further following negotiations will 
start after the separate agreement on short-range 
missiles, or does it mean that an agreement on 
short-range missiles is a precondition for an 
agreement on INF missiles? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. POOS (Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council) 
(Translation). - The sixteen members of the 
alliance have considered the links between an 
INF agreement and short-range missiles. They 
adopted the position set out in the Brussels 
communique, which says that an agreement on 
INF must be followed by negotiations on 
shorter-range missiles. That is the official 
position of the sixteen members. The ministers 
of the WEU countries have said nothing different 
today. They are in complete agreement with this 
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NATO position and reaffirm that the problem of 
shorter-range missiles should not be neglected 
when negotiating an agreement on INF, though 
no preconditions are implied. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Minister. On behalfofthe Assembly I should like 
to thank you for your presence here and for your 
detailed comments and replies. Before ending, I 
wish to express again the Assembly's gratitude 
and the conviction that relations between the 
Council and the Assembly have steadily 
improved in recent times and are largely respon-
sible for improved efficiency, markedly better 
understanding and the unquestionably closer 
co-ordination of our efforts and work. 
As President of the Assembly and speaking on 
behalf of all my colleagues I wish to express 
appreciation of your actions and of the Council's 
work today in bringing this about. Thanks to 
you, we have plenty to do. It has been a suc-
cessful occasion. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
5. Close of the extraordinary session 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I wish to 
thank our committee rapporteurs for all the work 
they have done. My thanks go also to the 
members of the Assembly for their attendance 
and their participation in our debates; I have at 
various times expressed my gratitude to min-
isters, ambassadors and representatives of 
member states who have attended. 
My warmest thanks also go to all staff made 
available to us here in Luxembourg to help with 
the work of committees, political groups and the 
Assembly itself; this includes all messengers, 
security guards and other hard-working staff who 
have helped us until now and I am sure will con-
tinue to do so until we leave. 
I wish also to thank the press and everyone 
who has followed our deliberations, the staff of 
the Office ofthe Clerk of the Assembly who have 
served us unstintingly as usual. Finally, Mr. 
Secretary-General, thank you for your 
attendance and your work which I trust will 
produce further results. 
The extraordinary session of the Assembly of 
Western European Union in Luxembourg is 
closed. 
(The sitting was closed at 7.05 p.m.) 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the Europelln pillar of the Atlantic Alliance -
Part I: The reactivation of WEU 
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(i) Considering that the proposal made by the Prime Minister of France on 2nd 1 December 1986 to 
draw up a European security charter provides an opportunity for a fundamental re-examination of the 
requirements of that security; 
(ii) Considering that the policy of deterrence pursued by the Atlantic Alliance remains the guarantee 
of that security; 
(iii) Considering that the main threats to international peace now arise in areas not covered by the 
alliance; 
(iv) Considering that European co-operation in armaments matters has become essential for the 
security of Europe; 
(v) Considering that the search for disarmament or the limitation of armaments is essential for the 
maintenance of peace and should continue to be given priority but that this search must not jeopardise 
the security of Europe; 
(vi) Considering that the recent development of chemical weapons constitutes a particularly serious 
threat for all mankind; 
(vii) Welcoming recent measures taken by the Council to increase its activities in order to meet the 
requirements of European security but regretting that information on these activities communicated to 
the public and to the Assembly is still far from adequate; 
(viii) Considering that it is still essential to bring the requirements of European security to the attention 
of the public; 
(ix) Deeply regretting the continuous failure of the Council to inform the Assembly in a proper way; 
(x) Considering that new governmental activities in WEU must allow the Assembly to exercise to the 
full its responsibilities under Article IX of the treaty; 
(xi) Noting in particular that the replies to Assembly recommendations and written questions relating 
to the Council's activities, the Standing Armaments Committee and the Independent European Pro-
gramme Group seriously distort the Council's commitments to the Assembly, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Study closely the proposals made by the French Government for drawing up a European security 
charter with a view to: 
(a) defining Europe's security requirements, acquainting its American allies with them and 
ensuring that current negotiations on the limitation of nuclear and conventional weapons lead 
to substantial reductions without compromising Europe's security based on a policy of deter-
rence; 
(b) reaffirming member countries' continuing concern not to compromise the cohesion of the 
alliance and to include the strengthening of the European pillar in the context of the alliance; 
(c) averting a chemical arms race by calling upon the United States and the Soviet Union to seek 
an agreement ensuring the complete elimination of such arms and promoting the extension of 
this agreement to all countries; 
(d) including in the charter a commitment to ensure reciprocal exchanges of information and con-
sultations in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty in regard to any 
threat to international peace; 
(e) also including an expression of the joint will to remove obstacles still obstructing the devel-
opment of European co-operation in armaments matters; 
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2. To this end, direct the measures taken to give new work to WEU so as to ensure that the appli-
cation ofthe modified Brussels Treaty contributes to the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance and the con-
solidation of peace by: 
(a) keeping the political committee on European security in the framework of WEU; 
(b) considering how the treaty should be applied to ensure that it meets present European security 
requirements and allows WEU to be enlarged to include Western European countries wishing 
and able to take part; 
(c) ensuring that these countries are kept informed of the activities of WEU and allowing the 
countries concerned to take part henceforth in some of these activities, particularly in co-oper-
ation in armaments matters; 
(d) giving the necessary impetus to European co-operation in armaments matters, inter alia by 
adapting its decision of 7th May 1955 setting up a Standing Armaments Committee to present 
facts of such co-operation; 
(e) acting without delay on its document " WEU and public awareness " so as to inform public 
opinion of all its activities in accordance with the principles set out in the Rome declaration, 
including the issue of communiques at the close of meetings of the political committee on 
European security; 
(f) ensuring co-ordination of member countries' participation in the course to be organised by the 
French Institut des hautes etudes de defense nationale in 1988 and ofthe development of sub-
sequent courses so as to promote public awareness of European security requirements in all 
member countries; 
(g) developing exchanges of views with the United States authorities so as to enhance the 
cohesion of the alliance; 
(h) applying in full Article IX of the treaty under which it has an obligation to report to the 
Assembly on its activities and on the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, even when 
pursued in frameworks other than WEU. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Ahrens, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. When the General Affairs Committee 
asked your Rapporteur to study what might con-
stitute a European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, 
its wish was not to limit its deliberations to the 
Council's report on its activities in 1986 but to 
examine to what extent past or future decisions 
on the activities and structure of WEU corre-
sponded to the Council's intention, voiced in the 
Rome declaration, to set up this second pillar. 
2. Since the committee took this initiative, 
two events have given shape to your 
Rapporteur's mandate. First, speaking to the 
Assembly on 2nd December 1986, Mr. Chirac, 
Prime Minister of France, proposed that the 
WEU countries together draw up a European 
security charter. Second, on 4th December. the 
Presidential Committee of the Assembly dectded 
to hold an extraordinary session in Luxembourg 
in April 1987 at which, in addition to disar-
mament, consideration would be given to the 
reactivation of WEU, covering the action to be 
taken on Mr. Chirac's proposals and the political 
committee on European security which the 
Council decided to set up in Luxembourg on 
14th November 1986. The latter question was 
referred to the General Affairs Committee and 
therefore quite naturally took its place in the 
study of the European pillar of the alliance. 
3. However, it is difficult for a report to be 
presented to the Assembly in April, which conse-
quently should be adopted by the General Affairs 
Committee on 16th March, to include a reply to 
the annual report of the Council. This report was 
very late in reaching the Assembly in 1986 and, 
even if there are hopes that the Council will try 
to speed things up, there is little chance of the 
committee being able to give its opinion on the 
thirty-second annual report of the Council in 
time. Moreover, the ministerial meeting of the 
Council 1normally followed by joint meetings 
with th~ Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments and the General Affairs Committee, 
should give parliamentarians useful pointers to 
the guidelines adopted by the Council and the 
decisions taken. These joint meetings are at the 
moment expected to be held at the end of April, 
i. e. after the Assembly's extraordinary session. It 
is therefore hardly desirable for the General 
Affairs Committee to give its views on the Coun-
cil's activities before the ministerial meeting and 
the joint meetings are held. 
4. This being so, your Rapporteur felt he 
should divide his draft report into two parts. The 
first part, dealing with Mr. Chirac's proposals 
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and the creation of a political committee on 
European security, might thus be adopted by the 
committee in March and included in the agenda 
of the extraordinary session. The second part 
might be adopted subsequently and incl~ded 
only in the agenda of the first I part of the thirty-
third ordinary session, as is customary. 
II. Reactivation of WEU 
5. It is of little concern to the WEU 
Assembly to know what inte~l political reasons 
led the Prime Minister of France to address it on 
2nd December 1986 and make the remarks 
which your Rapporteur will itry to analyse. It 
should merely be noted that the presence of a 
prime minister, even from a country where the 
President of the Republic is also head of the 
executive, is sufficiently excep~ional to be under-
lined. In the last ten years, only Mr. Mauroy, also 
Prime Minister of France, addressed members of 
the Assembly, not during a sitting but in the 
course of a dinner on 29th November 1982, thus 
limiting the official nature ofhis remarks. Never-
theless, on that occasion Mr. Mauroy heralded 
his government's intention to propose . to 
France's partners that Western European Umon 
be given new impetus and his address was a 
major event in the steps leading to the Seven's 
decision to reactivate WEU. 
6. At that time, the situation was marked by 
the difficulties the Western European countries 
were experiencing in imple~enting the NA '!0 
twofold decision of December 1979 whtch 
implied, on the one hand, reviving disa!mament 
negotiations to obtain the coJnplete Withdrawal 
of Soviet SS-20 missiles and, on the other, 
deploying Pershing 11 and cruise missiles _in 
Western Europe in the event of these negotia-
tions not being successful. The number and scale 
of demonstrations against deployment raised the 
question of whether the people of the countries 
concerned were not going to force their govern-
ments to oppose the application of the NATO 
decision on their territory. Mr. Mauroy recalled 
the danger of a disarmed Europe in face of Soviet 
missiles and drew the public's attention to its 
security requirements. He was probably 
encouraged by the relative unanimity in France 
towards the policy of nuclear deterrence pursued 
by successive governments and by the conviction 
that greater awareness of the threats to \Yestern 
Europe would help all the European nat10ns. to 
accept the cost and implicit risks of an effective 
policy of deterrence. 
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7. An important aspect ofthe Prime Minister 
of France's address was the role he attributed to 
the WEU Assembly in this effort to inform and 
appeal to public opinion. He believed a public 
debate on security requirements to be the best 
means of coping with fears and putting over 
what he considered to be reasonable views. 
8. It now seems that this address, which was 
followed by more specific proposals in the 
framework of WEU, led to significant results 
since, together with Belgian proposals submitted 
to the Council in 1983 but not published, it was 
at the origin of the reactivation of WEU which 
included the elimination of out-of-date discrimi-
nation, reaffirmation ofthe role ofNATO and of 
existing national deterrent forces as instruments 
of Europe's defence and, finally, the Council 
adopting a new approach to its role thanks inter 
alia to the participation of defence ministers in 
its work: the purpose was to give the alliance's 
defence policy political guidance to take account 
of Europe's specific interests. The governments 
of the other WEU countries all accepted the 
French proposals, on the one hand because they 
probably feared that France might otherwise 
move away from its partners to try to guarantee 
its security by other means and, on the other, 
because they shared France's views about the 
need to enhance the European dimension of joint 
security, provided this did not jeopardise the 
cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance; nor should it 
induce the Americans to make concessions to the 
fraction of their public opinion which wanted 
American troops to be withdrawn from Europe 
since these forces make a decisive contribution 
to the protection of Western European territory 
by the American nuclear deterrent. The Rome 
declaration of 27th October 1984 expressed the 
Seven's agreement to remodel the work of 
WEU. 
9. However, implementation of the prin-
ciples agreed upon in Rome seems to have run 
up against various obstacles which are difficult to 
define since the governments have done their 
utmost to conceal them. In any event, in 1985 
and the first half of 1986 one has to record a suc-
cession of hesitations, delays, uncertainties and 
evasions in the Council's work, which has fallen 
well short of the intentions expressed in 
Rome. 
10. The wish to maintain the cohesion of the 
Atlantic Alliance and not to provoke negative 
reactions in the United States to the reactivation 
of WEU and differences of opinion in certain 
European countries have already imposed strict 
limits on the intentions expressed by the govern-
ments. There is absolutely no question of 
reviving the idea of a European army or a 
European defence community with its own 
armed forces. A European pillar of the alliance is 
not to be set up in military terms. This is not the 
aim of countries assigning forces to NATO inte-
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grated military commands or of those with forces 
remaining under national command, i. e. mainly 
French forces. From the very outset the former 
clearly had no intention of doing anything that 
could be taken for a withdrawal of forces from 
the alliance and France was not prepared to place 
its forces, particularly its nuclear forces, under a 
command over which it did not have sover-
eignty. 
11. There thus remain the areas to which the 
modified Brussels Treaty applies but which are 
outside NATO integrated activities or are not 
covered by consultations in other European 
institutions such as economic, social and cultural 
matters. First and foremost comes the security 
policy of member countries, particularly in 
regions outside the North Atlantic Treaty area. 
12. Then there are all matters relating to disar-
mament which oblige Europe to follow closely 
the relevant Soviet-American talks or multi-
lateral negotiations so that its security is not 
jeopardised by the terms of any agreement on the 
limitation of armaments or disarmament. 
Europe is even less able to impose its views in 
such matters because it takes no part in the most 
important negotiations and can hardly play a 
leading role in a matter which is being conducted 
by the two great powers. It therefore has to limit 
its action to a continuing study of the progress of 
negotiations and to approaching its American 
allies when the need is felt. 
13. The third major task WEU took on con-
cerns the production of armaments. It has to 
ensure that European technology does not fall 
too far behind in this sector, that it plays a fair 
part in trade between countries of the alliance 
and that intra-European co-operation allows its 
industries to produce at reasonable cost. 
14. Finally, one of WED's main roles as 
redefined in the Rome declaration is to make 
public opm10n understand the European 
dimension of security problems so that it accepts 
the sacrifices of all kinds which are essential for 
maintaining its security, i. e. military service, an 
adequate armaments budget, respect for allies in 
every area and acceptance of certain risks, 
including those implied by the deployment of 
nuclear weapons to ward off the even greater 
risks that an inadequately-defended Europe 
would run. It should be emphasised that this 
essential role can be played effectively with the 
means available to WEU only if Europe makes 
convincing progress in other areas. There would 
be no point in claiming to uphold the morale of 
European nations if the difficulties confronting 
economic Europe were too serious, if political 
rivalry developed, if Europe's real interests in 
disarmament or armaments were not effectively 
defended or if the defence of Europe was not 
ensured. 
15. Hence, if WEU is to be effective as an 
instrument for acting on public opinion, the 
Community and European political consulta-
tions must be conducted efficiently, the deterrent 
exercised by NATO must be maintained at an 
adequate level and all the aims set for WEU itself 
in the Rome declaration must be attained. 
16. Yet the convergence of all these factors has 
not been achieved, or only very imperfectly, 
since October 1984, with the result that outside 
observers, the press and WEU parliamentarians 
have increasing doubts about the seriousness of 
the intentions expressed in Rome. 
17. (a) In the European Communities, there 
was no major operational crisis in 1985 and 
1986. On the contrary, the adoption and subse-
quent ratification by most member countries of 
the single European act showed the continuing 
will of the Twelve to develop Community 
Europe, although there is still much discussion 
about the merits of the common agricultural 
policy. Monetary policy has encountered serious 
difficulties but this affects only some of the 
members of the Community. From the WEU 
standpoint, the single act is particularly note-
worthy in that it recognises our organisation's 
specific role in exercising its responsibilities, con-
sidered as a contribution by the Seven to the soli-
darity of the Twelve. But it can hardly be 
claimed that Community activity in recent years 
has given much impetus to European feelings. 
The single act also testifies to the meagre pro-
gress achieved by twelve-power Europe. 
18. (b) In political co-operation, the devel-
opment of consultations has not allowed mean-
ingful decisions to be taken in times of crisis, 
particularly for responding to the terrorist threat 
which affected Europe several times in 1985 and 
1986. There are three very different reasons for 
this. First, European countries have very 
unequal means of acting outside the NATO area. 
Although some of them took action in the 
Falklands, Lebanon and Chad, they could not 
rely on serious assistance from partners which, 
for various reasons, did not have the means of 
taking such action. The most they could hope for 
was relative solidarity from their partners. 
Second, the involvement of several of them in 
external conflicts and their consequences, partic-
ularly when they were victims of terrorist actions 
or hostage-taking, left them no possibility of 
respecting collective discipline which failed to 
take account of the facts. This was one of the 
reasons for the Franco-British differences over 
Syria in autumn 1986: the United Kingdom saw 
this country as being behind an operation which 
had been judged in a British court, whereas Mr. 
Chirac, in an interview in the Washington Times 
on 7th November 1986, recalled that for the sake 
of its solidarity with the United Kingdom France 
could not sacrifice its negotiations to obtain the 
release of certain hostages or a policy aimed at 
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the bulletin said the United Kingdom had vetoed 
the principle of a joint statement. Conversely, 
the bulletin said the ministers would have been 
able, without great difficulty, to agree on a text 
defining a joint overall position on the aftermath 
of Reykjavik. It is to be hoped that the thirty-
second annual report of the Council, albeit much 
later than the press, will give the information to 
which the Assembly is entitled on this matter. 
23. (ii) On the SDI, the thirty-first annual 
report of the Council mentioned generally-agreed 
principles. It was announced in turn that the 
working group on the SDI had been instructed to 
prepare a study on air defence in Europe and 
then, in November 1986, that the task assigned 
to the working group on the SDI had been 
extended to cover all matters relating to Europe's 
security. This latter decision makes one wonder 
about the nature of this working group, its 
responsibilities and what the Council expects of 
it. Specialising in the SDI, it could conduct a 
serious study into a question on which Europe 
will inevitably have to give its views and take 
major decisions in the next few years. It might 
have been logical and desirable to extend the 
range of its activities to the air defence of 
Europe. By extending it still further, is it not 
being turned into a replica of the Council itself? 
Does it not also reduce the impact and seri-
ousness of its work? 
24. (iii) On more general consultations on 
foreign policy matters related to security, in 
regard to which the single European act clearly 
shows WEU's place, the Council has started to 
hold meetings of political directors from minis-
tries for foreign affairs. At its meeting in 
Luxembourg on 13th and 14th November 1986, 
it decided to make these meetings more official 
and binding, in particular by having them meet 
at least as frequently as after all the meetings of 
the Twelve. In answer to a question on this 
subject, Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office ofthe Council, 
told Assembly representatives that these 
meetings were part of the WEU Council's activ-
ities. This is not unimportant since the Council 
consequently has to report on them in its annual 
report to the Assembly, in accordance with 
Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
25. (iv) In regard to the meetings attended by 
ministers of defence or members of their staff, 
whose discussions include European co-oper-
ation in armaments matters, the Assembly is 
even less well informed of what happens in the 
Council, assuming that something actually does 
happen. On 15th July 1986, our colleague, Mr. 
van der Werff, put Written Question 271 to the 
Council on the role the Council intended to play 
in this field and on the mandate and activities of 
the Standing Armaments Committee. The 
Council answered this question only on 17th 
November, merely recalling the role the Rome 
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declaration had assigned to the Council for pro-
viding political impetus in this field and 
asserting that its" effort will be continued". The 
Council said it had " decided to undertake a 
process of reflection on ways of enhancing col-
laboration between the SAC and Agency Ill " -
whereas it had already instructed Agency Ill to 
ensure the secretariat of the SAC - to " help to 
identify areas of research relevant to WEU ... in 
the current context of the transitional period " 
which is to end in 1987, after which it would 
draw "final conclusions". Finally, the Council 
gave an assurance that " the SAC will meet in the 
not too distant future ". One may well wonder 
what the Council means by " not too distant 
future " since, as far as your Rapporteur knows, 
no date has yet been fixed for the next meeting of 
the SAC which, it should be recalled, did not 
meet at all in 1986. It might as well be said 
clearly that neither the Council nor the SAC has 
done anything to promote co-operation in arma-
ments matters. In this case, even the press has 
given no indication of the origins of and reasons 
for an evident blockage. 
26. Furthermore, the Council is now taking 
refuge behind a pretext which fools no one in 
order to refuse to give any information about the 
present or planned activities of the Independent 
European Programme Group, i. e. that it cannot 
do so on the grounds that this information also 
concerns non-member countries of WEU. This 
situation did not prevent the Council under-
taking to report to the Assembly on all matters 
relating to the application of the modified 
Brussels Treaty, even when exercised in a 
framework other than WEU. This is the under-
taking on which the Council is now going back, 
which is serious for the Assembly and its future 
work, because it thus calls in question the 
exercise of the responsibility assigned to the 
Assembly in Article IX of the treaty. Moreover, 
if it is acting in this way it is most probably in 
order to conceal, or at least to avoid admitting, 
that the governments have not managed to 
achieve better co-operation in the IEPG than in 
WEU. 
27. (v) Relations between the Council and the 
Assembly depend on the way the Council applies 
the treaty and the Rome declaration and on the 
various means it gives the Assembly for fulfilling 
its tasks. Its half-hearted implementation of the 
principles defined in Rome impels it to withhold 
information from the Assembly and restrict its 
instruments of work so that its weaknesses are 
not exposed to the public view. So far, the 
Council had at least attempted to coat the pill of 
its attitude towards the Assembly with fine 
words and had not restricted the Assembly's pos-
sibilities of expression. In December 1986, the 
abundance of ministerial pronouncements for 
the first time seriously perturbed parliamentary 
work because the Council had limited the 
Assembly's budgetary resources to such an extent 
that it was unable to prolong its session to take 
account of the time taken up with ministerial 
addresses. If the De defensa bulletin already 
mentioned is to be believed, government repre-
sentatives went still further since, according to 
the bulletin, there was criticism of the 
Assembly's impulsive and irresponsible char-
acter. As far as your Rapporteur knows, this crit-
icism did not come from the press, which 
reported on the Assembly's work with great 
objectivity. The only other source might be gov-
ernment representatives trying to discredit the 
Assembly when they were unable to keep it 
quiet. Your Rapporteur has learned with satis-
faction that the President of the Assembly did 
not let these anonymous allegations go unan-
swered. Could an unbiased observer compare an 
impulsive, irresponsible Assembly with an 
active, responsible Council? The question needs 
only to be put to find an answer. 
28. As the bulletin abundantly quoted by your 
Rapporteur most rightly points out, in con-
clusion to its long article on the WEU Assembly 
session, "the general impression given at the 
Luxembourg summit meeting has been con-
firmed: by the force of circumstances, the 
Council is tending to take the leading role 
because it has the power to take decisions and is 
responsible for the budget: both the Assembly 
and the secretariat have to manceuvre to 
strengthen their immediate presence in the 
current process, which might in the long run 
diminish their place and influence in the union ". 
The Assembly's aim has admittedly never been 
to achieve pre-eminence over the Council, but 
on the other hand it cannot allow the Council to 
abuse its strength, particularly in budgetary 
matters, to make it become its purveyor of prop-
aganda for the press and public opinion or to 
reduce it to silence in order to strip the modified 
Brussels Treaty of its parliamentary aspect which 
was why it was so novel in 1954 and is still its 
hallmark. 
29. (vi) Similar reasons probably led the 
Council not to follow up the excellent document 
on WEU and public awareness appended to its 
thirty-first annual report and to maintain a thick 
smokescreen around all intergovernmental 
meetings held in WEU, with the exception of the 
spring ministerial meeting, unless the 
anomymous remarks reported in De defensa are 
to be considered as Council communications. 
30. In answer to the following question put by 
our colleague, Mr. Antretter: 
" Is the Federal Government aware that, 
contrary to its answer of 6th June 1986 to 
my Question 83, the new public relations 
unit created in the Secretariat-General of 
WEU in London has not yet started work 
since the corresponding post has still not 
been filled? 
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What steps does the Federal Government 
intend to take to ensure that this public 
relations unit, created q>n its initiative, is 
staffed without delay so that it may start 
work?" 
Mr. Mollemann, Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, said 
on 22nd December 1986: 
" The new public relations unit of the 
Secretariat-General of WEU in London 
was created on 1st January 1986. 
However, the corresponding post of Head 
of the Press Service has not yet been filled. 
An official from another section of the 
Secretariat-General is at present carrying 
out the work. The Secretary-General has 
given an assurance that he will ~nsure th~t 
this post is filled as soon as posstble and m 
the prescribed manner. 
The Federal Government has asked its 
representative to the · WEU Permanent 
Council to ensure that this post is filled 
without delay. " 
The Assembly would be most interested to know 
what is holding up implementation of this 
measure, which stems directly from the Rome 
declaration. 
31. Thus, more than two years after the Rome 
declaration, the least that can be said is that 
implementation of the principles it enunciates is 
advancing extremely slowly and in several 
important areas it has not even been started. 
This is the context in which ~he proposals made 
by the Prime Minister of France to the Assembly 
on 2nd December 1986 should be placed. 
Ill. A charter of principles 
for the security of We$tern Europe 
32. The proposal made to the Assembly on 
2nd December 1986 that the seven governments 
draw up a European security charter is obviously 
not likely to cause any immediate upheaval in 
WEU's activities. The most the Council has done 
is to set up a working group to go into the pro-
posal and examine the text France has been 
asked to prepare. Your Rapporteur knows 
nothing of the working conditions of this group 
or the deadlines set for it after a first meeting in 
January. 
33. Mr. Chirac's suggestions contained 
nothing very new about the actual content of this 
charter, since they mainly listed the principles on 
which he considered the Seven were already in 
agreement. In his own words, the list of prin-
ciples given by Mr. Chirac were moreover 
" simply indicative " and most of the items cor-
respond to tasks WEU is already handling: 
assessing the threat to Europe and encouraging 
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maintenance of the defence effort of member 
countries at a level commensurate with the 
threat, while promoting disarmament with the 
aim of increasing security at the lowest possible 
level of armament and enhancing the strategic 
linkage between Europe and the United States. 
34. The only terms which might apparently 
give rise to reservations by some of France's 
partners are those at the top of the list, i.e. 
"Nuclear deterrence is still the only effective 
way of preventing war in Europe ". Mr. Chirac's 
very words about the need to face the overall 
threat imply that deterrence does not depend 
only on nuclear weapons but forms a· whole and 
that the aim of disarmament should be to lower 
the level of armament, particularly nuclear, as far 
as possible, while maintaining deterrence. In the 
Ottawa declaration of April1974, the partners of 
France and the United Kingdom certainly 
recognised that the contribution made by the 
nuclear forces of those two countries was a major 
factor in European security. But in view of the 
reactions of a section of public opinion towards 
anything nuclear, it is probably not in Europe's 
interests to give undue priority to the nuclear 
element of a policy of deterrence. This was, for 
example, the view expressed by Mr. van den 
Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Neth-
erlands, when answering oral questions in the 
Second Chamber of the States-General on 1Oth 
December 1986. 
35. This reservation is a secondary one and 
probably relates more to the form - obviously 
open to negotiation- of Mr. Chirac's suggestions 
than to their content, and when he said that 
" any developments which may occur as a result 
of technical progress must aim to reinforce deter-
rence not to question it " he was voicing the 
evident concern aroused in Europe by some 
American statements about President Reagan's 
strategic defence initiative. Europe has no 
interest in the two great powers developing the 
idea that a war can be waged without the risk of 
nuclear devastation on their territory. Here too 
Mr. Chirac endorsed an action already started by 
the WEU Council when it set up a working group 
on the air defence of Europe and published the 
principles on which the Seven had reached 
agreement in regard to the SDI. 
36. One may even wonder whether It IS not 
possible to find a consensus among the Seven on 
points Mr. Chirac did not mention but which 
have already been the subject of agreements of 
principle, including the need to develop 
European co-operation in armaments matters 
and to examine any threats to Europe stemming 
from events outside the North Atlantic Treaty 
area and measures of all kinds which Europe can 
take to counter them. 
37. Co-operation in armaments matters is spe-
cifically included among the aims the Rome dec-
laration assigned to the WEU Council but whose 
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implementation is suffering from the uncertainty 
and delays mentioned in the previous chapter. 
The Prime Minister of France confirmed the 
interest his country attaches to developing such 
co-operation. The drafting of a European 
security charter might be an opportunity to 
define priority aims in this area and, above all, 
ways and means of achieving them and the prin-
ciples which have so far been lacking for 
effective, continuous action. Here, your 
Rapporteur is referring in particular to the 
studies conducted by the SAC into economic and 
juridical obstacles to co-operation. Are the Seven 
therefore unable to agree to removing these 
obstacles? 
38. Answering a question put by our colleague, 
Mr. Valleix, on 2nd December 1986, the Prime 
Minister of France nevertheless said that France 
would be in favour of representatives of the arms 
industries being associated in some way with the 
work of WEU in order to reflect upon and define 
methods of European co-operation in arma-
ments matters, provided it was the Assembly 
that made the necessary proposals to the govern-
ments. It is naturally difficult for the Assembly 
to make firm, realistic proposals, but it would 
seem very wise to make Agency Ill responsible 
for doing so since this is quite clearly its role. 
The Assembly can but recommend that the 
Council move in this direction when preparing 
the European security charter. 
39. Consultations on events outside the 
NATO area obviously raise more delicate ques-
tions since it would seem difficult for states to 
reach agreement beforehand on their reactions to 
possible threats. Nevertheless, Article VIII of the 
modified Brussels Treaty makes the Council 
responsible for organising any exchanges of 
views which may be necessary because of threats 
to international peace, wherever they may occur. 
A European security charter might recall this 
principle and express the governments' firm 
intention to apply it effectively, which the 
Council has never done. The development of the 
political committee on European security, set up 
in Luxembourg, would allow this. 
40. However, the crux of the initiative by the 
Prime Minister of France is probably not to be 
found in the suggestions relating to the contents 
of this charter but rather in the revelation it rep-
resented. It would be both risky and pointless to 
bring it down to an act of internal policy, particu-
larly since President Mitterrand, in an address to 
the Royal Institute for International Affairs in 
London on 15th January 1987, insisted on the 
need to strengthen co-ordination and discussion 
of defence matters. He added that he wanted 
more exchanges, meetings and agreements in 
military matters and, if all European forces were 
co-ordinated, an accurate and not merely verbal 
idea would be obtained of a sort of European 
defence, all this in conjunction with WEU which 
would be most useful from this point of view. 
This is indeed the same proposal as the one 
developed by Mr. Chirac. 
41. It may however be wondered why France, 
which throughout the years has made so many 
general proposals for breathing new life into 
WEU, has proved to be infinitely more reserved 
from the moment there is question of taking def-
inite measures in the framework of WEU. Not 
only did its proposals then become rare but it 
was no more eager than others when it had to 
give shape to contractual commitments. Here 
your Rapporteur wishes to suggest three explan-
atory points but he has absolutely no knowledge 
of the extent to which they have effectively been 
taken into account by French leaders: 
42. (a) France has often stated that it did not 
intend, by integrating its forces with those of its 
WEU partners, all of which have a place in the 
NATO integrated military structure, to return to 
the system of integration in NATO that it 
rejected in 1967. There can be no doubt that 
there is quite a large consensus on this point in 
France and it is certain that many of France's 
allies would like to see it resume its place in 
NATO. It has therefore shown no more desire to 
be committed, through WEU, to collective deci-
sions which it might have found disagreeable 
than its allies, which feared that WEU's activities 
might weaken NATO. 
43. (b) Ever since General de Gaulle decided, 
following the explosion of the first French 
atomic bomb, to withdraw French nuclear 
weapons unilaterally from the controls, the prin-
ciple of which it had accepted in the 1954 Paris 
Agreements, France seems to have experienced 
difficulties in its relations with WEU. The 
annexes to the treaty which are not effectively 
applied or which have been overtaken by the 
trend of international events should probably be 
re-examined to avoid these texts, which were 
drafted thirty-two years ago, being an obstacle to 
the most important aspect of the treaty: the unre-
served application of Article V. 
44. (c) On 2nd December our colleague, Mr. 
Stoffelen, asked Mr. Chirac whether France, 
whose new defence planning act made provision 
for the manufacture of chemical weapons, 
intended to respect its undertakings under 
Articles Ill and IV of Protocol No. Ill of the 
Paris Agreements. While insisting on the need 
for France to have " a chemical deterrent " in 
spite of its " earnest wish ... for the complete and 
total disappearance and destruction of all 
chemical weapons", Mr. Chirac failed to answer 
the question, thus giving rise to fears that France 
might apply the same method in this matter as 
for nuclear weapons. 
45. Your Rapporteur is afraid that exchanges 
between France and its WEU partners have 
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never been clear enough on these three ques-
tions. It is indeed evident that at present no one 
is thinking of integrating forces in the framework 
of WEU, although some do not wish the possi-
bility to be permanently excluded. It should be 
easy to find an approach satisfactory to everyone 
in this connection. The question of the control of 
French nuclear weapons is in fact settled 
according to France's own wishes and, if a legal 
solution were sought, it should be found without 
too much difficulty. The question of chemical 
weapons has not yet arisen but it would be 
regrettable - and this could probably be avoided 
- if it were to arise in such a way that France 
failed to follow through its proposals on the 
reactivation of WEU. 
46. Conversely, there are three points which 
Mr. Chirac clarified in answering questions put 
to him by several members of the Assembly and 
this should facilitate the definition of the prin-
ciples of European defence, first in regard to the 
application of Article V of the treaty, second, the 
participation of other European members of the 
Atlantic Alliance in the European security 
charter and, third, relations with the United 
States. 
47. Answering further questions, Mr. Chirac 
indicated very clearly that France intended to 
fulfil its obligations under Article V of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty and that the defence of 
France began not at its own frontiers but at those 
of its neighbours. He also said France intended 
to share with no one decisions relating to the 
stage of hostilities at which it would bring in its 
nuclear weapons, the highly deterrent nature of 
which Mr. Chirac emphasised, which precluded 
any prior declaration concerning their possible 
use. This was France's unswerving approach and 
the only way for its allies to derive the maximum 
benefit from this deterrent was to develop as far 
as possible their relations with France in defence 
matters, both bilaterally and multilaterally, not 
to obtain specific commitments which it cannot 
give but a regular process of consultation and 
co-operation. 
48. Apparently the French initiative in WEU 
was not an isolated one. It was preceded, accom-
panied and followed by talks between France and 
several of its allies, particularly the United 
States, the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
United Kingdom. There were indications that 
Mr. Chirac's initiative had been the subject of 
prior consultations between France and its 
partners, for instance at the Franco-German 
summit meeting in Frankfurt on 28th October 
1986 and during Mr. Chirac's visit to London on 
20th November. It was noted in particular that 
on the same day it was decided that Mr. Chirac 
would address the WEU Assembly. From this it 
may be deduced that the Prime Minister's pro-
posals on 2nd December were a well-prepared 
initiative undertaken with the certainty that it 
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would be welcomed. Hence it would be absurd to 
reduce it to the level of a French internal policy 
operation. 
49. However, the fact is that other govern-
ments do not seem to have been notified of Mr. 
Chirac's intentions. This was made clear on 6th 
December 1986 by Mr. Tindemans, Minister for 
External Relations of Belgium, when answering a 
question put to him by our colleague, Mr. 
Beysen. He added, moreover, that: 
"If the French- since they are there as full 
members - make proposals in that forum 
in order to be able to discuss security and 
draw up a European charter, we must -
and right from the start - adopt a very 
positive attitude." 
50. Your Rapporteur does not know the 
results of the Franco-German talks, but Chan-
cellor Kohl's statement to the federal press on 
13th January 1987 indicates that there was fairly 
broad agreement between the two countries. The 
Chancellor said: 
" Close agreement and a joint European 
approach in the various areas of security 
policy are becoming increasingly urgent. 
We have laid the foundations together 
with our French friends. Truly European 
interests, which are called in question by 
the dialogue between the great powers, 
also require co-ordination anchored in an 
institution. 
The Federal Government is convinced 
that WEU might be an appropriate 
instrument for this purpose. In this con-
nection, I formally approve the conclu-
sions and proposals of Mr. Chirac, Prime 
Minister of France. 
- We must give WEU the means to fulfil 
this task from an organisational point of 
view. First steps have been taken in this 
sense. 
- We must also give WEU political 
impetus to ensure that it can speak 
authoritatively about Europe's interests 
in security policy. 
Such an evolution in WEU would 
strengthen the European pillar of the 
Atlantic Alliance. It is directed against no 
one." 
51. The Netherlands Government, for its part, 
while not subscribing so explicitly to Mr. 
Chirac's proposals, expressed itself through its 
Prime Minister, Mr. Lubbers, in an interview 
granted to the German newspaper Die Welt on 
2nd February 1987, as follows: 
" Question. - What do you think of a more 
independent European security policy in 
the framework of the Atlantic Alliance? 
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Helmut Schmidt has not been the only one 
to propose it for a long time. He even 
wishes it to be attained under French lead-
ership. 
Mr. Lubbers. - I do not believe very 
strongly in a leading role for Paris, but I 
believe the European pillar must be 
strengthened. I think there is sufficient 
room to develop this European pillar. This 
is the trend of thoughts in the Netherlands. 
According to its geographical position, 
each country has its own means and 
special commitments within the alliance. 
It must also have a specifically European 
commitment there. 
There is already a broad consensus among 
Europeans on disarmament policy and 
towards the United States. Furthermore, 
France and Germany have taken the first, 
albeit limited, steps towards co-operation 
in defence matters. European co-operation 
in defence matters will certainly increase, 
but there are still obstacles. France and the 
United Kingdom have a tendency to be 
rather autarkical. We would welcome a 
European security and defence policy if it 
made a contribution to the alliance, and 
we are working to this end. 
Question. - Would Western European 
Union (WEU) be an appropriate 
instrument for building and strengthening 
this pillar? 
Mr. Lubbers. - One of the instruments, 
but the result should not be a WEU armed 
force. No new situation in terms of forces 
should be created. I think we must first 
concern ourselves with improving internal 
co-ordination, mainly in armaments 
matters. Only thus would de facto co-oper-
ation also be able to work. The Hague will 
help to ensure that the European com-
ponent - the second pillar in NATO - is 
further enhanced and strengthened. " 
52. Your Rapporteur is not aware of any 
formal statements by other governments on the 
action they intend to take on Mr. Chirac's pro-
posal, but he has heard it said that the WEU 
Council had set up a working group to prepare 
their implementation, which means the Seven 
have reached agreement on taking part in the 
group. In other words, they have at least 
accepted the proposal in principle. 
53. Should Mr. Chirac's statement be con-
nected with the announcement in certain British 
newspapers on 23rd January 1987 of agreement 
between France and the United Kingdon to hold 
talks on the possible use of the two countries' 
nuclear weapons? The main purpose of these 
talks would be to discuss co-operation for tar-
geting, which would obviously considerably 
enhance the deterrent effect of the two countries' 
weapons and also Europe's military and political 
cohesion. This matter has been raised often in 
the last twenty years but it has always been 
impossible to make the slightest progress. Admit-
tedly, an agreement of this kind, if confirmed, 
would remain bilateral, but it would nevertheless 
help to make forces hitherto planned as purely 
national political instruments more European. 
54. However, the prospect of WEU adopting a 
European security charter may perhaps provoke 
reservations outside the organisation which will 
possibly be echoed in certain governments. 
Franco-British nuclear agreement would cer-
tainly not be enough to remove them. 
55. Indeed, the Assembly knows that several 
European members of the Atlantic Alliance do 
not wish WEU to play an important role in 
organising western defence; they claim to 
represent the European element of the alliance to 
which they rightfully consider they too belong. 
Here we are touching on the problem of the 
enlargement of WEU to which, in spite of the 
Assembly's recommendations, the Council has 
not yet been able to give a clear answer. In the 
Rome declaration, it recommended that the 
Assembly increase contacts with the parliaments 
of those countries; this was done by inviting 
observers to sessions and, since 1986, to com-
mittee meetings and by the visit of the General 
Affairs Committee to Portugal in 1985 and to 
Norway and Denmark in 1986. The General 
Affairs Committee has also asked to visit Spain, 
but has not yet received an answer from that 
country. 
56. All the European member countries of the 
alliance have, to varying degrees and in various 
ways, shown their interest in the reactivation of 
WEU and their concern not to be excluded from 
whatever may develop. They cannot be wholly 
satisfied by being parliamentary observers to the 
Assembly. It is clear that the aim, proclaimed or 
not, of several of them is accession to WEU, for 
others participation in some of its activities and 
for all to be kept fully informed of what the 
Council is doing. 
57. Mr. Chirac's proposal does not forcibly 
link endorsement of the European security 
charter with participation in WEU, although it is 
favourable to the enlargement of WEU itself: 
" By celebrating in this way the deep-
rooted agreement which unites them on 
such vital issues, the seven members of 
WEU would be adopting an approach in 
which other countries could join if they so 
wished: I am thinking in particular of our 
neighbours on the Iberian peninsula, 
Spain and Portugal. 
WEU - and to my mind this is its true 
raison d'etre - is destined to become, 
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sooner or later, one of the keystones in the 
building of Europe. Its ,expansion would 
thus be perfectly in keeping with the 1984 
decision to revitalise it. 
France is aware of the legal and political 
problems which will need to be overcome 
in order to achieve this $Oal. The consoli-
dation of what has been achieved through 
reactivation does not call for precipitate 
action, but our political stance must be 
perfectly clear, and we must do everything 
in our power to make the reality of 
Western European Unictm live up to its 
name. 
As I have already assured you, France is 
determined to contribute to the emergence 
of a common European awareness on 
defence matters, which would also draw 
more substance from the responsibilities 
of some of our members outside Europe, 
and from our other obligations within the 
Atlantic Alliance. " 
58. This too is a matter on which a decision 
will have to be taken in the negotiations on the 
European security charter: which countries will 
be invited to accede to it? Will these countries at 
any stage take part in the preparation of the 
charter? Will their accession iqtply active partici-
pation in some or all of WED's activities? Your 
Rapporteur can but repeat the views already 
expressed by the Assembly th~t WEU should be 
open to all countries which are members ofboth 
the European Community and the Atlantic 
Alliance. Possibly a given country which is not 
yet a member of the Community might join 
WEU, but it would be an aberration for non-
member countries of the alliance to take part in 
view of the role played by NATO in European 
security, WEU's main concern. 
59. The question of the United States' reac-
tions to the reactivation of WEU and the prepa-
ration of a European security charter is quite dif-
ferent. It is evident that Europe's security cannot 
be ensured without the deterrent exercised by 
American nuclear weapons and the presence of 
American forces on the European continent. As 
Mr. Chirac confirmed on behalf of France, no 
country is contemplating replacing the Atlantic 
Alliance by a European defence system. 
Moreover, the United States Government has 
never shown any opposition of principle to 
Europe's participation in NATO being 
organised. For instance, it approved the Rome 
declaration. 
60. It is clear, however, that the development 
ofthis organisation has given rise to reservations 
or even opposition in certain American circles 
and this obviously carries weight because of per-
sistent opposition in Congress to the mainte-
nance of American forces in Europe. Any sign of 
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Europe asserting itself in security matters has 
both advantages and disadvantages for the 
United States. On the one hand, it has every 
interest in Europe being more sure of itself and 
assuming a greater share of the burden of its own 
defence. Agitation against the deployment of 
Euromissiles after 1979 worried the American 
authorities and the reactivation of WEU, seen as 
a means of making Europeans more interested in 
their security, was welcomed. Again, if European 
co-operation in armaments matters allows the 
European members of the alliance to use their 
military budgets to better avail the joint military 
system would thus be strengthened. 
61. Conversely, the American authorities may 
fear that the expression of a European political 
will in certain areas may hinder their diplomacy 
and give the Soviet Union the impression that it 
could break up the alliance, particularly by 
opposing Europe to the United States in disar-
mament questions. This was expressed in the 
American approach to the WEU countries in 
February 1985, asking them to avoid adopting a 
European position on the matter. Similarly, the 
Americans may fear they will encounter stronger 
opposition to some of their views on strategy, 
general policy and the management of forces in 
NATO. European reservations concerning 
certain revisions of alliance strategy, the SDI and 
the bombing of Tripoli engendered apprehension 
about such an evolution. Finally, the Americans 
may fear that the development of European 
co-operation in the armaments industry may cut 
off certain markets in Europe and elsewhere just 
when their trade balance is already heavily in 
deficit. 
62. Indubitably certain American reactions 
have prompted several of the seven governments 
to be cautious about reactivating WEU. 
However, anxiety caused by what Europe has 
learned of events at the Reykjavik summit 
meeting, coming after the announcement of the 
SDI programme, led a large section of European 
public opinion to admit the need to strengthen 
Europe's participation in the Atlantic Alliance. 
Mr. Chirac, for his part, did not conceal the fact 
that this event was one of the main reasons for 
his initiative, and it is clear that he contributed 
largely to making the other members of WEU 
admit this. 
63. The role Europeans can play in American 
security and defence decisions should probably 
not be overestimated. Europe has played very 
little part in President Reagan's main decisions 
in these matters, be it the SDI, Reykjavik or the 
bombing of Tripoli. However good or otherwise 
Europe's organisation of defence becomes, it will 
probably have little effect on American decisions 
on strategy, armaments or external policy. Con-
versely, it should help the European members of 
the alliance to promote their own security 
interests vis-a-vis the United States and corn-
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pensate for any weakening of the American 
presence in Europe. 
64. Furthermore, Europe must be most careful 
to make its views known and understood, not 
only by the United States Government but also 
by Congress and public opinion. The Assembly 
is gratified that the Secretary-General was able to 
tour the United States in October 1986 to good 
account. The Assembly for its part should make 
better use than in the past of the transatlantic 
visits of its committees to present and defend its 
views on this matter. But no one can hope for 
decisive results if the seven governments do not 
also take strenuous action to make the United 
States understand the requirements of European 
security. 
IV. The activities of WEU 
65. It is obviously desirable for Western 
Europe to define the principles on which its 
security is based. But it is no less important for 
any European security charter to be applied 
immediately and effectively, failing which it 
would be nothing more than yet another example 
of European rhetoric. In this connection, Mr. 
Chirac's proposals came at the right moment, i.e. 
just after the ministerial meeting in Luxembourg 
on 13th and 14th November 1986, at which the 
seven governments agreed to give new impetus 
to the reactivation of WEU, after a year of 
marking time, and following the failure of the 
Reykjavik summit meeting. 
66. The Assembly has already had an oppor-
tunity of discussing the decisions taken in 
Luxembourg during the debate on the report by 
our colleague, Mr. Bianco, at the December 1986 
session. Since the session, your Rapporteur has 
received no official information about the action 
taken on these decisions and he can but mention 
a few questions raised by the most recent 
events. 
67. The ministers' main decision was to set up 
a political committee on European security 
formed of political directors from the ministries 
for foreign affairs and possibly representatives of 
the ministries of defence. A first meeting of this 
committee was planned to be held in January 
1987 and a second in March. 
68. In fact, the press reported that, at the invi-
tation of Mr. Fischbach, Minister of Defence of 
Luxembourg, the country having the 
chairmanship-in-office of the Council, represen-
tatives of defence ministries met at the Chateau 
of Senningen (Luxembourg) on 23rd January 
1987 for an informal meeting, the first of this 
kind. The Secretary-General of WEU was 
present. The aim was to exchange ideas and 
information for strengthening WEU and the 
voice of European countries in NATO. Partici-
pants referred to the security situation in the 
Mediterranean, the imbalance of conventional 
forces in Europe, European defence against 
nuclear weapons, the production of armaments, 
the strategic situation in Europe and security 
problems outside the North Atlantic Treaty area. 
As far as your Rapporteur knows, this infor-
mation, given to the press by the Luxembourg 
presidency, was not the subject of a 
communique. However, it is important to know 
at what level these talks were held and what kind 
of results were achieved: were they, for instance, 
intended to prepare the ministerial meeting in 
April? 
69. The political committee on European 
security should meet periodically, inter alia on 
the occasion of meetings ofthe Twelve, and hold 
emergency meetings as and when necessary. By 
doing this, it would take on the political duties of 
the WEU Council under Article VIII of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty, i.e. it would become a third 
element of the WEU Council alongside minis-
terial meetings and meetings of ambassadors in 
London. It would obviously be far better adapted 
than the ambassadorial Council to hold the 
political consultations provided for in the treaty, 
while the ambassadors and their directly 
dependent working group would be more con-
cerned with the administrative continuity of the 
Council. Hence it is particularly important for 
meetings of the political committee on European 
security to be effectively assisted by the 
Secretariat-General of WEU and for the annual 
report of the Council to give details of them 
accordingly to the Assembly even though a 
communique may already have been issued. The 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Mr. 
Poos, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, 
assured the Assembly that this committee would 
actually be the WEU Council. The full conse-
quences should be drawn from this, one being 
that meetings of the political directors of the 
ministries for foreign affairs of the Seven should 
in no event be confused with meetings of the 
Twelve, even if they immediately precede or 
follow them. 
70. Moreover, the fact that WEU does not yet 
include all members of the European Com-
munity, i.e. all countries taking part in twelve-
power political consultations, nor all the 
European members of the Atlantic Alliance 
creates a situation which is particularly embar-
rassing or irritating for countries which are not 
yet members ofWEU since WEU's activities are 
increasing. This limits WEU's possibilities of 
claiming to speak on behalf of Europe and is a 
source of division among Europeans. 
71. According to Mr. Tindemans' answer to 
the question put by Mr. Beysen on 4th December 
1986, already referred to above, the Belgian Gov-
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ernment seems interested in maintaining and 
developing specifically WEU structures: 
"At present, we are studying its internal 
organisation and how the existing agencies 
can be given more activities. We propose 
that there should also be contacts at the 
level of political directors, as is the case in 
the European Commuqity and between 
NATO ambassadors. Similarly, we 
propose that regular contacts also be held 
at the level of military and diplomatic 
experts and that cor.espondents be 
appointed as is the case in the European 
Community. In this way, new life could 
effectively be given to WEU." 
72. The real remedy for thi~ situation wo~ld 
obviously be to enlarge WEU. The questiOn 
arose with Portugal's application for mem-
bership in October 1984 which has not yet 
elicited any answer from the Council. This is 
most inconsiderate and conseqUently other coun-
tries which might think of joining WEU will be 
more reserved and cautious. The reasons given 
by the Council for postponing its decision are 
questionable and give the impression th~t it 
secretly wishes to refuse. The Assembly Itself 
which, in accordance with the Council's recom-
mendations, has developed its relations with the 
parliaments of non-member countries, is now in 
an embarrassing situation where they are con-
cerned. 
73. However, for reasons of which everyone is 
aware, it is not possible at present to consider the 
accession of all the European members ofNATO 
to the modified Brussels Treaty. Yet they must 
not be left out of what is being done in WEU: 
they must be kept regularly informed, they must 
be allowed to take part in whatever WEU activ-
ities are possible without raisihg problems, inter 
alia in co-operation in armaments matters, and 
finally there must be co-ordination between 
WEU on the one hand and the European Council 
and NATO bodies on the other. Co-ordination 
has so far been ensured by member countries and 
in particular by the country having the 
chairmanship-in-office of the Council. The 
development of intergovernlllental activities in 
WEU and increased participation by representa-
tives of defence ministries would henceforth 
mean co-ordination being established on a per-
manent basis pending the effective enlargement 
ofWEU. 
7 4. Another decision taken by the Council in 
Luxembourg which no doubt has a more limited 
immediate impact but which conforms to the 
concern shown by the Council in 1984 to con-
vince Europeans of the need for an effective 
defence policy was to set up a European institute 
for defence studies. This was a French proposal 
and France has invited member countries to take 
part in a first course it is organising in autumn 
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1988. Belgium and the United Kingdom are to 
organise similar courses in subsequent years. 
75. In making this proposal, the French Gov-
ernment was responding to wishes already 
expressed in the Assembly in December 1984 by 
Mr. Genscher, the German Minister, then 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, and regularly 
recalled ever since by successive rapporteurs of 
the General Affairs Committee, Mr. Masciadri, 
Mr. van der Sanden, Mr. Berrier and Mr. Bianco. 
It doubtless also had in mind the success in 
France itself of the Institut des hautes etudes de 
defense nationale, which has just celebrated its 
fiftieth anniversary. Set up by the Front 
populaire government, the aim of the institute 
was to arouse a spirit of defence in France by 
associating civil servants, persons holding influ-
ential posts in the private sector and the military 
in long-term courses on defence matters. An 
association of former trainees allows interest in 
these matters to be maintained among those who 
have attended the courses. In this way, they have 
made a major contribution to making known 
France's defence policy and eventually having it 
accepted by a very large section of public opinion 
in the country. 
76. It is significant therefore that in the last 
few years France has been considering the 
extension of this experience to European 
defence. It made its proposals to the WEU 
Council and has taken the necessary steps to 
ensure that its ideas are implemented. For this 
undertaking to succeed, however, it must not be 
linked unduly with the views of a single country. 
The way the Council's decision is implemented 
must be the subject oftrue consultations between 
members of WEU: how to recruit delegations 
from member countries for the courses already 
planned, the subjects to be studied, methods of 
work and the choice of speakers should be 
examined in WEU. There has so far been some 
ambiguity about the link between the French 
proposal for a study institute and Mr. Genscher's 
proposal which, on the contrary, related to 
co-operation between existing research institutes 
in each country. This ambiguity must be cleared 
up entirely since these are two different initia-
tives with separate aims and they can be fol-
lowed up only by means specific to each one. 
77. Mr. Genscher's proposal concerned 
university-type establishments on which gov-
European establishments conducting research in 
defence matters. 
78. The French proposal requires more initi-
ative and continuity of action by WEU bodies if 
WEU's contribution is not to be reduced to 
sending invitations to nationals of other coun-
tries to take part sporadically in studies con-
ducted in each of the member countries. It would 
probably be vain to hope that it would require no 
financial effort by WEU, but the judicious use of 
a WEU agency to guide the work, circulate infor-
mation on a reciprocal basis, allocate tasks and 
co-ordinate procedure seems necessary. Your 
Rapporteur wishes each government to examine 
the French proposals seriously and to agree not 
to abandon responsibility for these activities to 
each member country in turn. The Council's 
answers to the Assembly so far on this matter 
seem rather short. 
V. Conclusions 
79. There is no doubt that the Reykjavik 
meeting, following the launching of the SDI pro-
gramme, created circumstances favourable to 
Western Europe assuming greater responsibility 
for its own security, as is proved by the decisions 
taken by the Council in Luxembourg, Mr. 
Chirac's address and the favourable response to 
it in certain member countries. 
80. The main thing for the Assembly is that in 
this situation the reactivation of WEU is 
developed so as not to be merely a surge of 
European dynamism, which might soon be called 
in question by the trend of special interests and 
events, but is carried into effect by the estab-
lishment of new structures which alone can give 
permanency to the outcome of political decisions 
taken today. 
81. The governments are certainly breaking 
new ground in WEU. The danger today is that 
the WEU framework may as a result break up: 
the Standing Armaments Committee does not 
meet, arms controls are reduced to very little, the 
Secretary-General alone attends meetings of 
political directors or representatives of defence 
ministries and most of these meetings are unof-
ficial. 
ernment institutes cannot expect to impose their 82. In such a situation, your Rapporteur con-
views. Your Rapporteur knows nothing about siders the role of the Assembly must be to recall 
the results of the first steps taken in this matter the constraints of contractual undertakings. It is 
but thinks WEU's role will inevitably be fairly empowered to do so by Article IX of the treaty 
limited. It would mainly be to supply institutes which makes it responsible for answering the 
concerned with documentation on European annual report of the Council. If this report and, 
research in defence matters to help them to make more generally, information transmitted by the 
useful outside contacts so that they may work Council to the Assembly does not allow it to 
efficiently. A first contribution might be for a exercise this power to scrutinise WEU's true 
WEU agency to prepare and circulate a list of activities, the Assembly would lose its raison 
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d'etre and its credibility in the eyes of public 
opinion. The Council too would lose what had 
ensured its stability and strength in times when it 
was not very active and, finally, any change in 
circumstances which led it to slow down its 
activities once again would reduce it to nothing, 
or almost nothing. This is why the Assembly, 
while welcoming the Council's new activity, has 
to ask for Mr. Chirac's proposals to lead to a 
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detailed definition of the tasks !and responsibil-
ities of all the WEU organs embodied in a new 
contract, extended to include those European 
members of the Atlantic Alliance now able to 
take part. On this condition only will WED's 
activities be able to help to advance European 
union in areas for which it is responsible in 
accordance with the wish constantly expressed 
by the Assembly ever since it has existed. 
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Amendments 1 and 2 
The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance 
Part I: The reactivation of WEU 
AMENDMENTS 1 and 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Bassinet 
1. At the end of paragraph 2 (f) of the draft recommendation proper, add: 
27th April 1987 
" ( 1) for this purpose, by instructing the Secretary-General to play an active part in organising the 
first course and to promote the formation of an association of former participants of which he 
would ensure the secretariat; (2) by asking the French institute to invite Spain and Portugal to 
send participants to this course;". 
2. In paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out " the proposal made by 
the Prime Minister of France on 2nd December 1986 to draw up a European security charter provides " 
and insert " the proposals by the French Government, and particularly the one to draw up a European 
security charter, provide ". 
Signed: Bassinet 
1. See lst sitting, 27th April 1987 (amendments adopted). 
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31st March 1987 
Disarmament - reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council 
SECOND REVISED REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 2 
by Mr. Amadei, Rapporteur 
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Dejardin (Alternate: Fecriaux), Edwards (Alternate: Brown), Ertl, Galley (Alternate: Baumel), Gerstl, Giust, Jung, Konen, de 
Kwaadsteniet, Mrs. Lalumiere, MM. Lemmrich, Matraja, Pecchioli (Alternate: Antoni), Sarti, Scheer, Sir Dudley Smith (Alternate: 
Lord Newall), MM. Steverlynck, Stokes (Alternate: Corrie). 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
129 
DOCUMENT 1090 
(d) The conference on disarmament in Europe 
- Refraining from the threat or use of force 
- Prior notification of certain military activities 
- Observation of certain military activities 
- Annual calendars 
- Constraining provisions 
- Compliance and verification 
- Annexes 
(e) Comprehensive nuclear test ban 
(f) Chemical weapons 
(g) Space weapons 
VI. Conclusions 
APPENDICES 
I. Letter from the Secretary-General to the President ofthe Assembly- 17th 
March 1986 (Extract) 
11. Appeal by the Warsaw Treaty member states to the member states of 
NATO and to all European countries for a programme to reduce armed 
forces and conventional armaments in Europe- Budapest, lOth-IIth June 
1986 
Ill. North Atlantic Council statement on conventional arms control - Halifax, 
29th-30th May 1986 
IV. North Atlantic Council communique of 12th December 1986 (Extract con-
cerning arms control and disarmament) 
V. Draft directives to the foreign ministers of the USSR and the United States 
concerning the drafting of agreements on nuclear disarmament, handed to 
President Reagan by General Secretary Gorbachev at the Reykjavik 
summit on ll th October 1986 and published subsequently by the Soviet 
Union 
VI. Implementation of confidence-building measures - Notification of mil-
itary manreuvres under the CSCE regime by: 
l. NATO countries 
2. Warsaw Pact countries 
3. Neutral and non-aligned countries 
VII. Statement by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CC of the 
CPSU, Moscow, 28th February 1987 
130 
DOCUMENT 1090 
Introductory Note 
' In preparing this report the Rapporteur arranged for the following representatives to the MBFR 
talks in Vienna to be interviewed on his behalf on 7th and 8th March 1986: 
Mr. Jozef Sestak, Deputy Head, Delegation of Czechoslovakia, and Dr. Lenka Novotna; 
H.E. Mr. J.H.L. van de Mortel, Ambassador, Head of the Netherlands Delegation, and Mr. Pieter 
Jan Wolthers; 
Mr. Kent Brown, Adviser, US Delegation; 
H.E. Mr. Michael Alexander, Ambassador, Head of the UK Delegation; 
H.E. Mr. Valerian Mikhailov, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the USSR; 
Dr. Jurgen Pohlmann, Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany; 
Mr. Krzysztof Stronczynski, member of the Polish Delegation. 
The committee as a whole adopted the first version of this report at its meeting in Venice on 29th 
April1986. It subsequently met in Washington DC and Norfolk, Virginia, from 16th to 20th June 1986, 
when it was addressed by or met with: 
16th June 1986 
State Department, Washington DC 
Ms. Rozanne Ridgway, Ambassador, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian 
Affairs; 
Mr. Charles Thomas, Ambassador, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and 
Canadian Affairs; 
Mr. John Hawes, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political Military Atlairs; 
Mr. Edward Rowny, Ambassador, Special Representative for Strategic Arms Negotiations; 
Congressional Research Service, Washington DC 
Mr. Stanley Sloan, Specialist in US Alliance Relations; 
Mr. Paul Gallis, Analyst in West European Affairs; 
Mr. Charles Gellner, Senior Specialist, International Affairs; 
Mr. Stuart Goldman, Analyst in Soviet Affairs; 
Mr. Steven Hildreth, Analyst in National Defence; 
Mr. Francis Miko, Specialist in International Relations; 
Ms. Charlotte Preece, Specialist in West European Affairs; 
Mr. Dagnija Sterste-Perkins, Foreign Affairs Analyst; 
Ms. Jeanette Voas, Arms Control Analyst; 
Mr. Paul Zinsmeister, Specialist in National Defence. 
Brookings Institution, Washington DC 
I 
Mr. Joshua Epstein, Research Associate in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Programme. 
17th June 1986 
Department of Defence, Washington DC 
Mr. Fred Ikle, Undersecretary of Defence for Policy; 
Dr. Winfred Joshua and Colonel Don Scott, Defence Intelligence Agency; 
Mr. Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defence; 
Mr. Frank Gaffney, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control 
Policy; 
Mr. Douglas Feith, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Negotiations Rolicy; 
Mr. Frank Cevasco, Director NATO Affairs, Defence Research and Engineering; 
Mr. Robert Mullen, Assistant Deputy Under-Secretary for Trade Security Policy. 
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18th June 1986 
United States House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services 
Mr. Samuel Stratton, Representative of New York, and members of the committee: 
Democrats 
Mr. Melvin Price; 
Mr. Charles E. Bennett; 
Mr. G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery; 
Mr. Earl Hutto; 
Mr. Ike Skelton; 
Mr. Thomas M. Foglietta; 
Mr. Richard Ray; 
Mr. Solomon P. Ortiz; 
Mr. Albert G. Bustamante; 
Republicans 
Mr. G. William Whitehurst; 
Mr. Robert E. Badham. 
19th June 1986 
Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia 
Admiral Lee Baggett, US Navy, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, and staff; 
Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey Dolton, RN, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic; 
Vice-Admiral Bemard Cauderer, US Navy, Commander Submarine Force US Atlantic Fleet; 
Rear-Admiral Jerry Tuttle, US Navy, Deputy and Chief-of-Staff for the Commander-in-Chief US 
Atlantic Fleet, and staff. 
20th June 1986 
Arms Control Association, Washington DC 
Mr. Paul Wamke, former Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; 
Mr. Spurgeon Keeny, President of the Arms Control Association. 
It met subsequently in Geneva on 24th and 25th July 1986, when it was addressed by the fol-
lowing representatives to the Conference on Disarmament: 
H.E. Mr. Victor Issraelyan, Ambassador, Representative of the Soviet Union; 
H.E. Mr. Robert van Schaik, Ambassador, Representative of the Netherlands; 
H.E. Mr. Donald Lowitz, Ambassador, Representative of the United States; 
H.E. Mr. Rolf Ekeus, Ambassador, Head of the Swedish Delegation; 
H.E. Mr. Ian Cromartie, Ambassador, Leader of the United Kingdom Delegation and Chairman 
of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Chemical Weapons Ban; 
H.E. Dr. Henning Wegener, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the Federal Republic of 
Germany; 
H.E. Mr. Mansur Ahmad, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of Pakistan. 
The committee subsequently discussed and adopted a revised version of the report at its meeting 
at the seat of the Assembly, Paris, on 3rd November 1986. 
The committee as a whole met at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 24th February 1987, where it 
was addressed by: 
The Rt. Hon. the Lord Carrington, Secretary-General of NATO; 
The Hon. Stephen Ledogar, United States Charge d'affaires, acting permanent representative to 
NATO; 
General Wolfgang Altenburg, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee. 
The committee as a whole was addressed in Vienna on 16th and 17th March 1987 by the fol-
lowing representatives to the MBFR talks and to the CSCE conference: 
H.E. Dr. K.P. Emst, Ambassador, Leader of the GDR Delegation to the MBFR talks; 
Professor Wemer Hanisch, GDR Delegation to the CSCE conference; 
H.E. Mr. Robert Blackwill, Ambassador, United States Representative to the MBFR talks; 
132 
DOCUMENT 1090 
H.E. Mr. Warren Zimmermann, Leader of the United States Delegation to the CSCE conference; 
H.E. Mr. V. V. Mikhailov, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the Soviet Union to the MBFR 
talks; 
Maj. General Viktor Tatarnikov, Delegation of the Soviet Union to the CSC~ conference; 
H.E. Dr. Klaus Citron, Ambassador, Representative of the FRG in the Mandate Talks on Con-
ventional Arms Control; 
H.E. Dr. Giinter Joetze, Ambassador, Representative of the FRG to the MBFR talks; 
H.E. Mr. Edouard Molitor, Ambassador, Leader of the Luxembourg Delegation to the MBFR 
talks and to the CSCE conference; 
Mr. Hubert Wurth, Luxembourg Representative to the NATO High-Level Task Force on Con-
ventional Force Reductions; 
H. E. Mr. Hans Meesman, Ambassador, Leader of the Netherlands Delegation to the CSCE con-
ference; 
H.E. Mr. J.H.L. van de Mortel, Ambassador, Netherlands Representative to the MBFR talks. 
The committee subsequently discussed and adopted the present second revised report at its 
meeting in Paris on 31st March 1987. 
The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the Ministers, members of Congress, 
officials and senior officers who met the Rapporteur or committee and replied to questions. In par-
ticular the Rapporteur thanks those members of the staff of the WEU agency for the study of arms 
control and disarmament who assisted in the preparation of the report. 
The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee. 
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Second revised draft Recommendation 
on disarmament 
The Assembly, 
(i) Recalling that Europe's security is based on the deterrence exercised by all the member countries 
of the Atlantic Alliance; 
(ii) Noting therefore that no partial agreement on limiting armaments must come into force without 
all the problems raised by Europe's security having been examined; 
(iii) Stressing that since December 1979 the Soviet Union has deployed a large number of" shorter-
range INF " weapons in Eastern Europe; 
(iv) Believing that it is more than ever necessary for the Council to discuss and harmonise the views 
of member governments on disarmament and arms control matters, with a view to facilitating 
agreement on a common policy within the alliance as a whole, and welcoming therefore the position 
adopted by the Council in its thirty-first report on the whole range of arms control negotiations, in par-
ticular the importance ministers attach " to respect for existing treaty obligations "; 
(v) Endorsing the common position on nuclear and conventional arms control and disarmament 
after the Reykjavik summit reached by all sixteen allied governments in the North Atlantic Council 
communique of 12th December 1986, which reiterates both the alliance strategy of deterrence, based on 
adequate conventional and nuclear defences, and the commitment to verifiable arms control and disar-
mament agreements to enhance stability at lower levels of forces and armaments; 
(vi) Noting that in that communique ministers inter alia" welcome the progress at Reykjavik toward 
agreement on 50% reductions in United States and Soviet strategic offensive forces ... ", the allies con-
cerned "fully support the envisaged elimination of American and Soviet land-based LRINF in 
Europe ... " ; and ministers strongly support "the United States-Soviet negotiations in Geneva on 
defence and space systems which aim to prevent an arms race in space and strengthen strategic sta-
bility" ; 
(vii) Welcoming the improvement in confidence-building measures included in the document of the 
Stockholm conference on disarmament in Europe; 
(viii) Welcoming also General Secretary Gorbachev's statement of 18th April 1986 expressing readiness 
to pursue conventional force reductions from the Atlantic to the Urals, and its positive reflection in 
1986 in the NATO Halifax statement and Brussels declaration, and in the Budapest appeal of the 
Warsaw Pact countries, but believing that agreement on initial reductions in the MBFR framework can 
be reached immediately the Soviet Union accepts the necessary verification measures; 
(ix) Recalling that the stockpiling of large quantities of chemical weapons by the Soviet Union may 
well force the alliance to retain or acquire retaliatory capability in this field, while hoping that negotia-
tions in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva will lead to a ban on all chemical weapons with ade-
quate verification safeguards and the destruction of all existing stockpiles; 
(x) Aware that the overwhelming majority of United Nations member countries, including a majority 
of the members of NATO and WEU, have repeatedly called for multilateral negotiations on a compre-
hensive nuclear test ban; 
(xi) Convinced that the enhancement ofwell-balanced security and deterrence should be the primary 
criterion of any process of arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Urge member governments, in their consultations concerning the bilateral nuclear and space talks 
in Geneva, to bear in mind the impact of these talks on European security, and to support the United 
States: 
(a) in negotiating a properly verifiable agreement to secure, within five years, the elimination of 
all long-range INF missiles within range of Europe, their limitation to 100 warheads in the 
Asian part of the Soviet Union and in the United States, combined with the simultaneous 
withdrawal of shorter-range INF from Czechoslovakia and East Germany; the right for NATO 
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to match Warsaw Pact numbers in such missiles if those negotiations fail; and follow-on nego-
tiations on the reduction of all shorter-range missiles; 
(b) in negotiating a properly verifiable agreement to secure a 50% reduction within five years in 
the numbers of strategic nuclear warheads; 
(c) in respecting existing treaties which can be modified only by agreement between the parties to 
them; 
2. Urge governments participating in the MBFR negotiations to press for the earliest agreement on 
initial reductions of United States and Soviet forces proportional to the relative numerical strength of 
their forces, including the right of reasonable automatic inspections and the obligation for all troops 
entering or leaving the reductions zone to pass at all times through recognised entry-exit points with per-
manent observers; 
3. Urge participating governments to pursue actively the improved prospects for a complete 
chemical weapons ban, including the destruction of all existing stocks, in the Geneva Conference on 
Disarmament, to press the Soviet Union to accept fully the United Kingdom compromise proposal for 
challenge inspection and, pending the outcome of these negotiations in 1987, not to approve the 
deployment of further chemical weapons in Europe; 
4. (a) Urge the Soviet Union to accept the United States' proposal for the mutual exchange of 
official technical teams for calibrating the yield of nuclear tests; 
(b) Call for the opening of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban in the Conference on Disar-
mament in Geneva. 
135 
DOCUMENT 1090 
Second reyised draft Recommendation 
replying to the thirty-first annual report of the Council 
The Assembly, 
(i) Regretting the serious delay in the communication of the Council's annual report in 1986, the 
omission of information concerning one important meeting, and considering that the absence of 
agreement on certain matters should not prevent the Council from presenting the rest of its report on 
time; 
(ii) Welcoming, however, the communication in October 1986 of the first part of the report for that 
year, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Ensure that in future the whole of the annual report on its activities reaches the Assembly before 
the end ofFebruary ofthe following year and that it contain a complete account of activities arranged by 
the Council; 
2. Take into consideration both the strategic and political aspects when discussing the enlargement 
ofWEU. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Amadei, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
.1.1. Th~ first version of this report 1, adopted 
m committee by 13 votes to 0 with 7 abstentions 
on 29th April 1986, was referred back to the 
committee on 5th June that year after the 
Assembly had failed to complete discussion of 
the report in the light of the 13 amendments 
tabled. 
1.2. The first revised version of the report 2 
was drafted in the immediate aftermath of the 
Reykjavik meeting between President Reagan 
and General Secretary Gorbachev, at a time of 
some ferment in Europe and the NATO alliance 
concerning the wisdom of some of the hastily-
drafted yet far-reaching proposals discussed by 
the two leaders. That first revised version, 
adopted by the committee by 8 votes to 7 with 
no abstentions on 3rd November 1986 was 
again referred back by the Assembly o~ 2nd 
December, after 21 amendments had been 
tabled, but before the Rapporteur had been 
allowed to introduce it. 
1.3. This second revised version of the report 
is drafted in a calmer atmosphere, at a time when 
some at least of the intra-alliance arguments of 
last December concerning both priorities for 
some of the disarmament objectives formulated 
at Reykjavik and procedural aspects of negotia-
tions on conventional force reductions have been 
ironed out at least for the time being in the North 
Atlantic Council communique of 12th December 
1986, the accompanying Brussels declaration on 
conventional arms control and some subsequent 
work in the corresponding high-level group in 
NATO. At the same time, a new transatlantic 
argument has developed over the obvious desire 
of the White House and the United States 
Secretary of Defence to adopt a new, " broad " 
interpretation of the ABM treaty in order to 
proceed with early space-testing and then 
deployment of some strategic defence systems; 
but on this issue the European allies are in much 
closer agreement in calling for existing treaties to 
be respected. 
1.4. This second revised report has been pre-
par~d by the Rapporteur for the extraordinary 
sess10n of the Assembly convened especially as 
the President announced on 4th December' to 
discuss disarmament as well as the reactivation 
of WEU. It is a particularly interesting time to 
deal with the subject because although it may yet 
1. Document 1059. 
2. Document 1075. 
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be difficult to identify substantive progress in the 
many bilateral and multilateral disarmament 
negotiations that are currently proceeding, never-
theless in the words of Lord Carrington " the log 
jam has broken " and there is motion on all 
fronts. 
1.5. In the original terms of reference given to 
the Rapporteur for his report in December 1985, 
the committee noted that " as the internal WEU 
conventional arms control functions are termi-
nated at the end of 1985, ,while three new 
agencies are created, including the agency for the 
study of arms control and disarmament ques-
tions, the report replying to the annual report of 
the Council can conveniently be combined with 
a follow-up report on disarmament which, in 
view of the impulse given by the Reagan-
Gorbachev summit, will follow negotiations on 
the most topical or urgent disarmament 
problems, without however covering all the 
topics dealt with in the information report of 4th 
November (Document 1040) or the report of 
22nd November (Document 1043) ". In this 
second revision of the report the sections dealing 
with the disarmament negotiations have been 
brought up to date. 
1.6. At the time of drafting the first report in 
spri~g 1986, the Rapporteur
1 
had in his pos-
sessiOn only Chapters Ill andl IV of the annual 
report of the Council. The complete report did 
not reach the Assembly until after 20th May that 
year. Moreover, on 24th October the Council 
~ommunicated to the Assemb~y the first part of 
1ts report for 1986. In preparing the first revision 
of this report, the Rapporteur therefore took 
advantage of the intervening period to comment 
both on the complete anmial report of the 
Council covering the year 198~ as well as the first 
part of 1986. This second revision is revised in 
the light of events, but the draft recommendation 
has been separated into two parts dealing respec-
tively with disarmament and
1 
with the reply to 
the thirty-first annual report of the Council, 
because the first is very topical whereas the 
second is historical record now that the Council's 
thirty-second report is already overdue. 
II. Activities of the Council 
2.1. The annual report of the Council for the 
year 1985, which should normally reach the 
Assembly towards the end of February, was 
dated 20th May, although Chapters Ill and IV on 
the last activities up to 31st December 1985 of 
the former international ~cretariat of the 
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Standing Armaments Committee and of the 
Agency for the Control of Armaments reached 
the Office of the Clerk in March. It would in fact 
appear that the Council had the greatest diffi-
culty in reaching agreement on a simple account 
of its own activities in 1985. The committee wel-
comes however the communication on 24th 
October of the first part of the Council's report 
for 1986, covering the first half of the year, and 
the Council's intention announced therein to 
"present its report in two half-yearly parts and 
transmit, if appropriate, written information 
concerning certain of its activities" (Chapter Ill, 
1 ). 
2.2. Where these activities of the Council are 
concerned, the committee is gratified to see the 
large section devoted to disarmament negotia-
tions and the fact that the Council discussed 
these negotiations at both permanent and minis-
terial level. An important passage from Chapter I 
is worth quoting: 
" The ministers expressed the hope that 
the negotiations between the United States 
and the Soviet Union would make pos-
sible radical reductions in their strategic 
and medium-range nuclear armaments 
and agreements aimed at ending the arms 
race on earth and preventing an arms race 
in space. They underlined in this regard 
the importance they attached to respect for 
existing treaty obligations. " 
This was an important statement that the com-
mittee will refer to below. 
2.3. However, the committee notes a curious 
gap in the Council's report - there is no reference 
to the important meeting organised by the 
German Government, which had the 
Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council at the 
time, of experts on disarmament questions from 
the seven ministries for foreign affairs and held 
in Bonn on 11th February 1985 under the chair-
manship of Ambassador Ruth. At the time the 
press reported that Mr. Richard Burt, then 
American Assistant Secretary of State, had sent a 
letter to certain ministries for foreign affairs of 
WEU countries according to which this meeting 
of experts was thought to be inappropriate. 
2.4. The committee considers it important for 
the WEU countries to harmonise their positions 
on major disarmament questions. It is therefore 
regrettable that the Council makes no reference 
to one of its most successful initiatives in this 
sense. 
2.5. It is not surprising that the Council was 
unable to reach agreement on two specific points 
on which the positions of the seven governments 
still seem to differ. These are Portugal's appli-
cation for membership ofWEU made in October 
1984 and the attempt to co-ordinate the reac-
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tions of WEU countries to the United States 
invitation to take part in research for strategic 
defence purposes. 
2.6. In regard to the accession of new states to 
the Brussels Treaty, Article XI of the treaty pro-
vides that "the high contracting parties may, by 
agreement, invite any other state to accede to the 
present treaty on conditions to be agreed 
between them and the state so invited". The 
Seven seem to have been unprepared for 
Portugal's application in 1984 which in a way 
anticipated their invitation. In this connection, 
another letter from the WEU Secretary-General 
on 26th February 1986 informing the President 
of the Assembly of his visit to Spain on 28th and 
29th January reports in regard to Spain that: 
"On relations between Spain and Western 
European Union, those to whom I spoke 
confirmed Spain's interest in acceding to 
WEU. How do they view such accession? 
They are aware that accession to WEU is 
at the invitation of the WEU Council. 
They will therefore await this invitation in 
due course, i.e. after the major debate on 
the problem of security raised by the refer-
endum on 12th March has come to a con-
clusion." 
The Secretary-General concluded: 
" Still in my personal capacity, I con-
cluded that it was politically desirable, if a 
state wished to join WEU, for it: 
- to be a member of the Communities 
and of political co-operation; 
- to be a member of the Atlantic Alliance; 
and 
- to have a real desire to promote a 
European security dimension. " 
2.7. The Council's report for the first part of \ 
1986 now makes it clear that the accession of 
Portugal will not now be considered until 1988, 
after the " transitional period " up to the end of 
1987 when the new structures of WEU resulting 
from the 1984 reactivation are to be reviewed, 
and after " the applicability to new members of 
all the provisions of the modified Brussel Treaty 
and its additional protocols" have been 
examined in depth. (The application of Protocols 
Nos. 11 and Ill is discussed below in paragraphs 
2.10 et seq. and 3.1 et seq.). While it is certain 
that the accession of Portugal and Spain would 
be very warmly welcomed from a purely political 
standpoint, certain WEU countries consider that 
at the same time it is essential not to isolate the 
European allied countries on the two flanks 
which are of vital strategic importance for 
European security. Should not a simultaneous 
invitation therefore also be made to all the allied 
European countries members of NATO to join 
WEU? 
2.8. In regard to the American invitation to 
European firms to take part in research for stra-
tegic defence purposes, the bilateral negotiations 
held by the United States with each of the 
European allied countries are making slow pro-
gress. Memoranda of understanding have been 
signed by the United Kingdom, Germany and, 
on 19th September 1986, by Italy but with the 
reservation that signature did not imply that 
government's political or military support for the 
SDI 3• Exceptionally for this type of document, 
their content has not been published, which is 
arousing concern about the extent of the 
American technical know-how to which 
European industries taking part in the research 
would have access. Government reservations 
about the SDI were referred to very recently by 
Baroness Young, British Minister of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, when she 
addressed the Assembly on 3rd June 1986: 
"We shall in particular look from a 
European perspective at certain aspects of 
European participation in the SDI 
research programme, and at the politico/ 
strategic implications of SDI for Europe 
itself. Many ofthese questions, as Geoffrey 
Howe made clear in his speech in March 
1985 to the Royal United Services 
Institute, are unanswerable, and will be so 
for a long time to come. And differences in 
perception and perspective between our 
member governments have already 
limited the possible extent of co-ordi-
nation or participation in the SDI research 
programme. " 
The many questions and reservations referred to 
by Sir Geoffrey Howe in this speech of 15th 
March 1985 were quoted in an earlier report by 
the committee 4• 
2.9. Where the future activities of the three 
new Council agencies are concerned, a letter 5 
from the Secretary-General dated 17th March 
1986 gives some information. Inter alia, it 
reports that: 
" Agency I is to study Soviet tactics vis-
a-vis the countries of Western Europe in 
regard to questions of the control of arma-
ments and disarmament. In the future it 
will also have to take an interest in the 
control of conventional armaments and 
the essential problem of verification. " 
3. The Times, 20th September 1986. 
4. Document 1033, WEU and the strategic defence initi-
ative, 4th November 1985, Rapporteur: Mr. van den Bergh -
explanatory memorandum, paragraph 4.2. 
5. Text at Appendix I. 
139 
DOCUMENT 1090 
Application of Protocol No. II on forces of 
Western European Union 
2.10. In 1985, the Council quly carried out the 
formalities provided for in Protocol No. 11 of the 
modified Brussels Treaty to ensure that the 
forces maintained by member countries on the 
mainland of Europe did not exceed the agreed 
levels. 
2.11. In regard to the forces which the United 
Kingdom has undertaken to station on the 
mainland of Europe in accordance with Article 
VI of Protocol No. 11, fixed by the Council at 
55 000 men plus a tactical air force, the com-
mittee notes with satisfaction that, according to 
the Council's report, in 1985 the number of 
British forces concerned wa$ 56 005, of which 
814 were redeployed in Northern Ireland for 
'short tours of duty. These figures compare with 
56 467 on the mainland of Europe of which 972 
in Northern Ireland in 1984, according to the 
Council's previous report. The British tactical air 
force stationed on the mainland of Europe in 
1985 was the same as in the pnevious year, i.e.: 
Role Aircraft/ Squadrons Equipment 
Strike/ Attack Jaguar 1 
Tornado 4 
Offensive support Harrier I 2 
Reconnaissance Jaguar 1 
Air defence Phantom 2 
Rapier surface-to-air 
missiles 1 
Air transport Puma 1 
Chinook 1 
Ground defence RAF regiment 1 
Ill. Agency for the Contro,l of Armaments 
(a) Conventional weapons 
3.1. In its 1984 report 6 the committee 
examined the history of the rather incomplete 
application of controls of member countries' 
weapons provided for in the Brussels Treaty as 
modified in 1954. There is nQ need to return to 
controls of conventional weapons - and the gaps 
in their application - since the Council, in accor-
dance with several Assembly recommendations, 
decided to abolish them completely as from 1st 
January 1986. In 1985, in aocordance with the 
decision of principle taken lDy the Council in 
Rome in October 1984, supplemented by its 
resolution of 23rd January 1985, controls were 
applied to only about half the conventional 
weapons subject to control uhder the modified 
Brussels Treaty and its Protocols Nos. Ill and 
6. Thirty years of the modified B!Vssels Treaty - reply to 
the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council, Document 
973, 15th May 1984, Rapporteur: Mr. De Decker. 
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IV. By pursuing documentary controls - which 
represented most of the Agency's work in the 
past - in 1985 and carrying out thirty-four field 
control measures in the same year, the Agency 
for the Control of Armaments duly carried out 
its duties until the last day of its existence with a 
full staff. The table hereafter gives a breakdown 
of field control measures: 
Numbers and types of inspections carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments -1961-85 
Non-production 
Quantitative control measures control 
measures Total 
control 
at units (of which measures (all 
at under at at non- categories) 
depots national production Sub-total production production plants plants of chemical 
command 
weapons) 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1961 29 15 12 66 7 
!!l 
63 
2 26 20 11 57 7 65 
3 35 13 13 61 10 74 
4 39 19 13 71 9 80 
5 26 16 11 53 7 n.a. 60 
6 * * * * * n.a. 78 7 * * * * * n.a. 70 8 * * * * * n.a. 79 9 * * * * * (3) 77 
a b a b a b a b a b a b 
1970 * * * * * * * * * * n.a. 82 72 1 * * * * * * * * * * n.a. 82 72 2 * * * * * n.a. - 66 3 * * * * * n.a. - 66 4 * * * * * n.a. - 71 5 * * * * * n.a. - 72 
6 * * * * * n.a. - 71 
7 * * * * * n.a. - 70 8 * * * * * n.a. - 68 9 * * * * * n.a. - 70 
1980 * * * * * n.a. - 70 1 * * * * * n.a. - 70 2 * * * * * n.a. - 69 3 * * * * * n.a. - 72 4 * * * * * n.a. - 66 5 * * * * * n.a. - 34 
Notes a, b: From 1971 onwards the Agency adopted a new system of presenting its summary table of inspections, thenceforth 
counting inspections of several small grouped ammunition depots as a single inspection. An apparent reduction in numbers of 
inspections in fact reflects no reduction in the activities of the Agency. For comparison, the Council reported both sets of figures 
(old and new style -a and b) for the years 1970 and 1971. 
n.a. : Information not available. 
Sources: Figures for total control measures (all categories) given in column 7 are derived from published annual reports of the 
Council. With regard to the variable categories of controls (columns I to 6), figures for 1961-65 are also derived from the pub-
lished annual reports of the Council. Those for 1966 to 1969 have never been made available to the committee. Those for 1970 to 
1985 have been communicated to the Assembly by the Council in response to Recommendation 213, but permission to publish 
them has been withheld. Minor discrepancies in some totals result from differences of definition of visit and are without signifi-
cance. 
* Confidential information available to the committee deleted from the published report. 
3.2. The Council's decision to control in 1985 
only half the number of conventional weapons 
formerly controlled, pending the complete abo-
lition of such controls as from 1st July 1986, 
seems curious, not to say aberrant. 
140 
(b) ABC weapons 
. 3.3. The situation is different in regard to 
atomic, biological and chemical weapons. The 
Rome declaration adopted by the Council on 
\ 
27th October 1984 asserted that " the commit-
ments and controls concerning ABC weapons 
would be maintained at the existing level and in 
accordance with the procedures agreed up to the 
present time". But, as in previous years, the 
annual report of the Council for 1985 states that 
" since the situation has remained the same as in 
previous years, the Agency did not exercise any 
control in the field of atomic weapons " and the 
list of biological weapons subject to control 
accepted by the Council in 1981 having been 
renewed by the latter for 1985 " as in previous 
years... the Agency did not exercise any control 
in the field of biological weapons ". 
3.4. There remain chemical weapons. As for 
atomic and biological weapons, there are two 
aspects to controls of chemical weapons pro-
vided for in the Brussels Treaty: 
(i) control of any production in countries 
not having renounced the right to 
produce chemical weapons; 
(ii) verification of undertakings made by 
the country which renounced the right 
to produce such weapons. 
3.5. As in past years, in 1985 the Council first 
renewed the list of chemical weapons subject to 
control which it had previously approved. Then, 
according to the annual report, the questionnaire 
which the Agency sends the six countries which 
have not renounced the right to produce such 
chemical weapons asked: 
" . .. whether production of chemical 
weapons on their mainland territory had 
passed the experimental stage and entered 
the effective production stage. As in the 
past, all these states replied m the 
negative. 
In addition, the Agency asked all the 
member states to declare any chemical 
weapons that they might hold. Since all the 
member states replied in the negative, the 
Agency carried out no quantitative con-
trols of chemical weapons in 1985. " 
3.6. The committee notes that this situation 
will change if France starts the effective pro-
duction of chemical weapons as Mr. Jean-
Bernard Raimond, French Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, foresaw in his address to the Geneva dis-
armament conference on 19th February 1987. 
According to Article Ill of Protocol No. Ill to the 
modified Brussels Treaty: " When the devel-
opment of atomic, biological and chemical 
weapons in the territory on the mainland of 
Europe of the high contracting parties who have 
not given up the right to produce them has 
passed the experimental stage and effective pro-
duction of them has started there, the level of 
stocks that the high contracting parties con-
cerned will be allowed to hold on the mainland 
of Europe shall be decided by a majority vote of 
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the Council of Western European Union" and, 
according to Article IV, these weapons "will be 
controlled to the extent and in the manner laid 
down in Protocol No. IV". 
3.7. In the case of the seventh country, which 
has renounced the right to produce chemical 
weapons on its territory, the annual report states 
that: 
"The competent authorities of the country 
concerned provided tile Agency with a 
detailed, precise and complete reply to the 
request for information - aimed at facili-
tating the control of non-production of 
chemical weapons - which was sent to 
them by the Agency in occordance with the 
resolution adopted by the Council in 1959 
and with the directive received from the 
Council in 1960. In addition, the pro-
cedure applied with these authorities since 
1973 was again used. " 
3.8. In regard to field control measures, the 
Agency each year conducts agreed verification of 
non-production in plants. But reports of the 
Council prior to 1983 contained the following 
reservation: 
" As the convention for the due process of 
law 7 has not yet entered into force, the 
control measures carried out by the 
Agency at private concerns had, in 1982, 
as in previous years, to take the form of 
agreed control measures. 
One consequence of this situation is that, 
in order to obtain the . agreement of the 
firms concerned, the Agency has to give a 
few weeks' notice. Since this agreement 
has never been withheld, the 1982 pro-
gramme of control measures at privately-
owned plants was therefore drawn up with 
full confidence that it could be imple-
mented as in previous years. " 
3.9. In future, therefore, WEU's activities in 
regard to the internal control of armaments will 
be limited in fact to this procedure for con-
trolling chemical weapons which could be 
extended to control of the production of French 
chemical weapons if this becomes effective. The 
Agency for the Control of Armaments has not 
been disbanded altogether, but its staff has been 
reduced to one person, an expert in chemical 
weapons. 
7. Convention concerning measures to be taken by 
member states of Western European Umion in order to enable 
the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out its 
control effectively and making provisibn for due process of 
law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the Brussels 
Treaty, as modified by the protocols signed in Paris on 23rd 
October 1954 (signed in Paris on 14th December 1957 but so 
far ratified by only six countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom). 
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IV. Standing Armaments Committee 
4.1. In the chapter of the annual report on the 
activities of the Standing Armaments Committee 
in 1985, it is stated that the commmittee: 
" having noted the ministerial decisions 
taken in regard to it and in regard to the 
establishment of the 'agencies for security 
questions', addressed the problem of 
co-operation in the field of armaments and 
research, and that of its own future. " 
Delegates' opinions appear to have been divided 
as to the expediency of convening the committee 
in the future. The new Agency Ill which is 
replacing the former international secretariat of 
the SAC is now working directly for the Council 
and, according to the letter of the Secretary-
General of 17th March 1986: 
" will study certain aspects of com-
petitivity in the armaments industry in 
Europe and the implications of the evo-
lution of the world arms market, together 
with the problems of technological trans-
fers between European allies. " 
V. International negotiations on the 
control of armaments 
(a) General 
5.1. The committee welcomed the fact that the 
Council decided in the Rome declaration of 
October 1984: 
" ... to hold comprehensive discussions 
and to seek to harmonise their views on 
the specific conditions of security in 
Europe, in particular: 
- arms control and disarmament. " 
5.2. In 1985, the committee, for its part, 
studied in detail the progress of negotiations on 
the control of armaments in four international 
forums: the bilateral negotiations between the 
United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear 
and space weapons, the mutual and balanced 
force reduction negotiations in Vienna, the con-
ference on disarmament in Europe in Stockholm 
and the Geneva disarmament conference s. 
5.3. At the close of the first summit meeting 
between President Reagan and General Secretary 
Gorbachev in Geneva from 19th to 21st 
November 1985, the committee was able inter 
8. Disarmament, information report, Document I 040, 
4th November 1985, Rapporteur: Mr. Blaauw; Disarmament, 
Document 1043, 22nd November 1985, Rapporteur: Mr. 
Blaauw. 
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alia to welcome " the postttve fresh start to 
bilateral relations between the United States and 
the Soviet Union ... and the constructive refer-
ences to most arms control issues in the agreed 
statement including the principle of a 50% 
reduction in nuclear arms, the general and com-
plete prohibition of chemical weapons, and the 
idea of an interim INF agreement, while noting 
the absence of specific agreement" 9• The very 
positive impetus given to the negotiations was 
enhanced shortly afterwards by the long 
statement on disarmament made by General 
Secretary Gorbachev in Moscow on 15th 
January 1986 which contained six proposals, 
including a fifteen-year programme leading in 
three stages to the complete elimination of 
nuclear weapons throughout the world before the 
end of the century and a three-month prolon-
gation of the moratorium on nuclear tests ini-
tially declared by the Soviet Union as from 6th 
August 1985 immediately after it had carried out 
a programme of nuclear test explosions. 
5.4. In 1986, several mainly positive events 
occurred which change the prospects for almost 
all the various negotiations on arms control. The 
impromptu summit meeting in Reykjavik was 
the most recent to attract worldwide attention 
and gave rise to varied reactions on the part of 
the European allies leading up to the alliance's 
collective conclusions which were set out in the 
North Atlantic Council communique of 12th 
December 1986. Then, in his statement of 28th 
February 1987, Mr. Gorbachev announced 
major concessions relating to INF missiles. Con-
sideration should also be given to the conse-
quences of President Reagan's speech on 27th 
May 1986 about SALT II, the NATO declara-
tions in Halifax and Brussels and the appeal of 
the member states of the Warsaw Pact of 11th 
June 1986 relating to the reduction of armed 
forces and armaments in Europe, certain conces-
sions announced by the Soviet Union on 22nd 
April 1986 and again on 17th February 1987 con-
cerning verification in the context of a ban on 
chemical weapons and the new British proposals 
of 15th July 1986 and, finally, the document of 
the Stockholm conference adopted on 19th Sep-
tember 1986 relating to confidence-building 
measures. The committee examines these devel-
opments under the following heads. 
(b) Bilateral negotiations 
(i) Intermediate-range nuclear forces 
5.5. In the bilateral negotiations in Geneva 
between the United States and the Soviet Union 
on strategic nuclear weapons, intermediate-range 
9. Recommendation 425, adopted by the Assembly on 2nd 
December 1985, the draft version of which is given in 
Document 1043. 
nuclear forces and space weapons, particular 
attention was paid to intermediate-range 
weapons last year because of the new proposals 
put forward by Mr. Gorbachev in his statement 
of 15th January 1986 and the terms of the West's 
answer. Details of the proposals made by each 
side's negotiators in Geneva are obviously not 
known. But since the Soviet Union in particular 
has developed the habit of negotiating more pub-
licly than in the past, the public is most probably 
aware of the major elements of the proposals 
exchanged. 
5.6. The rather spectacular language used by 
Mr. Gorbachev in his address on 15th January 
1986 was certainly intended to impress world 
public opinion: 
" The Soviet Union is proposing a step-
by-step and consistent process of ridding 
the earth of nuclear weapons, to be imple-
mented and completed within the next 
fifteen years, before the end of this 
century." 
Nevertheless, for intermediate-range weapons, 
this address contains at least the outline of 
certain tangible proposals. The first stage would 
last from five to eight years: 
" The first stage will include the adoption 
and implementation of the decision on the 
complete elimination of intermediate-
range missiles of the USSR and the United 
States in the European zone, both ballistic 
and cruise missiles, as a first step towards 
ridding the European continent of nuclear 
weapons. 
At the same time the United States should 
undertake not to transfer its strategic and 
medium-range missiles to other countries, 
while Britain and France should pledge 
not to build up their respective nuclear 
arms." 
During the second stage, starting in 1990 and 
spread over a period of five to seven years: 
" ... the other nuclear powers will begin to 
engage in nuclear disarmament. To begin 
with, they would pledge to freeze all their 
nuclear arms and not to have them in the 
territories of other countries. 
In this period the USSR and the United 
States will go on with the reductions 
agreed upon during the first stage and also 
carry out further measures designed to 
eliminate their medium-range nuclear 
weapons and freeze their tactical nuclear 
systems." 
DOCUMENT 1090 
the "European zone "as being the area extending 
as far as longitude 80° east, i.e. a line some 1 300 
km to the east of the Urals, beyond which SS-20 
missiles are out of range of Europe. SS-20 mis-
siles west of that line would be I destroyed: 
"We do not propose to move these SS-20 
missiles somewhere else. They will be 
destroyed under painstaking and reliable 
national and international control, 
including inspections on site and on the 
spot. " 
5.8. The detailed Soviet proposals tabled at the 
Geneva negotiations on 16th January 1986 were 
supplemented by letters to the British and 
French Governments, not represented at the 
negotiations. 
5.9. At this stage, there were two new and 
positive elements in these S<1>viet proposals. 
British and French nuclear forces would no 
longer be taken into account in the negotiations; 
they would be frozen, however, at their present 
level. Secondly, the Soviet Union at that time no 
longer seemed to be seeking a link with space 
weapons, a ban on which was previously to have 
formed part of any agreement op other weapons 
systems. This point was confirmed publicly by 
Mr. Gorbachev in an interview which he granted 
to United States Senator Edward Kennedy in 
Moscow on 6th February 1986 when Mr. 
Gorbachev said that his proposal to withdraw 
SS-20s from Europe if the Americans did the 
same with their Pershing lis deJI>ended solely on 
the United Kingdom and Franc~ refraining from 
increasing their corresponding nuclear weapons 
and the United States not supplying such 
weapons to other countries. 
5.10. While the United States was holding con-
sultations with its allies, particularly during Mr. 
Paul Nitze's visit to Europe ~n February, the 
press on 8th February 1986 reported an 
American counter-proposal approved by Mr. 
Reagan subject to consultations with the allies. It 
is believed this plan accepted the elimination of 
all intermediate-range American and Soviet mis-
siles stationed in Europe but also insisted on a 
50% reduction in Soviet SS-20 'missiles in Asia. 
However, no ceiling was said 1to be placed on 
British or French forces, nor were there to be 
limitations on the supply of American missiles to 
the allies. 
5.11. The European allies had reservations 
about the first American proposals, considering 
that the complete eliminadon of nuclear 
weapons stationed in EuroPe would leave 
western forces at the mercy of the conventional 
superiority of the Warsaw Pact forces, particu-
5.7. Further details were given on 12th Feb- larly in Central Europe. The American answer 
ruary 1986 during an interview granted to West finally communicated to the Soviet Union on 
German television by General Nikolai Chervov, 23rd February 1986 returned rather to the 
Soviet spokesman on disarmament. He defined " global zero-zero " position already defined in 
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1981. The United States therefore proposed as a 
target the elimination of SS-20 and cruise mis-
siles in both Europe and Asia, but as a first stage 
the reduction to 140 of the SS-20 launchers in 
Europe, with a proportional reduction in Asia; 
only in the second and third stages would the 
United States agree to a reduction of its own mis-
siles parallel with Soviet reductions; short-range 
missiles were also to be taken into account. 
Soviet proposals relating to the freezing of 
British and French forces were rejected since the 
Geneva negotiations are purely bilateral. French 
and British answers to Mr. Gorbachev also 
rejected his proposal, France recalling its well-
known position that it is in favour of all reduc-
tions in nuclear weapons, but the arsenals of the 
superpowers must be reduced significantly before 
reductions in the relatively small French forces 
can be considered; in any event, priority was to 
be given to reducing conventional weapons. 
5.12. In previous reports, the committee 
recalled that the existence of British and French 
forces had in fact been taken into account 
already in the SALT I and SALT II bilateral 
agreements. In the first case, the Soviet unilateral 
declaration accompanying the agreement stated 
that the Soviet Union could increase the number 
of its strategic missile launching submarines in 
the event of the United States' allies doing 
likewise. In the case of SALT II, it has been 
known for a long time that the concession which 
allowed the Soviet Union to retain 308 heavy 
ICBMs (SS-9s and SS-18s) was made in compen-
sation for British and French nuclear forces and 
the deployment of American nuclear systems in 
Europe. 
5.13. While the committee has always rejected 
any proposal to reduce British and French 
nuclear forces at a time when the superpowers 
have thousands of nuclear warheads, it has 
nevertheless drawn attention to the problems 
which would arise for the negotiations on the 
control of armaments if European forces were 
equipped with multiple-warhead missiles. The 
Trident missile, intended to come into service 
with the British force in the nineties, is designed 
to carry up to eight warheads. The possibility of a 
British force eight times its present size obvi-
ously raises a problem for the Soviet Union in 
the current negotiations. 
5.14. During summer 1986 there was a fairly 
intensive bilateral dialogue with exchanges of 
letters between President Reagan and General 
Secretary Gorbachev in June, July and Sep-
tember, followed shortly afterwards by the 
announcement of a meeting between the two 
leaders in Reykjavik on 11th and 12th October. 
The initiative for this meeting came from the 
Soviet Union; it was to be a preparatory meeting 
for a true summit meeting and was not to lead to 
the signing of a final agreement. 
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5.15. Before the Reykjavik summit meeting, the 
press was already reporting new American pro-
posals for reducing INF in Europe to 100 war-
heads on each side (and hence only 33 SS-20 mis-
siles for the Soviet Union): 100 warheads in the 
Asian part of the Soviet Union, which would be 
offset by 100 cruise missiles based in the United 
States. 
5.16. The Soviet Union made significant con-
cessions in Reykjavik relating to intermediate-
range missiles 10• First, the agreement would aim 
at " the complete elimination of Soviet and 
United States medium-range missiles in 
Europe " and, second, " without taking the 
nuclear potentials of Britain and France into 
account", meaning that these forces would no 
longer be frozen. " Negotiations will be started 
on the missiles with a range of under 1 000 kilo-
metres deployed by the sides in Europe " 
(SRINF). At the close of the summit meeting, the 
press reported that intermediate-range missiles 
remaining in Soviet Asia and the United States 
following their elimination in Europe would be 
limited to 100 warheads on each side, i.e. 33 
SS-20 missiles on the Soviet side. At the same 
time, the Soviet Union back-tracked by again 
making any agreement on intermediate missiles 
depend on the conclusion of an agreement on 
anti-ballistic weapons. 
5.17. A fairly heated discussion started in 
Europe on the expediency of accepting this new 
Soviet proposal, which, on the NATO side, 
would lead to the removal of cruise and Pershing 
II missiles whose deployment following NATO's 
1979 decision led to opposition from a section of 
the public. However, the elimination of these 
missiles was already implicit in the 1979 decision 
in the event of the SS-20 being withdrawn, and 
explicit in the famous zero-zero option proposed 
by NATO in 1981. Since then, each com-
munique issued by the NATO Nuclear Planning 
Group has confirmed "our willingness to 
reverse, halt, or modify the deployment -
including the removal or dismantling of missiles 
already deployed - upon achievement of a ... 
equitable agreement " 11 • Finally, the consensus 
of the sixteen NATO countries on negotiations 
on intermediate-range missiles after Reykjavik 
was expressed in the North Atlantic Council 
communique of 12th December 1986 12, as 
follows: 
"Opportunity for progress in some areas, 
notably in the LRINF negotiations, must 
not be held hostage to agreements in other 
unrelated ones. Soviet insistence on doing 
so would contradict assurances given at 
the highest level. 
10. See Appendix V, section 2. 
11. Nuclear Planning Group communique, 22nd October 
1986. 
12. See Appendix IV. 
On the basis of the December 1979 NATO 
decision on LRINF modernisation and 
arms control, the allies concerned fully 
support the envisaged elimination of 
American and Soviet land-based LRINF 
in Europe and the limitation to 100 war-
heads in Asia and the United States while 
their ultimate objective remains the total 
elimination of all such LRINF. They stress 
that an INF agreement must not neglect 
the existing imbalances in shorter-range 
United States and Soviet INF missiles and 
must provide for a commitment to 
follow-on negotiations on these mis-
siles. " 
5.18. Finally, on 28th February 1987 Mr. 
Gorbachev made a statement, referring to " the 
Soviet leadership and the country's Defence 
Council, which I am responsible for 
presiding ... " 13 probably in order clearly to 
involve the Soviet military authorities - and 
reverting to his position prior to Reykjavik: 
"The Soviet Union suggests that the 
problem of medium-range missiles in 
Europe be singled out from the package of 
issues, and that a separate agreement on it 
be concluded, and without delay ... It was 
agreed in Reykjavik that the Soviet Union 
and the United States would eliminate all 
their medium-range missiles (MRM) in 
Europe within the next five years. Within 
the same period the number of Soviet 
MRMs in the Asian part of our territory 
would be cut down to a hundred warheads 
on the understanding that the United 
States could leave the same number of 
MRM warheads in its national territory. 
As soon as an agreement on eliminating 
Soviet and United States medium-range 
missiles in Europe is signed, the Soviet 
Union will withdraw from the German 
Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, 
by agreement with the governments of 
those countries, the longer-range theatre 
missiles which had been deployed there as 
measures in reply to the deployment of 
Pershing 11 and cruise missiles in Western 
Europe. As far as other theatre missiles are 
concerned, we are prepared to begin talks 
immediately with a view to reducing and 
fully eliminating them ... " 
5.19. In Moscow on 2nd March it was the 
Soviet Chief-of-Staff, Marshal Sergei 
Akhromeyev, who confirmed that, as foreseen in 
the Soviet document tabled in Reykjavik, the 
Soviet Union was making no link between 
British and French nuclear forces and the pro-
posed agreement on intermediate forces, which 
the Soviet Union hoped would be concluded 
13. Text at Appendix VII. 
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within six months. However, at some as yet non-
determined stage in the process of reducing 
nuclear weapons, Britain and Fqmce would have 
to join in. Marshal Akhromeyev made it clear 
that missiles to be eliminated would be 
" destroyed " or " dismantled " under the " most 
effective control " including " on-site reciprocal 
inspection of the action of the parties " 14• The 
chief Soviet negotiator, Mr. Vorontsov, in a 
press conference in Paris on 6th March, went on 
the offensive on verification: " We demand total 
access to all bases, all depots, to all places where 
these missiles are ... " in Eur<l>pe and in the 
United States, including "private production 
plants " if necessary with special legislation to 
provide this right 15• The extensive nature of 
expected inspection provisions is shown by the 
special conference of foreign ministry officials 
from the five NATO countries in which INF 
missiles are based held in Washington on lOth 
March prior to the tabling of inspection pro-
posals by the United States in the Geneva talks 
on 12th March. In Belgium at least domestic 
legislation is expected to be required. 
5.20. These latest Soviet concessions make it 
highly desirable for NATO to accept the 
agreement on INF now envisaged. Certain conse-
quences should be examined. 
Possible decoupling of American deterrent 
forces 
5.21. The elimination of cruise and Pershing 11 
missiles in Europe would obviously reduce the 
number of American nuclear weapons based in 
Europe and within range of Soviet territory. 
Some have thought the elimination of this 
category of weapons might re~uce the essential 
coupling between American ~trategic nuclear 
weapons and the defence of Eutope. Others con-
sidered this argument too philosophical to be of 
real military significance. In any event, the 
argument takes no account of the many other 
American nuclear weapons wh~h would remain 
in Europe or in European waters and which are 
still within range of Soviet territory, i.e. 150 
F-111 aircraft based in the United Kingdom, 20 
A-6E and 48 A-7 carrier-based aircraft (assuming 
that two of the fourteen Atnerican aircraft-
carriers are in European waters) and, finally, 
many of the 166 TLAM/N nuclear cruise mis-
siles with a range of 1 350 nautical miles already 
deployed on board American surface ships and 
five submarines, and which will number 758 
when their production has been completed. 
Shorter-range INF missiles 
5.22. Until the seventies, NATO had some 
7 000 American nuclear warheads earmarked for 
14. Tass, 2nd March 1987. 
15. Figaro, 7th March 1987. 
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tactical weapons in Europe, including tactical 
aviation, Lance short-range missiles and the 
artillery. The Soviet Union was then believed to 
have only 3 500. However, in the meantime 
NATO has unilaterally reduced the number ofits 
tactical warheads, on the one hand to offset the 
deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles and, 
on the other hand, because of the obsolescence of 
certain weapons systems with the result that the 
number of warheads now earmarked for the 
abovementioned tactical equipment is only just 
over 4 000. Since the deployment of cruise and 
Pershing 11 missiles by NATO in 1983, the 
Soviet Union "in compensation " has deployed 
shorter-range INF missiles, including the SS-23 
with a range of 500 km and the modified version 
of the SS-12 (SS-22) with a range of 900 km, in 
Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany, visibly 
threatening the European capitals. NATO tac-
tical aviation cannot reach Soviet territory 
although the capitals of the other Warsaw Pact 
countries are within range. The constraints 
imposed on shorter-range weapons in an 
agreement on LRINF will therefore be of impor-
tance, and seem to have been foreseen in the 
statement of 28th February 1987. 
Number of warheads to be eliminated 
5.23. The most positive aspect of the planned 
INF agreement is the number of warheads to be 
eliminated on each side; for NATO, it would be a 
matter of 108 Pershing 11 and 208 cruise missiles 
effectively deployed at the end of 1986 out of a 
total of 464 whose deployment is planned, i.e. a 
total of only 316 warheads eliminated. Con-
versely, the Soviet Union would eliminate 408 
SS-20s with 3 warheads each, i.e. a total of 1 224 
warheads, 729 16 of which cover Europe, leaving 
only 33 SS-20s in Soviet Asia (1 00 warheads 
foreseen in the draft agreement) which would be 
offset by 100 missiles in the United States. 
Comparison with the situation before 1979 
5.24. When NATO took its 1979 decision, the 
Soviet Union had already deployed 120 SS-20s 
in addition to other intermediate-range missiles, 
500 SS-4s and 90 SS-5s. At that time, NATO had 
no missiles of comparable range. The proposal to 
reduce to zero on each side the number of 
intermediate-range missiles in Europe therefore 
can but be a definite advantage for NATO com-
pared with the situation before 1979. 
The European zone 
5.25. It is essential for the "European zone" 
·which would henceforth be free of such missiles 
to be the one defined in paragraph 5. 7 above, i.e. 
from a line some 1 300 km to the east of the 
16. Marshal Akhromeyev on 2nd March 1987 referred to 
243 SS-20s in Europe. 
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Urals, beyond which SS-20 missiles are out of 
range of Europe. 
Conclusion concerning INF 
5.26. On the adjournment of the Geneva INF 
talks on 26th March, Mr. Maynard Glitman, the 
United States Representative, described the 
session as " useful and constructive " but added 
" difficult issues remain ... ". He recalled the 
United States "long-standing position that there 
must be equal global constraints on shorter-range 
INF missile systems as an integral part of this 
INF treaty to ensure its viability and 
effectiveness" 17• It was hoped that the meeting 
between Mr. Shultz and Mr. Shevardnadze in 
Moscow from 13th to 16th April would help the 
Geneva negotiations to progress on their 
resumption on 23rd April. 
5.27. In the draft recommendation, the com-
mittee therefore proposes the conclusion of a 
separate agreement for •• the elimination of all 
long-range INF missiles within range of 
Europe". It will obviously be important for the 
details of the treaty that the two delegations will 
have to draft in Geneva to provide for adequate 
verification measures and a programme of reduc-
tions in stages spread over the planned five-year 
period, allowing passage to a subsequent stage of 
reductions only when the other side's implemen-
tation of the previous stage has been verified. 
(ii) Strategic nuclear weapons 
5.28. Referring to strategic weapons in his major 
statement of 15th January 1986 on the elimi-
nation of nuclear weapons before the end of the 
century, Mr. Gorbachev said: 
•• Stage one. Within the next five to eight 
years the USSR and the United States will 
reduce by one half the nuclear arms that 
can reach each other's territory. On the 
remaining delivery vehicles of this kind 
each side will retain no more than 6 000 
warheads. 
It stands to reason that such a reduction is 
possible only if the USSR and the United 
States mutually renounce the devel-
opment, testing and deployment of space 
strike weapons. " 
In stage two, as from 1990 and for a period of 
five to seven years, the United States and the 
Soviet Union would have completed the 50% 
reduction in their strategic weapons; at the same 
stage, the prohibition of space strike weapons 
would have to become multilateral, with the par-
ticipation of major industrial powers. There 
would be a ban on the development of non-
nuclear weapons based on new physical prin-
ciples, with a destructive power close to that of 
17. International Herald Tribune, 27th March 1987. 
nuclear arms or other weapons of mass 
destruction. Finally, in stage three as from 1995 
the elimination of all remaining nuclear weapons 
would be completed. Mr. Gorbachev then made 
a few comments about verification: 
"We have in mind that special procedures 
will be worked out for the destruction of 
nuclear weapons as well as the disman-
tling, re-equipment or destruction of 
delivery vehicles. In the process, agree-
ment will be reached on the numbers of 
weapons to be destroyed at each stage, the 
sites of their destruction and so on. 
Verification with regard to the weapons 
that are destroyed or limited would be 
carried out both by national technical 
means and through on-site inspections. 
The USSR is ready to reach agreement 
on any other additional verification 
measures. " 
5.29. In his answer communicated to the Soviet 
Union on 23rd February 1986, President Reagan 
reconfirmed the American proposal to reduce 
strategic nuclear weapons by half. In an address 
on 24th February 1986 on the eve ofthe opening 
of the twenty-seventh congress of the Soviet 
Communist Party, President Reagan expressed 
reservations about the rather publicity-seeking 
aspects of Mr. Gorbachev's proposals: 
" On the other hand, many of the specific 
details proposed in the subsequent phases 
of the Soviet 'plan' are clearly not appro-
priate for consideration at this time. In our 
view, the total elimination of nuclear 
weapons will require, at the same time, the 
correction of the conventional and other 
force imbalances, full compliance with 
existing and future treaty obligations, 
peaceful resolution of regional conflicts ... 
Unfortunately, the details of the Soviet 
'plan' do not address these equally vital 
requirements." 
5.30. Towards 20th May, the United States had 
to face the problem of respecting the SALT Il 
treaty when the strategic submarine Nevada 
started sea-trials with a load of 24 missiles. To 
respect the treaty limits, the United States then 
had to dismantle two old Poseidon submarines 
(with 16launchers each) or reduce the number of 
its Minuteman ICBMs. On 14th April, 52 of the 
100 senators wrote to President Reagan asking 
him to take the necessary steps to respect the 
treaty. 
5.31. On 27th May 1986 President Reagan 
made a major speech on his intention to consider 
himself no longer bound by the SALT II treaty, 
the key passage of which reads as follows: 
" ... I have determined that, in the future, 
the United States must base decisions 
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regarding its strategic force structure on 
the nature and magnitude of the threat 
posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not 
on standards contained in the SALT 
structure which has been undermined by 
Soviet non-compliance, an~ especially in a 
flawed SALT II treaty which was never 
ratified, would have expired if it had been 
ratified, and has been violated by the 
Soviet Union. 
Since the United States will retire and dis-
mantle two Poseidon submarines this 
summer, we will remain technically in 
observance of the terms of the SALT II 
treaty until the United S~ates equips its 
131 st B-52 heavy bomber for cruise 
missile carriage near the end of this year. 
However, given the decision that I have 
been forced to make, I int~nd at that time 
to continue deployment of US B-52 heavy 
bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 
131 st aircraft as an appropriate response 
without dismantling additional US 
systems as compensation under the terms 
of the SALT II treaty. Of ~ourse, since we 
will remain in technical compliance with 
the terms of the expired SALT II treaty for 
some months, I continue ~o hope that the 
Soviet Union will use this time to take the 
constructive steps necessary to alter the 
current situation .. Should they do so, we 
will certainly take this into account. " 
5.32. The 131st B-52 with 121 cruise missiles 
duly came into service on 28th November 1986, 
the United States having thus exceeded the 
ceiling of 1 320 strategic launchers imposed by 
SALT II. The following 5th December, the 
Soviet deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. 
Bessmertnykh, said the Soviet Union would con-
tinue to respect SALT II limits " for the time 
being". At the same press conference, General 
Chervov added that the 131 st bomber was not a 
threat in itself but that in view of the steady 
increase in American forces the Soviet Union 
could not respect SALT II much longer. 
5.33. President Reagan's speech of 27th May 
1986 was much commented on in divergent 
statements by various members of the American 
administration and the public. On 19th June the 
United States House of Representatives passed 
by 256 votes to 145 a non-binding resolution 
calling on the President to " continue to adhere 
to the provisions of the SALT agreements as long 
as the Soviet Union does likewise". At its 
meeting in Washington from 16~h to 20th June, 
the committee also heard diverging opinions 
about the themes of this speech. As far as the 
actual terms of the speech are concerned, it is 
clear that the President did not say, as some 
members of his administration would have liked, 
that SALT II is dead. 
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5.34. Reactions by the governments of the WEU 
countries to the speech of 27th May 1986 were 
also negative. In the House of Commons on 18th 
November 1986, Mrs. Thatcher, the British 
Prime Minister, returning from talks with Pres-
ident Reagan at Camp David, said:" We did not 
discuss the provisions of the SALT 11 treaty on 
this occasion. They remain as before. They must 
be observed by both sides, and I hope that they 
will be ... " 
5.35. A key argument relates to possible viola-
tions of the SALT 11 treaty by the Soviet Union. 
As the committee has already underlined, the 
only case of violation of the SALT 11 treaty spe-
cifically endorsed by the NATO countries was 
the introduction of two " new " missiles - the 
SS-X24 and SS-25- by the Soviet Union 18 when 
under the treaty it is allowed only one. It should 
be stressed that, until 28th November 1986, 
neither the United States nor the Soviet Union 
had violated the numerical ceilings imposed by 
SALT 11 and that the United States is not 
accusing the Soviet Union of doing so. Although 
it has deployed improved models of strategic 
missiles, the Soviet Union, like the United 
States, simultaneously destroyed or withdrew 
from service other missiles so as to respect the 
ceilings. According to the definitions used the 
number of warheads thus destroyed or with-
drawn by the Soviet Union is believed to be 
between 600 and 1 300, plus 14 nuclear-
propelled submarines. Recent figures given by 
the Soviet Union of numbers of total " strategic 
delivery vehicles " dismantled by the Soviet 
Union and the United States in compliance with 
SALT I and SALT 11 claim 616 and 290 
respectively 19• 
5.36. The question whether or not the SS-25 is a 
new missile within the meaning of SALT 11 (i.e. 
whether its diameter, launch weight or throw 
weight exceed those of its predecessor by more 
than 5%) is highly complex and depends inter 
alia on the components to be included in the 
expression "throw weight". If the violation is 
proved, as the NATO countries seem to believe, 
an appropriate response would be to deploy 
" new " missiles such as the Midgetman 
envisaged by the United States, but not to exceed 
ceilings hitherto respected by both super-
powers. 
5.37. Nevertheless, the 27th May speech and 
2Rth November 1986 deployment do not seem to 
have held up· bilateral negotiations on strategic 
weapons too much. At Reykjavik, the Soviet 
Union proposed a 50% reduction in offensive 
strategic weapons on both sides covering all 
18. See Document 1040, Disarmament, information 
report, 4th November 1985. Rapporteur: Mr. Blaauw- para-
graphs 4.25 to 4.27. 
19. Pravda, 17th March 1987; quoted from Soviet News, 
18th March 1987. 
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types of such weapons, " taking into account the 
historically established specificities of the struc-
tures of each side's strategic forces " 20••• " A 
solution will also be found to the problem of ... 
sea-based ... cruise missiles" (referred to in para-
graph 5.21 above). At the close of the summit 
meeting, the press reported on proposals for the 
total elimination of strategic ballistic missiles 
within ten years, with a reduction of 50% during 
an initial five-year period in the number of 
nuclear warheads in each of the three categories: 
ICBMs, missiles on submarines, and the nuclear 
pay loads of strategic bombers. President Reagan 
in his televised press conference of 14th October 
said: 
" For the first time on the highest level we 
and the Soviets came close to an 
agreement on real reductions of both stra-
tegic and intermediate-range weapons ... 
For the first time we began to hammer out 
details of a 50% cut in strategic forces over 
five years ... 
... And maybe most important, we were 
just in sight of an historic agreement on 
completely eliminating the threat of 
offensive ballistic missiles by 1996. " 
5.38. The United States position on eliminating 
strategic missiles in ten years is limited to " bal-
listic missiles " - ICBMs and SLBMs - but 
would not cover cruise missiles or other weapons 
carried by bombers - a point on which the Soviet 
spokesman after the summit appeared to dis-
agree, claiming that the elimination of" all stra-
tegic nuclear weapons " had been discussed at 
the summit, but the United States has denied 
that this was formally proposed, although tacitly 
accepting that the elimination of " all strategic 
nuclear weapons " may have been discussed in 
conversation 21 • At Reykjavik once again the 
Soviet Union abandoned its request to offset the 
medium-range American systems based outside 
American territory, nor did it ask to offset 
British and French forces. But again the Soviet 
Union made agreement on strategic weapons 
depend on an agreement limiting the SDI pro-
gramme to research. In his statement on 28th 
February 1987, Mr. Gorbachev spoke, however, 
of" the prevention of deployment of weapons in 
outer space ". 
(iil) Space weapons 
5.39. In his references to space weapons in his 
address on 15th January 1986, Mr. Gorbachev 
maintained his total opposition: " We are against 
weapons in space. " But for the first time he 
seemed to consider the possibility of space 
20. See draft Soviet directives at Appendix V. 
21. International Herald Tribune, 28th October 1986, 
"US denies Pact account", and 29th October 1986, "New 
US orders for arms talks ... ". 
research not leading to the deployment of 
offensive weapons in space: 
"Space must remain peaceful, strike 
weapons should not be deployed there. 
Neither should they be developed. And let 
there also be a most rigorous control, 
including opening the relevant labora-
tories for inspection. " 
5.40. If there has been a specific answer from 
the United States to this request to open labora-
tories engaged in space research for inspection, it 
has not been made public. In his 24th February 
1986 address, President Reagan merely wel-
comed the Soviet Union's acceptance of the prin-
ciple of verification: 
" We intend to pursue in specific terms at 
the negotiating table General Secretary 
Gorbachev's public offer to resolve any 
necessary verification issues. " 
5.41. At his press conference in Reykjavik at the 
close of the summit meeting on 12th October, 
General Secretary Gorbachev, having first con-
firmed the Soviet concessions in regard to 
intermediate-range and strategic nuclear 
weapons referred to above, reaffirmed the Soviet 
Union's request that the ABM treaty be of indef-
inite duration and that the two parties undertake 
not to abrogate it for at least ten years. " Simulta-
neously, we suggested that all the ABM require-
ments be strictly observed within these ten years, 
that the development and testing of space 
weapons be banned and only research and testing 
in laboratories be allowed. " Mr. Gorbachev con-
tinued:" We are aware ofthe commitment of the 
American administration and the President to 
SDI. Apparently, our consent to its continuation 
and to laboratory tests offers the President an 
opportunity to go through with research and 
eventually to get clear what SDI is, what it is 
about. Although it is already clear to many 
people, ourselves included. " (See also the Soviet 
draft tabled in Reykjavik 22.) 
5.42. President Reagan did not hold a press con-
ference until 14th October on returning to Wash-
ington, when he expressed his determination to 
proceed to actual testing of SDI, and appeared to 
belittle the ABM treaty: 
" I offered to delay deployment of 
advanced strategic defence for ten years 
while both sides eliminated all ballistic 
missiles, but General Secretary Gorbachev 
said that his demand that we give up all 
but laboratory research on SDI - in effect 
kill the programme was non-
negotiable ... 
Now the ABM treaty, which he kept 
referring to as if it was the Holy Grail, I 
22. See Appendix V, section 3. 
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asked him once what was sp great about a 
treaty that had our governments saying to 
our people, we won't protect you from a 
nuclear attack? That's basically what the 
ABM treaty says ... 
I told him that what we were proposing 
with SDI was that once we reached the 
testing stage we would - well, before that, 
that right now we were ready and willing 
to sign a treaty- a binding treaty that said 
when we reached the testing stage that 
both sides would proceed, because we told 
him frankly that we knew they were 
researching also on defence, nor was that 
ever denied. And we said we both will go 
forward with what we are doing. When we 
reach the testing stage, if it's us, we'll 
invite you to participate and see the test ... 
and I said or if you have perfected a 
system that can be this kind of defence 
that we're talking about, then we share, so 
that there won't be one side having this 
plus offensive weapons, but that we elim-
inate the offensive weapons and then we 
make available to all who feel a need for it 
or want it this defence system so that 
safety is guaranteed for the future. " 
On 15th October, in approving a defence budget 
of $292 billion for FY 1987, tl:le US Congress 
reduced the Administration's request of $5.3 
billion for SDI to only $3.5 billion. 
5.43. In contrast to President Reagan's com-
mitment to testing and, apparently, deployment 
of SDI, allied support for the United States 
position on SDI has been limited to support for 
"research", and has specifically stressed the 
importance of maintaining the ABM treaty. 
Thus Baroness Young, United 1 Kingdom Min-
ister of State for Foreign Affairs, speaking of the 
Reykjavik summit in the House pfLords on 15th 
October 1986, said: 
"Perhaps I can confirm ... as President 
Reagan has repeatedly confirmed, that 
SDI research is consistent with the present 
treaty obligations, including the ABM 
treaty. He recently reaffirmed that SDI 
will be conducted in conformity with a 
strict interpretation of the treaty. The gov-
ernment have repeatedly made it clear that 
we regard the treaty as an important 
element in preserving international peace 
and stability and want to see it reaffirmed 
and strengthened. Any suspicion of viola-
tions should be pursued according to the 
mechanisms provided in the treaty. " 
5.44. The reservations of WEU governments 
concerning SDI are referred to in paragraph 2.8 
above. The communique of the NATO Nuclear 
Planning Group meeting in Gleneagles on 21st 
and 22nd October similarly said "We strongly 
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support the United States exploration of space 
and defence systems, as is permitted by the ABM 
treaty". 
5.45. Early this year, a keen public discussion 
began between the United States and its 
European allies relating to the interpretation of 
the ABM treaty when Mr. Weinberger, the Sec-
retary of Defence, seemed to be wishing to 
impose a new " broad " interpretation which 
would have allowed strategic defence systems to 
be tested in space and a commitment, before the 
end of President Reagan's administration, to 
deploy at least some parts of such a system. The 
White House, weakened by the Irangate affair, 
no longer seemed able to impose its own policy, 
the only one which might have put an end to a 
discussion now dividing the Departments of 
State and Defence. 
5.46. Mrs. Thatcher, the British Prime Minister, 
had made her position very clear on 19th March 
1985 when she told the House of Commons that 
"research is permitted and constraints on 
deployment are those contained in the anti-
ballistic missile treaty signed in 1972 both by the 
Soviet Union and the United States, which per-
mitted research but required negotiation before 
testing and deployment in accordance with the 
terms of the treaty". With Mr. Craxi, the Italian 
Prime Minister, by her side in London on 11th 
February 1987, Mrs. Thatcher said: "We both 
expressed the hope that the United States would 
continue to consult its allies closely on issues 
connected with the strategic defence initiative" 
and added:" Our message to the United States is 
'please consult your allies on this matter of vital 
interest to us all'." 23 Mr. Younger, British Sec-
retary of State for Defence, then visited Wash-
ington where he was reported by the press to 
have said on 18th February 24: "If the part of the 
programme we are involved in went, in our 
view, outside the treaty, we would not want to be 
involved. That is why we have very carefully 
stated that British participation is most definitely 
confined to the research part of SDI. We are not 
committed to anything beyond that. " 
5.47. Speaking to the Geneva disarmament con-
ference the following day, Mr. Raimond, French 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, referring to the dis-
cussion about the interpretation of the ABM 
treaty, said: 
" ... the ABM treaty is essentially bilateral... 
So, it is up to the two signatory countries 
to determine for themselves what today is 
in keeping with the provisions laid down 
in 1972, taking account of new techno-
logical developments; what goes beyond 
the agreed provisions of the treaty; and 
what modalities can or cannot be used to 
23. The Times, 12th February 1987. 
24. Daily Telegraph, 19th February 1987. 
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make changes in the treaty. Whatever 
solution may be found, I add that it would 
have to be agreed upon bilaterally. We are 
attached to maintaining the ABM treaty ... 
We therefore hope to see it respected by 
both parties, including with respect to 
research activities. These are clearly per-
mitted by the treaty." 
The minister expressed no opinion on the 
question of tests. 
5.48. During the week of 24th February, Mr. 
Nitze, President Reagan's special adviser on dis-
armament, and Mr. Perle, Assistant Secretary of 
Defence, visited the European countries in which 
cruise missiles are based, winding up on 28th 
February with a meeting with the North Atlantic 
Council in Brussels at the close of which the 
NATO spokesman said that consultations would 
be continued and that no decision relating to the 
interpretation of the ABM treaty would be taken 
by the United States in the immediate future. 
The European allies for their part have made 
their opinions clearly known, in particular that 
any interpretation of the ABM treaty required 
consultations between the two parties. 
(iv) The limitation of nuclear tests 
5.49. Still on the bilateral level, talks to establish 
negotiations on nuclear tests have been under 
way in Geneva between the United States and 
the Soviet Union since July 1986. (The multi-
lateral aspect of this question at the Geneva dis-
armament conference is referred to in paragraph 
5.91 below.) The Soviet Union considers the 
purpose of these bilateral negotiations to be a 
complete ban on nuclear tests. The United States 
considers the Soviet Union must be persuaded to 
accept methods of calibrating the yield of nuclear 
tests by the on-site Corrtex method proposed by 
President Reagan on 14th March 1986 with a 
view to improving the possibilities of verifying 
two bilateral treaties, i.e. the threshold test ban 
treaty signed by President Nixon and Mr. 
Brezhnev on 3rd July 1974 and the treaty on 
peaceful nuclear explosions signed by President 
Ford and Mr. Brezhnev on 28th May 1976. 
These two treaties have never been ratified by 
the United States. On the adjournment of the 
fourth session of the talks on 20th March, Mr. 
Robert Barker, the United States Representative, 
stated: 
" Immediately following the successful 
conclusion of such negotiations (on verifi-
cation protocols to the two treaties) and 
the subsequent ratification of these 
treaties, and in association with a pro-
gramme to reduce and ultimately elim-
inate all nuclear weapons, the United 
States would propose that the United 
States and the USSR immediately engage 
in negotiations on ways to implement a 
step-by-step parallel programme of lim-
iting and ultimately ending nuclear 
testing." 
5.50. While it is widely recognised in scientific 
circles that a ban on underground nuclear tests 
can now be verified at a distance by seismic 
means, it is conversely difficult by such means to 
make an accurate assessment of the yield of tests 
carried out. The threshold test ban treaty fixed a 
ceiling of 150 kt. According to the United States, 
the calibration of the geological structure of the 
two superpowers' nuclear test sites by the 
Corrtex system would subsequently allow a more 
accurate assessment to be made of the yield of 
tests by seismic stations far from the sites. 
5.51. In the text tabled in Reykjavik, the Soviet 
Union called for bilateral talks on a complete 
end to nuclear tests, adding that: " The subject of 
these talks could include questions concerning 
verification, the lowering of the ceiling on the 
yield of explosions and a reduction in their 
number, and the 1974 and 1976 treaties." 
Although the United States has still not agreed to 
resume the trilateral negotiations with the Soviet 
Union and the United Kingdon on the complete 
suspension of nuclear tests which were broken 
off in 1980, it has recently announced that if the 
two treaties of 1974 and 1976 could be accom-
panied by a protocol providing for additional 
verification measures of the type proposed by the 
United States, consideration might then be given 
to progressively lowering the threshold for 
authorised tests below 150 kt and to negotiating 
an agreement to reduce progressively the number 
of tests authorised each year. 
5.52. In a somewhat publicity-minded gesture, 
President Reagan sent the two treaties in 
question to the Senate on 13th January 1987 for 
ratification, still subject to the conclusion of an 
additional protocol requiring separate ratifi-
cation by the Senate before the principal treaties 
could come into force. 
(c) Mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe 
(i) The western initiative of 5th December 1985 
5.53. On 5th December 1985, western 
participants 25 in the MBFR negotiations in 
Vienna put forward new proposals which they 
said were intended to allow a first, albeit modest, 
agreement to be reached quickly. To this end, 
they accepted the general framework and main 
provisions of the Warsaw Pact proposal of 14th 
25. On the western side, " direct " participants are coun-
tries whose territory forms the " reduction zone " (Belgium, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands) plus the other countries having troops in the 
zone (Canada, the United Kingdom and the United 
States). 
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February 1985, but proposed rhaking only half 
the initial reductions set out in that proposal. On 
30th January 1986, the western proposals were 
supplemented by an outline text accompanied by 
a table of associated measures. 
5.54. The western initiative provided for an 
initial cutback of 5 000 Amencan and 11 500 
Soviet troops in the reduction zone. It provided 
for a no-increase commitment r~lating to NATO, 
the Warsaw Pact and American and Soviet 
troops stationed in that zone which was to come 
into force immediately after the reductions. The 
agreement and its various provisions were to be 
valid for a period of three years following the 
completion of the initial reductions. This period 
was to be used to pursue negotiations and 
prepare for further reductions. 
5.55. Since the new proposals no longer insisted 
on prior agreement on levels! of troops now 
present in the reduction zone (the data problem}, 
they were intended, in the min~ of the West, to 
allow speedy progress to be made. It was also 
believed that acceptance, during the period of the 
agreement, of the first stage of transitional force 
ceilings relating, on the one hand, to each 
alliance and, on the other hand, to the United 
States and the Soviet Union separately was also a 
favourable factor for advancing the negotia-
tions. 
5.56. Nevertheless, NATO maintained and to a 
certain extent strengthened the verification 
system hitherto envisaged. 
5.57. The associated measures1 included: 
- setting up permanent entry and exit 
points with observers through which all 
personnel of land and 1air forces of par-
ticipating countries would leave or enter 
the reduction zone; 
- notification and observation of with-
drawals; 
- notification of out-qf-garrison activ-
ities; 
- exchange of observers on the occasion 
of such activities; 
- notification of ground force movements 
in the reduction zone; 
- the right for each side to conduct thirty 
inspections each year to verify the 
no-increase undertaking; 
- exchange of information up to battalion 
level; 
- the free use of national technical 
means. 
5.58. The only position adopted in the western 
proposal on what was to happen to the weapons 
of units withdrawn was to say that it was for each 
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side to decide on the destination of the 
equipment concerned. However, the proposal 
increased from 18 to 30, as compared with pre-
vious proposals, the number of annual inspec-
tions required, and made the provisions relating 
to out-of-garrison activities apply also to the 
western part of Soviet territory, outside the 
reduction zone. 
(ii) Immediate Warsaw Pact reactions and its 
written answer of 20th February 1986 
5.59. The first Warsaw Pact reactions were 
rather encouraging. At a press conference in 
Moscow on 17th December 1986, Mr. 
Mikhailov, Soviet Ambassador to the MBFR 
talks, said that the western proposals were in line 
with the spirit of Geneva but were still very 
divergent. He criticised however the associated 
measures, which he considered to be deliberately· 
excessive, and also the fact that the reduction 
figures proposed by NATO were not significant 
and the 5th December proposal did not include 
the equipment of troops withdrawn. 
5.60. Even Mr. Gorbachev's statement of 15th 
January gave an encouraging impression; he said 
he was prepared for " reasonable verification " of 
troop reductions, including the establishment of 
permanent verification posts at the points of 
passage of troops withdrawn. 
5.61. The Warsaw Pact counter-proposal of 20th 
February 1986 entitled " draft agreement on the 
initial reduction by the Soviet Union and the 
United States of ground forces and armaments 
and on the subsequent no-increase of forces and 
armaments of the sides and associated measures 
in Central Europe " could not therefore fail to be 
very disappointing to the western allies. 
5.62. Although it accepts the principle of per-
manent verification posts at points where troops 
enter or leave the reduction zone, this proposal is 
negative in several respects: 
- while the reductions proposed by 
NATO were not militarily significant, 
the Pact would nevertheless agree to 
similar figures: 6 500 American and 
11 500 Soviet troops, which, for the 
West, did not correspond to the dis-
parity between American and Soviet 
troops stationed in the reduction zone; 
- the verification measures proposed were 
termed excessive and a kind of legalised 
spying. It was unacceptable to extend 
the area of verification to cover part of 
Soviet territory as NATO had requested 
for out-of-garrison activities. 
5.63. Furthermore, the question of the desti-
nation of the weapons of troops withdrawn 
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remained at the heart of the East-West contro-
versy. 
5.64. In greater detail, the seventeen articles in 
the document, which the Warsaw Pact describes 
as intended to guide the negotiations towards a 
favourable outcome, may be summarised as 
follows: 
- in the course of one year, the USSR and 
the United States will withdraw behind 
their national boundaries 11 500 and 
6 500 men respectively from their 
ground forces stationed in Central 
Europe, together with their armaments 
and combat equipment; 
- information on the military units 
reduced will be exchanged prior to the 
beginning of the withdrawals; 
- the eleven direct participants in the 
negotiations will undertake not to 
increase the levels of their ground and 
air forces in the reduction zone for a 
period of three years after the com-
pletion of the Soviet-American reduc-
tions; 
- as from the same date, updated figures 
on forces remaining in the reduction 
zone will be exchanged each year; 
- when the agreement comes into force, 
three or four observation posts will be 
established on each side; 
- units and subunits of the ground forces 
of all signatories of the agreement must 
enter or leave the reduction zone via 
these posts; 
- observation posts will be manned by 
representatives of both sides; 
- military activities (movements, exer-
cises, call-up of reservists) involving 
more than 20 000 men must be notified 
beforehand; 
- in addition to the obligation not to 
interfere with implementation of 
national technical means, requests for 
on-site verification may be made if well-
founded. As a rule, such requests should 
be granted. A refusal must be accom-
panied by a sufficiently convincing 
explanation; 
- a consultative commission will be estab-
lished to settle disputes which may arise 
when the agreement is implemented. 
Finally, on the basis of these proposals, the East 
offered to join in the drafting of a joint 
agreement, in the course of which the utmost 
should be done to overcome remaining diffi-
culties. 
(iii) The situation towards the end of 1986 
5.65. Since the Warsaw Pact proposals of 14th 
February 1985 and the western answer of 5th 
December 1985, the negotiations seem to have 
made little progress in spite of the concessions 
made by both sides. 
5.66. The East has mainly kept to its earlier pro-
posals, i.e. withdrawal in combat or combat 
support units, establishment of permanent entry 
and exit points, immediate freeze of troop levels 
in the reduction zone on a collective basis and 
without national sub-ceilings for a period of 
three years after the completion of initial with-
drawals under the control of observers from both 
sides. The NATO countries for their part have 
agreed to abandon their data requirements and, 
as a whole, have linked their proposals with the 
plan proposed by the Warsaw Pact. There are 
still major points of disagreement, however, and 
these explain the disappointment felt on both 
sides. 
5.67. Differences between East and West have 
crystallised around verification. While the Pact 
has now agreed to the permanent presence of 
observers at entry and exit posts, during and 
after the reductions, it has not accepted western 
requirements concerning larger-scale inspections 
in the reduction zone, which, for the Pact, can 
take place only after a well-founded and justified 
request and with the prior consent of the country 
concerned. The NATO partners are calling for 
thirty inspections each year for both sides, at 
short prior notice. 
5.68. The other point at issue is the destination 
of equipment of units withdrawn. The West 
wishes to have a free hand in stockpiling such 
equipment as the country concerned sees fit, but 
the East on the contrary insists on it being 
destroyed or returned to the country of origin. 
The geographical asymmetry between the parties 
to the negotiations prevents NATO from 
accepting this position. 
5.69. In its previous report, the committee sug-
gested with regard to the unresolved problem of 
equipment that " NATO could however accept 
the withdrawal, to a depot in some rear area in 
Europe to be designated, of the equipment of 
American units to be withdrawn from the 
zone". 
5. 70. Still to be settled is the fate of rotations of 
individuals relieving troops in the reduction 
zone which the Soviet Union refuses to have 
pass through the official entry and exit points. As 
for the strengths to be notified before their with-
drawal, the West is calling for them to be 
reported down to battalion level whereas the 
East does not wish to go lower than divisional 
level. Finally, the delicate problem of notifi-
cation of exercises and possible inspections in 
the two western districts of the Soviet Union, 
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measures which the West considers essential for 
the security of the countries on the alliance's 
flanks, has not been solved. 
5.71. Nevertheless, by propo~ing far smaller 
reductions than before (half), at the same time 
increasing from eighteen to thi~y the number of 
annual inspections called for, NATO has gone 
against the conventional Soviet position that any 
verification must be commensurate with the 
magnitude of the reductions involved. 
5. 72. In 1986, attention was paid to new pro-
posals for conventional reductions in the wider 
area extending from the Atlantic to the Urals, 
but NATO's position in the MBFR negotiations 
remains unchanged. According to the North 
Atlantic Council communique issued on 12th 
December 1986 26 : " Those of us participating in 
MBFR reaffirm our determ,nation to reach 
early, substantial and verifiable agreement. .. " 
(iv) The new talks in Vienna on a mandate for 
negotiations on the reduction of conventional 
forces in Europe 
5. 73. Some confusion arose over Mr. 
Gorbachev's speech in East Berlin on 18th April 
1986 when he said: · 
" The USSR proposes substantial 
reduction of all components of land forces 
and tactical aircraft based in Europe, 
including the relevant parts of American 
and Canadian forces deployed there. 
The military units shoul<!l be dissolved and 
their armaments either destroyed or put 
into storage on their national territories. 
The scope of the reductions must obvi-
ously cover the whole of Europe, from the 
Atlantic to the Urals, "27. 
5.74. On 11th June, the theme of Mr. 
Gorbachev's speech was taken further in the 
Budapest appeal by the Warsaw Pact member 
states to the NATO member states and all 
European countries for a programme to reduce 
armed forces and conventional weapons in 
Europe 28• As a first stage, this appeal proposes, 
in an area extending from the Atlantic to the 
Urals, a reduction of 100 000 to 150 000 in the 
forces of the two alliances followed by other 
reductions so that in the early nineties the land 
and tactical air forces of the two alliances would 
be reduced by 25% as compared with present 
levels. Conventional weapons and nuclear mis-
siles with a range of less than 1 000 km would be 
included in the reductions; . equipment with-
drawn would either be destrc:>yed or stockpiled 
on national territory. Verification measures are 
26. See Appendix IV. 
27. International Herald Tribune, 22nd April 1986. 
28. See Appendix II. 
DOCUMENT 1090 
envisaged in the third part of the appeal while 
the fourth part states that negotiations on imple-
menting the proposals might be held either in a 
first stage of the conference on disarmament in 
Europe (Stockholm) or in a special forum with 
the participation of the European states, the 
United States and Canada, or in the context of 
the Vienna MBFR negotiations enlarged to 
include other European states. 
5.75. In the meantime, meeting in Halifax, 
Canada, on 29th and 30th May 1986, the North 
Atlantic Council in ministerial session had 
issued a statement on conventional arms 
control 29 which referred inter alia to the setting 
up of a high-level task force on conventional 
arms control designed to build on the western 
proposals already presented at the Stockholm 
conference on disarmament in Europe and the 
Vienna MBFR negotiations and to take account 
of Mr. Gorbachev's statement on 18th April. 
This task force is also studying the Budapest 
appeal. 
5.76. The "bold new steps ... required in "the 
field of conventional arms control " advocated 
by NATO in this Halifax statement have prayed 
more difficult to agree upon than was thought 
when the statement was adopted. The subse-
quent Brussels declaration on conventional arms 
control adopted on 12th December 1986 30 
summarises only the first results of the task 
force. While the latter declaration provides for 
" distinct negotiations " , a major difference per-
sisted between France, which wanted these new 
negotiations to be held in the framework of the 
CSCE with the presence of neutral European 
countries, and the other NATO countries, which 
considered that only the member countries of 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact whose conventional 
forces would be subject to reductions in the nego-
tiations should participate directly. This dif-
ference was shown publicly at the Vienna fol-
low-up meeting to the conference on security and 
co-operation in Europe where the United States 
Delegate, Mr. Zimmermann, said on 26th Feb-
ruary 1986 that the NATO countries woqld 
propose to the Warsaw Pact countries discus-
sions on the reduction of conventional forces. 
The French Delegate to the conference, Mr. 
Renard, answered on 30th January that" France 
would not agree to take part in enlarged MBFR 
talks ... it refuses a process having no link with 
the CSCE... France has proposed a wording 
aimed at allowing all participants in the CSCE 
process to continue to be involved in the dis-
cussion on security and then to allow the twenty-
three countries belonging to alliances to .hold 
informal talks, parallel with the work of the 
thirty-five on confidence-building measures, 
with a view to preparing a mandate for negotia-
29. See Appendix Ill. 
30. See Appendix IV. 
tions more directly concerning conventional sta-
bility". In fact, the idea of negotiations on con-
ventional reductions from the Atlantic to the 
Urals dates back to the proposals made by Mr. 
· Giscard d'Estaing, then French President, to the 
special session of the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1978. Such negotiations would have 
formed a second stage of the conference on disar-
mament in Europe held in Stockholm. 
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5.77. The informal talks between representa-
tives of the twenty-three Warsaw Pact and 
NATO countries opened at the French Embassy 
in Vienna on 17th February 1987. 
5. 78. While various proposals relating to the 
new negotiations seem interesting, the com-
mittee is for the time being sceptical about the 
possibility of concluding an agreement on 
·reducing conventional forces with adequate veri-
fication measures in a wider framework when, 
after thirteen years of negotiations in Vienna in a 
more restricted framework, the Soviet Union has 
still not accepted the necessary verification 
measures. If the Soviet Union accepted the com-
mitment of a number of annual inspections and 
the obligation for all troops entering or leaving 
the reduction zone to pass through entry and exit 
checkpoints, a first agreement could be reached 
in Vienna immediately. With the experience 
acquired in the more restricted framework, con-
sideration might then be given to wider negotia-
tions. 
(d) The conference on disarmament in Europe 
5. 79. At the last session of the conference on 
disarmament in Europe held in Stockholm in 
1986, only in August were major concessions 
made by both sides which on 19th September 
finally allowed publication of the " Document of 
the Stockholm conference on confidence- and 
security-building measures and disarmament in 
Europe ... ". Comprising 104 paragraphs with 
four annexes, this document is clearly different 
from the Helsinki final act of 1975, on the one 
hand because " the measures adopted in this doc-
ument are politically binding ... " (whereas appli-
cation of the confidence-building measures in the 
final act were always optional) and on the other 
because the confidence-building measures 
accepted in Stockholm: 
" will cover the whole of Europe as well as 
the adjoining sea area* 
* In this context, the notion of adjoining sea area is 
understood to refer also to ocean areas adjoining 
Europe." 
In other words, the new area of application 
extends from the Atlantic to the Urals while the 
Helsinki measures applied in the Soviet Union 
only to a 250 km wide strip of territory along its 
western frontier. 
5.80. The Stockholm document has six sections 
and four annexes. 
Refraining from the threat or use of force 
5.81. Paragraphs 9 to 28 recall the obligation of 
participating states to refrain" from the threat or 
use of force " on which the Soviet Union 
insisted but in exchange participating states also 
" reconfirm their commitment to the basic prin-
ciple of the sovereign equality of states and stress 
that all states have equal rights and duties within 
the framework of international law " and " the 
universal significance of human rights and fun-
damental freedoms ... " - principles dear to the 
West. 
Prior notification of certain military activities 
5.82. Paragraphs 29 to 37 govern notification of 
military activities which must be given at least 
42 days in advance if they involve at least 13 000 
troops or 300 tanks (or at least 3 000 troo~s in 
the case of amphibious or parachute exerctses), 
and notification must include air forces if the 
exercise involves 200 or more sorties. Activities 
carried out without advance notice will be 
notified at the time the troops involved com-
mence such activities. (See constraining provi-
sions below.) Notification must include details of 
the principal weapons systems involved, by cat-
egory. 
Observation of certain military activities 
5.83. Paragraphs 38 to 54 contain an obligation 
to invite observers to all exercises involving 
more than 17 000 troops (or more than 5 000 in 
the case of amphibious or parachute exercises). It 
is generally estimated tha~ some ten ex~rcise_s_by 
each military alliance wtll exceed th1s cethng 
each year. Each state has the right to send two 
observers who may use their own maps, photo-
graphic equipment, binoculars, etc. 
Annual calendars 
5.84. Paragraphs 55 to 58 provide for the 
exchange by each state with all other states, not 
later than 15th November each year, of a cal-
endar of all exercises notifiable under the doc-
ument for the following year. 
Constraining provisions 
5.85. Paragraphs 59 to 62, enhancing the pro~i­
sions for prior notification, provide for n?t~fi­
cation two years in advance of any act1v1ty 
involving more than 40 000 troops and an 
absolute ban on military activities involving 
more than 75 000 troops which have not been 
notified two years in advance or more than 
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40 000 troops not notified one year in 
advance. 
Compliance and verification 
5.86. The thirty-six paragraphs numbered 63 to 
98 contain key provisions relating to verification 
rights. Each state is entitled to ask for one 
inspection per year and each state is bound to 
accept up to three requests for inspection per 
year in the case of notifiable activities being sus-
pected of having taken place without being 
notified in accordance with the provisions of the 
document. The inspected state has no right to 
refuse such inspections " except for areas or sen-
sitive points to which access is normally denied 
or restricted, military and other defence installa-
tions as well as naval vessels, military vehicles 
and ~ircraft ". In contrast, the Soviet Union has 
never accepted automatic verification obliga-
tions in the framework of the MBFR talks. 
5.87. The inspected state 1must answer the 
request within twenty-four hours, and the state 
requesting an inspection . may send _four 
observers who must arrive on the temtory 
within thirty-six hours of the request. Inspection 
may be conducted using a land vehicle, heli-
copter or aircraft according to the wishes of the 
state requesting the inspection, but the two states 
must choose by mutual agreement which of them 
will provide the vehicles, i.e. the inspected state 
may insist on its own vehicles being used, but the 
inspectors may oversee navigation, etc. 
5.88. The request for inspection must specify 
the area within which the inspection will be con-
ducted which must not exceed that required for 
an army-level military activity. The inspection 
must be terminated within forty-eight hours of 
the arrival of the inspection team. 
Annexes 
5.89. The four annexes relate to: 
I. the zone of application; 
11. the date of notification (15th 
December 1986 fur the first year of 
application); 
Ill. the right to raise any matter relating to 
confidence-building measures at the 
Vienna meeting; 
IV. the obligation not to take advantage of 
the alliances to circumvent the ins-
pection system, i,e. a state belonging 
to one of the alliances must not 
exercise its right of inspection on the 
territory of a state belonging to the 
same alliance in order to exhaust the 
quota of three annual inspections. 
The document entered into force on 1st January 
1987. 
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5.90. Although in the negotiations the NATO 
member countries asked that notification relate 
to exercises involving more than 6 000 troops 
and confer on inspectors the right to overfly ter-
ritory in their own aircraft, the provisions of the 
Stockholm document show real improvement in 
confidence-building measures. The committee 
has reported several times on the application of 
confidence-building measures in the context of 
the Helsinki final act 31 • The table at Appendix 
VI summarises their application. The effec-
tiveness of the new measures will be established 
only after several years of application. It will cer-
tainly have to be seen how the Soviet Union 
interprets the expression " areas or sensitive 
points to which access is normally denied or 
restricted " within which any state is entitled to 
refuse inspection. Prospects are good, however. 
Already on 15th December 1986 the annual cal-
endars of exercises planned in 1987 had been 
exchanged. NATO plans eighteen exercises to 
nine of which observers are invited and the 
Warsaw Pact twenty-five to nine of which 
observers are invited. Five are planned by 
neutral and non-aligned countries. The com-
mittee will not fail to follow the application of 
this important document very closely. 
(e) Comprehensive nuclear test ban 
5.91. At the forty-first session of the United 
Nations General Assembly which ended in 
December 1986, very particular attention was 
once again paid to a ban on all nuclear tests. 
Three separate resolutions 32 were devoted to the 
matter, the first of which inter alia urged the 
three depositary powers of the partial test ban 
treaty to promote, at the Geneva disarmament 
conference, the creation of a special committee 
to negotiate a treaty on a complete halt to 
nuclear test explosions. The second, calling for 
negotiations to be held at the conference on dis-
armament for a complete ban on nuclear tests, 
was adopted by 137 votes to 1 (France) with 15 
abstentions (including the United Kingdom and 
the United States), the five remaining member 
countries of WEU and the eight other NATO 
countries having voted in favour. 
5.92. In his speech on 15th January 1986, Mr. 
Gorbachev prolonged by three months, until 
31 'St March 1986, the unilateral moratorium 
declared by the Soviet Union in August 1985, the 
fortieth anniversary of the attack on Hiroshima. 
The United States maintained the position held 
by the Reagan administration for the past two 
years according to which nuclear tests had 
become necessary to guarantee the effectiveness 
of nuclear weapons in storage. For the first time 
31. See the committee's information report, Disarmament. 
Document 1040, 4th November 1985, Appendix IV. 
Rapporteur: Mr. Blaauw. 
32. 41j46A; 41/47; 41/54. 
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since the Soviet moratorium was declared, the 
United States carried out a test on 22nd March 
1986 and there have been several more since. At 
Easter 1986 Mr. Gorbachev proposed an emer-
gency meeting in a European city to discuss a 
moratorium on nuclear tests and, in spite of the 
statement by Marshal Akhromeyev, Chief-of-
Staff of the Soviet armed forces, at a press con-
ference in Moscow on 14th April 1986, that the 
Soviet moratorium had been terminated as from 
11th April, it was only on 26th February 1987 
that the Soviet Union conducted its first nuclear 
test since the unilateral moratorium, the United 
States having already conducted three in 1987. 
General Botnenin said at the time that the test 
was an isolated one, that the Soviet Union had 
no intention of competing with the United States 
space programme and that it was prepared to 
resume the moratorium as soon as the United 
States did likewise, but the second Soviet test 
after the moratorium was conducted on 12th 
March. (The bilateral talks on nuclear tests are 
referred to in paragraph 5.49 et seq. above.) 
5.93. A team of United States seismologists 
from a private institution who had effectively 
monitored the moratorium with instruments in 
the vicinity of the testing range were required to 
switch off their equipment and leave the area -
apparently to preclude " calibration " measure-
ments called for by the United States (paragraph 
5.50). On 26th March the (private) British 
Seismic Verification Research Group announced 
it had also signed an agreement with Mr. 
Gorbachev's Chief Scientific Adviser to establish 
a permanently manned seismic station 640 km 
south of the main Soviet test site 33• 
5.94. At the Geneva disarmament conference it 
has still not been possible to set up a special com-
mittee to negotiate a treaty on banning nuclear 
tests as called for in United Nations General 
Assembly resolutions and proposed in Geneva 
by the non-aligned and Warsaw Pact countries. 
As in previous years, the western powers have 
maintained their opposition to terms of reference 
which would allow a treaty to be negotiated, con-
sidering that the terms of reference of a special 
committee should be limited to examining 
problems. 
5.95. In a letter addressed to the conference on 
20th February 1986, General Secretary 
Gorbachev said: 
"The Soviet Union, for its part, has been 
doing all it can to help achieve this goal. In 
particular, it is agreeable to the strictest 
control over a ban on nuclear-weapon 
tests, including on-site inspections and the 
use of all the latest developments in seis-
mology." 
33. Guardian, 27th March 1987. 
The Soviet Union had also announced that it 
would agree to the establishment of regional 
seismological networks on its territory to verify 
that a treaty banning nuclear tests was 
respected. 
5.96. Finally, at the disarmament conference the 
ad hoc group of experts on seismic measuring 
systems submitted a report on its technical tests 
in 1984 in the framework of international co-op-
eration for recording and analysing seismic phe-
nomena with a view to verifying an agreement 
banning nuclear tests. 
5.97. The western countries' position, which is 
well known, has not changed. The United States 
has asserted several times that it intended to 
pursue a nuclear test programme designed above 
all to ensure the reliability of American nuclear 
weapons. This was a break from the earlier 
policy of pursuing trilateral negotiations on a 
complete suspension, these negotiations having 
been suspended in 1980. It is known that the 
present test programme also covers research on a 
possible X-ray laser for strategic defence systems 
and on new nuclear warheads for the Midgetman 
missile. The press has now quoted scientists at 
the United States Los Alamos nuclear weapons 
laboratories as saying that new generations of 
nuclear weapons under development, under-
stood to be part of the SDI programme, would 
require at least 100 test explosions per weapon 
compared with six for earlier weapons 34• The 
United Kingdom for its part continues to assert 
that it is prepared to accede to a treaty banning 
tests if the verification problem is solved. On this 
latter point, the United Kingdom and the United 
States seem to be the only countries to consider 
that existing seismic networks, particularly if 
supplemented by regional systems on the ter-
ritory of nuclear weapon countries, are not 
enough to verify such a treaty. At the Geneva 
disarmament conference on 19th February 1987, 
Mr. Raimond, French Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, said without ambiguity: 
" France does not consider today, any 
more than yesterday, that stopping tests is 
a precondition for progress towards 
nuclear disarmament. It maintains that, 
on the contrary, the stopping of tests could 
become significant at the end of a 
long-term process resulting in real and 
effective nuclear disarmament." 
5.98. The Prime Minister of China, Mr. Zhao, 
in his address of 20th March 1986 marking inter-
national peace year, announced that China was 
henceforth renouncing tests in the atmosphere; it 
had not conducted any since 1980. At the 
Geneva disarmament conference, China has 
declared that it is prepared to play an active part 
in negotiations to draft a total test ban treaty. 
34. The Times, 19th April 1986. 
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5.99. The other European allied countries repre-
sented at the disarmament conference at the 
moment are supporting United States opposition 
to the creation of a special committee in Geneva 
to draft a test ban treaty. However, in their 
public statements and in their affirmative votes 
on United Nations resolutions on the suspension 
of nuclear tests, they have shown they were in 
favour of a test ban treaty. For instance, the 
communique issued by the· Federal German 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs on 2nd April 1986 at 
the close of Mr. Papandreou's visit to Bonn indi-
cated that there was a chance of starting negotia-
tions intended first to limit and then to stop 
nuclear tests. 
5.100. The committee referred in its previous 
report to scientific evidence that underground 
nuclear explosions could be adequately moni-
tored down to the smallest yields. As in its last 
report, the committee calls for the opening of 
negotiations on a complete nuclear test ban 
treaty and that the Soviet lJ nion be urged to 
accept the United States' invitation to participate 
in the testing of the new calibration system at the 
United States test site. 
(j) Chemical weapons 
5.10 1. The state of negotiations at the end of 
1985 on a chemical weapons ban was described 
in earlier reports by the 
1
committee 35• The 
emphasis on the need for such an agreement in 
the Reagan-Gorbachev summit communique of 
21st November 1985 led to rthe belief that pro-
gress was possible in the negotiations being held 
on this subject at the Geneva disarmament con-
ference. The communique also announced the 
start of a bilateral dialogue ion measures to be 
taken to prevent the proliferation of chemical 
weapons. In his statement on 15th January 1986, 
Mr. Gorbachev referred to chemical weapons as 
follows: 
"We are prepared for~ timely declaration 
of the location of enterprises producing 
chemical weapons and for the cessation of 
their production, and are ready to start 
developing procedures for destroying the 
relevant industrial base and to proceed, 
soon after the convention enters into 
force, to eliminating, the stockpiles of 
chemical weapons. All these measures 
would be carried out under strict control 
including international on-site inspec-
tions. " 
Referring to certain interim measures, he said: 
" For example, agreement could be 
achieved on a multilateral basis not to 
35. Disarmament, Documents 1040 of 4th November 
1985 and 1043 of 22nd November 1985, Rapporteur: Mr. 
Blaauw. 
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transfer chemical weapons to anyone and 
not to deploy them in the territories of 
other states. " 
5.102.At the Geneva disarmament conference 
on 11th March 1986, the United States represen-
tative, Mr. Lowitz, while affirming the priority 
his country gave to a comprehensive treaty elim-
inating chemical weapons, said: 
" However, the United States is opposed 
to a formal treaty - as some have sug-
gested - such as one that would mirror the 
nuclear non-proliferation treaty for 
nuclear weapons. " 
At the session of the conference in spring 1986, 
the United States also made it clear, in regard to 
the American draft treaty banning chemical 
weapons tabled in 1984, that the inspections 
called for would apply to all establishments 
capable of manufacturing chemical products, 
and not solely to state enterprises, as the wording 
of the draft had initially indicated. 
5.103. The special ad hoc committee and its three 
subgroups set up by the conference on disar-
mament continued their work in 1986 and 1987. 
On 22nd April 1986 the representative of the 
Soviet Union introduced some significant new 
proposals which in particular moved further 
towards the western position on some aspects of 
destruction of chemical weapon facilities and 
verification: 
- destruction of chemical weapon stocks 
would begin within six months and be 
completed within 10 years of entry into 
force of a convention; 
- within 30 days of entry into force the 
number, capability and precise location 
of all plants capable of producing 
chemical weapons would be declared; 
- destruction or dismantling of such pro-
duction facilities would begin within 
one year of entry into force; 
- all production activities would cease 
immediately on entry into force and 
measures to ensure their close-down, 
including disconnection from any non-
military chemical production facilities 
the operation of which would be 
authorised under a convention, would 
be completed within three months; 
- fairly detailed provisions were described 
for destruction of production 
equipment, or the dismantling of 
equipment which could be used for 
authorised civilian chemical pro-
duction; 
- verification measures were provided 
for: " including systematic on-site 
inspections, such as the verification of 
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the accuracy of declarations, the sealing 
by inspectors of the facility to be closed, 
the periodic checking of preservation of 
seals up to the moment the seals are 
removed and the destruction or the dis-
mantling of the facility is initiated ... the 
final international verification would be 
carried out upon the full termination of 
the process of the elimination or the dis-
mantling of the entire facility". 
5.1 04. The detailed nature of the Soviet pro-
posals, which are obviously based on the design 
of existing chemical production plants where no 
doubt legitimate civilian chemical processes are 
also carried out, makes these proposals a con-
vincing attempt at progress. The proposals do 
not however go into detail about subsequent ver-
ification measures after destruction of existing 
and declared chemical weapon production plants 
has been completed, merely asserting that "the 
convention should envisage measures ensuring 
its strict observance ... first of all the prevention 
of the use of the commercial chemical industry 
for the development and production of chemical 
weapons". Nevertheless they seem to offer a 
solid basis for active negotiation of a treaty 
leading to a complete and verified ban on 
chemical weapons. 
5.1 05. In the light of the important Soviet 
statement, a wide consensus could be seen in the 
negotiations on the routine verification system 
which would be applied for the destruction of 
declared stocks of chemical weapons, the dis-
mantling of production plants and ~dared 
installations of the legal civil chemical industry 
whose products could be used for the production 
of chemical weapons. A point still at issue is the 
concept of challenge inspections which would 
allow inspection of an undeclared chemical 
installation suspected of manufacturing for-
bidden products. Until now the Soviet Union 
has insisted on the right of any state to refuse 
requests for challenge inspections if they were 
considered abusive - if, for instance, they sought 
to inspect other secret military installations on 
the pretext of alleged chemical production. The 
United States proposals concerning challenge 
inspection, contained in the draft treaty it tabled 
in 1984, were considered too intrusive by the 
Soviet Union and also by certain western allied 
countries with large-scale chemical industries. 
5.106.0n 15th July 1986, the United Kingdom 
tabled a document containing new proposals for 
challenge inspections 36• This text provides that 
each state party to the convention would have 
the right directly to request an inspection of 
another party. This inspection would be carried 
out impartially by members of the international 
technical secretariat that would be set up by the 
convention. They would be required to reach the 
36. Document CD/715, 15th July 1986. 
location not later than seventy-two hours from 
the issue of a challenge. Normally, any state 
receiving a request for inspection would 
authorise the team to conduct a detailed inquiry 
in order to establish the facts. But if in excep-
tional circumstances the state considered that its 
security would be threatened by the inspection 
requested, it would have the right to propose 
alternative measures to provide sufficient infor-
mation for the matter under consideration to be 
resolved. The time-limit for this process would 
be a maximum of seven days and during that 
time the requested state would be obliged to take 
sufficient steps to enable its compliance to be 
demonstrated. 
5.107. If, following an inspection or refusal of an 
inspection, the requesting state was not satisfied 
that the requested state was respecting the con-
vention, the Executive Council set up under the 
convention would take collective measures 
which might include withdrawal of rights and 
privileges under the convention. Such measures 
would be without prejudice to the right of the 
other states to take unilateral action up to and 
including withdrawal from the convention - the 
ultimate sanction. 
5.1 08. The report by the ad hoc committee on 
chemical weapons dated 21st August 1986 con-
tains the text of those articles of a convention on 
which agreement has been reached, consisting 
largely of the technical aspects of chemical 
product definition which would be covered by 
the convention, by category: supertoxic lethal 
products, other lethal chemical products a~d 
other harmful chemical products, and the restnc-
tions applying to each product. 
5.109.Sessions of the disarmament conference 
are normally suspended at the end of August to 
allow delegates to take part in d~bates on disar-· 
mament in the United Nations General 
Assembly in New York during the autumn. They 
are resumed only in February of the following 
year. In view of the urgency of drafting *e con-
vention on chemical weapons, · however, 
informal consultations were continued in 
Geneva during autumn 1986 and the ad hoc 
committee resumed its work in January 1987. 
5.110. In autumn 1986, the representative of the 
Soviet Union had, in the First Committee ofthe 
United Nations General Assembly in New York, 
shown some interest in the British proposals on 
challenge verification. At the Geneva disar-
mament conference on 17th February 1987, the 
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as that of a state suspected of actually using 
chemical weapons. 
5.111. At the disarmament conference on 19th 
February, Mr. Raimond, French Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, asked whether progress should 
not be step by step. He said: · 
"My country wishes to achieve results, 
even if they prove to be limited, in an 
initial stage, for exa~ple, to the pro-
gressive destruction of1 stocks and pro-
duction facilities during a period to be 
determined. This same stage-by-stage 
approach could be used with respect to the 
solution to be found for ihe problem of the 
lists of supertoxic agents. " 
The minister added: 
" Nevertheless, it is in the light of these 
uncertainties in the begotiations that 
France does not rule out the possibility of 
acquiring a limited and purely deterrent 
capability in this area .... tbis would only be 
used for retaliation and not for a first 
attack. In any case, the current negotia-
tions, to which we continue to attach very 
high priority, could not constitute a mora-
torium for France, nor for that matter for 
any other country. " 
The minister announced that France would sub-
sequently be tabling specific proposals. 
5.112. There are still many points on which 
agreement was not reached in the text of the con-
vention being drafted by the conference's ad hoc 
committee. If this convention is to be completed 
in 1987, it is essential for the Soviet Union in 
particular to clarify inter alia its position on chal-
lenge inspections. 
5.113. In parallel with these multilateral negotia-
tions, the United States and ~he Soviet Union 
have, since the 1985 Geneva lsummit meet~ng, 
been holding bilateral negotiations on chemtcal 
weapons whose results have not been made 
public. But at its meeting in Geneva in July 
1986, when it was addressed by representatives 
of several delegations to the conference, the com-
mittee noted that the general opinion was that it 
would be possible to conclude a convention in 
1987 if the main stumbling-blq>ck, i.e. challenge 
verification, could be overcom~. This agreement 
could thus be reached before the production of 
binary chemical weapons began in the United 
States as planned at the end of 1987. 
Soviet representative said his country was hence- 5.114. Once again there is reason to deplore the 
forth prepared to accept the obligation to declare, use of chemical weapons by Iraq against Iran in 
within thirty days of the entry into force of a con- February 1986. For the first time, the United 
vention, the site of stocks of chemical weapons Nations group of experts investigating the 
and their automatic inspection on site. However, incident mentioned Iraq by n~me: " The agent 
the Soviet Union continued to limit acceptance used has mainly been mustard gas although on 
of challenge inspection to declared plants and some occasions nerve gas was also employed ... 
depots and certain still to be defined cases such On many occasions, Iraqi forces have used 
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chemical weapons against Iranian forces. " This 
shows the importance of a multilateral con-
vention - which must be a worldwide one -
banning chemical weapons. 
5.115.0n 18th February 1986 the NATO 
Supreme Commander, General Rogers, made an 
important statement to the French Institute for 
International Relations in Paris about stocks of 
chemical weapons. For the first time since 1969, 
he was expecting NATO to approve American 
plans concerning the production of chemical 
weapons. He outlined a plan providing for the 
transfer of chemical weapons to Europe in the 
event of crisis and after consultation with the 
European allies. He considered the stockpiling of 
chemical weapons should be approved as a force 
goal by the Defence Planning Committee at min-
isterial level. When voting funds in 1985 for the 
production of chemical weapons for the first 
time since 1969, the United States Congress had 
made production subject to the prior acceptance 
by the European allies of plans providing for the 
stockpiling of chemical weapons in Europe. 
5.116. The communique of the NATO Defence 
Planning Committee dated 22nd May 1986 
refers to " the 1987-1992 force goals which reflect 
the priorities we have identified for improving 
conventional defence " without making it clear 
that, for the United States, the force goals 
include production of the new generation of 
so-called " binary " chemical weapons. Three 
countries - Greece, Norway and Denmark -
appended a reservation concerning the text of the 
communique. At the same time the representa-
tives ofBelgium, Italy and the Netherlands made 
it known that they did not approve of the 
American decision. At all events, the ministerial 
meeting merely noted, without approving, a 
force goal affecting only the United States. Since 
then, Germany and the United Kingdom have 
indicated that the new chemical weapons would 
not be deployed in Europe in peacetime and that 
each country would have the right to veto their 
possible deployment on its territory in times of 
crisis. This possible deployment seems to have 
been discussed bilaterally with Germany and the 
United Kingdom and Germany has obtained a 
compensatory assurance that the stocks of 
American chemical weapons now stationed on 
its territory will be withdrawn by 1990. 
5.117. The committee repeats the conclusions it 
reached in its last report, considering that 
chemical weapons now stockpiled in Germany 
were sufficiently effective to deter an enemy 
from using such weapons. It consequently rec-
ommends making all necessary efforts to ensure 
the conclusion in 1987 of a treaty banning such 
weapons, including the destruction of all stocks. 
While underlining the importance of realistic 
verification measures, the committee asks that 
the situation be re-examined at the end of 1987. 
In the meantime, it considers there is no need to 
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approve the deployment of further chemical 
weapons in Europe. 
(g) Space weapons 
5.118. In 1986, the Geneva disarmament con-
ference was late in reconstituting the ad hoc com-
mittee on the prevention of an arms race in outer 
space. The Soviet Union proposed that an inter-
national agreement be prepared guaranteeing the 
immunity of artificial earth satellites, banning 
the creation, testing and deployment of new anti-
satellite systems and making it compulsory to 
destroy old ones. It proposed that partial 
measures be taken urgently to enhance confi-
dence between states in space activities pending 
a solution to the problem of preventing an arms 
race in space with all that implies. 
5.119. In his address to the conference on 19th 
February 1987, Mr. Raimond, French Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, recalled French proposals at 
the special session of the United Nations 
General Assembly on disarmament in 1978 for 
the creation of an international satellite agency 
to monitor disarmament measures, which pro-
posal, as the committee noted at the time, took 
up two of the committee's own proposals 37• 
Noting that present space arrangements were 
inadequate for the immunity of satellites ofthird 
countries, and the difficulties of international 
provisions for banning anti-satellite systems, the 
minister proposed the registration and notifi-
cation of space objects and proposed making the 
international satellite monitoring agency respon-
sible for ensuring the application of measures of 
transparency and the code of conduct of space 
activities. 
VI. Conclusions 
6.1. The committee's conclusions are set forth 
in the draft recommendation, the substantive 
paragraphs of which relate to this explanatory 
memorandum as follows: 
Recommendation Explanatory 
on disarmament memorandum 
Paragraphs Paragraphs 
1 5.1 et seq. 
l(a) 5.5 to 5.27 
l(b) 5.28 to 5.38 
l(c) 5.36 to 5.48 and 2.8 
2 5.53 to 5. 78 
3 5.101 to 5.117 
4(a) and (b) 5.49 to 5.52 and 
5.91 to 5.100 
Recommendation 
replying to the 
31st annual report 
of the Council 
Paragraphs 
1 
2 
Paragraphs 
2.1 to 2.5 
2.5 to 2.7 
37. East-West relations and defence, Document 587, 8th 
November 1972, Rapporteur: Mr. Destremau, and Security 
and the Mediterranean, Document 637, 21st May 1974, 
Rapporteur: Mr. Jung. 
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APPENDIX I 
Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Assembly 
17th March 1986 
(Extract) 
The Council has instructed me to give you 
the following information concerning the staff 
and activities of the new agencies responsible for 
security questions. 
Since 1st January, each of these agencies 
has a director: General E. Rambaldi directs the 
agency for the study of arms control and disar-
mament questions (Agency I} and the 
restructured ACA. The former head of the 
international secretariat of the SAC, Mr. E. 
Hintermann, is responsible for the agency for the 
development of co-operation in armaments 
(Agency Ill). Appointed by the ministers at 
their meeting in Rome on 14th November 1985, 
a senior United Kingdom official, Mr. I. 
Dawson, has taken charge of the agency for the 
study of security and defence problems 
(Agency 11). 
A full table of establishment will be sent to 
you as soon as all the posts have been filled. 
As indicated in the Bonn communique, 
the role of these new agencies is to carry out the 
studies requested by the Council. 
Certain studies have already been planned, 
all or part of which will be the subject of interim 
reports which might be presented to the minis-
ters at their meeting in Venice. 
Agency I is to study Soviet tactics vis-a-vis 
the countries of Western Europe in regard to 
questions of the control of armaments and 
disarmament. In the future it will also have to 
take an interest in the control of conventional 
armaments and the essential problem of verifica-
tion. 
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In connection and close co-ordination 
with the tasks of Agency I, Agency 11 will have to 
study the assessment of the threat, and the con-
tribution of the WEU countries to the response 
to this threat, and the question of management 
resources. 
Agency Ill will study Cfjrtain aspects of 
competit1v1ty in the armaments industry in 
Europe and the implications of the evolution of 
the world arms market, together with the prob-
lems of technological transfers between Euro-
pean allies. 
Other tasks have been planned and will 
have to be undertaken during the transitional 
period up to the end of 1987. 
All these studies constitute internal work-
ing papers for the Council intended to contribute 
to its process of reflection on the subjects dealt 
with. 
In order to guarantee the availability of the 
information necessary for them, the agencies 
shall establish links with the appropriate interna-
tional bodies and with national adminis-
trations. In this respect it must be noted that 
the latter must be assured that the classified 
information they transmit to lthe ministerial 
organs of WEU is handled in accordance with 
their security regulations and ,limited to the 
exclusive use of these organs. 
The suggestion to place at the disposal of 
the ministerial organs a computerised documen-
tation centre will have to be assessed in the light 
ofbudgetary priorities and will have to be exam-
ined subsequently by the Council. 
(signed) A. CAHEN 
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Appeal by the Warsaw Treaty member states to the member states of NATO 
and to all European countries for a programme to reduce armed forces 
and conventional armaments in Europe 
Budapest, 10th-11th June 1986 
The Warsaw Treaty member states, being 
aware of their responsibility to their respective 
peoples and to mankind for the peace of Europe 
and the world at large and seeking a radical 
change for the better in the current complicated 
international situation, are of the view that now, 
more than ever, there is a need for taking reso-
lute action and concrete measures aimed at end-
ing the arms race, proceeding to effective disar-
mament and averting the danger of war. 
They support the programme proposed by 
the Soviet Union for the complete and compre-
hensive liquidation of nuclear and other types of 
weapons of mass destruction by the end of this 
century. They are convinced that the cessation 
of nuclear testing, the achievement of nuclear 
disarmament and the prevention of the exten-
sion of the arms race to outer space, a ban on and 
the liquidation of chemical weapons and other 
disarmament measures would be conducive to 
bringing about a more secure world for the peo-
ples of Europe and the entire globe. 
The allied states profess a complex 
approach to disarmament problems and that the 
liquidation of weapons of mass destruction be 
supported by significant cuts in armed forces and 
conventional armaments. Along with making 
Europe free of nuclear weapons, the problem of 
the reduction of armed forces and conventional 
armaments is acquiring an ever greater signifi-
cance for the present and future of the European 
continent. It is on this continent that the two 
largest groupings of armed forces equipped with 
the most up-to-date armaments face each other 
and the destructive power of some systems of 
conventional armaments is growing equal to that 
of mass-destruction weapons. The allied states 
seek to ensure that concrete nuclear disarma-
ment measures and cuts in conventional arma-
ments and armed forces are followed by appro-
priate reductions in the military spending of the 
states. 
Guided by these considerations, the 
Warsaw Treaty member states present these 
concrete proposals to all the other European sta-
tes, to the United States of America and 
Canada. These proposals constitute a signifi-
cant supplement to the programme for the elimi-
nation of weapons of mass destruction, bJJt at the 
same time bear an independent character, and 
their realisation would substantially reduce the 
danger of war in Europe. 
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I. 
The Warsaw Treaty member states pro-
pose a substantial reduction in the land and tacti-
cal air forces of European states and in the corre-
sponding forces of the United States and Canada 
stationed in Europe. Simultaneously with con-
ventional armaments, tactical nuclear weapons 
with a range of up to 1 000 km should also be 
reduced. 
The geographical zone of reduction 
includes the whole territory of Europe, from the 
Atlantic Ocean to the Orals. 
They propose that the reduction of armed 
forces and conventional armaments in Europe be 
carried out gradually at agreed times, with the 
military balance maintained at ever lower levels 
and without jeopardising the security of any of 
the parties. In addition, parallel to the troops 
under reduction their armaments and equipment 
inclusive of nuclear means would also be dis-
mantled. 
As a first step, a one-time mutual reduc-
tion is proposed to be carried out in such a way 
that the troop strength of the countries belonging 
to the opposing military-political alliances be cut 
by 100 000-150 000 troops on each side within a 
year or two. Cuts in tactical air forces as part of 
these measures would be of great signi-
ficance. Immediately afterwards, given the wil-
lingness of the NATO countries to act likewise, 
the Warsaw Treaty member states are ready to 
carry out further significant reductions, as a 
result of which, the land forces and tactical air 
forces ofboth military alliances in Europe would, 
by the early 1990s, be reduced by some 25% as 
compared with present levels. Such reductions 
would affect more than half a million troops on 
each side, thus the opposing armed forces in 
Europe would be reduced by over one million 
troops. 
The allied socialist states stand for contin-
uing the process of reductions in the armed 
forces and armaments ofNATO and the Warsaw 
Treaty. Significant reductions in the armed 
forces and armaments of the two alliances would 
make it possible for all the other European coun-
tries to join this process. 
They propose that the components of 
armed forces to be reduced be demobilised in the 
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form of equivalent larger units, units and 
subunits, together with their troop arms and 
equipment. Troops would be discharged in 
accordance with established procedures in the 
given state. 
Armaments and equipment subject to 
reduction could be destroyed or stored on 
national territories in accordance with agreed 
procedures. Nuclear warheads should be 
destroyed. Certain types of military equipment 
could, subject to agreement, be transferred for 
peaceful purposes. 
Funds becoming available as a result of 
appropriate reductions in armed forces and con-
ventional armaments cannot be allocated to the 
creation of new types of weapons or to other mil-
itary purposes, they should be used for the needs 
of economic and social development. 
All the states party to an agreement on 
armed forces and armaments reduction would 
assume the commitment to keep from increasing 
their land forces and tactical strike aviation 
beyond the limits of the cut-back area. 
11. 
The Warsaw Treaty member states pro-
pose to work out such a system of reductions in 
armed forces and conventional armaments 
under which the process of reduction would 
result in a lessening of the danger of surprise 
attack and would contribute to the consolidation 
of strategic stability on the European 
continent. With this end in view, they propose 
to come to agreement at the very beginning of 
the process on a significant reduction in the tacti-
cal air forces of the two military-political alli-
ances in Europe and on lowering the level of the 
concentration of troops along the lines of contact 
between the two alliances. 
For the same purpose, supplementary 
measures would be elaborated and implemented 
which were suitable for strengthening the convic-
tion of the countries of the Warsaw Treaty and 
NATO and the other states of Europe that sur-
prise offensive operations would not be launched 
against them. 
They plan to reach agreement on limiting 
the number and size of larger military exercises 
and on exchanging more detailed information 
about the size offorces and equipment regrouped 
to Europe from other regions for the period of 
military exercises, and on other measures facili-
tating the increase of mutual trust. 
The implementation of measures like the 
establishment of nuclear and chemical weapon-
free zones on the European continent, gradual 
reduction in the military activity of the two mili-
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tary alliances, the establishment Of co-operation 
among their member states on qu~stions of arms 
reduction and disarmament would facilitate the 
strengthening of confidence, the creation of more 
favourable conditions for the reduction of armed 
forces and armaments in Europe! 
Ill. 
The reduction of armed forces and con-
ventional armaments would take place accompa-
nied by reliable and effective verification 
through national technical means and interna-
tional procedures including on-site inspection. 
They propose to organise, together with 
measures of verification for the process of reduc-
tion, the observation of the military activities of 
troops remaining after reduction~). 
Appropriate forms of verification would 
be applied concerning measures strengthening 
mutual confidence and implemented in harmony 
with the agreements. 
For purposes of verification the parties 
will exchange, at an agreed date, data on the total 
troop strengths of their land forces and tactical 
strike air forces stationed in the zone of reduc-
tion and separately on their components to be 
reduced and on those not aff'ected by the 
reduction. They will exchange information 
concerning the designation of th~ formations to 
be dismantled, their troops' strength, location, 
and the quantity of their main types of weapons 
agreed upon. The parties would notify each 
other of the beginning and co1111pletion of the 
reduction. 
For purposes of verification, an interna-
tional consultative committee !will be formed 
with the participation of representatives of 
NATO and the Warsaw Treaty as well as of 
interested neutral and non-aligned and other 
countries of Europe. 
On-site inspection of the reduction of 
armed forces and the destruction or stockpiling 
of armaments could be carried out, if necessary, 
with the involvement of representatives of the 
international consultative committee. For pur-
poses of such supervision posts of control, com-
posed of representatives ofthe international con-
sultative committee, would be set up at major 
railway centres, airports and harbours. 
IV. 
The present proposals for,the reduction of 
armed forces and conventional armaments in 
Europe could be the subject of concrete discus-
sion in the second stage of the conference on con-
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fidence- and security-building measures and dis-
armament in Europe. 
At the same time, keeping in mind the 
pressing urgency of taking measures to lower the 
level of military confrontation in Europe, the 
Warsaw Treaty member states would consider it 
possible to proceed without delay to explore the 
proposals presented here. To this end, they 
deem it possible to convene a special forum with 
the participation of the European states as well as 
the United States and Canada. 
They are also prepared to widen the frame-
work of the Vienna negotiations on the mutual 
reduction of armed forces and armaments in 
Central Europe through the inclusion of other 
European states and the corresponding modifica-
tion of the terms of reference of those negotia-
tions. 
While expressing their readiness to make 
use of all possible channels and for mutually low-
ering the level of military confrontation on an 
all-European scale, they reaffirm their interest in 
reducing armaments and armed forces in Central 
Europe and come out once again for a successful 
conclusion of the first stage of the Stockholm 
Conference. 
V. 
In terms of the assessment of the real 
intentions of military-political groupings and 
individual states the question of military doc-
trines is no less important. The mutual suspi-
cion and distrust accumulated over many years 
must be dispelled, the two sides must be thor-
oughly acquainted with each other's problems in 
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this regard, too. For the sake of European and 
world security the military concepts and doc-
trines of military alliances must be of a defensive 
character. 
The Warsaw Treaty member states declare 
with full responsibility that they will never, 
under any circumstances, initiate military 
actions against any state, whether in Europe or in 
another region of the world, if they themselves 
are not victims of aggression. Their proposals 
stem from their consistent policy aimed at the 
elimination of the military threat, the creation of 
a stable and secure world, from the defensive 
character of their military doctrine which pre-
supposes the maintenance of armed forces at the 
lowest possible level and the reduction of mili-
tary capabilities to a level indispensable for 
defence. 
The member states of the Warsaw Treaty 
were guided by the same peaceful intentions 
when they presented their proposal for the simul-
taneous dissolution of the two military alli-
ances. 
The member states ofNATO also profess 
the defensive nature of their alliance. Conse-
quently there can be no obstacle to the mutual 
and significant reduction of armed forces and 
conventional armaments in Europe. 
In presenting this appeal, the Warsaw 
Treaty member states set no preliminary condi-
tions for starting the objective discussion of the 
proposals contained therein. They are ready to 
consider, in a creative spirit, other relevant pro-
posals formulated either by the NATO member 
states, by the neutral and non-aligned or the 
other states of Europe. 
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North Atlantic Council statement on conventional arms control 
Halifax, 29th-30th May 1986 
Within the alliance, we cherish the ideal 
that all the peoples of Europe, from the Atlantic 
to the Urals, should live in peace, freedom and 
security. To achieve that ideal, bold new steps 
are required in the field of conventional arms 
control. 
Our objective is the strengthening of stabi-
lity and security in the whole of Europe, through 
increased openness and the establishment of a 
verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of 
conventional forces at lower levels. 
To work urgently towards the achievement 
of this objective, we have decided to set up a 
high level task force on conventional arms 
control. 
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It will build on the western proposals at 
the CDE conference in StockhOlm and at the 
MBFR negotiations in Vienna, im both of which 
participating allied countries are determined to 
achieve early agreement. · 
It will take account of Mr. Gorbachev's 
statement of 18th April expressirtg, in particular, 
Soviet readiness to pursue conrventional force 
reductions from the Atlantic to the Urals. 
An interim report will be presented to the 
Council in October, and a final report will be dis-
cussed at our next meeting in December. 
Our aim is a radical improvement in East-
West relations in which more confidence, greater 
openness, and increased security will benefit all. 
I 
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North Atlantic Council communique 
12th December 1986 
(Extract concerning arms control and disarmament) 
1. The North Atlantic Council met in minis-
terial session in Brussels on 11th and 12th 
December 1986. Ministers agreed as follows: 
2. We shall continue to explore all opportu-
nities for a broad and constructive dialogue 
which addresses the concerns of the peoples of 
East and West. We reconfirm our commitment 
to a more co-operative East-West relationship 
including political dialogue, commercial rela-
tions, and cultural exchanges, in which all states 
participate on equal terms. Respect for human 
rights and encouragement of human contacts 
remain essential. 
Recent high-level meetings, notably that 
between President Reagan and General Secretary 
Gorbachev in Reykjavik, constitute important 
milestones in East-West relations. 
3. The alliance strategy of deterrence, based 
on adequate conventional and nuclear defences, 
has proved its value in safeguarding peace and 
enabling us to resist intimidation. It remains 
fully valid. The continuing build-up of Soviet 
forces underscores that maintaining this effective 
range of deterrence capabilities must remain a 
key alliance priority. 
4. Arms control and disarmament are an 
integral part of our security policy. We remain 
committed to reaching equitable agreements 
aimed at enhancing stability at lower levels of 
forces and armaments. They must strengthen 
security in Europe and must not weaken the link 
between the European and North American 
members of the alliance. Effective verification is 
an essential condition for all such agreements. 
Real progress on arms control can only be made 
if a stable overall balance is assured at all times. 
5. Following Reykjavik, we support the 
United States in seeking balanced, equitable and 
effectively verifiable arms control agreements 
with the Soviet Union. We agree that instead of 
simply codifying the existing levels of arsenals, 
agreements in Geneva should seek to achieve 
substantial reductions in offensive nuclear forces 
in ways that will enhance peace and stability. We 
therefore welcome the progress at Reykjavik 
towards agreement on 50% reductions in United 
States and Soviet strategic offensive forces and 
towards an agreement on longer-range interme-
diate nuclear missiles. We fully endorse the 
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United States' determination to negotiate 
detailed agreements on this basis as a matter of 
priority and urge the Soviet Union to join in this 
effort in Geneva. 
Opportunity for progress in some areas, 
notably in the LRINF negotiations, must not be 
held hostage to agreements in other unrelated 
ones. Soviet insistence on doing so would con-
tradict assurances given at the highest level. 
On the basis ofthe December 1979 NATO 
decision on LRINF modernisation and arms 
control, the allies concerned fully support the 
envisaged elimination of American and Soviet 
land-based LRINF in Europe and the limitation 
to 100 warheads in Asia and the United States, 
while their ultimate objective remains the total 
elimination of all such LRINF. They stress that 
an INF agreement must not neglect the existing 
imbalances in shorter-range United States and 
Soviet INF missiles and must provide for a com-
mitment to follow-on negotiations on these mis-
siles. 
We also reviewed the United States-Soviet 
negotiations in Geneva on defence and space 
systems which aim to prevent an arms race in 
space and strengthen strategic stability. We 
strongly support these efforts. 
In all cases, effective verification would be 
an essential condition. We will continue to assess 
and to consult closely on all these issues in the 
appropriate alliance fora 1• 
6. Nuclear weapons cannot be dealt with in 
isolation. We also look for progress in other areas 
of arms control, particularly since reductions in 
nuclear weapons will increase the importance of 
removing conventional disparities and elimi-
nating chemical weapons. An effective resolution 
of these issues is an essential requirement for real 
and enduring stability and security in Europe. 
7. At our last session in Halifax we stressed 
the importance which we attach to conventional 
arms control and decided to consider all the 
issues involved in a high-level group. We have 
approved the first report of this group and have 
also adopted the Brussels declaration on conven-
tional arms control. 
I. Greece recalls its position on nuclear matters and space 
system issues as expressed during previous NATO minis-
terial meetings. 
APPENDIX IV 
8. Those of us participating in MBFR 
reaffirm our determination to reach early, sub-
stantial and verifiable agreement and call upon 
the East to respond constructively to the western 
initiative of 5th December 1985. This would, in 
our view, significantly contribute to the 
launching of other negotiations, this time 
extended to Europe as a whole 2• 
9. The continued Soviet build-up of chemical 
weapons is a matter of great concern, as is the 
proliferation and use of such weapons. At the 
Geneva conference on disarmament, we seek a 
convention which meets our objective, the 
general, complete and verifiable prohibition of 
chemical weapons and destruction of all existing 
stock-piles. If the Soviet Union is prepared to 
take a constructive attitude on all aspects of an 
effective verification regime, such an agreement 
is within reach. We appeal to the USSR to join 
us in overcoming the outstanding obstacles. 
10. The Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting is of 
major importance for the promotion of stable 
and constructive East-West relations and for the 
sustained long-term improvement of relations 
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between all the participating s~tes. We deplore 
the deficiencies of Warsaw Pact countries in hon-
ouring their commitments, particularly in the 
field of human rights and human contacts. We 
shall continue to insist on the full implemen-
tation of all agreements reached in the CSCE 
process. 
We welcome the results of the Stockholm 
CDE. The confidence- and 1 security-building 
measures agreed upon, if fully implemented, will 
create more transparency and contribute to 
greater confidence and predic~bility of military 
activities in the whole of Eurqpe. The measures 
thus represent progress in regard to the Helsinki 
final act and demonstrate the validity of the step-
by-step approach defined in the Madrid 
mandate. 
We shall press for a balanced and con-
structive outcome at Vienna a(lld a strengthening 
of the CSCE process through improved com-
pliance by the East and progress in all three 
baskets. 
Brussels declaration on conventional arms control 
by ministers at North Atlantic Council session 
12th December 1986 
1. At Halifax we agreed on the objective of 
strengthening stability and security in the whole 
of Europe, through increased openness and the 
establishment of a verifiable, comprehensive and 
stable balance of conventional forces at lower 
levels. In pursuit of this objective we set up a 
high-level task force; we have today reviewed its 
first report. We have instructed it to continue in 
being and to provide further regular reports to 
the Council. 
2. Arms control should enhance, and not 
diminish, security in Europe. We reiterate our 
commitment to the maintenance of an effective 
and credible deterrent posture. Therefore our 
approach to arms control will remain consistent 
with the need, at each step of the negotiating 
process, to retain the means to implement 
alliance and national strategies. 
3. While maintaining effective deterrence 
involving both nuclear and conventional forces, 
we seek to establish a stable relationship of con-
ventional forces in Europe. Reductions in 
nuclear weapons which are the subject of discus-
sions between the United States and the USSR in 
Geneva would increase the importance of elimi-
nating conventional disparities. 
2. Recalling its position on the MBFR negotiations, 
France has made a reservation on this sentence. 
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4. We are therefore ready to open East/West 
discussions with a view to the establishment of a 
new mandate for negotiatin~ on conventional 
arms control covering the whole of Europe from 
the Atlantic to the Urals. 
5. For such negotiations to succeed, there 
must be recognition of the facts about the current 
situation, and a common understanding on phi-
losophy, objectives and methods. 
The facts 
6. Statements by eastern spokesmen some-
times imply that the present military situation in 
Europe is stable and balanced. It is not. On the 
contrary, it is marked by asymmetries and dis-
parities which vary from region to region but 
which are detrimental to western security and 
which are a source of potential instability. The 
relevant factors include: 
- the armaments, ·equipment types, 
deployments, numbers, mobility and 
readiness of the armed forces 
involved; 
- the information, predictability and con-
fidence about them; 
- considerations of geography. 
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The philosophy 
7. Military forces should exist to prevent war 
and to ensure self-defence, not for the purpose of 
initiating aggression and not for purposes of 
political or military intimidation. 
The objectives 
8. These should be: 
- the establishment of a stable and secure 
level of forces, geared to the elimination 
of disparities; 
- a negotiating process which proceeds 
step by step, and which guarantees the 
undiminished security of all concerned 
at each stage; 
- focus on the elimination of the capa-
bility for surprise attack or for the initi-
ation of large-scale offensive action; 
- further measures to build confidence 
and to improve openness and 
calculability about military behaviour; 
- the application of the measures 
involved to the whole of Europe but in a 
way which takes account of and seeks to 
redress regional imbalances and to 
exclude circumvention; 
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- an effective verification regime (in 
which detailed exchanges of infor-
mation and on-site inspection will play 
a vital part) to ensure compliance with 
the provisions of any agreement, to 
guarantee that limitations on force 
capabilities are not exceeded. 
The methods 
9. We propose that distinct negotiations take 
place: 
- to build upon and expand the results of 
the Stockholm conference on confi-
dence- and security-building measures; 
- to eliminate existing disparities, from 
the Atlantic to the Urals, and establish 
conventional stability at lower levels, 
between the countries whose forces bear 
most immediately upon the essential 
security relationship in Europe, namely 
those belonging to the alliance and the 
Warsaw Pact. 
10. In the light of the foregoing therefore, we 
are ready to initiate discussion on enhancing 
conventional stability in the whole of Europe. 
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Draft directives to the foreign ministers of the USSR and 
the United States concerning the drafting of 
agreements on nuclear disarmament 
Draft handed to President Reagan by General Secretary Gorbachev 
at the Reykjavik summit on 11th October 1986 
and published subsequently by the Soviet Union 
Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of 
the CPSU Central Committee, and United States 
President Ronald Reagan, having considered the 
situation in the field of nuclear arms and having 
brought the position of the two countries consid-
erably closer together at their working meeting at 
Reykjavik, Iceland, agreed to issue directives to 
their countries' foreign ministers to prepare the 
texts of accords and agreements to be signed in 
Washington during the General Secretary's 
official visit to the United States on ... ( date of the 
visit), which are to be based on the following key 
provisions: 
1. In the field of strategic arms. An agreement 
on a 50% reduction in the strategic offensive 
weapons of the Soviet Union and the United 
States, taking into account the historically estab-
lished specificities of the structures of each side's 
strategic forces. All types of strategic offensive 
weapons, including heavy missiles, will be 
subject to reduction within specified limits. A 
solution will also be found to the problem oflim-
iting the deployment of sea-based, long-range 
cruise missiles. 
In the course of their negotiations the sides 
will take into consideration each other's interests 
and concerns and display the political will to 
reach agreement on all questions pertaining to 
the problem of strategic offensive arms. 
2. In the field of medium-range missiles. An 
agreement on the complete elimination of Soviet 
and United States medium-range missiles in 
Europe, without taking the nuclear potentials of 
Britain and France into account. Negotiations 
will be started on the missiles with a range of 
under 1 000 km deployed by the sides in 
Europe. 
As soon as is practically possible, separate 
talks will be started on Soviet and American 
medium-range systems in Asia. 
3. Regarding the treaty on the limitation of 
anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and a ban on 
nuclear testing. 'In order to strengthen the regime 
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of the treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic 
missile systems, signed in 1972 for no set limit of 
time, the Soviet Union and 1 the United States 
will reach agreement pledgiqg not to use their 
right to withdraw from this treaty for ten years 
and to strictly abide by all, of its provisions 
throughout that period. The testing of all space-
based elements of anti-ballislic missile defences 
in space will be prohibited. This would not apply 
to laboratory research or testing in this field, nor 
entail a ban on the testing of stationary land-
based systems or components thereof allowed by 
the ABM treaty. In the next few years the sides 
will seek and find through negotiations ·further 
mutually-acceptable solutions in this sphere. 
The sides consider it expedient to apply 
extra efforts to reach mutually-acceptable 
accords on banning anti-satellite systems. 
The bilateral talks (between the Soviet 
Union and the United States) on the total prohi-
bition of nuclear tests will be resumed as early as 
is practically possible. The subject of these talks 
could include questions concerning verification, 
the lowering of the ceiling on the yield of explo-
sions and a reduction in the!ir number, and the 
1974 and 1976 treaties. 
The commencement of talks on the issue 
of banning nuclear explosions will be a condition 
for the elaboration of an agreement on strategic 
arms. 
* 
* * 
The General Secretary of the CPSU 
Central Committee and th~ President of the 
United States believe that these accords are a 
matter of fundamental importance and a turning 
point in the work to implement the tasks they set 
themselves in Geneva in 1985, which are: to 
limit and reduce nuclear arms, to prevent an 
arms race in space and stop the arms race on 
earth, and to strengthen strategic stability and 
universal security. 
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Implementation of confidence-building measures 
1. Notification of military mantzuvres under the CSCE regime by NATO countries 
Sponsoring Name of Size of Notification Observers Date manc:euvre given (no. of country manczuvre (no. of men) days) invited 
1975 
September FRG Grosse 68000 23 -
Rochade 
October USA Certain Trek 57000 34 Yes 
Oct/Nov USA Reforger 75 53000 21 
-
September Turkey Deep Express 18000 21 -
October Norway Batten Bolt 8 000 24 -
Oct/Nov Netherlands Pantsersprong 10000 14 -
1976 
September FRG Grosser Bar 50000 21 Yes 
September USA Gordian Shield 30000 21 -
September USA Lares Team 44000 21 Yes 
Feb/Mar Norway Atlas Express 17000 21 
-
September Norway Teamwork 13 500 21 Yes 
October Denmark/FRG Bonded Item 11000 21 -
November Britain Spearpoint 18000 23 Yes 
1977 
September USA Cardon Edge 58 700 21 Yes 
September FRG Standhafte 38 000 21 Yes 
Schatten 
May USA Certain 24000 23 -
Fighter 
September Denmark Arrow Express 16000 21 Yes 
September Belgium Blue Fox 24 500 21 -
Sep/Oct Netherlands Interaction 12000 21 Yes 
October Turkey Tayfun 77 15 000 30 Yes 
1978 
September FRG Blaue Donau 46 000 24 Yes 
September USA Certain Shield 56000 24 Yes 
September Netherlands Saxon Drive 32 500 24 Yes 
September FRG Bold Guard 65 000 24 -
March Norway Arctic Express 15 300 30 Yes 
September Norway Black Bear 8200 30 -
1979 
Jan/Feb USA Certain 66000 25 Yes 
Sentinal 
September USA Constant 29000 21 Yes 
Enforcer 
September FRG Harte Faust 60000 21 Yes 
March Norway Cold Winter 79 10000 30 -
Sep/Oct Turkey Display Determina- 18000 32 -
tion 79 
October France Saone 79 16000 21 Yes 
October Britain Keystone 18 000 21 
-
1980 
September FRG St. Georg 44000 24 Yes 
September USA Certain Rampart 40000 21 Yes 
September Britain Spearpoint 90000 24 Yes 
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Sponsoring Name of Size of Notification Observers Date manceuvre given (no. of country manceuvre (no. of men) days) invited 
March Norway Anorak Express 80 18 200 31 -
September Norway Teamwork 80 16 800 28 Yes 
October France Marne 80 17 000 10 -I 
1981 
September USA/FRG Certain 4S 600 24 Yes 
Encounter 
September FRG Scharfe Klinge 48 000 21 Yes 
October Britain Red Claymore 23000 21 
-
March Norway Cold Winter 11000 21 -
September Norway Barfrost 9 000 21 -
Sep/Oct Denmark Amber Express 1S 000 21 Yes 
October Belgium/FRG Cross Fire 21000 21 -
October France Farfadet 4000* 14 -
1982 
March Norway Alloy Express 14 200 30 -
Sep/Oct Denmark/FRG Bold Guard 82 47 200 24 Yes 
September USA/FRG Carbine Fortress 
82 73 000 24 Yes 
September FRG Starke Wehr 3S 000 21 Yes 
September France Langres 82 17000 4 -
1983 
Norway Cold Winter 83 10000 -
USA/FRG Confident Express > 2S 000 Yes 
FRG Wehrhafte Loewen >2SOOO Yes 
September FRG/Neth. Atlantic Lion > 2S 000 Yes 
Britain Eternal Triangle > 2S 000 -
September Denmark Ample Express > 2S 000 -
France Moselle 83 -
1984 
A. Major 
' man!Euvres 
March Norway Avalanche 2S 000 29 Yes 
Express 
September Britain Lion Heart 132 000 24 Yes 
FRG 84 (Full Flow) I 
plus 
Spear 
Point 84 
September FRG Flinker ss 000 22 Yes 
lgel 
September USA/FRG Certain Fury soooo 21 Yes 
B. Smaller-scale 
man!Euvres 
September France Doubs 84 20000 32 Yes 
September Denmark Bold 21000 22 No 
Gannet 84 
1985 
A. Major 
man!Euvres 
January USA Central Guardian 72000 21 Yes 
September Britain Brave Defender 6S 000 28 Yes 
September FRG Trutzige Sachsen 60000 21 Yes 
B. Smaller-scale 
man!Euvres 
March Norway Cold Winter 8S 10000 21 -
June France Jourdan s 000 - Yes 
• To Mediterranean CSCE countnes only. 
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Sponsoring Name of Size of Notification Observers Date manc::euvre given (no. of country man~uvre (no. of men) days) invited 
1986 
A. Major 
manreuvres 
January USA Certain Sentinel 73 000 21 (FRG) Yes 
28 (USA) 
September FRG F riinkischer 
Schild 58000 21 Yes 
September NATO Bold Guard 86 65000 21 Yes 
B. Smaller-scale 
manreuvres 
March NATO Anchor Express 
86 20000 28 Yes 
September Norway Blue Fox 86 24000 21 Yes 
September Norway Barfrost 86 11 000 45 -
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2. Notification of military manfluvres under the CSCE regime by Warsaw Pact countries 
Sponsoring Date 
country 
1975 
None 
1976 
Jan/Feb USSR 
June USSR 
April Hungary 
October Hungary 
September Poland 
1977 
Mar/Apr USSR 
July USSR 
1978 
February USSR 
July USSR 
September USSR 
1979 
February USSR/CSSR 
April USSR 
July USSR 
mid-May Hungary 
1980 
July USSR 
September GDR 
August Hungary 
1981 
September USSR 
1982 
January USSR/CSSR 
September Bulgaria 
1983 
January Hungary 
June Hungary 
July USSR 
July USSR 
September USSR 
1984 
A. Major 
man(l!Uvres 
June/July USSR 
September CSSR 
1985 
A. Major 
mantEuvres 
May -
July -
July USSR 
• Verbal nollfications on 3rd May 1979. 
•• Accord1ng to T ASS on 5th September 1981. 
*** Only from Warsaw Pact countnes. 
Name of Size of Notlficallon 
manczuvre given (no. of manceuvre (no. of men) days) 
Kavkaz 25000 21 
Sever 25 000 21 
- 10000 I 
- 15 000 0 
Tarcza 76 35 000 21 
- 25 000 21 
Karpatia 27 000 21 
Berezhina 25 000 21 
Tarcza78 30000 21 
Kavkaz 11 25 000 21 
Druzhba 26 000 21 
- 25 000 21 
Ne man 25 000 21 
Shield 79 25 000 * 
- 30000 21 
Brotherhood in Arms 40000 21 
Dyna 80 18000 I 
Zapad 81 100 000** 21 
Druzhba 82 25 000 21 
Shield 82 60000 21 
Danube 83 over few days 
20000 
Kunsag 83 14000 6 
50000 21 
26000 21 
23 000 21 
- 60000 22 
Shield 84 60000 21 
- 25 000 25 (CSSR) 
28 (USSR) 
- 25 000 23 (GDR) 
22(USSR) 
Kavkaz 85 25 000 21 
(Caucasus 85) 
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Observers 
invited 
Yes 
Yes 
-
-
Yes 
-
Yes 
Yes 
-
-
-
-
Yes 
Yes 
-
-
-
Yes*** 
-
-
-
-
-
-
Yes 
No 
No 
-
-
Yes 
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Sponsoring Name of Size of Notification Observen Date mana:uvre given (no. of country manreuvre (no. of men) days) invited 
1986 
A. Major 
mana:uvres 
February USSR - 50000 24 -
February USSR - 25 000 21 -
September CSSR Druzhba 86 25 000 28 Yes 
(Friendship 86) 
September USSR - 25 000 21 -
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3. Notifreation of military manmuvres under the CSCE regime by neutral and non-aligned countries 
Sponsoring Name of Size of Notification Observers Date manreuvre given (no. of country manmuvre (no. of men) days) invited 
1975 
October Yugoslavia 
- 18 000 25 -
November Switzerland 
- 40000 31 -
1976 
October Yugoslavia Golilja 24000 24 Yes 
November Sweden Poseidon 12 000 30 -
1977 
March Sweden Vonn 77 10000 21 Yes 
October Spain Podenco 8 000 53 Yes 
November Austria Herbstiibung 12000 37 
-
1978 
November Austria (Command Post 5 000 20 -
Exercise) 
1979 
March Switzerland N ussknacker 34000 28 Yes 
October Switzerland Forte 27000 33 Yes 
November Austria Area Defence 27 500 45 Yes 
Exercise 79 
1980 
None 
1981 
Oct/Nov Spain Crisex 81 32 200 25 Yes 
October Switzerland Cresta 25 000 33 -
1982 
March Sweden Norrsken 23 000 30 Yes 
September Sweden Sydfront 25 000 30 -
1983 
B. Smaller-scale 
manmuvres 
September Yugoslavia Unity 83 22000 35 Yes 
SeptjOct Sweden Ostkust 20000 31 No 
1984 
None 
! 
1985 
A. Major 
man(J!Uvres 
October Switzerland Tornado 25 000 42 -
B. Smaller-scale 
man(J!Uvres 
February/March Sweden Viistgriins 22000 42 Yes 
1986 
A. Major 
manreuvres 
October Austria Baumverteidigung 30000 41 Yes 
Herbstiibung 
1986 
November Switzerland Dreizack 1986 40000 48 Yes 
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APPENDIX VII 
Statement by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary 
of the Central Committee of the CPSU 
Moscow, 28th February 1987 
On 15th January 1986, the Soviet Union 
put forward a historic programme, that of stage-
by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons. When 
suggesting it we proceeded from the firm con-
viction that future security would be a 
nuclear-free one. The Soviet leadership and the 
country's defence council, which I am respon-
sible for presiding, constantly keep the problems 
of the security of the country, that of our allies, 
and of universal security at the centre of 
attention. We do not have the slightest doubt 
that the security of the world and the survival of 
humanity should be ensured by joint efforts and 
political means and not by weapons. 
....... (7 preliminary paragraphs) 
Today, on behalf of the Soviet leadership, 
I am announcing our decision which is as 
follows: 
The Soviet Union suggests that the 
problem of medium-range missiles in Europe be 
singled out from the package of issues, and that a 
separate agreement on it be concluded, and 
without delay. 
There is actually not just a basis, but an 
accord ready for such a step. It was agreed in 
Reykjavik that the Soviet Union and the United 
States would eliminate all their medium-range 
missiles (MRM) in Europe within the next five 
years. Within the same period the number of 
Soviet MRMs in the Asian part of our territory 
would be cut down to 100 warheads on the 
understanding that the United States could leave 
the same number of MRM warheads in its 
national territory. 
As soon as an agreement on eliminating 
Soviet and United States medium-range missiles 
in Europe is signed, the Soviet Union will 
withdraw from the German Democratic 
Republic and Czechoslovakia, by agreement 
with the governments of those countries, the 
longer-range theatre missiles which had been 
deployed there as measures in reply to the 
deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in 
Western Europe. 
176 
As far as other theatre missiles are con-
cerned, we are prepared to begin talks immedi-
ately with a view to reducing and fully elimi-
nating them. 
So, there is a real opportunity to !ree our 
common European home from a considerable 
portion of the nuclear burden within the shortest 
possible time. That would be a real and big step 
towards completely freeing Europe of nuclear 
arms. We are putting our proposals on the nego-
tiating table with the United States in Geneva. 
We were assured more than once that if 
the USSR singled out the issue of medium-range 
missiles from the Reykjavik package, there 
would be no difficulty to agree to their elimi-
nation in Europe. A good opportunity is now 
being offered to prove that in practice. This is 
being awaited by the Europeans and by the 
peoples of other continents. This is required by 
the interests of the present and the future. 
By singling out the issue of medium-range 
missiles in Europe now, the Soviet Government 
still considers it highly important to reach 
agreement on substantial limitation and then 
elimination of strategic arms. 
Of course, the conclusion of such an 
agreement, as has been repeatedly emphasised, 
should be conditioned by a decision on the pre-
vention of deployment of weapons in outer 
space, in view of the organic interconnection of 
these issues. 
Despite all the difficulties and artifical 
obstructions, the Soviet Union is again showing 
its will to resolve the nuclear disarmament issue. 
The new way of thinking means an ability 
to listen to the voice of the public, the European 
and world one, to understand the concerns and 
interests of other peoples, and not to separate 
one's own security from the security of neigh-
bours in our interconnected world. 
The historic chance should not be missed! 
We are awaiting a speedy and positive reply. 
Source: Novosti, London (slightly edited). 
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Amendment 1 
Disarmament -
reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Mr. A.ntoni and others 
24th April 1987 
1. At the beginning of paragraph (ix) of the preamble to the second revised draft recommendation, 
leave out from " Recalling that " to " in this field " and insert: " Emphasising the need to conclude 
mutually verifiable agreements with a view to eliminating chemical weapons in Europe". 
Signed: Antoni, Gianotti~ Rubbi, Francese 
1. See 2nd sitting, 27th April 1987 (amendment fell). 
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Amendment 2 
Disarmament -
reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENT 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Gianotti and others 
24th April 1987 
2. In paragraph 1, lines 2 and 3, of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out " to 
support the United States" and insert "to support active participation by European countries". 
Signed: Gianotti, Antoni, Rubbi, Francese, Colajanni 
1. See 2nd sitting, 27th April 1987 (amendment not moved). 
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Amendments 3 and 4 
Disarmament -
reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENTS 3 and 4 1 
tabled by Mr. Rubbi and others 
24th April 1987 
3. In paragraph 1 (a) of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out " combined with 
the simultaneous withdrawal of shorter-range INF from Czechoslovakia and East Genrtany; the right for 
NATO to match Warsaw Pact numbers in such missiles if those negotiations fail" and insert "in the 
context of an undertaking to withdraw immediately the shorter-range INF missiles stationed in Czecho-
slovakia and East Germany". 
4. In the last line of paragraph 1 (a) of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out 
" reduction of all shorter-range missiles " and insert " balanced, verifiable and verified reduction of the 
other missiles ". 
Signed: Rubbi, Antoni, Giannotti, Co{ajanni, Francese 
1. See 2nd sitting, 27th April 1987 (amendment 3 not moved; amendment 4 fell). 
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AmendmentS 
Disarmament -
reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENT sI 
tabled by Mr. Antoni and others 
24th April 1987 
5. At the end of paragraph 2 of the second revised draft recommendation proper add " thus pro-
moting a new concept of balanced and verified European security linked to the noblest values of a policy 
of peace and co-operation in the world ". 
Signed: Antoni, Giannotti, Rubbi, Co/ajanni, Francese 
1. See 2nd sitting, 27th April 1987 (amendment not moved). 
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Amendment 6 
Disarmament -
reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENT 6' 
tabled by Mr. Giannotti and others 
24th April 1987 
6. In paragraph 3 of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out" to press the Soviet 
Union to accept fully the United Kingdom compromise proposal" and insert" to combine their efforts 
to seek an agreement acceptable to all the parties". 
Signed: Giannotti, Rubbi, Antoni, Francese, Colajanni 
l. See 2nd sitting, 27th April 1987 (amendment not moved). 
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Amendment 7 
Disarmament-
reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENT 7 1 
tabled by Mr. A.ntoni and others 
24th April 1987 
7. In paragraph 4 (a) of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out" Urge the Soviet 
Union to accept the United States' proposal" and insert "Promote the conclusion of an agreement 
acceptable to both the United States and the Soviet Union". 
Signed: Antoni, Colajanni, Rubbi, Giannotti, Amadei 
l. See 2nd sitting, 27th April 1987 (amendment not moved). 
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Amendment 8 
Disarmament -
reply to the thirty first annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENT 8 1 
tabled by Mr. Scheer and Mr. Stof/ekn 
27th April 1987 
8. In paragraph 1 (a) of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out from" combined 
with the simultaneous withdrawal of shorter-range INF " to the end of the paragraph and insert " and 
combined with the following disarmament of all American and Soviet shorter-range INF in Europe; " 
l. See 2nd sitting, 27th April 1987 (amendment negatived). 
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Signed· Scheer, Sto.ffelen 
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Amendments 9 and 10 
Disarmament -
reply to the thirty first annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENTS 9 and 10 1 
tabled by Mr. Bassinet and others 
27th April 1987 
9. Leave out paragraph 2 of the second revised draft recommendation proper and insert: 
"Urge governments participating in the informal Vienna consultations to start negotiations as 
soon as possible in the framework of the CSCE on conventional disarmament from the Atlantic to 
the Urals;" 
10. In paragraph 3 of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out from " to accept 
fully " to the end of the paragraph and insert " to accept the French or British chemical disarmament 
proposals tabled at the Geneva disarmament conference; " 
l. See 2nd sitting, 27th April 1987 (amendments withdrawn). 
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Signed: Bassinet, Oehler, Lalumiere 
Document 1090 27th April 1987 
Amendments 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 
Disarmament -
reply to the thirty first annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENTS 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 1 
tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson 
11. In the preamble to the second revised draft recommendation, leave out paragraph (i) and insert: 
" (i) Recalling that Europe's security is based on the deterrence exercised by all the member coun-
tries of the Atlantic Alliance thanks to their capacity, in spite of Warsaw Pact superiority in many 
fields, to prevent any potential adversary undertaking an aggression in the hope that the confron-
tation will remain at a level chosen by him; " 
12. In the preamble to the second revised draft recommendation, leave out paragraph (iv) and insert: 
"(iv) Considering that Western Europe may be compelled in the fairly near future to assume more 
responsibility for the requirements of its security but that in present circumstances this is ensured 
only thanks to the presence of American forces and armaments in Europe; '' 
13. In paragraph (iv), line 2, of the preamble to the second revised draft recommendation, insert after 
" matters": 
" to elaborate valid concepts for the most urgent disarmament steps and their mutual interdepen-
dence which are in the interests of common security". ' 
14. In paragraph 4 of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraph (b). 
15. In paragraph 1 ofthe second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraph (c). 
16. In paragraph (v), line 3, of the preamble to the second revised draft recommendation, leave out 
" both " and from " deterrence " to end and add: 
" whose security should be stabilised by appropriate and verifiable disarmament measures which 
are subject to agreement; " 
17. Leave out paragraph (ix) ofthe preamble to the second revised draft recommendation and insert: 
"(ix) Recalling in this context that the Soviet Union maintains more conventional forces than it 
requires for its defence and that their offensive force structures optimised to perform aggressive 
operations must be perceived as a potential threat to the member countries by the member 
nations of WEU; " 
18. In paragraph 1 (a), line 5, of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out after 
" fail " to the end of the paragraph and add: 
"and make effective progress in the negotiations aiming at greater stability and crisis control in 
the conventional field (MBFR) and which should take place on the whole of Europe from the 
Atlantic Ocean to the Ural mountains;" 
19. In paragraph 3, line 4, of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out after 
" inspection " to the end of the paragraph. 
20. In paragraph 2, line 3, ofthe second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out " reasonable 
automatic " and insert " regular on-site ". 
Signed: Bennett, Wilkinson 
I. See 2nd sitting, 27th Apri11987 (amendments 11 and 12 adopted; amendment 13 fell; amendments 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 
20 adopted). 
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Memorandum on the budget of the Assembly 
from Mr. Jean-Marie Caro, President of the Assembly, 
to Mr. Jacques Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council 
12th March 1987 
1. You know the difficulties the Assembly is encountering in fulfilling its tasks with the means now 
available to it. 
2. Following your suggestions at the Assembly's last plenary session, you proposed the implemen-
tation of three principles to help to overcome these difficulties: 
(i) The annual growth rate applicable to the WEU budget as a whole would be that calculated each 
year by the Commission of the Communities for the European Communities. 
(ii)Within the limits of the overall budget defined in application of this rate, the Council would 
recognise the Assembly's budgetary independence. 
(iii)The annual growth rate would be calculated after deduction of the implications of pensions, 
these being the subject of a separate budget. 
3. I confirm my agreement with these proposals which seem likely in future to avoid the friction reg-
ularly caused in recent years when the Assembly's budget was drawn up. 
4. It is therefore with the utmost interest that I await the Council's answer so that the Assembly may 
know as soon as possible the amount of the overall budget, calculated on these new bases, which will be 
available to it in 1987 to pursue the tasks it has set itself. 
5. You can count on my fullest support for the efforts you are making with so much conviction for 
the greatest benefit of WEU as a whole. 
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The Assembly, 
Ministerial meeting of the Council 
MOTION FOR A RECOMMENDATION 1 
tabled by Mr. Goerens and others 
with a request for urgent procedure 
27th April 1987 
(i) Considering that the diplomatic/press offensive of Mikhail Gorbachev, who is multiplying pro-
posals for nuclear disarmament, calls for a co-ordinated response from the Atlantic Alliance; 
(ii) Aware that these proposals, which affect first and foremost European security, should lead to 
European interests being defined in WEU, the only European organisation with responsibilities in this 
area; 
(iii) Encouraged by the call to the European members of the Atlantic Alliance by George Shultz, 
United States Secretary of State, following his recent visit to Moscow, requesting their opinion on these 
proposals, 
URGES THE CoUNCIL 
1. To make known its collegiate point of view on the Gorbachev proposals through the intermediary 
of its Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Jacques Poos, in his statement to the Assembly on Tuesday, 28th April 
1987; 
2. To instruct its Chairman-in-Office to give the Council's point of view on the Soviet proposals at 
the meetings of the North Atlantic Council to be held on 11th and 12th June 1987. 
Signed: Goerens, Stoffelen, De Decker, Close, Pecriaux, Knight, Schulte, Kittelmann, Antoni, 
Martino 
l. See 2nd sitting, 27th April 1987 (urgent procedure agreed to). 
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The Assembly, 
Application of Order 65 on the draft budget 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 
REPORT 1 
tabled on behalf of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 2 
by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur 
Draft Recommendation 
on principks fiJiplkabk in preJIIlring the budgets 
of the WEU ministerial organs and the Assembly 
27th April 1987 
Fully endorsing the proposals made by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, for putting an end to WEU's budgetary difficulties, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Implement without delay the three principles defined by the Chairman-in-Office: 
- application to the operating budgets of the ministerial organs and of the Assembly of WEU of 
the growth rate defined in the European Communities; 
- establishment of a separate budget for pensions; 
- recognition of the Assembly's freedom to manage its budget within the limits of the appropria-
tions thus calculated. 
The Assembly, 
Draft Order 
on the budget of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 
I. APPROVES the action taken by the Presidential Committee in application ofOrder 65 and the terms 
of the memorandum of the President of the Assembly dated 12th March 1987; 
2. INVITES the Presidential Committee and the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
to take the necessary steps to implement, during the present financial year, the provisions decided upon 
for improving the structure of the Office of the Clerk. 
I. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Sir Dud/ey Smith (Chairman); MM. Sinesio (Alternate: Giust), Bohl (Vice-Chairmen); MM. 
Beysen, Chartron, Dec/ercq, Dhaille (Alternate: Mrs. Lalumiere), Enders, Ferrari Aggradi, Freeson (Alternate: Sir Paul Hawkins), 
Haase, Mrs. Herfkens, MM. Linster, Morris (Alternate: Lord Mackie), Oeh/er, Mrs. Pack, MM. Pollidoro, Rauti, Stokes, van Tets, 
Zierer. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Sir Dudley Smith, Clulirman and Rapporteur) 
Following the Presidential Committee, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
fully endorsed the proposals made by Mr. Poos, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, for putting an end 
to the budgetary difficulties standing in the way of the reactivation of WEU as a whole. 
The Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration considered the Assembly should, in a 
further order, express its satisfaction with the action taken by the Presidential Committee in application 
of Order 65 and urge it to pursue its effort jointly with our committee to ensure that this action can be 
completed during the present financial year. 
The committee also considered that the Assembly should, in a recommendation, give its full 
support to the action taken by Mr. Poos to ensure that WEU has the means to fulfil its mission. 
It was in this spirit that the committee unanimously adopted the present report. 
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The need for action by the Assembly of Western European Union 
to press western governments for action to channel resources 
into development needs and away from the arms trade 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 1 
tabled by Mr. Freeson and others under Rule 28 
The Assembly, 
28th April 1987 
(i) Noting that millions of men, women and children die from starvation and are malnourished 
throughout the third world, a condition which makes for instability and insecurity; 
(ii) Noting the links between the arms race, the arms trade and poverty and injustice and their contri-
bution to the conditions of war which threaten Western Europe, whose member states largely provide 
the armaments in question; 
(iii) Believing that the WEU parliamentary Assembly has a special responsibility to challenge what 
our democratically-elected governments and our industries are doing in our names and to press for 
resources to go into development needs and away from death and destruction; 
(iv) Noting that military expenditure contributes to the failure to meet social needs both in Europe 
and in the poor countries of the world; noting that the arms trade is one of the major causes of poverty 
which also fuels the arms race, making international conflict more likely; 
(v) Believing that arms production and trading cannot be isolated from but is central to the question 
of development, both North and South; 
(vi) Further believing that European countries bear an increasingly important responsibility as they 
seek to increase their sales of arms worldwide to the detriment of their own people, the third world 
developing countries and world peace itself, 
1. RESOLVES that action must be taken to reverse this trend and to channel resources into the social 
needs of European countries and worldwide development; 
2. FuRTHER RESOLVES to press its member states and others to change their policies in this direction, 
and 
3. THEREFORE CALLS on its member governments to take urgent steps: 
(a) drastically to reduce their countries' arms trading, particularly in Africa, South America, the 
Middle and Far East; 
(b) to reduce the level of arms production; and 
(c) to transfer scientific, technical, research and productive resources to development needs in 
these areas of the world. 
Signed: Freeson, Stoffelen, Ahrens, Linster, Buchner, Scheer, Fourre, Bassinet, Miller, Bogaerts, 
Coleman, Garrett, Hughes, Edwards, Cox, Ross, Brown, Woodall, Hardy, Klejdzinski 
l. See 3rd sitting, 28th April 1987 (motion to be referred to the appropriate committee by the Presidential Committee). 
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Communique issued at the close of the ministerial meeting 
of the Council of Western European Union 
Luxembourg, 27th-28th Apri/1987 
28th April 1987 
1. WEU foreign and defence ministers met in Luxembourg on 28th April 1987. jfheir discussions 
continued the process of joint reflection on security matters initiated in 1984. They recalled the impor-
tance of the Rome declaration and the communiques of Bonn in 1985 and Venice in 1986. 
2. Ministers stressed the important role WEU can play in the development of a European union, an 
important stage in which was the signature of the single European act. They emphasis~d the importance 
of further strengthening the European component of the North Atlantic Alliance. The alliance needs a 
strong and united Europe which jointly analyses and defines more clearly its security interests. They 
intend to develop WEU further as a suitable forum to this end. Such a development will also serve the 
interests of all the allies. The defence of a free Europe is also the defence of North America. 
' 
3. Their overriding objective remains to strengthen peace in freedom and to prevent any kind of war 
or intimidation by military means. They reaffirmed that there is for the foreseeable future no alternative 
to the western concept for the prevention of war, which must continue to be based on an appropriate 
mix of conventional and nuclear forces which together provide a credible deterrent against all forms of 
aggression. They stressed the need to maintain the effectiveness of this strategy thrmllgh the linkage of 
Europe's security to that of North America. Recalling the indivisible nature of security in the North 
Atlantic Treaty area, ministers re-emphasised the essential character of the commitment ofthe United 
States and Canada to the defence of Europe. The presence of United States nuclear forces and the 
presence ofUnited States troops in Europe remain indispensable for the security ofthe,whole alliance. 
4. In this context, ministers recalled the importance of the contribution made by the seven member 
countries of WEU to alliance defence capabilities. They stressed that a strong conventional component 
is a fundamental prerequisite for an effective defence of Western European territory. 
They recalled that five member states provide delivery systems and the facilities for nuclear 
weapons which remain under United States control. They acknowledged the contribution made by 
France's and Britain's independent nuclear forces to the western deterrent by increasing the uncertainty 
in the mind of a potential aggressor. 
5. The considerations stated above remain fully valid in the context of the current evolution in 
East-West relations. 
All aspects ofthe East-West dialogue affect the security interests of Europe. WEU ministers reite-
rated their wish to see Western Europe continue to participate actively in the development of this dia-
logue and to shoulder its responsibilities fully. The member governments of WEU will continue, while 
retaining strong defences, to strive to develop co-operation and dialogue with Eastern European coun-
tries. 
6. Ministers underlined their determination to make full use of the CSCE follow-up meeting in 
Vienna for progress in all fields. In this context, they reaffirmed their commitment to all the provisions 
of the Helsinki final act and the Madrid concluding document. The balanced application of these provi-
sions is the prerequisite for a more constructive development of East-West relations in all fields, 
political and military as well as economic and technological, and in the field of human rights and con-
tacts. Each step towards the free movement of individuals and ideas allows progress towards over-
coming the division which continues to affect Europe and towards building a stable framework of peace 
and security in Europe. 
7. Arms control and disarmament efforts aimed at effectively verifiable agreements leading to a 
stable balance of forces at lower levels are an integral part of western security policy. A successful 
outcome of the current East-West negotiations depends on the continued solidarity between Europe and 
the United States. 
Ministers noted with satisfaction that conditions and prospects for dialogue between East and 
West on arms control had improved. A recent expression of this improvement was the intensification of 
the negotiations in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union, as evidenced by the visit of 
Secretary of State Shultz to Moscow. Ministers expressed the hope that the prospects for progress would 
be confirmed and would materialise in agreements which would ultimately reduce the hitherto undimin-
ished threat represented by the Soviet military capability. 
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8. Ministers wished to recall that the basic proposal in the field of land-based intermediate-range 
nuclear missiles was formally presented by the United States as long ago as 1981. Ifthe achievement of 
an agreement proves possible, this will be as a result of the constructive approach and the steadfastness 
of the western countries concerned. They underlined that any arms control agreement should meet the 
fundamental security requirements of the West. 
Ministers examined with interest the growing possibility of an agreement aimed at the total elimi-
nation of American and Soviet longer-range intermediate land-based nuclear missiles, which should be 
effectively verifiable. They fully support the United States efforts for its conclusion. 
Ministers recalled their serious concern at the existing Soviet superiority in shorter-range interme-
diate nuclear missiles and the requirement not to neglect this in any INF agreement. In this context, 
they noted that the Soviet Union had, in response to earlier proposals tabled by the United States, 
recently made statements on these missiles, the content of which should be carefully studied as soon as 
they are clarified in writing. They underlined the importance of ongoing consultations with the alliance. 
9. Underlining the great importance which they attach to progress also being made in the field of 
strategic weapons, ministers reiterated their support for United States proposals for a 50% reduction of 
Soviet and American strategic offensive forces as a matter of priority. As for negotiations on space and 
defence systems, every effort must be made in Geneva to arrive at agreement on the relationship 
between United States and Soviet strategic offensive weapons and defensive systems with the aim of 
strengthening strategic stability. 
10. Ministers reiterated that reductions in nuclear weapons would increase the importance of 
removing the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact and eliminating chemical weapons, given the 
need for a stable balance at all times. 
They underlined the need to focus on the problems arising from geostrategic asymmetry and the 
Warsaw Pact's capability for surprise attack or for the initiation of a large-scale offensive action. 
11. Ministers stressed their determination to intensify their efforts to strengthen stability and 
security in the whole ofEurope, through increased openness and the establishment of a verifiable, com-
prehensive and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels. They recalled the Brussels decla-
ration of 11,th December 1986. They expressed their hope that the informal discussions taking place in 
Vienna in a constructive atmosphere would, within a reasonable time, lead to an agreement allowing the 
opening of new negotiations on conventional arms control in Europe aimed at eliminating existing dis-
parities. 
They recalled at the same time their determination to strive for the continuation of the conference 
on confidence and security-building measures in Europe. 
Only a stable East-West balance of forces at each stage of the arms control process can ensure 
security in Western Europe. 
12. Ministers also underlined their commitment to the conclusion of a comprehensive and effec-
tively verifiable, global ban on chemical weapons. 
13. Ministers stated their resolve to continue their efforts towards the establishment in Europe of the 
technological and industrial base necessary to ensure the development of a strong and competitive 
European armaments industry, this being an important aspect of Europe's contribution to defence. In 
this connection, they reaffirmed the importance they attach to the generation of more, and more sys-
tematic, collaboration in the field of conventional armaments. 
14. Ministers took note of an interim report on European security interests in the present strategic 
context. This report was prepared in accordance with the mandate set out at the informal ministerial 
meeting of the WEU Council in Luxembourg on 13th and 14th November 1986. 
They mandated the Permanent Council to finalise this report and, on this basis, to establish a 
common platform for identifying the principles of European security with a view to its examination, 
possible adoption and publication. 
15. Ministers took note of the report prepared by the special working group analysing the politico-
strategic implications of the current research programmes on strategic defensive systems. They 
instructed the special working group to continue to examine the implications of ballistic missile defence 
within the framework of its reflections on the problems affecting security interests in Western Europe. 
16. With regard to the problems of security in the Mediterranean, ministers took note of the draft 
outline study prepared jointly by France and Italy which, in conformity with their decision of 
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November 1986, would provide a basis for reflection by a group of experts acting under the authority of 
the Council. 
17. Ministers noted with satisfaction that the reactivation of the organisation, which allowed for a 
close association of the foreign and defence ministers, had become a reality. They heard a report by the 
presidency on the reorganisation of the intergovernmental structures of WEU. 
They pointed out that the measures still to be taken should be specified by 31st December 1987 
and that the possible collocation of the ministerial organs in one capital should also be contemplated. 
They therefore instructed the Permanent Council to present them with definitive proposals at their 
autumn meeting 
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